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In England and Wales, the criminalisation of disease transmission has principally 
arisen in cases involving HIV transmission. This includes Rowe [2018] where 
intentional transmission was established for the first time, in part through digital 
evidence. Criminal law scholarship on transmission offences has acknowledged 
that issues of HIV (non-)disclosure can be contentious, presenting particular 
challenges stemming from various disclosure expectations and understandings 
of HIV transmission risk which exist in different contexts/communities.  
 
Such issues have been compounded by the proliferation of HIV disclosure 
features on mobile “dating” applications targeted at men who have sex with men 
in recent years. How these new technologies influence and supplant existing 
expectations, knowledge of risk, and distributions of responsibility is an issue 
which has yet to be considered in empirical socio-legal literature. Utilising a 
visual, scenario-driven, methodology, this project analyses the responses of 102 
application users who use these apps to connect with men and demonstrates that 
these features are understood in several complex and often contradictory ways. 
 
Firstly, this thesis illustrates how participants’ conceptualisations of risk and 
safety might challenge existing approaches to “sexual responsibility” and the 
uneven distribution of responsibility for HIV prevention. Secondly, it highlights 
how contextual disclosure expectations and the perceived “right to know” have 
the potential to influence legal debates on “conditional consent”. Thirdly, it 
demonstrates how discourses on responsibility and agency, as well as 
participants’ often erroneous understanding of the law, are shaped by these 
disclosure features.  
 
This thesis, therefore, makes a significant and original contribution to criminal law 
scholarship. It emphasises the importance of proper appraisal of contextual 
norms and knowledge in transmission cases and concludes by summarising that 
whilst applications offer new ways to understand culpability, responsibility and 
obligation in transmission cases, this can only be achieved justly through a 
detailed examination of social context in which these are used, which is not 
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Chapter 1: Introduction  
This thesis addresses the interrelationship of social, ethical and legal obligations 
relating to HIV disclosure and non-disclosure. Specifically, it questions whether 
the legal framework through which HIV is criminalised in England and Wales 
might be informed and developed in light of context dependent expectations and 
knowledge relating to the use of online mobile dating applications. Contemporary 
understanding of criminal legal theory has recognised that the criminal law has a 
social character, which cannot ‘exist prior to, or independently from, the social 
contexts in which it is found’.1 In relation to sexual offences, O’Malley and Hoven 
point out that this social context shapes the meaning of gestures and other acts, 
which may distinguish legitimate, informed consent from its illegitimate foil.2 
Similarly, in relation to HIV transmission offences, context may shape the 
meaning of relevant legal concepts – such as risk, disclosure and responsibility. 
Consequently, it is possible to take account of the ‘rich tapestry of responsibility 
(and other normative) practices’ which might inform the criminal law,3 and present 
a socio-legal analysis of HIV transmission offences which identifies the influences 
online mobile dating applications may have.     
 
Focusing upon offences which are concerned with the transmission, or risk of 
transmission, of HIV is not only a reflection of the particularly complex 
interrelationship of obligations, expectations and understandings seen in this 
 
1 Arlie Loughnan, Self, Others and the State: Relations of Criminal Responsibility (Cambridge 
University Press 2019) 27–28; drawing on Scott Veitch, Law and Irresponsibility: On the 
Legitimation of Human Suffering (Routledge-Cavendish 2007) 28–29. 
2 Tom O’Malley and Elisa Hoven, ‘Consent in the Law Relating to Sexual Offences’ in Kai Ambos 
and others (eds), Core Concepts in Criminal Law and Criminal Justice (Cambridge University 
Press 2019) 155. 





context. It is also, in part, an acknowledgement that the criminalisation of HIV 
transmission continues to be one of the ‘great debates in criminal law’.4 Since the 
emergence of HIV/AIDS nearly 40 years ago, the role and function of the criminal 
law in respect of HIV transmission has been the subject of significant academic 
debate and legal analysis.5 In England and Wales specifically, these issues were 
redefined once precedents established in Dica6 and Konzani7 established a 
framework through which the reckless transmission of HIV was criminalised via 
s.20 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861.8  
  
Central to many of these discussions has been the influence of social and 
contextual expectations of HIV disclosure between (prospective) sexual partners. 
Several legal scholars – including Spencer, Slater, and others – have argued that, 
in certain circumstances, such expectations lend weight to arguments in favour 
of the criminalisation of HIV transmission because there is a moral wrong in the 
‘betrayal of legitimate expectations and the exploitation of vulnerability within the 
context of a certain kind of relationship.’9  
 
Although there is an emphasis on the moral and ethical evaluation of people living 
with HIV in such arguments, rather than on specific legal determinations, these 
 
4 Jonathan Herring, Great Debates in Criminal Law (4th Edn, Red Globe Press 2020) 72–86. 
5 Matthew Weait, Intimacy and Responsibility: The Criminalisation of HIV Transmission 
(Routledge-Cavendish 2007) 1, 21–27; James Chalmers, ‘Disease Transmission, Liability and 
Criminal Law’ in AM Viens, John Coggon and Anthony S Kessel (eds), Criminal Law, Philosophy 
and Public Health Practice (Cambridge University Press 2013) in particular, at 136-128. 
6 R v Dica [2004] EWCA Crim 1103. 
7 R v Konzani (Feston) [2005] EWCA Crim 706. 
8 See Chalmers (n 5) 139; Samantha Ryan, ‘Disclosure and HIV Transmission’ (2015) 79 The 
Journal of Criminal Law 395, 396. 
9 James Slater, ‘HIV, Trust and the Criminal Law.’ (2011) 75 Journal of Criminal Law 309, 318; 
See also, JR Spencer, ‘Liability for Reckless Infection Pt 1’ (2004) 154 New Law J 384; JR 
Spencer, ‘Liability for Reckless Infection Pt 2’ (2004) 154 New Law J 448; John Flaherty, 





arguments remain of consequence to legal decision making.  As Ryan has 
recently pointed out, the influence such arguments might have in respect of the 
distinction between “active deception” and mere “non-disclosure” of HIV status is 
significant.10 Ryan argues against criminalisation, other than in cases of “active 
deception”, on the grounds that voluntarily engaging in higher risk activities  (as 
condomless sex with a partner of unknown status might be categorised) 
incorporates consent to that risk transpiring from those activities.11 This position 
is not universal, however, and many have emphasised that a link does exist 
between social obligations, or what Farmer terms obligations of civility, and forms 
of criminal responsibility.12  In light of this, analysing how obligations and 
expectations operate and are understood by those involved with them takes on 
an additional significance,  beyond being an important example of understanding 
the social context in which the law operates.  
 
In this thesis, such issues are investigated in a particular context – namely, the 
online disclosure and non-disclosure of HIV status via features dedicated for this 
purpose on mobile dating apps. Internet enabled location-aware dating apps 
emerged in the mid to late 2000s and utilise the technical capabilities of modern 
smartphones, tablets and other devices with GPS or location tracking 
functionality to connect users with one another, primarily on the basis of proximity 
between users. This design, which has resulted in the label ‘people-nearby 
applications’,13 is predicated on interaction between users who are online at, or 
 
10 Samantha Ryan, ‘“Active Deception” v Non-Disclosure: HIV Transmission, Non-Fatal Offences 
and Criminal Responsibility’ [2019] Criminal Law Review 4. 
11 Ryan (n 10) 18–19. 
12 Lindsay Farmer, ‘Civility, Obligation and Criminal Law’ in Daniel Matthews and Scott Veitch 
(eds), Law, Obligation, Community (Routledge 2018) 226–227. 
13 See, for example, Eran Toch and Inbal Levi, ‘Locality and Privacy in People-Nearby 





about, the same time as one another. User created profiles, and the images and 
information on them, therefore play a significant role in facilitating initial 
interaction between users who are otherwise strangers.14 Recently, particularly in 
the latter half of the 2010s, features specifically intended to facilitate HIV status 
disclosure between users became prevalent across many popular dating apps. 
This included the nearly ubiquitous Grindr and a number of popular, but slightly 
less well known, applications such as Hornet.15 Such features were already 
commonplace on several dating websites and these dedicated HIV disclosure 
features share many commonalities with these precursors,16 contrasting with a 
more limited range of applications which discuss prevention techniques rather 
than disclosure.17 However, the ongoing popularity of dating applications in 
particular lends a certain significance to the impact of these features as they exist 
on applications. This significance might be compared to the ongoing debate over 
the potential link between the use of applications and increased rates of STI 
 
Boundaries : The Uses & Gratifications of Grindr’ [2014] 2014 ACM International Joint Conference 
on Pervasive and Ubiquitous Computing 619. 
14 Jeremy Birnholtz and others, ‘Identity, Identification and Identifiability’, Proceedings of the 16th 
international conference on Human-computer interaction with mobile devices & services (2014); 
Colin Fitzpatrick, Jeremy Birnholtz and Jed R Brubaker, ‘Social and Personal Disclosure in a 
Location-Based Real Time Dating App’, 48th Hawaii International Conference on System 
Sciences (2015). 
15 See Grindr LLC, ‘New to Grindr Profiles: HIV Status and Last Test Date Fields’ (9 November 
2016) <web.archive.org/web/20161115044007/www.grindr.com/blog/new-grindr-profiles-hiv-
status-last-test-date/> accessed 26 August 2019; and, also, Hornet Networks, ‘With Hornet, Gays 
Can Now Play Safe on Gay Mobile Social Networks’ (PR Newswire, 20 January 2012) 
<www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/with-hornet-gays-can-now-play-safe-on-gay-mobile-
social-networks-137800183.html> accessed 26 August 2019. 
16 Kane Race, ‘Framing Responsibility: HIV, Biomedical Prevention, and the Performativity of the 
Law’ (2012) 9 Journal of Bioethical Inquiry 327; Brandon Andrew Robinson, ‘Doing Sexual 
Responsibility: HIV, Risk Discourses, Trust, and Gay Men Interacting Online’ (2018) 61 
Sociological Perspectives 383; Cameron Giles, ‘Digital Disclosure: HIV Status, Mobile Dating 
Application Design and Legal Responsibility’ [2020] Information and Communications Technology 
Law. 
17 For instance, Scruff, see Chase Ledin and Kristian Møller Jørgensen, ‘Viral Hauntology’, Viral 





transmission, as well as whether any such link is correlative or causative, itself a 
highly contested socio-medical issue.18  
 
The objectives of this thesis might therefore be summarised as two-fold. Firstly, 
this work aims to establish what disclosure expectations exist on mobile dating 
apps and to explore how such expectations relate to, impede or extend beyond 
legal concepts found in the existing literature on the criminalisation of HIV 
transmission. Secondly, it seeks to present a socio-legal analysis of the present 
state of HIV transmission offences in England and Wales and to discuss how 
digital evidence, taken from dating apps, might offer new ways of evaluating legal 
and ethical culpability. This is summarised in the research question:  
How are HIV disclosure features on dating apps understood, and how 
might these context dependent understandings shape the criminalisation 
of HIV transmission in England and Wales? 
 
In reaching a conclusion to this question, I argue that digital technology has the 
potential to provide an insight into areas of life which hitherto were regarded as 
private, with offences relating to sex and sexuality being a prime example of this.19 
I go on to argue, however, that there is a risk that such evidence may be 
presented uncritically during criminal proceedings and that this may misrepresent 
the nuanced, complicated and multifaceted ways in which these features are 
employed and understood by dating application users themselves.  In 
 
18 cf. Eric Rice and others, ‘Sex Risk among Young Men Who Have Sex with Men Who Use 
Grindr, a Smartphone Geosocial Networking Application’ (2012) 3 Journal of AIDS and Clinical 
Research; Matheus Almeida, Jo Gibbs and Claudia Estcourt, ‘Are Geosocial Networking (GSN) 
Apps Associated with Increased Risk of STIs & HIV: A Systematic Review’ (2016) 92 Sexually 
Transmitted Infections A19; Melissa Cabecinha and others, ‘Finding Sexual Partners Online: 
Prevalence and Associations with Sexual Behaviour, STI Diagnoses and Other Sexual Health 
Outcomes in the British Population’ [2017] Sexually Transmitted Infections 1. 
19 Jessica Parker, ‘Sex, Texts and Disclosure’ (2018) 182 Criminal Law & Justice Weekly 25; 
Heather R Hlavka and Sameena Mulla, ‘“That’s How She Talks”: Animating Text Message 





demonstrating this point, I draw on qualitative empirical data, collected via an 
online survey using visual elicitation methods and present an analysis of the 102 
participants who took part in this research.  
 
1.1 Significance, Originality and Contribution to Knowledge 
This piece makes a significant and original contribution to socio-legal criminal law 
scholarship through its critical appraisal of the current legal framework 
surrounding HIV transmission in England and Wales by demonstrating how 
context specific norms might inform the law in this area. It highlights how legal 
concepts as well as concepts relevant to legal decision making, such as 
recklessness and risk, consent and disclosure, and responsibility, may be 
narrower and less nuanced than the ways in which these concepts are 
understood by those using or engaging with HIV disclosure features on dating 
apps. It makes a specific contribution to scholarship in three main areas: 
methodology; analysis of collected data; and legal analysis.  
 
Methodologically, this piece contributes to the growing field of literature 
addressing the use of online recruitment and data collection techniques. It does 
so through its development of the “visual vignette” – an approach which builds 
upon existing story completion methods and research employing visual elicitation 
techniques. As outlined in Chapter 2, the increased availability of online research 
tools and the ease with which visual stimuli can be incorporated into online data 
collection methods continues to provide new ways to conduct qualitative 
empirical research. For projects such as this one, where there is an emphasis on 
participants’ understanding of an inherently visual, but sensitive, issue such as 





(for instance, the “digital walkthrough”)20 which may have ethical limitations 
relating to informed consent or privacy. 
 
Through the analysis of the data collected in this project, I demonstrate several 
limitations of key legal concepts relating to HIV transmission criminalisation. 
Throughout the analysis presented in Chapters 4-6, I discuss the extent to which 
the criminal law is understood in terms of the ‘self-determining moral agent, 
equipped with distinctive cognitive and volitional capacities of understanding and 
self-control’21 and highlight how participants’ understandings of what is meant by 
risk, safety and consent may not concord with the legal approach to these 
concepts. In Chapter 4, I highlight how certain legal concepts are understood to 
have a universal relevance, detached from spatial and temporal influences,22 
which contrasts with the ways in which these concepts were discussed by 
participants. In Chapter 5, I then go on to discuss the relationship between 
participants’ framework of consent and trust and the analysis of conditional 
consent and the act/omission distinction in criminal law literature. In this chapter, 
I go on to argue that the legal framing of disclosure and non-disclosure might be 
re-examined in light of participants’ accounts.  
 
Throughout this thesis, I present a socio-legal analysis of the evidence that might 
be taken from mobile dating applications and the influence this may have on 
criminal proceedings relating to HIV transmission or the non-disclosure of HIV 
 
20 Kath Albury and others, ‘Data Cultures of Mobile Dating and Hook-up Apps: Emerging Issues 
for Critical Social Science Research’ (2017) 4 Big Data & Society 1. 
21 Nicola Lacey, ‘Responsibility and Modernity in Criminal Law’ (2001) 9 Journal of Political 
Philosophy 249, 251. 






status. Although I focus on the concepts relevant to the analysis of evidence 
taken from dating applications, rather than evidential rules of admissibility or 
exclusion; the analysis I present of the former provides a foundation for future 
work on the latter, whilst also addressing other relevant aspects of HIV 
criminalisation. In Chapter 2, I discuss how the criminalisation of HIV transmission 
is often justified, as I have mentioned above, through reference to perceived 
breaches of social obligations and norms of “sexual responsibility”. Furthermore, 
I assess the emerging concept of “sexual fraud” and how HIV transmission 
offences relate to and may draw on the literature developed from gender 
deception cases of recent years.23  In later chapters, having demonstrated the 
narrow simplicity of several of the concepts underpinning sexual responsibility 
and sexual fraud, I argue that the tendency to present sexual and legal 
responsibility as coherent – rather than various inconsistent and perhaps 
conflicting responsibilities – is in part responsible for a perceived “duty to 
disclose” HIV status which can sometimes be observed in legal literature.24 I go 
on to argue that claims that non-disclosure is analogous to active deception can 
be linked to this deployment of responsibility in legal and moral discourse.25 
 
It should also be pointed out that significant developments in the criminalisation 
of HIV transmission have occurred since the initial conception of this project. In 
2017, Daryll Rowe was the first person in England and Wales to be convicted of 
intentionally infecting another person with HIV.26 As one of the first major pieces 
 
23 Alex Sharpe, ‘Expanding Liability for Sexual Fraud Through the Concept of ’Active Deception: 
A Flawed Approach’ (2016) 80 The Journal of Criminal Law 28. 
24 On this potential duty, see Weait (n 5) 191; Ryan (n 8) 399. 
25 As Ryan points out, EB establishes that this is not the case, see Ryan (n 10) 4; and, R v EB 
[2006] EWCA Crim 2945. 
26 Rowe was also convicted in Scotland where there is a similar but distinctive framework of HIV 





of socio-legal research in the wake of Rowe, this thesis also includes some 
analysis of the decision in that case, where digital evidence, albeit predominantly 
taken from direct messages rather than application profiles, played a significant 
role in establishing Rowe’s intent. It is argued that, although a major development 
in the history of disease transmission criminalisation, Rowe leaves several issues 
unaddressed and presents some new concerns which future case law may need 
to consider. 
 
1.2 Thesis Structure 
This thesis consists of five core chapters, supplemented by this introduction and 
a final concluding chapter. My arguments proceed as follows:  
 
1.2.1 Chapter 2 
In Chapter 2, I present an overview of the existing literature addressing the 
criminalisation of HIV transmission in England and Wales and situate this thesis 
within the broader context the literature establishes. I begin by outlining the 
historic non-criminalisation of STI transmission before going on to discuss the 
academic and policy debate which occurred following the emergence of the 
HIV/AIDs epidemic in the early 1980s. Within this chapter, I pay particular 
attention to the Law Commission and Home Office consultations which took place 
in the 1990s and discuss the extent to which these set the stage for the landmark 
cases of Dica and Konzani in the early 2000s.  
 
 
consider the specifics of the Scots Law on HIV transmission, which includes separate provisions 






Considering the legal and academic aftermath of these two cases, I go on to 
suggest that the criminalisation of HIV transmission continues to be justified 
through reference to obligations of responsibility, risk management and trust. I 
argue that these concepts are often overly simplistic and, moreover, that they are 
under-explored in socio-legal literature – often being equated to norms of sexual 
responsibility and citizenship. Turning to recent case law, I discuss the emerging 
concept of sexual fraud and its relevancy in HIV transmission cases. In the final 
stages of this chapter, I then turn to the distinction, or lack of distinction, between 
non-disclosure and deception, making particular mention of Rowe and the impact 
of the decision in that case going forwards. 
 
1.2.2 Chapter 3 
Having demonstrated a gap in the existing literature on HIV transmission 
offences, in Chapter 3 I set out the methodological framework underpinning this 
work and discuss the specific methods used in this project to address this 
literature gap. Chapter 3 begins by setting out three methodological themes: 
scenario and context driven research; visual research techniques; and, the 
internet as a site of research. Each of these themes is central to the approach 
taken here and following this overview I go into detail about the development of 
the online, visual, scenario driven data collection survey developed here.  
 
After discussing the design of the stimuli material, the recruitment process and 
the specific ethical concerns I anticipated and how these were addressed, I then 
provide an account of carrying out recruitment and data collection. Following this, 
I discuss the process of preparing responses for analysis and conducting the 





consequence of my theoretical framework, as well as the developments that have 
transpired in terms of application features and design since data collection took 
place. 
 
1.2.3 Chapter 4  
Chapter 4 is the first of three analysis chapters and is titled: ‘Risk, Safety and 
Other Core Concepts’. This chapter explores several themes underpinning the 
analysis in subsequent chapters. As I will explain when discussing my theoretical 
framework in Chapter 3, Chapter 4 draws on Valverde’s theory of chronotopic 
legal analysis in order to demonstrate how several of the concepts discussed by 
participants were dependent upon different ways of understanding space and 
time.27  
 
I argue that risk, one of the central themes developed using the data, as well as 
the related theme of safety, can be understood as operating at two different 
scales and tempos. Whereas the manner in which participants discussed risk 
possessed a chronological, linear narrative; this contrasted with safety which had 
a cyclical, ongoing quality. I suggest that this distinction plays a significant role in 
the distinct obligations and attitudes which risk and safety are discussed as 
producing within the data. 
 
In particular, in the latter half of Chapter 4, I discuss how stigmatising behaviours 
and attitudes – including the avoidance of people living with HIV on dating apps 
– were discussed by participants. I argue that these practices might be examined 
 





in light of the differences in scale and tempo seen in risk and safety. This section 
argues that HIV transmission risk, disclosure and non-disclosure, and other 
knowledge and expectations discussed by participants might be understood as 
being as much about men ‘feeling safe’ as they are about practices of safety and 
risk reduction.28 This chapter then concludes with a brief observation linking this 
discussion of tempo and temporality with later discussion about sexual 
responsibility and the distribution of responsibility for preventing HIV transmission 
between sexual partners. 
 
1.2.4 Chapter 5 
Entitled ‘Consent, Disclosure and Trust’, Chapter 5 analyses participants’ 
understanding of disclosure and consent. It critiques claims that certain facts, 
such as HIV status, are “material” to consent or that consent can be made 
“conditional” upon expected facts or presumptions made by prospective sexual 
partners.  In analysing the distinction between acts and omissions as they exist 
in this context, I draw upon literature exploring the socio-cultural narratives 
surrounding sex and HIV status disclosure which I explore in Chapter 2. I argue 
that conditional consent arguments rely upon assumptions about the social 
context and normative practices of HIV disclosure which are presumed to exist 
universally. I suggest that where some argue that non-disclosure is comparable 
to active deception, or otherwise to a sufficiently serious breach of trust to warrant 
 
28 This point draws upon the work of Bourne and Robson, who also argue that practical experience 
of “safe” sex has an emotive element which must be considered. See Adam H Bourne and 
Margaret A Robson, ‘Perceiving Risk and (Re)Constructing Safety: The Lived Experience of 





the imposition of the criminal law, that this represents the overextension of 
presumed moral ideas into the law.29  
 
Consequently, I argue that online mobile dating applications are poor tools for 
evidencing HIV disclosure and consent to the risk of HIV transmission. The 
additional probative value that juries might give to the (semi-)permanent record 
of HIV status disclosure and non-disclosure, therefore, appears to be 
unjustifiable. As part of this argument, I discuss the highly contractual 
understanding of consent which can be observed in some literature on HIV 
transmission. Here I discuss the presumed “right to know” which was mentioned 
by some participants and the manner in which “consent talk”,30 more generally, is 
ill-suited to respond to the wider socio-cultural factors which can and do influence 
HIV transmission. I argue that application evidence may appeal to jurors because 
it may be presumed to be “objective” and detached from the passionate, emotive 
and sexualised context of disclosure, which should instead cause us to question 
its usefulness as a tool in legal decision making.  
 
1.2.5 Chapter 6 
In the final analysis chapter, titled ‘Legal, Social, and Moral Responsibilities’, I 
address the legal and non-legal forms of responsibility discussed by participants 
and return to the trend of “responsibilisation” in discourse on HIV prevention, 
which I will introduce below in Chapter 2. Drawing on socio-legal literature, this 
 
29 On which, see Cane (n 3) 15–16. 
30 Joseph J Fischel, Screw Consent: A Better Politics of Sexual Justice (University of California 





chapter challenges individualistic constructions of sexual responsibility.31 Building 
on the discussion of disclosure in Chapter 5, in this chapter I argue that perceived 
disclosure obligations demonstrate that there is a tendency to construct legal and 
sexual responsibility in a manner closely associated with ideals of personal 
autonomy. To further demonstrate this point, I highlight how many participants 
discussed positive obligations of HIV status disclosure, in some instances 
independent of any actual transmission risk, and go on to discuss how these 
accounts highlighted the importance of themes such as rationality and 
individualism observed in the data.  
 
Chapter 6 also notes how ethical issues relating to HIV disclosure are often 
presented as uncontroversial or otherwise uncontested, even where the 
challenges of legal rights and duties are extensively debated.32 It suggests that 
these assumptions surrounding sexual ethics shape interpretations of deception 
and non-disclosure, as discussed in the previous chapters. Building on this point, 
it demonstrates how legal responsibility for HIV prevention and status disclosure 
were only partially understood by some participants and were, in some instances, 
misunderstood by others, supporting the findings of Dodds, Bourne & Weait and 
Phillips & Schemeri.33  
 
 
31 Diana Young, ‘Individual Rights and the Negotiation of Governmental Power’ (2015) 24 Social 
& Legal Studies 113. 
32 Sharon Cowan, ‘Offenses of Sex or Violence? Consent, Fraud, and HIV Transmission’ (2014) 
17 New Criminal Law Review 135. 
33 Catherine Dodds, Adam Bourne and Matthew Weait, ‘Responses to Criminal Prosecutions for 
HIV Transmission among Gay Men with HIV in England and Wales’ (2009) 17 Reproductive 
Health Matters 135; Matthew D Phillips and Gabriel Schembri, ‘Narratives of HIV: Measuring 
Understanding of HIV and the Law in HIV-Positive Patients’ (2016) 42 Journal of Family Planning 





Chapter 6 concludes by reiterating the link between legal doctrines of 
responsibility and perceived (non-legal) obligations surrounding HIV disclosure 
and non-disclosure. Here, I return to the evolving concept of “sexual fraud” and 
suggest that evidence taken from mobile dating apps might have an additional 
effect on the future deployment of this concept. I emphasise, however, that if it 
does then care should be taken to ensure that the legal distinctions between non-
disclosure and deception continue to be observed.  
 
1.2.6 Chapter 7 
Following Chapter 6, I return to the broader, and I would emphasise ongoing, 
debate over the criminalisation of HIV transmission and re-examine it in light of 
the analysis presented across the preceding chapters. I argue that although 
mobile dating applications offer a new and adaptable way to consider issues 
relating to the criminalisation of HIV transmission, there is significant scope for 
such evidence to be used to frame legal responsibility around social expectations 
of good, responsible sexuality which is individualistic, moralistic and unevenly 
distributed.34 I argue that the uncritical presentation of evidence taken from 
mobile dating applications, which does not acknowledge the particularities of the 
social context in which this evidence is produced, is unlikely to improve upon the 
current flawed framework of HIV transmission criminalisation. If data taken from 
applications is to evidence the nuanced and sometimes contradictory ways in 
which those who are active on these applications use and understand these new 
 
34 See Chris Ashford, ‘Bareback Sex, Queer Legal Theory, and Evolving Socio-Legal Contexts’ 





disclosure features, it cannot simply become another way of establishing fault 
and “sexual fraud”.  
 
1.3 Concluding Remarks 
As I have detailed above, the aim of this thesis is to critically examine the current 
criminalisation of HIV transmission in England and Wales through an exploration 
of the evidentiary potential of profiles on mobile dating apps which make use of 
HIV disclosure features. 
 
In achieving this aim, I demonstrate that participants’ understanding of HIV 
transmission risk, disclosure, and responsibility is shaped by the disclosure 
features now seen on dating applications in nuanced and contradictory ways. 
Over the following six chapters, I therefore argue that although evidence taken 
from mobile dating applications has the potential to significantly shape future HIV 
transmission trials, there are should be significant concern over such evidence 
being presented to Courts and to juries as simple or straightforward. 
29 
 
Chapter 2: Literature Review 
Since the emergence of the HIV/AIDS epidemic, nearly 40 years ago, there has 
been significant academic, legal, and popular debate on the issue of HIV 
criminalisation and the law’s broader response to disease transmission. Some of 
the most significant and contentious debates within the existing literature have 
addressed the intersection and potential conflict between principles of criminal 
law and principles of public health as well as the law surrounding it.1 Although, as 
Weait notes, different jurisdictions possess different legal frameworks through 
which the transmission, attempted transmission or mere non-disclosure of HIV 
status can be criminalised,2 the fundamental concepts and principles of criminal 
law at the heart of these debates – concepts such as risk, disclosure, and 
responsibility – are common across many, if not most, jurisdictions. 3  
 
In particular, many of these debates can be summarised as a disagreement about 
the role of the law in HIV transmission cases. This is especially contentious in 
respect of the purposes of punishment in HIV criminalisation cases.4 In Punishing 
Disease: HIV and the Criminalization of Sickness, Trevor Hoppe notes such 
 
1 Matthew J Weait, ‘Limit Cases: How and Why We Can and Should Decriminalise HIV 
Transmission, Exposure, and Non-Disclosure’ (2019) 27 Medical Law Review 576; Jonathan 
Herring, Great Debates in Criminal Law (4th Edn, Red Globe Press 2020) 81–83. 
2 For a comparative analysis of HIV transmission offences in a number of jurisdictions, see David 
Hughes, ‘Did the Individual Consent to the Risk of Harm? A Comparative Jurisdictional Analysis 
of Consent in Cases of Sexual Transmission/Exposure to HIV’ (2018) 82 The Journal of Criminal 
Law 76. 
3 Weait, ‘Limit Cases: How and Why We Can and Should Decriminalise HIV Transmission, 
Exposure, and Non-Disclosure’ (n 1) 577. 
4 Leslie P Francis and John G Francis, ‘Criminalizing Health-Related Behaviors Dangerous to 
Others? Disease Transmission, Transmission-Facilitation, and the Importance of Trust’ (2012) 6 
Criminal Law and Philosophy 47; Matthew Phillips and Ashish Sukthankar, ‘Imprisonment for 
Non-Intentional Transmission of HIV: Can It Be Supported Using Established Principles for 
Justifying Criminal Sentencing?’ (2013) 89 Sexually Transmitted Infections 276; Alex Woody and 
others, ‘Motivations for Punishing Someone Who Violates HIV Nondisclosure Laws: Basic 





debates in the context of the American criminal justice system. He demonstrates 
that socio-medical knowledge and understanding of HIV, its transmission and its 
prevention, are drawn on by lawyers in HIV transmission cases. This, he argues, 
enables lawyers to develop new ways of understanding relevant legal concepts 
such as harm, recklessness and wrongdoing and thus to justify the imposition of 
criminal culpability.5  
 
Mathen and Plaxton have, similarly, observed that the criminal law relating to HIV 
in Canada faces challenges as a result of modern medical knowledge. They 
suggest that because the criminal law has, to date, focused upon risk in the 
context of transmission; the developments seen in the treatment and prevention 
of HIV should have a significant impact on the criminal law. Specifically, they 
suggest that these developments shift the construction of riskiness and the point 
at which transmission risk becomes too significant as to be non-dismissible by 
the criminal law.6 Likewise, in the English context, Phillips and Sukthankar have 
argued that these developments should have an impact, not only on the 
theoretical debates surrounding the punishment of offenders, but also practical 
criminal sentencing policy. Considering the theoretical justifications of 
punishment found in s.142 Criminal Justice Act 2003, which includes deterrence 
and rehabilitation,7 they highlight, for example, that: ‘[t]he concept of prevention 
is now more complex with the use of antiretrovirals to reduce viral load, and 
thereby reduce the risk of transmission, and the intention to adhere to effective 
 
5 Trevor Hoppe, Punishing Disease: HIV and the Criminalization of Sickness (University of 
California Press 2018) ch 5. 
6 Carissima Mathen and Michael Plaxton, ‘HIV, Consent and Criminal Wrongs’ (2011) 57 Criminal 
Law Quarterly 464, 476. Throughout I draw on international literature to highlight theoretical 
issues such as this, but, it is not my intention to undertake a comparative analysis in this work.  





medication may be a marker of rehabilitation’.8 Whilst the statutory provisions that 
each of these authors are considering vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, the 
broader issue these debates are indicative of – the purpose and impact of the 
law’s response to HIV transmission – has a common relevancy.  
 
Nevertheless, it must also be recognised that there is a social and historic context 
specific to the current legal framework on HIV transmission in England and 
Wales. The transmission of a sexually communicable disease was, for a 
significant period, understood to not constitute a criminal offence – at least within 
the context of sexual relationships between husband and wife, which was 
similarly excluded from the law on rape.9 With the emergence of the HIV/AIDS 
epidemic, these existing principles came to be re-examined and re-evaluated.10 
This chapter, therefore, explores and analyses the existing academic research 
and literature addressing HIV criminalisation, with particular reference to the 
development of the criminalisation of transmission in England and Wales. In 
some instances, it draws upon literature from other jurisdictions, but with a focus 
on the theoretical debates on the philosophy of criminal law and social context 
surrounding the HIV/AIDS epidemic, rather than a specifically comparative 
perspective. On a similar basis, I draw upon socio-medical literature which 
discusses the historic and contemporary knowledge of HIV transmission and 
 
8 Phillips and Sukthankar (n 4) 277. 
9 See R v Clarence (1888) 22 QBD 23; for discussion of Clarence, see, for instance, David 
Ormerod, ‘Consent and Offences against the Person: Law Commission Consultation Paper No. 
134’ (1994) 57 The Modern Law Review 928, 936; Matthew Weait, Intimacy and Responsibility: 
The Criminalisation of HIV Transmission (Routledge-Cavendish 2007) 93–96; James Chalmers, 
‘Disease Transmission, Liability and Criminal Law’ in AM Viens, John Coggon and Anthony S 
Kessel (eds), Criminal Law, Philosophy and Public Health Practice (Cambridge University Press 
2013) 132–133, and further discussion below. 
10 For examples of earlier work, see KJM Smith, ‘Sexual Etiquette, Public Interest and The 
Criminal Law’ (1991) 42 Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 309; Peter Alldridge, ‘Sex, Lies and the 





prevention. This is done in order to demonstrate the specific realisation of broader 
debates, such as those discussed in the previous paragraph, within the English 
and Welsh context. 
 
In this chapter, I illustrate how much of the existing literature that attempts to 
justify the criminalisation of HIV transmission relies upon particular concepts such 
as disclosure and trust, risk taking and personal autonomy, and consent and 
sexual responsibility. There is extensive literature on both the broader 
criminalisation debate and the specific influence of these concepts within the case 
law on HIV transmission in England and Wales. Nevertheless, I establish that 
there is a gap within this literature relating to the nature and influence of these 
concepts as they arise on mobile dating applications. Despite the depth of 
literature on transmission criminalisation, I demonstrate that addressing this 
literature gap prompts a broader re-examination of criminalisation, taking into 
consideration emerging concepts such as “conditional consent” and “sexual 
fraud”, which I introduce in this chapter.  
 
This chapter is organised into nine subsequent sections. In the first two sections, 
I outline the debate which preceded and then developed alongside the cases of 
Dica and Konzani. These sections argue that this early case law imposed an 
imbalanced framework of responsibility in relation to the prevention of HIV 
transmission. I suggest that this has resulted in several issues which remain 
unresolved, including the impact of unilateral risk reduction and the culpability of 
defendants who have not been diagnosed as HIV+.11 Furthermore, I highlight the 
 
11 Damian Warburton, ‘A Critical Review of English Law in Respect of Criminalising Blameworthy 





significant role that prosecutorial discretion inhabits following these judgments 
and highlight how this makes understanding the social context within which the 
law operates all the more important. In the third and fourth sections, I explore 
recent developments in the detection, treatment and prevention of HIV and link 
these developments to the ongoing debates over criminalisation. In the fifth 
section, I introduce the concept of responsibilisation and demonstrate its 
relevance to trends in criminalisation and debate over the function of the law.  
 
HIV transmission offences do not exist in isolation and there have been a number 
of significant developments in recent years surrounding the issue of alleged 
deception in the context of sexual relationships. The concept of “sexual fraud” 
has emerged within the literature analysing cases which involve alleged 
deceptive behaviour relating to gender identity.12 In the sixth section below, I echo 
and build upon the arguments of Samantha Ryan,13 demonstrating the relevance 
of this literature to the analysis of HIV transmission offences. Discussion of 
“sexual fraud” also has a relevance to the seventh section of the chapter, where 
I illustrate how HIV transmission offences are exemplary of debates surrounding 
the act/omission distinction in theories of criminal law.14 Following on from this, 
in the final parts of this chapter, I return to the case of Rowe introduced in Chapter 
 
Criminal Transmission of HIV: Issues with Condom Use and Viral Load’ (2014) 54 Medicine, 
Science and the Law 187; David Hughes, ‘Is It Really a Risk? The Parameters of the 
Criminalisation of the Sexual Transmission/Exposure to HIV’ (2020) 84 The Journal of Criminal 
Law 191. 
12 Alex Sharpe, ‘Criminalising Sexual Intimacy: Transgender Defendants and the Legal 
Construction of Non-Consent’ [2014] Criminal Law Review 207; Alex Sharpe, ‘Sexual Intimacy, 
Gender Variance, and Criminal Law’ (2015) 33 Nordic Journal of Human Rights 380; Alex Sharpe, 
‘Expanding Liability for Sexual Fraud Through the Concept of ’Active Deception: A Flawed 
Approach’ (2016) 80 The Journal of Criminal Law 28; Alex Sharpe, ‘Queering Judgment’ (2017) 
81 The Journal of Criminal Law 417. 
13 Samantha Ryan, ‘“Active Deception” v Non-Disclosure: HIV Transmission, Non-Fatal Offences 
and Criminal Responsibility’ [2019] Criminal Law Review 4. 





1. I outline some of the unresolved issues that Rowe failed to address or itself 
introduced. I argue that Rowe is a highly unusual case which does not provide a 
sound basis upon which to develop the criminal law going forward. Nevertheless, 
I demonstrate how the questions that Rowe does leave unanswered provide 
something of a foundation for the arguments made and analysis presented in the 
later chapters of this work.  
 
2.1 Pre-Dica: Debate over Criminalising HIV Transmission Prior to 2003/4 
2.1.1 19th Century Foundations: Bennett, Clarence, and Procurement by 
False Pretences 
Responses to HIV from within and in respect of the law were limited during the 
early stages of the HIV/AIDS epidemic.15 Historically, the transmission of 
infectious diseases was understood as a public health concern, although it was 
theoretically possible for prosecutions to take place under statutes addressing 
public nuisance.16 Despite this, certain authorities on the issue of disease 
transmission do stand out across the late 19th century.17 In R v Bennett, heard in 
1866, a defendant was convicted for assault in relation to a sexually transmitted 
infection passed to his niece.18 The direction of Willes, J. in that case emphasising 
that:  
[A]lthough the girl may have consented to sleep, and therefore to have 
connexion with her uncle, yet, if she did not consent to the aggravated 
circumstances, i.e., to connexion with a diseased man, and a fraud was 
 
15 Jonathan Cooper and Doughty Street Chambers, ‘Learning to Love Again: The Ghost of Viruses 
Past, Present and Future’ (OUTy Street Seminar, 30 June 2020) 
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=T5z1ZiFL1LQ>. 
16 Chalmers (n 9) 125. 
17 Karl Laird, ‘Criminal Law Review Rapist or Rogue? Deception, Consent and the Sexual 
Offences Act 2003’ [2014] Criminal Law Review 492, 495–496. 





committed on her, the prisoner’s act would be an assault by reason of such 
fraud.19 
 
Critically in Bennett, the defendant was charged with an assault rather than a 
sexual offence. This distinction would be of significant importance to distinctions 
made between Bennett and future cases involving sexual deception. 
Subsequently, in 1868, an appeal in R v Barrow found that ‘even though [the 
complainant’s] consent [was] obtained by fraud, the act does not amount to 
rape.’20 Barrow along with other cases would, afterwards, go on to prove critical 
to the decision in R v Clarence,21 which set the scope of debate on the 
criminalisation of disease transmission for the next century.  
 
Clarence established the principle that transmission of a sexually transmitted 
infection did not amount to an offence, at least within the context of marriage. The 
case involved transmission of gonorrhoea between Charles and Selina Clarence. 
As Gleeson states, in the decision of Court for Crown Cases Reserved: ‘[t]he 
physical harm to Selina was summarily dismissed as the primary concern, and 
the case was transformed into a lengthy discussion of the damning wider 
repercussions of allowing a wife to charge her husband with non-consensual 
sex.’22 Gleeson argues that this is indicative of a broader dismissal of certain 
harms and prioritisation of others in the CCCR’s judgment.  
 
 
19 R v Bennett (n 18) 1106. 
20 R v Barrow [1868] LR 1 CCR 156 156. 
21 R v Clarence (n 9) 25. Although, it should also be noted that Barrow had received mixed judicial 
commentary before Clarence, in the case of R v Flattery, discussed below.  
22 Kate Gleeson, ‘Sex, Wives, and Prostitutes: Debating Clarence’ in Judith Rowbotham and Kim 
Stevenson (eds), Criminal Conversations: Victorian Crimes, Social Panic, and Moral Outrage 





Whilst the court took significant steps to dismiss the physical harm suffered by 
Selina,23 Gleeson suggests that the Court also found the idea of drawing on the 
(traditionally commercial) principles of fraud in sexual offence cases ‘dangerous, 
and plainly misguided’.24 The approach to harm seen in Clarence was part of a 
broader understanding of harm seen during this time, which excluded the injuries 
in the absence of a physical assault.25 This relatively narrow construction of 
inflicting grievous bodily harm facilitated the Court’s decision to avoid 
constructing disease transmission as an assault, at least within the context of 
sexual transmission.26 Although, as will be discussed below, Clarence is no 
longer good law in this respect, some observations made in the case continue to 
be relevant today. Specifically, as Stephen J observed, in disease transmission 
cases there is an uncertainty created as a result of the time elapsing between the 
point of transmission and the point at which symptoms become apparent or the 
infection is otherwise detectable.27 Whereas in contemporary contexts this 
becomes an issue in respect of identifying the defendant and establishing 
causation, as discussed below – in 1888, Stephen J drew upon this point to 
dismiss the proposition that disease transmission constituted an assault. 
Moreover, this understanding of assault coincides with an understanding of rape 
 
23 See, for instance, the judgment of Stephen J in R v Clarence (n 9) 41. 
24 Gleeson (n 22) 224. 
25 Vanessa E Munro, ‘On Responsible Relationships and Irresponsible Sex - Criminalising the 
Reckless Transmission of HIV R v Dica and R v Konzani’ (2007) 19 Child and Family Law 
Quarterly 112, 114. 
26 This point is made at several points in the judgment in Clarence. Most prominently, by Wills, J. 
See R v Clarence (n 9) 37–38. Nevertheless, it might be noted that this does not preclude the 
prosecution of disease transmission where an assault is committed, for example, where a needle 
is used to commit an assault.  





dependent upon the use of force, which was prevalent in judicial decisions at the 
time and which persists in some jurisdictions.28  
 
The Court’s concern that such principles would necessarily expose those 
participating in potentially immoral practice of seduction29 demonstrates the ways 
in which the scope of harm was implicitly limited and simplified down to relatively 
narrow contexts which implicitly reflect the patriarchal, somewhat misogynistic 
attitudes of the period.30 As Cooper and Reed note,31 the judgment had an 
ongoing influence over the construction and understanding of s.20 offences and 
broader legal concepts over the entirety of the 20th century. They note that it 
resulted in ‘judges giving more general attention to what precisely was involved 
in the wife’s consent, and the types of fraud which would and would not vitiate 
consent to a non-fatal “offence”.’32 Consequently, Clarence continued to have 
relevance to the criminal law on disease transmission, as well as in relation to the 
marital rape exception, for over a century. In respect of the marital rape exception, 




28 Jed Rubenfeld, ‘The Riddle of Rape-by-Deception and the Myth of Sexual Autonomy’ (2013) 
122 Yale Law Journal 1372, 1396–1397. 
29 Gleeson (n 22) 228; Laird (n 17) 495–496. 
30 See, generally, Gleeson (n 22). 
31 Simon Cooper and Alan Reed, ‘Informed Consent and the Transmission of Sexual Disease: 
Dadson Revivified’ (2007) 71 Journal of Criminal Law 461, 469–470. 
32 Cooper and Reed (n 31) 469. 
33 R v R [1992] 1 AC 599, 618 (Lord Keith); for discussion of this point, see Adrian Williamson, 






Furthermore, as Rubenfeld and Simpson both highlight,34 the approach in 
Clarence is distinguishable from other cases such as R v Flattery.35 This 
distinction is archetypal of the differentiation between fraud “in the inducement” 
and fraud “in the factum”,36 the decision in Flattery, where the defendant was 
convicted of rape after misrepresenting the act of intercourse as a medical 
procedure and therefore misrepresenting the nature of the act,37 being the latter. 
Whereas, in Clarence, although the judgement explicitly queries whether: 
the procurement of intercourse by suppressing the fact that the man is 
diseased is more nearly allied to the procurement of intercourse by 
misrepresentation as to who the man is or as to what is being done, or to 
a misrepresentation of a thousand kinds in respect of which it has never 
yet occurred to any one to suggest that intercourse so procured was an 
assault or a rape38 
 
ultimately, the judgment is reached on the basis that the deception was a fraud 
only in the inducement, Stephen J stating: 
The woman’s consent here was as full and conscious as consent could 
be. It was not obtained by any fraud either as to the nature of the act or as 
to the identity of the agent. The injury was done by a suppression of the 
truth. It appears to me to be an abuse of language to describe such an act 
as an assault.39 
 
Two key aspects of this line of reasoning warrant reiterating. Firstly, the 
judgement expressly distinguishes between the prospective sexual offence and 
prospective assault. This is consequential in the context of the subsequent 
overturning of Clarence in Dica, as will be discussed below. It also enables an 
understanding of consent grounded in 19th century understanding of sex and 
marriage, including the marital rape exception mentioned above. Secondly, in 
 
34 Rubenfeld (n 28) 1397; Bethany Simpson, ‘Why Has the Concept of Consent Proven So Difficult 
to Clarify?’ (2016) 80 The Journal of Criminal Law 97, 106. 
35 R v Flattery (John) [1877] 2 QBD 410. 
36 Cooper and Reed (n 31) 469; Rubenfeld (n 28) 1372. 
37 R v Flattery (John) (n 35) 411–412. 
38 R v Clarence (n 9) 29 (Wills, J.). 





respect of the prospective assault, the analysis of Stephen J is centred on the 
nature of the deception not the transmission itself. Whilst this is reflective of the 
understanding of assaults commonplace at the time, this also has an increased 
relevance in contemporary debate on “sexual fraud”, discussed later in this 
chapter.  
 
As such, Clarence served to set the terms of debate over deception in the context 
of sexual relationships over the entirety of the 20th century, alongside provisions 
on the procurement of consent by false pretences, found in the Criminal Law 
Amendment Act 1885.40 False procurement provisions were reiterated, without 
significant amendment, by the Sexual Offences Act 1956.41 Subsequent 
proposed reforms continued to incorporate procurement provisions, although 
Laird suggests that this reflected a perception that ‘repeal of the offence would 
leave a lacuna in the law’ rather than regular use of such provisions.42 However, 
false procurement was not carried into the Sexual Offences Act 2003,43 and it has 
been suggested that the provisions found in s. 76, relating to conclusive 
presumptions about sexual consent,44 do not go far enough in capturing 
behaviour which would have been criminalised by the repealed provisions of the 
1956 Act.45 However, it should also be acknowledged that procurement 
provisions specifically related to the procurement of a woman’s consent by false 
pretences. No comparable provisions existed for the procurement of a man’s 
consent by false pretences. It has been suggested that the decision of the Court 
 
40 Criminal Law Amendment Act 1885, s. 3. 
41 Sexual Offences Act 1956, s. 3. 
42 Laird (n 17) 496–497. 
43 Rebecca Williams, ‘Deception, Mistake and Vitiation of the Victim’s Consent’ (2007) 124 Law 
Quarterly Review 132, 135; Laird (n 17) 497–500. 
44 Sexual Offences Act 2003, s. 76. 





in Clarence can be said to be the result of misogyny on the part of the majority of 
the bench in that case.46 In a similar respect, the gender limitations in 
procurement provisions, which only applied to female complainants,47 it might 
also be suggested, were a result of the social and cultural biases of the period in 
which they were enacted and not fit for purpose in the modern age. 
 
2.1.2 HIV/AIDS, Proposed Reforms and Case Law in the 1990s and Early 
2000s 
The application of Clarence can be seen across the 20th century and into the 21st, 
with it being suggested that it was not until Dica that these issues would finally be 
resolved.48 In Linekar, in 1995, the Court of Appeal continued to draw on Clarence 
to distinguish between different categories of fraud.49 As McCartney and Wortley 
highlight,50 these principles were refined in Richardson – which developed the 
concept of fraud as to the ‘nature or quality of the act’.51 Stannard also suggests 
that this widening understanding of what constituted the quality of a sexual act 
can be seen in cases such as Richardson and Tabassum, which were decided in 
the years prior to the Sexual Offences Act 2003.52 Nevertheless, in the latter 
instance the Court of Appeal continued to endorse the principle that: 
 
46 Weait, Intimacy and Responsibility: The Criminalisation of HIV Transmission (n 9) 96. 
47 Notably, the provisions do appear equally applicable to male and female defendants, 
notwithstanding the lack of legal recognition of same-sex female relationships more generally at 
the time these provisions were enacted.  
48 See the Editor’s postscript in Gleeson (n 22) 229. 
49 R v Linekar (Gareth) [1995] QB 250. 
50 See Carole McCartney and Natalie Wortley, ‘Under the Covers: Covert Policing and Intimate 
Relationships’ (2018) 2 Criminal Law Review 137, specifically, footnote 40. 
51 R v Richardson (Diane) [1999] QB 444, 449. 






The additional unexpected consequences, of infection in the one case and 
non payment in the other, were irrelevant to and did not detract from the 
woman's consent to sexual intercourse.53 
 
This is not to suggest, however, that the emergence of the HIV/AIDS epidemic 
had not prompted academic commentary on the potential reform of Clarence 
principles. In 1991, Smith commented on the ‘[c]onsiderable reluctance’ of the 
courts to shift away from the narrow definition of the ‘nature of the act’ despite 
the concerns surrounding HIV/AIDS, stating: 
In the case of an AIDS virus infected partner, however, it might be 
maintainable that an act of intercourse which carries a strong risk of 
consequential death is so vitally distinct from non-life-endangering 
intercourse as to render apparent consent to the whole act quite unreal.54 
 
As Ryan notes,55 the Law Commission addressed the issue of HIV transmission 
criminalisation in the 1993 Legislating the Criminal Code: Offences Against the 
Person and General Principles consultation report.56 The Commission noted ‘the 
recent public concern over the possibility of deliberate or reckless infection of 
others with life-threatening conditions, including the HIV virus.’57 Furthermore, the 
Commission commented on the necessity of distinguishing between infections of 
this kind and less serious, potentially minor, infections rather than merely relying 
on prosecutorial discretion to prevent prosecutions in cases of the latter variety.58  
 
 
53 R v Tabassum [2000] 5 WLUK 243 [37]. 
54 Smith (n 10) 315. 
55 Samantha Ryan, ‘Disclosure and HIV Transmission’ (2015) 79 The Journal of Criminal Law 
395, 395–396. 
56 The Law Commission, Legislating the Criminal Code: Offences against the Person and General 
Principles (Law Com No 218, 1993) paras 15.15-15.19. 
57 The Law Commission, Legislating the Criminal Code: Offences against the Person and General 
Principles (n 56) para 15.17. 
58 The Law Commission, Legislating the Criminal Code: Offences against the Person and General 





However, in a consultation report published a year later, Criminal Law: Consent 
and Offences Against the Person, HIV is barely referenced. Where it is discussed, 
the report considers HIV through a narrow lens within its discussion of the House 
of Lords decision in Brown,59 with the ‘threat of serious injury or infection’ being 
a justification of the Lords approach in that case.60 Discussion of HIV as a general 
and pervasive threat in the context of same-sex relationships, notwithstanding 
the HIV-negative status of the defendants in Brown, is emblematic of the 
approach to same-sex sexuality seen in the judicial reasoning in that case.61 The 
perceived exceptional nature of the HIV threat as such seems to have been 
comparable in these instances to broader debates surrounding injury arising from 
consensual sexual activity.62 In the context of debates around sadomasochistic 
injury, Cowan argues that ‘there appears to be some underlying and unstated 
normative principle driving the differentiation of normal (permissible) [sexual 
behaviours] from abnormal (impermissible) sexual behaviours’.63  
 
Similarly, in the context of HIV transmission, the normative principle driving the 
distinction between “serious” and “minor” infections were often framed as 
achieving a ‘sensible balance’ whilst in fact ‘forestall[ing] any populist criticism 
that [the government] was being “soft” on crime.’64 Assuming that this balancing 
act would, given the context in which it is discussed, distinguish HIV transmission 
and the transmission of certain other “serious” infections from cases involving 
 
59 R v Brown [1993] UKHL 19. 
60 The Law Commission, Consent and Offences Against The Person (Law Com Consultation 
Paper No 134 1994) 11, specifically, footnote 36 (emphasis added). 
61 Carl F Stychin, Law’s Desire: Sexuality and the Limits of Justice (Routledge 1995) 137. 
62 On the broader debates surrounding Brown, see Herring (n 1) 86–97. 
63 Sharon Cowan, ‘The Pain of Pleasure: Consent and the Criminalisation of Sado-Masochistic 
“Assaults”’ in James Chalmers, Fiona Leverick and Lindsay Farmer (eds), Essays in Criminal Law 
in Honour of Sir Gerald Gordon (Edinburgh University Press 2010) 132. 





“less serious” infections, it is arguably a similar normative exercise to that 
discussed by Cowan. It is also indicative of two broader questions surrounding 
fraudulent acts in the context of consent. First, how to distinguish between 
consent to different consequences of the same action and, second, if and how to 
distinguish between different severities of fraud within those categories. The 
challenge of whether and how to distinguish between different categorisation of 
fraud was particularly emphasised by Ormerod in his work addressing the 1994 
consultation.65 The Law Commission suggested that where determining whether 
fraud was sufficient to invalidate consent: ‘the test should be, and should be no 
more than, whether the fraud or misrepresentation induced the victim’s 
consent.’66 Ormerod noted that this would have the effect of overturning the 
approach set out in Clarence but also identified that this would have consequence 
beyond the scope of Offences Against the Person Act 1861 by opening up 
potential rape charges.67 However, the Law Commission’s proposal also makes 
no differentiation between different severities of fraud, so that were the 
representation of even a relatively tangential detail in some manner considered 
fraudulent, the Commission provision would have effect.  
 
This issue would arise again the following year. In 1995, the Commission’s 
Consent in The Criminal Law Consultation returned to the issue of fraudulently 
obtained consent, expressing specific concern over HIV status cases. In a similar 
vein to Smith,68 the Commission stated that: 
It seems to us that this type of fraudulent misrepresentation is morally 
different from a fraudulent promise to pay for sexual services, and that it 
 
65 Ormerod (n 9). 
66 The Law Commission, Consent and Offences Against The Person (n 60) para 26.1. 
67 Ormerod (n 9) 936. 





comes close to affecting the nature of the act itself in that it deals with 
matters that can have a physical consequence.69 
 
Here, the Commission differentiated Linekar70 type cases from those comparable 
to Clarence,71 whilst at the same time introducing a moralistic argument focused 
on the severity of the deception in these two kinds of case. The first issue with 
this proposition is whether it is necessary to introduce moral or ethical concepts 
into the distinction when the Commission then draws upon the legal concept of 
the “nature of the act itself”. The second issue is that by suggesting that Clarence 
type deceptions “come close” to affecting the nature of the act, the Commission 
introduced a degree of uncertainty. It is unclear what ingredient is missing (or 
rather present) which would differentiate Clarence type deceptions from 
deceptions as to the nature of the act.  
 
On the first issue, it should be acknowledged that the moral and ethical scrutiny 
of defendants, distinct from arguments about criminal culpability, have been a 
persistent theme among the legal and academic literature discussed so far. In 
Clarence, Wills J suggests that the earlier decision in Bennett was ‘a case in 
which [the Judge] strained the law for the purpose of punishing a great wrong’.72 
The Law Commission’s approach in 1995 might be viewed as an extension of this 
moralistic mentality and desire to enforce certain ethical standards through legal 
distinctions. This does not address the second issue, however, unless it is 
accepted that the moral difference has an influence upon the nature of the act – 
which seems distinct from the emphasis on physical consequences in the 
 
69 The Law Commission, Consent in The Criminal Law (Law Com Consultation Paper No 139 
1995) para 6.19. 
70 R v Linekar (Gareth) (n 49). 
71 R v Clarence (n 9). 





Commission’s argument. If instead, it is the physical consequences of the 
misrepresentation which are the focus of the Commission’s argument, this too 
seems to be somewhat removed from the misrepresentation itself. In Clarence 
this point was itself considered by Stephen J, who queried whether an assault 
would be committed prior to it becoming apparent whether transmission had 
occurred or not.73  Here, the emphasis on the misrepresentation as akin to an 
element of the offence, rather than as an element of a defence – as will be seen 
in the developments in Dica and Konzani in the next section – appears to 
undermine the approach to assaults the Commission proposed in 1995.  
 
These issues would come to be of practical significance across the final years of 
the 1990s and into the new decade. The timing of these developments is not 
without significance. Advancements in the treatment of HIV in the 1990s had a 
significant impact upon the prognosis of many of those diagnosed as HIV+ who 
were able to access treatment, and consequently upon practices of HIV 
prevention.74 In 2001, HMA v Kelly established that HIV transmission was an 
offence under Scots criminal law.75 Chalmers notes how Kelly prompted further 
questions about the state of English criminal law and placed a renewed emphasis 
on the various proposals made by the Law Commission.76 Ormerod, noting the 
developments of Kelly and similar case law in other jurisdictions, returned to the 
question of whether criminalisation was a necessary or appropriate response to 
 
73 R v Clarence (n 9) 45 (Stephen J). 
74 See Susan Kippax and Kane Race, ‘Sustaining Safe Practice: Twenty Years On’ (2003) 57 
Social Science and Medicine 1. These issues are discussed in further detail below at 2.3. 
75  HMA v Kelly [2001] Unreported; for a detailed discussion of the case, see Victor Tadros, 
‘Recklessness, Consent and the Transmission of HIV’ (2001) 5 Edinburgh Law Review 371. 






HIV transmission.77 These two questions had been consistent themes within the 
consultations discussed above, as well as in more general debate, and Ormerod 
commented that there were ‘still no effective solutions’ to the issue at that time.78  
Nevertheless, two cases in the early 2000s would produce a solution within 
English Criminal Law, with the historic background set out above framing the 
tension between disease transmission as an assault versus non-disclosure as a 
sexual offence,79 which these cases would (in part) address.  
 
2.2 Dica and Konzani: Criminalising Reckless Transmission 
2.2.1 R v Mohammed Dica [2004] EWCA Crim 1103 
The precedent established in Clarence would prove key to understanding the 
transformation brought about in Dica in 2004. Mohammed Dica was diagnosed 
with HIV in 1995 and began to receive treatment for the condition at that time. 
Dica would then go on to have unprotected sexual intercourse with two women 
between 1997 and 2001, who would both go on to be diagnosed as HIV+.80 Dica 
was charged with two counts of causing grievous bodily harm, contrary to s.20 of 
the Offences Against the Person Act 1861.81 In the Court of Appeal’s analysis of 
the initial trial, it is explained that 
Judge Philpot [the trial judge] made two critical but distinct rulings. First, 
he concluded that notwithstanding the well-known decision by the Crown 
Cases Reserved in R v Clarence (1889) 22 QB 23, it was open to the jury 
to convict the appellant of the offences alleged in the indictment, on the 
basis that its standing as “an important precedent has been thoroughly 
undermined, and … provides no guidance to a (first) instance judge”. His 
second conclusion, which in a sense was more far-reaching, was that 
 
77 David Ormerod, ‘Criminalizing HIV Transmission-Still No Effective Solutions’ (2001) 1 Common 
Law World Review 135, 141–142. 
78 Ormerod (n 77). 
79 Chalmers (n 76) 160. 
80 R v Dica [2004] EWCA Crim 1103 [4]-[8] (Judge LJ). 





whether or not the complainants knew of the appellant’s condition, their 
consent, if any, was irrelevant and provided no defence.82 
 
In concurring with the first ruling of Philpot J, and emphasising that Clarence was 
no longer authoritative on the issue of disease transmission, the Court of Appeal 
(CoA) explicitly identified changing attitudes towards sex and sexuality. In 
particular, the CoA acknowledged that the marital rape exception critical to the 
decision in Clarence had ‘finally been identified as a fiction in R v R’.83 Also 
demonstrated in the CoA’s judgment is the changing construction of “inflict” in 
modern legal analysis.84 This was exemplified by the House of Lords in Ireland 
and Burstow, where the decision of Clarence was described as ‘troublesome’ and 
Lord Steyn stated that ‘criminal law has moved on’ since the time Clarence was 
decided.85  
 
Nevertheless, the decision of the Judge at first instance was, in part, overturned, 
specifically in respect of the second aspect of the ruling. In finding that consent 
was relevant to the s.20 charge, the CoA distinguished Dica from the well-known 
precedent, established in Brown, that consent cannot operate as a defence to 
serious harms. As Davies notes,86 this distinction was achieved by differentiating 
between consent to serious harm and consent to the risk of injury. As with 
Cowan’s assessment of the decision in Brown, discussed above,87 Lord Justice 
Judge’s analysis of the distinction between ‘indulging in serious violence for the 
purposes of sexual gratification’ and running the risk of disease transmission ‘as 
 
82 R v Dica (n 80) [13] (Judge LJ). 
83 R v Dica (n 80) [19] (Judge LJ). 
84 R v Dica (n 80) [29] (Judge LJ). 
85 R v Ireland; R v Burstow [1988] AC 147, 160 (Lord Steyn). 
86 Mitchell Davies, ‘R v Dica: Lessons in Practising Unsafe Sex’ (2004) 68 The Journal of Criminal 
Law 498, 500. 





well as all the other risks inherent in and possible consequences of sexual 
intercourse’,88 appears to develop from a conceptualisation of “normal” (i.e. good 
and permissible) sex distinct from indulgent (i.e. bad and prohibited) sex.89  
 
This would also support the argument put forward by Weait that the approach 
taken in Dica incorporated presumed moral values.90 Highlighting the ‘measured 
approval’ of Judge LJ in respect of the analysis presented by Spencer,91 Weait 
demonstrates how the judgment in Dica puts forward an understanding that the 
law on transmission ‘is, and should be, somehow dependent on a moral or ethical 
judgement about the kind and quality of relationship’ that the defendant and 
complainant have.92 It is also important to note that judicial commentary on the 
impact of Dica has similarly noted that public opinion, or – it might be suggested 
– presumed public opinion, is influential in the distinctions between permissible 
and indulgent sexuality. In the R v Barnes, in 2004, Lord Woolf CJ emphasises 
the manner in which ‘changing public attitudes can affect the activities which are 
classified as unlawful, as the judgment in Dica demonstrates.’93  
 
As well as its general influence upon the CoA’s approach in Dica, the specific 
influence of the moral and ethical prioritisation of certain kinds of relationship can 
be observed in the construction of consent to the risk of transmission that the 
 
88 R v Dica (n 80) [47] (Judge LJ, emphasis added). 
89 On the hierarchy and charmed circle of sexual practices, see Gayle S Rubin, ‘Thinking Sex: 
Notes for a Radical Theory of the Politics of Sexuality’, From Gender to Sexuality (1984); and, 
Chris Ashford, ‘(Homo)Normative Legal Discourse’ [2011] Durham Law Review 77, in particular, 
at 84. These points are returned to below. 
90 Matthew Weait, ‘Harm, Consent and the Limits of Privacy’ (2005) 13 Feminist Legal Studies 
97. 
91 JR Spencer, ‘Liability for Reckless Infection Pt 1’ (2004) 154 New Law J 384; JR Spencer, 
‘Liability for Reckless Infection Pt 2’ (2004) 154 New Law J 448. 
92 Weait, ‘Harm, Consent and the Limits of Privacy’ (n 90) 115; see R v Dica (n 80) [15] and [55]. 





Court puts forward. In order to justify the ability of some couples to consent to the 
risk of transmission, the Court suggests two examples of where consent to the 
risk of transmission is permissible. The first of these examples involves a couple 
who are Roman Catholic and ‘conscientiously’ object to the use of artificial 
contraception. The second involves a couple who are attempting to conceive and 
who therefore desist from condom use,94 which whilst not strictly the only option 
was nevertheless a reality of HIV/AIDS treatment at that time.95  
 
It is significant that in both of these examples the parties are in an opposite-sex 
relationship – in the case of the explicitly conscientious Roman Catholic couple 
(presumably) married – and that the willingness to run the risk of transmission 
stems from some external justification, religion or conception, rather than the 
internal dynamics of the relationship itself. This is not to suggest that the internal 
dynamics of a particular relationship are not significant to the CoA’s analysis of 
consent to transmission risk altogether. As Rogers highlights,96 there is an 
acknowledgement that consent may occur because of a ‘loving … and trusting 
relationship’.97 However, this kind of relationship is distinguished from other 
categories of relationship because of its duration and, because of an emphasis 
 
94 R v Dica (n 80) [49] (Lord Judge). 
95 It should be noted that even before the development of newer treatment options, which make 
conception possible without transmission risk, there were techniques to reduce, although not 
eliminate, the risk of transmission whilst enabling conception. See, for instance, Chelsea and 
Westminster Hospital NHS Foundation Trust, ‘Sperm Washing’ 
<https://www.chelwest.nhs.uk/private-care/fertility-treatment/treatment-options/treatment-
options-1/sperm-washing> accessed 3 July 2020. 
96 Jonathan Rogers, ‘Criminal Liability for the Transmission of HIV’ (2005) 64 The Cambridge Law 
Journal 20, 20. 





on the secondary and infrequent nature of transmission risk,98 arguably by its de-
sexed nature.99 
 
At the subsequent retrial, Dica was convicted on the original charges, 
notwithstanding the availability of a consent defence which the CoA’s judgment 
afforded him.100 Dica represented a significant step in the development of disease 
criminalisation in England and Wales. As Chalmers puts it: 
Before Dica, the question was this: “is there a convincing case for 
criminalising the reckless transmission of disease?” Now, the question is, 
“is there a convincing case for creating an exception to the general 
criminalisation of recklessly harming another person”?  
 
Chalmers adds that: 




It would also be incorrect to suggest that Dica resulted in a complete and 
consistent framework of transmission criminalisation. Dica left several issues 
unaddressed or unresolved within its analysis. On the one hand, Dica’s 
knowledge about his own HIV status meant that the issues apparent with a 
defendant who is undiagnosed and uncertain about his HIV status received little 
attention.102 On the other hand, the complainants’ existing knowledge about HIV 
transmission risk associated with unprotected sexual intercourse was also 
insufficiently addressed in the judgment in Dica, as Weait and Ryan both 
 
98 Judge LJ stating that these relationships may ‘from time to time also carry risks’. See R v Dica 
(n 80) [47] (Judge LJ). 
99 For further discussion of intimate culture and hetronormativity, which arguably is demonstrated 
in this section of Dica’s judgment, see Lauren Berlant and Michael Warner, ‘Sex in Public’ (1998) 
24 Critical Inquiry 547, in particular, at 650-562. 
100 Munro (n 25) 115. 
101 Chalmers (n 9) 139. 
102 The challenge of developing a framework of liability when different defendents will necessarily 
have different levels of awareness of their HIV status was noted in discussion contemporary with 





observe.103 Munro argues that the CoA in Dica took ‘refuge in the specific grounds 
of appeal’ rather than addressing the broader issues which Dica embodied and 
that, as a result, ‘the wider impact of the resultant criminalisation of Mohammed 
Dica’s conduct was left largely unaddressed.’104 However, several of these issues 
would be, almost immediately,105 taken up in the case of R v Konzani in 2005. 
 
2.2.2. R v Feston Konzani [2005] EWCA Crim 706 
Feston Konzani was diagnosed as HIV-positive in November 2000 and between 
2001 and 2003 had sex with three women who would go on to be diagnosed as 
HIV+. In Konzani’s initial trial, at the Crown Court in Middlesbrough in 2004, Fox 
J directed the jury that in order to convict they would need to be certain that each 
complainant ‘did not willingly consent to the risk of suffering that infection’.106 
Konzani was convicted on three counts of s.20 GBH and, at the direction of Fox 
J, acquitted on a fourth count relating to a separate complainant.107  
 
Several of the unresolved issues of Dica were central to Konzani’s appeal. In 
particular, Konzani claimed that a consent defence should have been open to him 
on the basis of an honest, although mistaken and unreasonable, belief that the 
complainants were in fact consenting to the risk of transmission.108 Awareness of 
 
103 Matthew Weait, ‘Knowledge, Autonomy and Consent: R v Konzani’ [2005] Criminal Law 
Review 763, 764; Samantha Ryan, ‘Risk-Taking, Recklessness and HIV Transmission: 
Accommodating the Reality of Sexual Transmission of HIV within a Justifiable Approach to 
Criminal Liability’ (2007) 28 Liverpool Law Review 215, 220. 
104 Munro (n 25) 119. 
105 In fact, as Weait notes, the first instance trial of Konzani began on the day the CoA’s judgment 
in Dica was handed down. See Weait, Intimacy and Responsibility: The Criminalisation of HIV 
Transmission (n 9) 70. 
106 Fox J is referenced by Judge LJ in the CoA judgment. See R v Konzani (Feston) [2005] EWCA 
Crim 706 [34] (Judge LJ). 
107 R. v Konzani (Feston) (n 106) [1] (Judge LJ). 





risk and the distinctions between general awareness of the multiple risks 
associated with unprotected sex and specific awareness of the particular risk 
accompanying unprotected sex with someone living with HIV played a central 
role in the judgment. Judge LJ concluded that: 
There is a critical distinction between taking a risk of the various, 
potentially adverse and possibly problematic consequences of sexual 
intercourse, and giving an informed consent to the risk of infection with a 
fatal disease. For the complainant’s consent to the risks of contracting the 
HIV virus to provide a defence, it is at least implicitly from the reasoning 
from R v Dica, and the observations of Lord Woolf CJ in R v Barnes 
confirm, that her consent must be an informed consent.109  
 
Weait has argued that this fails to take account of complainants’ existing 
knowledge of HIV transmission and that, consequently, it comes close to equating 
non-disclosure alone with recklessness.110 Given that it remains a possibility that 
a defendant could be charged with a transmission offence without themselves 
being aware of their status,111 it is also at least theoretically possible that a 
defendant may have less knowledge about HIV transmission risk than the 
complainant in a given situation. In his analysis of Dica, Spencer is critical of 
claims that complainants should be held – even partially – responsible for not 
inquiring about a prospective partner’s HIV status, at least in the context of non-
casual, non-commercial sex.112 Although this is indicative of a broader debate 
concerning the criminalisation of transmission, it may also serve to highlight how 
proponents of criminalisation are less concerned with complainants’ knowledge, 
but rather whether they come to it through the defendant.113  
 
109 R. v Konzani (Feston) (n 106) [41] (Judge LJ, emphasis in original). 
110 Weait, ‘Knowledge, Autonomy and Consent: R v Konzani’ (n 103) 765–766. 
111 See Warburton (n 11); this point has been reiterated more recently by The Law Commission. 
See The Law Commission, Reform of Offences Against The Person (Law Com No 361 2015) at 
para 6.17. These points are returned to below. 
112 Spencer, ‘Liability for Reckless Infection Pt 2’ (n 91). 
113 Ryan, ‘“Active Deception” v Non-Disclosure: HIV Transmission, Non-Fatal Offences and 





In this context, it is also important to note the CoA’s emphasis on the severity of 
HIV and its status as a ‘fatal disease’.114 Again, many of the arguments put 
forward in favour of criminalisation have sought to identify a category, or 
categories, of disease which are of sufficient severity that complainants ordinary 
knowledge of risks associated with a ‘“normal” lifestyle”’ become insufficient for 
consent to be informed through this knowledge.115 In Konzani, the CoA expressed 
the view that ‘[i]n the public interest, so far as possible, the spread of catastrophic 
illness must be avoided or prevented.’116 In an oft referenced section, the court 
went on to explain: 
If an individual who knows that he is suffering from the HIV virus conceals 
this stark fact from his sexual partner, the principle of her personal 
autonomy is not enhanced if he is exculpated when he recklessly transmits 
the HIV virus to her through consensual sexual intercourse. On any view, 
the concealment of this fact from her almost inevitably means that she is 
deceived. Her consent is not properly informed, and she cannot give an 
informed consent to something of which she is ignorant. Equally, her 
personal autonomy is not normally protected by allowing a defendant who 
knows that he is suffering from the HIV virus which he deliberately 
conceals, to assert an honest belief in his partner’s informed consent to 
the risk of transmission of the HIV virus. Silence in these circumstances is 




In the next section, I go on to address the changing nature of HIV infections in 
the UK and the manner in which new methods of prevention and treatment may 
alter the distribution of responsibilities relating to HIV prevention. However, at this 
stage it is important to note how the perceived severity of HIV infection is drawn 
upon in the CoA’s judgment and used to develop what both Weait and Ryan have 
 
114 R. v Konzani (Feston) (n 106) [41] (Judge LJ). 
115 Spencer, ‘Liability for Reckless Infection Pt 1’ (n 91). 
116 R. v Konzani (Feston) (n 106) [42] (Judge LJ, emphasis added). 





discussed in terms of an ‘”effective” duty to disclose’ known HIV status.118 This 
duty is “effective” because the CoA’s judgment does retain the possibility that a 
complainant may be sufficiently informed about a defendant’s HIV status, in the 
absence of direct disclosure, for consent to be informed consent. Judge LJ stating 
that ‘there may be circumstances in which it would be open to the jury to infer 
that, notwithstanding that the defendant was reckless and concealed his 
condition from the complainant, she may nevertheless have given an informed 
consent’ because of an awareness gained from other sources – the example 
given being where the complainant and defendant meet whilst the latter is being 
treated for his infection.119  
 
However, when read in conjunction with the CoA’s insistence that ‘[s]ilence in 
these circumstances is incongruous with honesty, or with a genuine belief’ in 
informed consent,120 the limited effect of this exception becomes readily apparent. 
As Weait establishes,121 this exception provides only very limited circumstances 
where defendants may be able to claim a reasonable belief in consent. It might 
also be pointed out that, irrespective of this provision, the only way that people 
living with HIV can be certain that they are not committing an offence is to disclose 
their HIV status.122 Although, as will be discussed below, preventative techniques 
– including treatment as a form of prevention – can reduce or eliminate 
transmission risk, the (often theoretical) risk that these techniques might fail, 
along with the possibility that recklessness might be found by a jury despite some 
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precautions being taken,123 results in an “effective” disclosure obligation if the risk 
of prosecution is to be entirely avoided.  
 
The relationship between Konzani’s knowledge of his HIV status, the expected 
(limited) knowledge of the complainants in the case, and consequentially the 
positioning of Konzani as a ‘blameworthy defendant’,124 work together to 
demonstrate the importance of contextual expectations in HIV transmission 
cases. In Dica,125 in order to distinguish that case from Brown,126 it was necessary 
for the CoA to differentiate between running a risk and that risk coming to fruition. 
In Konzani, the CoA then had to effectively determine in what situations a 
defendant’s belief in consent would be honest. It achieved this by creating a 
standard of reasonable behaviour – non-silence, or disclosure – and contrasting 
this with Konzani’s culpable behaviour – non-disclosure. This culpable behaviour 
is framed as an active – deliberate concealment – rather than a passive action or 
mistake.127 Framing what is arguably an omission as an act in this way might be 
described as the CoA identifying expectations associated with the context of 
sexual activity and elevating these to the standard of reasonable and expected 
behaviour, or what Ryan has termed a ‘cold and unrealistic approach to criminal 
 
123 As discussed below, prosecutorial discretion in such cases means that CPS guidance on this 
point plays a critical role. See Crown Prosecution Service, ‘Legal Guidance for Prosecutors and 
Guidance: Intentional or Reckless Sexual Transmission of Infection’ (Prosecution Policy and 
Guidance) 
<http://www.cps.gov.uk/legal/h_to_k/intentional_or_reckless_sexual_transmission_of_infection_
guidance/> accessed 4 April 2020; David Hughes, ‘Condom Use , Viral Load and the Type of 
Sexual Activity as Defences to the Sexual Transmission of HIV’ (2013) 77 The Journal of Criminal 
Law 136. 
124 Weait, Intimacy and Responsibility: The Criminalisation of HIV Transmission (n 9) 43–45. 
125 R v Dica (n 80). 
126 R v Brown (n 59). 
127 On active/passive distinctions, see Williams (n 43) 145–146; Ryan discusses how liability in 
Konzani stemmed from the percieved equivilance of non-disclosure and deception, see Ryan, 
‘“Active Deception” v Non-Disclosure: HIV Transmission, Non-Fatal Offences and Criminal 





liability … in which a common sense pragmatic view of what constitutes “proper” 
conduct in sexual relations, that is largely at odds with the reality of sexual 
behaviour’ is enforced by the courts.128  
 
In this section, I have introduced the two major cases through which the criminal 
law on HIV transmission in England and Wales has developed. These two cases 
reframed debate on disease transmission and subsequent debate has often been 
framed by the outcomes of these two cases. However, in the 16-plus years since 
the offences in Dica and Konzani were committed there has been a range of 
medical and pharmaceutical developments which the current law on HIV 
transmission must contend with. Therefore, before turning to literature on the 
theoretical and practical justifications of HIV transmission criminalisation, I will 
first summarise the changing nature of HIV testing, treatment and prevention.  
 
2.3 The Evolving Nature of HIV Treatment and Prevention 
Dica and Konzani both, in their own ways, demonstrate judicial concern over the 
severity of HIV, when contrasted with other, less serious, infections which are 
described as ‘various, potentially adverse and possibly problematic’. 129 As with 
Weait’s analysis of the various proposals pre-Dica, the focus appears to have 
been to achieve some “sensible balance”,130 which neither prevents prosecutions 
for “serious” cases but also does not entail mass prosecutions for “trivial” 
infections. This introduces the issue of categorising different transmission cases 
 
128 Ryan, ‘Risk-Taking, Recklessness and HIV Transmission: Accommodating the Reality of 
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within the law and the general lack of stratification seen in transmission cases 
thus far. Furthermore, it raises the prospect that the categorisation of HIV among 
the most serious infections may become, or has already become, outdated. 
Whether this is the case and how the law should respond to advancements in 
treatment and prevention are both pressing social and socio-legal issues.  
 
During the 1990s, the development of Highly-Active Antiretroviral Therapy, or 
“HAART”, meant that HIV was no longer, necessarily, a life-limiting condition, 
given access to treatment.131 Kippax and Race explain that ‘HAART changed the 
face of AIDS’, including the face of HIV prevention and of safer sex.132 Van Doorn 
suggests that prior to HAART, a HIV diagnosis ‘could do little more than expose 
infected individuals to the risk of stigma’ but that after HAART’s introduction 
diagnosis came to be constructed as integral to the health of the individual as well 
as to the broader public health.133 Whilst global disparities in access to testing 
and treatment mean that HIV/AIDS continues to be a global health concern,134 
HAART has demonstrably had a profound effect on the lives of people living with 
HIV and has been discussed in terms of producing a “post-AIDS” reality, although 
it has been suggested such claims are misguided.135   
 
Weait notes that as HAART was introduced, ‘a renewed commitment on the part 
of the international community to ensuring that [People Living with AIDS] should 
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not, by virtue of their HIV status, suffer in their enjoyment of basic human rights’ 
took place.136 However HAART, along with what has been described as “condom 
fatigue”,137 may also have added to a renewed emphasis on disclosure as a 
means of HIV prevention.138 This renewed emphasis on disclosure is significant, 
not only in the context of the ongoing distribution of responsibility for HIV-
prevention in non-legal settings,139 but also in setting the context for legal 
decisions. Debate over the efficacy of condoms as a means of HIV prevention 
and the adequacy of condoms and HAART in the absence of disclosure is a 
longstanding issue of legal contention.140 Considering these issues in a global 
context, as well as with specific reference to Dica, Klein notes that there is no 
objective basis for determining the point at which risk is unjustifiable and that 
‘social values can be expected to play an important role and may lead to 
convictions based on lower-risk or no-risk activities.’141  
 
More recent developments may further compound these issues. If HAART is to 
be described as the first turning point in the history of HIV treatment, then 
Treatment as Prevention, or “TasP”, might be described as the second. The 
revelation that, whilst on effective treatment, transmission risk through sexual 
intercourse can be eliminated for people living with HIV has been framed as ‘a 
 
136 Weait, Intimacy and Responsibility: The Criminalisation of HIV Transmission (n 9) 6. 
137 Jeffrey Escoffier, ‘Sex, Safety, and the Trauma of AIDS’ (2011) 39 WSQ: Women’s Studies 
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seismic shift in the discursive framing of the HIV body.’142 TasP and its associated 
slogan “Undetectable=Untransmittable” (“U=U”),143 have not only had a profound 
effect on public health narratives on HIV, these developments have also impacted 
the personal narratives and identities of those living with the virus. Grace and 
colleagues conclude that “undetectable”, as well as acting as a clinical marker, 
serves as a prevention orientated identity for some men who have sex with men 
and that “achieving” an undetectable viral load acts as ‘a signifier of a return to 
normalcy post-diagnosis’.144 For some, this effect has been so significant that an 
undetectable viral load has taken on an equivalence to being HIV-negative.145 
 
Further variations in identity and taxonomy in relation to HIV have emerged in the 
last decade. Among the many changes which have developed, some of the most 
significant have stemmed from the propagation of Pre-Exposure Prophylaxis, or 
“PrEP”. PrEP is a pharmaceutical prevention technique which can significantly 
reduce (although not eliminate) the risk of acquiring HIV when taken consistently, 
offering a highly effective alternative to condom use.146 PrEP has also served as 
a catalyst for renewed social and political debate surrounding HIV prevention, 
 
142 Asha Persson, ‘Non/Infectious Corporealities: Tensions in the Biomedical Era of “HIV 
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much of it centred around the judicial review of the decision by NHS England that 
PrEP provision did not fall under its remit.147 As Gonzales notes,148 PrEP has also 
resulted in a range of new HIV-related identities for those who might traditionally 
have identified only as HIV-negative. Indeed, many of these identities can be 
seen on dating applications, with identities such as ‘Negative, on PrEP’ appearing 
alongside “Undetectable” in contrast to the traditional positive-negative binary.149  
 
Hughes and Reed argue that biopharmaceutical HIV prevention techniques, 
particularly TasP, have yet to receive significant attention in English 
jurisprudence.150 As with earlier debates surrounding condom use, it remains 
uncertain whether the ineffective use of TasP would demonstrate recklessness 
on the part of a defendant or not.151 Furthermore, whilst there is, demonstrably, 
no offence where (unintended) transmission does not occur because of TasP, the 
worrying possibility of police investigations and prosecutions of those relying on 
TasP as a means of HIV prevention is not wholly farfetched, Yusef Azad raising 
such concerns as recently as 2019.152 Haire and Kaldor suggest that TasP, in 
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particular, reshapes the boundaries of safer sex and should be ‘interpreted as a 
“reasonable precaution”’ and therefore indicative of non-culpable behaviour.153  
 
These recent developments in treatment and prevention of HIV, as such, have a 
significant impact upon general debates over the criminalisation of HIV 
transmission. As Mathen and Plaxton have observed in a Canadian context, in 
the age of treatment as prevention, the law is effectively called upon to determine 
the point at which transmission risk becomes too significant as to be non-
dismissible by imposing criminal sanctions where levels of risk are ‘too much’.154 
The Canadian legal framework on transmission differs to England and Wales, in 
particular retaining the potential for convictions in instances of reckless exposure 
not resulting in transmission.155 Nevertheless, the somewhat contractual manner 
in which the “significance” of risk is determined, which is noted by Mathen and 
Plaxton,156 does, I would suggest, reflect a broader influence of marketplace 
ideals in the debate on transmission criminalisation and responsibility. 
 
2.4 Trust and Managing HIV Transmission Risk: Arguments for 
Criminalisation 
As noted above, there has been significant debate surrounding the theoretical 
justifications for criminalising of HIV transmission, which have persisted since 
Dica and Konzani established the legal basis for prosecutions via s.20 OAPA 
1861. The theoretical justifications for these offences continue to be debated with 
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the medical advancements discussed in the previous section arguably resulting 
in a renewed uncertainty over the true justifications for punishment in 
transmission cases. Herring suggests that, for most people, the failure of a person 
living with HIV to disclose their status would be considered a grave (moral) wrong, 
where transmission occurs.157 This may or may not be the case; however, this 
suggestion highlights that the act of non-disclosure and its relevance to consent 
have been core components of debate on HIV offences alongside the “wrong” of 
transmission itself.158  
 
Dica clearly established that reckless transmission would not constitute a sexual 
offence but did instead constitute GBH.159 In EB, the Court of Appeal reiterated 
this point, maintaining that whilst active deception might undermine consent to 
sexual activity, mere non-disclosure did not.160 As will be discussed below, the 
more recent case of Rowe did not follow this approach, utilising s.18 OAPA 1861 
charges instead.161 It is significant, therefore, that many of the arguments in 
favour of criminalisation discussed in earlier literature placed an emphasis on the 
complainant’s consent to sex, generally, in situations where HIV status is 
misrepresented to them.162  
 
The Sexual Offences Act 2003 holds that in order for an individual to consent s/he 
must agree ‘by choice’ and have ‘the freedom and capacity to make that 
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choice’.163 It has been suggested by some that non-disclosure of HIV status, 
particularly where such an issue is raised by the complainant, might prevent 
consent being reached “by choice”.164 Clough claims that there are arguably 
grounds for categorising “stealthing” (the intentional removal of condoms without 
agreement)165 as impeding consent.166 If this is accepted then, it might be argued, 
that deliberately misleading a partner about other means of HIV prevention, such 
as TasP, impedes consent and that to only prosecute transmission where it 
occurs leaves too significant a role to luck.167 However, it has also been observed 
that there is a physical difference between sex involving a barrier and sex 
without,168 which is not the case in (hypothetical) TasP deception cases. 
Nevertheless, there are some similarities between the two situations, particularly 
relating to the defendant’s knowledge and state of mind, which warrant 
consideration.  
 
In the broader context of what has come to be termed “sexual fraud” or “sex-by-
fraud”, an issue which has gained prominence in light of gender identity fraud 
cases,169 the emphasis on freedom and capacity to choose takes on an additional 
significance. As noted above, in Clarence, the decision by the Court for Crown 
Cases Reserved distinguished between different categories of harm. Although 
this approach was supplanted by Dica, in that case too distinctions were made 
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between consent to physical harm and consent to sexual activity. It might be 
observed that the continuing impact of Clarence can be seen in debates 
surrounding sexual fraud, in particular in debates over “seduction”. On the one 
hand, Hyman Gross suggests that extending the criminal law to cover ‘swindling’ 
and ‘gambits in a game of seduction’ would represent an overextension of 
personal moralism in the criminal law.170 On the other hand, Jonathan Herring 
argues that this is a ‘rather unpleasant analogy [which] sees women as passive 
participants’ in sexual encounters.171 Certainly Herring’s argument that to dismiss 
sexual deceptions as being ‘all part of the sexual game’ is to tacitly state that 
sexual relationships belong to a part of life where deception is to be expected, if 
not tolerated, is a compelling one. However, as Herring goes on to 
acknowledge,172 the role that fantasy and the idealised partner may have in 
sexual encounters must also be accommodated, particularly where consent is not 
made explicitly conditional on a given understanding of facts and circumstance.  
 
“Sexual fraud” might be criticised for being overly contractual and for failing to 
reflect the highly emotive nature of deception in the context of sexual 
relationships. Nevertheless, claims such as those by Gross, that ‘[t]reating sex as 
something to be obtained by a bargain involving representations and promises 
both misconceives and demeans it’,173 also overly reduces the meaning of sex. 
As such, whilst it would be erroneous to limit analysis of sexual “deceptions” by 
only drawing upon commercial or marketplace models, repeating an error seen 
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in Clarence and artificially limiting the scope of inquiry, it does not follow that 
drawing upon these concepts within a broader analysis debases or degrades the 
value of sex and sexuality. As Herring states, ‘what sexual intercourse is or 
means depends on its contexts and the party’s appreciation of it’.174  
 
Acknowledging the multiple, and potentially contradictory, understandings of sex 
and sexuality that exist need not involve some of these understandings being 
prioritised over others.  Bohlander has suggested that reducing the requirement 
for active disclosure on the part of people living with HIV might be described as 
‘the interests of one sector of society, small or large, [being] given unqualified 
precedence over the interests of other groups and society as a whole’.175 But, this 
argument fails to adequately distinguish between reducing requirements for 
disclosure, generally, and reducing requirements for (pro-)active disclosure. 
Reducing the latter arguably does not result in a form of ‘unqualified precedence’ 
for those people living with HIV (“PLWHIV”). Instead, it may be an 
acknowledgement that the interests of society as a whole cannot be served by a 
single unitary moral and ethical framework, or a single approach to disclosure. 
 
Drawing on marketplace principles of representations and promises involves, in 
part, analysing the defendant’s state of mind. Theft and fraud offences both place 
an emphasis on the defendant’s dishonesty,176 which the marketplace analysis 
of “sexual fraud” echoes. For instance, Slater argues in favour of an expanded 
approach to HIV criminalisation that would effectively criminalise non-disclosure 
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of HIV status when this took place within a ‘relationship of trust’.177 Slater states 
that: ‘[n]ot all breaches of trust, however morally egregious, are worthy of 
criminalisation.’178 As noted above, historically the distinctions drawn between 
immoral and illegal actions were noted in judicial decisions surrounding disease 
transmission, notably in Clarence. It has been suggested that this historic 
approach to disease transmission captured a belief that criminal law did not 
belong ‘in the bedroom’, a belief which should be criticised for dismissing 
significant and consequential harms as an unremarkable part of domestic life.179 
Whilst recognising the potential for violence and harm in domestic spaces is 
unquestionably commendable, Slater’s approach goes beyond this and is 
problematic for two key reasons.  
 
Firstly, Slater claims that within certain relationships there is a social value in 
parties being able to trust one another and dispense with elements of due 
diligence by relying on trust. Consequently, he holds that where there are ‘good 
reasons for trusting the other party of which the trusting party is aware, explicitly 
or tacitly’ then it is justifiable for the law to intervene were ‘the legal reinforcement 
of that trust seeks to prevent a personal and societal harm’.180 However, this is 
itself an oversimplification of the nature of trust and would arguably involve, in 
practice, drawing upon the ‘exclusivity and relative permanence’ of relationships 
rather than the specific interpersonal dynamics, of trust and other factors, within 
them.181 As such, whilst this would overcome the objections that the criminal law 
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ignores the domestic sphere, it would arguably focus on these domestic spaces 
to an almost exclusive degree. This would sustain heteronormative and 
homonormative thinking regarding the value of certain kinds of sex within certain 
kinds of relationships.182 Furthermore, exchanging one narrowly applied 
approach to disease transmission for another, in this way, hardly seems a 
sustainable approach to law and health.  
 
Secondly, the trust that Slater associates with certain kinds of relationships in fact 
only focuses upon the trust placed by one party (the HIV-negative partner) in the 
representations of the other (the HIV-positive partner). The one-directional nature 
of this trust and the lack of a reciprocal recognition of the trust that someone living 
with HIV might place in their partner is concerning. Arguably, this bears some 
relationship to arguments that under an equitable model of sexual ethics we 
would each have a shared responsibility to ensure that reckless transmission of 
HIV did not take place.183 Counter-claims to this argument have suggested that 
HIV transmission offences are not merely public health responses, but instead 
take account of the specific moral wrongdoing of the defendant, irrespective of 
any unwise or reckless behaviour by the complainant.184 However, if trust is 
central to this moral wrongdoing, as Slater argues, this necessarily involves 
inspecting the balance of responsibilities and expectations to which trust is 
attached.   
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The suggestion that those who are HIV-negative have a responsibility shared with 
those who are HIV-positive, a position which has been advocated by several 
authors,185 has often been interpreted as placing unwarranted obligation on the 
former. Spencer’s arguments that HIV-negative partners should be under no 
obligation to ‘cross-examine him each time they go to bed’ might be considered 
an example of such a claim.186 However, such arguments often fail to 
acknowledge the fundamentally social nature of HIV transmission, which by its 
nature involves two or more individuals interacting with one another.187 Placing 
most, if not all, responsibility for preventing HIV transmission on the shoulders of 
those already living with HIV is not only dubious as a public health response to 
HIV given the potential for misunderstanding and miscommunication,188 it is also 
questionable as a legal response to HIV. Rather than acknowledging the plural 
responsibilities surrounding sexual health and the distinctions between moral and 
ethical obligations and the law, the criminal law in England and Wales, it might 
be argued, reinforces an individualistic and stigmatising approach in its 
construction of legal responsibility.  
 
2.5 Responsibilisation and Risk 
The import of moral and ethical concepts of responsibility has a significant impact 
on the construction of not only legal responsibility, but also related concepts such 
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as risk and recklessness. As Adam argues, discourses on HIV prevention might 
be said to draw upon neoliberal principles of ‘informed consent, contractual 
interaction, and free market choice’ as part of a process of individual 
responsibilisation.189 Whilst responsibilisation discourses can be seen in several 
areas of criminal legal theory, including sexual offences unrelated to disease 
transmission,190 in transmission cases responsibilisation takes on an additional 
significance owing to the ‘direct relation between individual action and the safety 
of the population.’191  
 
Responsibilisation and the construction of the individual as the defining unit of 
HIV transmission has been a recurring element of responses to HIV since the 
early stages of the epidemic. Girard and colleagues have suggested that, whilst 
an ethos of shared responsibility for HIV prevention might be said to have existed 
during the initial community responses to HIV/AIDS, these dissipated over time, 
with distinct moral duties dependent upon HIV status emerging.192  Emphasis on 
consistent condom use was the hallmark of community responses and 
subsequent health education campaigns during the early years of the epidemic, 
where knowledge of transmission routes was at first limited and treatment options 
ineffective.193 However, this universalised approach to responsibility for HIV 
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prevention might be considered short-lived.194 HAART and a degree of “fatigue” 
over constant condom usage both, it has been suggested,195 contributed to the 
development of alternative safer sex practices such as negotiated safety – where 
condom use could be ceased with a regular partner.196 Scott suggests that this 
emphasis on ‘partner selection’ resulted in risk reduction strategies based on 
‘homespun criteria and strategies’ and a degree of ‘detective mode’ when 
estimating risk, rather than coherent criteria and genuine inquiry into a partner’s 
HIV status.197 Nevertheless, such disclosure and partner selection focused 
approaches also emphasise the differentiation of responsibilities between those 
living with HIV and those not.  
 
It might also be suggested that this is indicative of a continuation in a broader 
shift in attitudes towards disease and disease prevention which occurred across 
the 20th century. As Brandt has noted, growing biomedical knowledge about the 
routes of transmission in the early part of the 20th century did not dispel a 
perception that diseases were the result of ‘the “random” chain of events that 
brought together a microorganism, a “vector,” and human beings.’198 However, 
during the latter half of the century, it can be suggested that this gave way to an 
emphasis on individual responsibility. Consequently, ill health ‘would now be 
viewed as a failure to take appropriate precautions against publicly specified 
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risks, a failure of individual control, a lack of self-discipline, an intrinsic   failing.’199 
Such patterns of responsibilisation went hand-in-hand with a degree of moral 
judgment, which was of notable prominence in the initial stages of the HIV/AIDS 
epidemic. Brandt observing that: ‘[a]ccording to this view, those who are infected 
are responsible for their plight. AIDS is caused by a moral failure of the [infected] 
individual.’200  
 
This approach to disease transmission might be considered emblematic of the 
(post-)modern “risk society”.201 The concept of the “risk society” highlights the 
structural role that risk plays in modern life, particularly in guiding decision 
making, where the prevention of real or perceived risks is central.202 
Responsibilisation can therefore be understood as the development of a 
particular understanding of risk management, where individuals are ‘compelled 
to prudently manage the institutionally structured and dependent risks of her or 
his own DIY project of the self’.203 In the context of HIV prevention, this can be 
seen in the public health messages that promote self-responsibility for HIV 
prevention,204 as well as in the deployment of technology such as the internet as 
a tool to identify and manage risks.205 
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Such an understanding of risk can be contrasted with historic understanding of 
disease risk as natural or God-given. In Clarence, Stephen J quotes a passage 
from an earlier judgment, by Hale, and comments on this point:  
Upon this Hale (1 P. C. 432) remarks that … it is hard to discern whether 
the infection arise from the part or from the contagion in the air. It is God’s 
arrow …  Contagious diseases, as plague, pestilential fevers, small-pox 
&c., are common among mankind by the visitation of God, and the 
extension of capital punishments in cases of this nature would multiply 
severe punishments too far and give too great latitude and loose to severe 
punishments. … [Stephen J commenting that] Some of the expressions in 
this passage would scarcely be employed now, but it may be taken as a 
caution against wide and uncertain extensions of the criminal law.206 
 
The significance of this transition, from the historic understanding of risk 
observable in Hale’s comments to the post-modern risk centred approach, in the 
context of HIV prevention discourses is found in the emphasis on identifying and 
managing particular sites of risk. Worth, Patton and Goldstein emphasise how 
such approaches to sexual health and the emergence of HIV transmission 
offences construct those living with HIV as ‘vectors’ in the transmission of the 
virus.207 Vectors are a recurring theme in the history of HIV transmission and are 
one way through which HIV-risk is personified in a risk taking “Other”.208 The 
embodiment of risk in an Other can be seen, for example, in the case of bisexuals. 
Kagan notes how bisexuals have historically been constructed as vectors of 
disease transmission between the non-heterosexual and heterosexual sexual 
communities.209 This construction of bisexuals as a vector of transmission 
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situates community level transmission of disease with a specific group, who are 
then linked with transmission risk.   
 
As Weait notes, ‘HIV is only ever embodied’ in this manner. 210 Consequently, 
responsibilisation and the prescription of individual responsibilities are often 
located only with those living with HIV, or more broadly those engaging in 
practices understood as “risky”, for instance “barebacking”.211 As Kinsman 
highlights, such discourses often construct sexual promiscuity, and I would add 
other non-normative sexual practices, as problematic and issues of individual risk 
taking rather than a feature of the overall sexual community.212 
  
The degree to which these patterns of responsibilisation entail the surveillance 
and scrutiny, including self-surveillance and self-scrutiny, of individuals and 
groups demonstrably extends far beyond the scope of criminal law.213 Take, for 
example, the issue of insurance in the US and UK. Cobb has demonstrated how 
insurers have surveyed medical records to assess (or attempt to assess) 
individuals’ past “unsafe” sexual practices by noting previous STI diagnosis.214 
Cobb notes how this and questions about relationship/marital status may reflect 
a process of assimilation whereby certain categories of gay men – predominantly 
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white and socio-economically privileged – are integrated into ‘neoliberal sexual 
politics’.215 Arguello notes that within the risk society, individuals are cast as 
rational and universalised subjects acting in a risk averse manner and that, 
consequently, this serves to delegitimise actions which deviate from the rational 
choice to protect one’s own health and take responsible steps to avoid or reduce 
risks.216 Similarly, O’Malley argues that the process of responsibilisation can be 
observed in the creation of at-risk communities, which can be targeted with 
messages that it is their “responsibility” to manage risk, and that ‘[p]recautionary 
medical tests for a multitude of diseases or malfunction become a duty of those 
in high risk groups’.217 This focus on the identification and differentiation of those 
participating in “good” acceptable sexual practices,218 from those participating in 
“abnormal” and/or “risky” sexual practices, and the expectation of the freedom 
and capacity to choose not to engage in the latter can be observed not only in 
the case law on HIV transmission discussed above, but also in the recent case 
law on “sexual fraud” relating to gender identity.  
 
2.6 “Sexual Fraud” and Conditional Consent: Gender Identity and HIV 
Transmission Cases 
Gender “deception”, involving a defendant who, at the time of sexual activity with 
the complainant, identified as a different gender to that assigned at birth and did 
not disclose this information, has become a significant and pressing issue of 
criminal jurisprudence over the past decade. A series of cases, most significantly 
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McNally,219 Wilson,220 and Newland,221 have demonstrated the development of a 
concept which some have termed “sexual fraud”.222 Each of these cases 
addressed the impact that the defendant’s gender identity history, and the 
complainant’s apparent lack of knowledge concerning this, on the complainant’s 
consent. In McNally, the CoA did not approach these issues via the conclusive 
presumptions found in s.76 Sexual Offences Act 2003, discussed above,223 
instead determining that this information was relevant to the complainant’s 
general capacity and freedom to consent under s.74. Lord Justice Leveson 
stated: 
[T]he sexual nature of the acts is, on any common sense view, different 
where the complainant is deliberately deceived by a defendant into 
believing that the latter is a male … [the complainant] chose to have sexual 
encounters with a boy and her preference (her freedom to choose whether 
or not to have a sexual encounter with a girl) was removed by the 
defendant's deception.224 
 
This approach has been subject to significant criticism. Sharpe, in particular, has 
suggested that requiring transgender individuals to disclose their status, often 
unprompted, incorporates into the law a construction of transgender identities as 
inherently unstable and assumes transgender individuals to be continually 
uncertain about their own identification.225 It also draws upon a particular 
understanding of deliberate deception within which it is presumed that 
transgender defendants are not only deceiving themselves in their identification 
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but are also aware that every sexual partner they have holds a substantial interest 
in their gender identity. Sharpe argues that this indicates a belief that 
‘[a]pparently, the transgender person who believes that a cisgender person might 
actually want to have sex with him/her even if aware of his/her transgender status 
is by definition a fraud.’226  
 
Such an approach highlights the often-asymmetrical approach to sexual consent 
seen in legal analysis – whereby one participant is seen as the active instigator, 
proposing sexual conduct, and one is seen as a passive respondent, accepting 
or rejecting a particular advance.227 The limitations of this analysis can be 
observed in cases such as McNally as well as in the range of cases addressing 
HIV transmission. Although Konzani does establish that complainants might 
become informed through context, the extremely limited situations in which this 
exception to the general rule applies – as well as the continued focus on the 
reasonableness of the defendant’s belief where it does – emphasises the one-
sided focus of legal scrutiny in these cases. In both instances, the categorisation 
of the defendant as actively deceptive where they “conceal” their HIV status or 
previous gender identity is an oversimplification of the various representations, 
assumptions and implications that occur during sexual encounters.228 Gibson 
highlights that equating deception and mistake assumes a particular relationship 
of power of the defendant over the complainant, suggesting that the defendant’s 
blameworthiness may be diminished or non-existent where a complainant forms 
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a belief ‘unilaterally’.229 Gibson goes on to claim that such issues may be 
particularly noticeable in relation to issues of gender identity and sexuality, where 
cisnormativity and heteronormativity might produce assumptions which contrast 
with the genuine and authentic self-identification of defendants.230 
 
Others have argued that the defendant’s non-disclosure of information pertinent 
to the complainant’s consent is less justifiable where the defendant is aware of 
this situation. Clough, in particular, has stated that ‘[i]t is for the accused’s gain, 
and only their gain, if the reason for non-disclosure is that they are fully aware 
that the victim would be unlikely to consent if they knew the truth.’231 Although 
recognising that disclosure of previous gender identity may be emotionally 
challenging, Clough argues that McNally demonstrated an awareness that the 
complainant’s consent was conditional upon the assumption that McNally was 
male, and therefore actively decided not to disclose that information.232 This 
concept of “conditional consent” has been a subject of significant academic 
commentary in recent years. Fischel, for instance, has argued that although 
‘”[e]xplicitly conditional consent” is perhaps a rather ridiculous notion’ is the ‘least-
bad solution’ to the issue of deceptive sexual relationships.233 The idea that the 
criminal law should only intervene where one party explicitly identifies whatever 
fact their consent is conditional upon might resolve concerns such as Gibson’s 
that the law otherwise relies on cisnormative assumptions.234 Indeed Sharpe has 
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expressed concern that transgender individuals are called upon to internalise 
these beliefs, precluding them from ‘legitimately imagin[ing] him/herself to be the 
object of another’s desire’.235 However, I would suggest that Clough’s argument 
overstates the extent to which McNally was aware of any assumption on the part 
of the complainant and, to some extent, positions the complainant as a passive 
participant rather than an equal partner. As Sharpe highlights, moral expectations 
and assumptions play a significant role in the Court’s approach to categorising 
particular behaviour as culpable, with a particular emphasis on the principle of 
trust.236 Although the CoA determined that, as a matter of law, McNally had not 
committed an abuse of trust; this was largely owing to the narrow legal definition 
of trust in the context of sexual relationships.237 
 
Similarly, the idea of conditional consent and trust has arisen in discussion of HIV 
transmission offences. However, placing responsibility on the complainant in 
transmission cases has been subject to significant academic criticism,238 which 
might be said to have undermined the salience of such arguments in transmission 
cases. Cherkassky, for instance, argues that the acknowledgement in Konzani 
that a defendant might have reasonably believed the complainant was consenting 
without directly disclosing their status places too significant a burden on 
complainants to inquire about HIV status and allows a defendant to be 
‘completely reckless’ and yet not culpable.239 Elsewhere, I have been critical of 
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such a claim,240 arguing that this does not reduce the obligation to disclose but 
merely acknowledges that disclosure may take place through a third-party or 
through some indirect means such as a dating application profile.241 Even if 
Cherkassky’s argument that it is improper for significant responsibilities of 
investigation or inquiry to be placed on a complainant is generally accepted; there 
is arguably a need to acknowledge that this may not apply in specific contexts, 
particularly where there is a perceived responsibility on the HIV-negative to 
engage with available sexual health information.  
 
Distinctions must be highlighted, however, between the approach taken in the 
gender identity cases discussed above and HIV transmission offences. In 
particular, although it has been suggested that EB retained the possibility that 
active deception regarding HIV status might vitiate consent to sexual activity, 
generally,242 it has been consistently held that non-disclosure of HIV status will 
not do so.243 The decision by the Court of Appeal not to do so even in the case 
of Rowe, which involved active and malicious deception,244 discussed below, 
emphasises this distinction. As such, it might be suggested that the position first 
taken in Dica to treat HIV transmissions only as an offence against the person is 
now conclusive, unless, in future, Parliament decides to intervene. Nevertheless, 
the concept of “sexual fraud” developed in these cases arguably has some 
significance to the HIV and STI transmission offences going forward. As Ryan 
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has noted,245 there may be an ‘over-creativity in finding active deception’ in both 
sexual fraud and HIV transmission cases, resulting in the potential for significant 
over-criminalisation. Drawing on the analysis of sexual fraud and conditional 
consent discussed above, such concerns again highlight the complexity of the 
distinction between acts and omissions, a point which has roots in transmission 
cases going back to the time of Clarence.246  
 
2.7 Active “Deception”, Omissions, and Evidence of Fact 
The act/omission distinction in English criminal law is an issue of continued 
academic commentary and debate. As Herring notes,247 debate over our general 
duty to act and concern over the law over criminalising what are, in essence, 
moral or ethical obligations have been frequent issues in such discussions. 
Traditionally, it has been understood that omissions only constitute a criminal 
offence where there is a pre-existing duty to act, although this does not preclude 
the influence of perceived moral duties – which can in some instances shape 
culpability.248 In the context of HIV transmission and other “sexual fraud” cases, 
such as those discussed in the previous section, the extent to which “deception” 
as to information “material” to the complainant’s consent come to be placed on 
the ‘active side’ of this act/omission binary is significant.249 As Weait highlights, 
the prosecution case in Konzani drew heavily on the idea that the defendant ‘gave 
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certain implicit guarantees about himself’, which the complainants trusted.250 
Evidence which supports prosecution claims such as these, particularly where 
such evidence suggests a deliberately deceptive act on the defendant’s part, is 
likely to carry significant weight in relation the defendant’s culpability.  
 
Given the developments in the treatment and prevention of HIV since Konzani, 
such issues are ever more problematic owing to the distinct and differentiated 
ways in which people living with HIV may now choose to identify.251 As Sharpe 
suggests, where a defendant is aware of his low viral load and the reduced 
transmission risk resulting from it, but represents that he is HIV-negative, he may 
be judged more morally (and potentially legally) culpable because of the “active” 
nature of his deception, despite his efforts in maintaining a low viral load.252 In 
addition to omissions related to pre-existing duties, Ashworth suggests that 
another factor influences the categorisation of some omissions as closer to 
actions than others: opportunity.253 The basic premise of this point is that we 
might only be held responsible for omissions where we have the opportunity to 
act and the capacity to do so; which would preclude, for instance, criminalising 
failure to act where we are not present at the time or in the place of the event.254 
However, such matters might be further complicated in the context of defendants 
who ‘accidentally cause danger and then have a duty to prevent further harm’,255 
where presence at the time such danger was created may give rise to subsequent 
duty to act.  
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Ryan has argued that non-disclosure might be sufficiently distinguishable from 
active deception in transmission cases, so that the latter might be criminalised 
but not the former.256 The critical distinction between these two, similar to that in 
Konzani noted above, appears to be the impact of the defendant’s own 
knowledge. As Ryan states:  
[I]t is the fact that active deception evidences a more culpable state of 
mind upon which support for the making of this distinction is mainly based. 
Indeed it is difficult to see how a claim of consent by the sexual partner to 
run the risk of infection, or honest belief that such consent existed, could 
be sustained in the face of proof of active deception.257 
 
However, Ryan also goes on to counter Sharpe’s concern about non-disclosing 
parties who take steps to reduce their viral load. Ryan argues that, the emphasis 
being on the defendant’s culpability, evidence of active deception would not be 
sufficient to establish recklessness where steps had been taken to reduce 
infectivity, which would hardly indicate recklessness.258 Given that transmission 
is a necessary component of reckless transmission cases, I think there is merit in 
Ryan’s arguments on this point. However, I think that in the past such issues have 
easily been avoided because of the lack of conclusive, or even indicative, 
objective evidence of the defendant’s representations to the complaint.259 Given 
the proliferation of new forms of evidence, including dating application profiles, I 
remain concerned that findings of active deception might have an impact in future 
transmission cases, even where transmission risk itself was low. Such issues are, 
perhaps, likely to be compounded by Rowe where deliberate attempted 
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transmission involving active deception did result in a conviction in the absence 
of transmission itself.260 
 
2.8 Rowe: Intentional and Reckless Transmission  
One of the most significant developments in transmission case law since Dica, 
Daryll Rowe was convicted in 2017 in respect of five offences of causing grievous 
bodily harm by transmission and five counts of attempting to intentionally transmit 
HIV to sexual partners. As noted above, the case was the first intentional disease 
transmission case to result in a conviction, indeed the first to be prosecuted in 
England and Wales, and Rowe was sentenced to life with a minimum term of 12 
years.261 The case received significant media attention at the time,262 and 
subsequently has been the subject of a BBC television documentary;263 however, 
certain facts of the case warrant repeating.  
 
In April 2015, at a sexual health provider in Edinburgh, Rowe was informed that 
he had tested positive for HIV. At this point he was advised on how to reduce the 
risk of transmitting the virus to others, including through the use of condoms, as 
well as being advised to begin treatment, a consequence of which would be that 
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the risk of transmitting the virus during sex would be ‘dramatically reduce[d]’.264 
Rowe initially refused treatment and subsequently, in July 2015, was advised 
again to initiate treatment when blood tests indicated that his immune system was 
compromised as a result of the virus. At this stage, it appears Rowe was also 
advised of the criminalisation of HIV transmission,265 and of “PEP” – a 
combination of drugs that can be taken post-exposure to HIV which reduce the 
chance of infection if treatment is initiated within three days of exposure and the 
course of medication is adhered to for the full course of treatment. 
 
Between then and December 2016 when, following a failure to surrender, he was 
arrested in the North East of England, Rowe had unprotected sex with multiple 
sexual partners. Many of these partners were met through online mobile dating 
applications, predominantly the application Grindr, and digital messages sent 
between the defendant and several complainants were referred to at trial as 
evidence of Rowe’s intent. Alongside these messages, Rowe was able to provide 
‘no credible explanation for his cutting the tops off of the condoms’ he used with 
several of the complainants.266 
 
Several of the complainants reported having unprotected sex with other sexual 
partners during the periods within which they acquired the infection, and the 
challenge of scientifically establishing that the complainants acquired the 
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infection from the defendant were noted.267 As others have highlighted,268 
although genetic analysis is able to demonstrate that two infections are closely 
related, it is not able to determine causative relationships, including the direction 
of transmission, and certainly not to the criminal standard. Expert evidence in 
Rowe concluded that, in relation to the infections that were the subject of the s. 
18 charges, the infections were part of the ‘same infection cluster’ suggesting a 
common ‘connection between the men in Brighton and in Scotland’, where Rowe 
had resided.269 
 
Rowe’s initial decision not to begin a treatment regime and subsequent failure to 
adhere to a treatment regime after instigating one, were also noted within the 
judgment. Treatment was framed within the judgment as one means of 
‘assert[ing] control over the virus’ along with disclosure, the use of condoms, and 
post-exposure disclosure to facilitate the uptake of PEP.270 Lack of adherence 
was identified as a cause for concern due to the possible resistance to effective 
treatment options which it can result in,271 as well as the immediate impact it can 
have on viral load – the level of the virus present in the blood. On this point, one 
section of the judgement stands out: 
… If the viral load is below 40 the virus would be considered undetectable 
and there is little risk of passing it on. If an individual stopped taking 
antiretroviral medication their viral load would increase within a matter of 
weeks. An individual would not know how infectious they were and only a 
blood test could reveal it. Tests on the applicant showed that the virus was 
 
267 R v Rowe (n 161) [23]. 
268 See, for example, Weait, Intimacy and Responsibility: The Criminalisation of HIV Transmission 
(n 9) 100–101; Udo Schüklenk, ‘Should We Use the Criminal Law to Punish HIV Transmission?’ 
(2009) 4 International Journal of Law in Context 277; Hughes, ‘The Criminal Transmission of HIV: 
Issues with Condom Use and Viral Load’ (n 11) 118. 
269 R v Rowe (n 161) [29]. 
270 R v Rowe (n 161) [65]. 





not detectable between 4 April 2016 and 22 July 2016 because his viral 
load was under 40 but he was potentially infectious at other times.272 
 
Rowe’s defence – which primarily related to a claim by the defendant that he 
believed himself to be cured of the infection – did not at any stage claim, or more 
broadly refer to the possibility, that the complainants consented, either to the risk 
of transmission or to transmission itself.273 As the first case of intentional 
transmission it is significant, in and of itself, that consent was not discussed to 
the extent that it was in earlier case law, most prominently Dica and Konzani, if 
only to suggest that the present approach to consent set out in those cases 
appears to be firmly established to the extent that it was not key to any of the 
grounds of appeal in Rowe.  
 
It might also be suggested that this was a practical consequence of the extensive 
evidence that Rowe deliberately deceived his partners as to his HIV status. This 
supports Ryan’s claim, noted above, that evidence of active deception 
undermines the possibility of consent-based defences.274 Rowe’s case did not 
feature the HIV disclosure features discussed here, which were only beginning to 
feature on the applications Rowe used at the time he was arrested. Nevertheless, 
application use was a significant feature of the case, with the defendant meeting 
several of the complainants via Grindr and other applications.275 Messages of a 
graphic nature, including those where Rowe taunted the complainants and 
 
272 R v Rowe (n 161) [28]. 
273 Whether the latter would indeed be possible given the limitation of Brown is itself an 
underexplored issue. See R v Brown (n 59). 
274 Ryan, ‘“Active Deception” v Non-Disclosure: HIV Transmission, Non-Fatal Offences and 
Criminal Responsibility’ (n 13) 15. 





subsequently disclosed that he was HIV+ were critical to the prosecution’s 
case.276 
 
The specific facts of Rowe, in particular the nature and extent of these messages 
and the extent to which Rowe refused and later did not adhere to treatment to the 
detriment of his own health, and, perhaps less unique but still unusual,277 
intentional damage to condoms, mark out Rowe as an unusual case. It is, 
perhaps, unlikely that cases with similar facts will arise again, given that they 
necessarily involve individuals discontinuing, or not instigating, lifesaving 
treatment.278 However, what was not established in Rowe, it is argued, and what 
is of critical importance in the development of the concept of criminal 
responsibility vis issues of bodily autonomy, disease transmission and sexual 
consent, is why both the intentional transmission of HIV and attempted  
transmission of HIV were (and that they were is not specifically disputed here) 
intentional and attempted transmissions. What this piece will go on to argue, 
below, is that the unusual and perhaps somewhat startling facts of Rowe have 
resulted in a missed opportunity to establish a clearer framework of criminal 
responsibility in relation to disease transmission and sexual health which, in the 
context of an evolving socio-medical environment of HIV treatment and 




276 R v Rowe (n 161) [14]. 
277 See Brennan (n 165); and, for legal analysis, Brodsky (n 168). 
278 Giles (n 262). 
279 Including, in particular, the evolving role and understanding of PrEP. On which, see 





2.9 Concluding Remarks 
In this chapter, I have set out the background on HIV transmission offences in 
England and Wales. In the first section, I introduced Clarence and other 19th 
century cases which governed disease transmission criminalisation, or more 
accurately non-criminalisation, over the 20th century. I highlighted how the historic 
understanding of transmission risk and sex’s close association with the institution 
of marriage obscured the broader legal issues of what constitutes harm and what 
obligations we owe our sexual partners by way of information disclosure prior to 
sex. It is significant, of course, that the primary statute by which HIV transmission 
came to be criminalised pre-dates the emergence of HIV/AIDS by over 100 years 
and, as with reform to the Offences Against the Person Act more widely,280 it is 
questionable whether these provisions are fit for purpose in the modern world.  
Following this introduction, I turned to the specific cases of Dica and Konzani and 
discussed the manner in which culpability in those cases is closely linked with the 
defendant’s apparent knowledge, the complainant’s vulnerability to deception 
and the principle that non-disclosure violated the trust that the complainants 
placed in Dica and Konzani.  
 
I then considered the developments seen in the treatment and prevention of HIV 
since the time of Dica and Konzani, suggesting that the emergence of Treatment 
as Prevention, in particular, as well as the increased availability of PrEP have the 
potential to significantly alter the debate over the justifications of transmission 
criminalisation. I agreed with Weait’s statement that laws on HIV transmission 
‘frequently express an explicit moral agenda and exist as a means of enforcing 
 





and reinforcing particular cultural and social norms and values.’281 Discussing 
these values, including trust and responsibility, I highlighted the individualistic 
nature of these concepts. I emphasised that debate on HIV transmission risk 
frequently makes connections between the actions of individual people living with 
HIV and broader concerns around public health. I suggested that the uneven 
distribution of responsibility for HIV prevention between people living with HIV 
and the HIV-negative was a cause for concern and is consequential in how those 
living with HIV are framed within the law.  
 
Following this, I provided an account of the concept of “sexual fraud”. Discussing 
the case law on gender identity “deception” seen in recent years, I argued that 
the development of this concept was significant given its potential influence in 
HIV transmission cases. In particular, the distinction between active deception 
and non-disclosure seen in those cases and the impact that this distinction has 
on the act/omission binary might, I would suggest, have some relevance in HIV 
transmission cases. The complexity of establishing both objective facts and 
subjective understanding in HIV transmission cases was noted by Ormerod even 
before Dica, in 2001.282 However, given the emergence of new forms of evidence, 
such as dating applications, which might more overtly demonstrate defendants’ 
(mis)representations – the impact of evidence that might be used to demonstrate 
defendants’ culpability arguably warrants further academic and legal attention, 
which the remainder of this thesis aims to address. 
 
281 Weait, ‘Unsafe Law: Health, Rights and the Legal Response to HIV’ (n 187) 539. 
282 Ormerod (n 77). 
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Chapter 3: Research Methodology and Method 
3.1 Introduction 
Exploring the social and contextual expectations and knowledge which feature in 
academic debates surrounding the criminalisation of HIV transmission and 
addressing the role of dating application profiles as a potential source of evidence 
in criminal proceedings presented several methodological challenges. Not only is 
the subject matter of this project highly personal and sensitive, but the objective 
of investigating the contextual meanings and expectations of HIV transmission 
risk, disclosure, and responsibility warranted a data collection method which was 
similarly contextualised.1 With this in mind, this chapter first explains my overall 
theoretical perspective before then addressing the methodologies relevant to this 
project. I then turn to the specific methods used for data collection, which used 
visual elicitation as part of a qualitative online survey, before then discussing the 
actual process of data collection and analysis.  
 
As noted in Chapter 1, there has not, to date, been empirical research into the 
impact of application disclosure features from a criminal law perspective in 
England and Wales. Given this, along with the relative lack of research into online 
disclosure from a legal perspective, more generally, a more novel approach to 
data collection was necessary. Given this lack of prior research, it seemed 
appropriate to adopt a qualitative approach, which would allow emerging issues 
 
1 Kazmer and Xie discuss the concept of ‘contextual naturalness’ in internet based interviews. 
Whilst the approach taken here differs in some respects from internet based interviews because 
of specific ethical concerns, discussed below, the objective of maintaining a contextual similarity 
remains similar. See Michelle M Kazmer and Bo Xie, ‘Qualitative Interviewing in Internet Studies: 
Playing with the Media, Playing with the Method’ (2008) 11 Information Communication and 
Society 257; and, for a more recent application of this approach, Dan Michael Fielding, 





to be identified and analysed.2 A qualitative approach seemed the most 
appropriate way to facilitate the exploration of participants’ understanding of 
these features and provide a basis for future research, including potential 
quantitative/mixed methods research into specific behaviours and practices.3  In 
reaching this decision, I was influenced to some extent by existing literature which 
does address online disclosure from a social or cultural perspective.4 This 
literature proved invaluable during the planning stages of the project, where it 
aided in the development of the visual elicitation stimuli materials employed here. 
 
Given the focus on participants’ contextual understanding, the constructionist 
epistemological approach taken in this project, which emphasises ‘the collective 
generation [and transmission] of meaning’ and ‘the hold our culture has on us’,5 
is perhaps unsurprising. Whilst some authors draw a distinction between 
constructivism on the one hand, focusing on the ‘individual mind’ and the 
construction of meaning within it, and constructionism, emphasising the social 
construction of meaning, on the other,6 such distinctions are not replicated by all 
authors.7 Furthermore, some position constructionism as an overarching term or 
 
2 Crotty notes that researchers rarely begin with a fully formed research philosophy in mind, 
instead focusing on a particular problem they seek to address. See Michael Crotty, The 
Foundations of Social Research (Sage 1998) 13. 
3 It did not seem appropriate to adopt a quantitative approach for this project. Although specific 
issues guided the research design, these were not readily reducable to variables in the manner 
necessary for quantitative work. For discussion of the limitations of quantitative research, 
generally, see Lisa Webley, ‘Qualitative Approaches to Empirical Legal Research’ in Peter Cane 
and Herbert Kritzer (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Empirical Legal Research (OUP 2010). 
4 See, in particular, Kane Race, ‘Click Here for HIV Status: Shifting Templates of Sexual 
Negotiation’ (2010) 3 Emotion, Space and Society 7; Brandon Andrew Robinson, ‘Doing Sexual 
Responsibility: HIV, Risk Discourses, Trust, and Gay Men Interacting Online’ (2018) 61 
Sociological Perspectives 383. 
5 Crotty (n 2) 58 (‘[and transmission]’ in original). 
6 Crotty (n 2) 57-58. 
7 For instance, Braun and Clarke speak only of constructionism, although they also highlight 
contextualism, whcih might be seen as a form of ‘constructionism-[very]-lite’: Virginia Braun and 





as an ontological position, rather than an epistemological one, 8 and there have 
been some who suggest that applying a critical approach involves separate 
considerations from constructionist research.9 I would argue, however, that 
attempting to draw too fine a distinction between these approaches is ultimately 
unhelpful and, instead, it is important to consider the philosophical foundations of 
this work more holistically.  
 
The importance of such considerations is apparent when examining the vignette 
technique set out across this chapter. The use of the vignette method in this 
project is driven by the assumption that knowledge cannot be non-situational.10 
Vignettes employ short stories or other stimuli,11 in this project stories and visual 
stimuli, to elicit responses from participants. Barter and Renold argue that such 
methods are effective at capturing beliefs and attitudes, particularly in relation to 
everyday occurrences experienced by participants, whilst also facilitating the 
exploration of sensitive and personal topics.12 Wilks notes that there are ‘obvious 
questions about the extremely complex relationship between reports of 
behaviours and the behaviours themselves’ and that ‘[t]here is no guarantee that 
the responses to a given vignette will in some way mirror actual behaviour of the 
respondent’.13 However, Wilks also notes that this limitation is less consequential 
 
8 Crotty (n 2) 58. 
9 Salma Patel, ‘The Research Paradigm – Methodology, Epistemology and Ontology – Explained 
in Simple Language’ (Salma Patel, 15 July 2015) <http://salmapatel.co.uk/academia/the-
research-paradigm-methodology-epistemology-and-ontology-explained-in-simple-language/> 
accessed 31 May 2019. 
10 Janet Finch, ‘The Vignette Technique in Survey Research’ (1987) 21 Sociology 105, 105–106. 
11 Douglas Harper, ‘Talking about Pictures : A Case for Photo Elicitation’ (2002) 17 Visual Studies 
13; Tjitske de Groot and others, ‘Using Visual Vignettes to Explore Sensitive Topics: A Research 
Note on Exploring Attitudes towards People with Albinism in Tanzania’ [2020] International 
Journal of Social Research Methodology. 
12 Christine Barter and Emma Renold, ‘The Use of Vignettes in Qualitative Research’ [1999] 
Social Research Update. 
13 Tom Wilks, ‘The Use of Vignettes in Qualitative Research into Social Work Values’ (2004) 3 





if the focus of the study relates to beliefs and values, where vignettes might be 
judged by their ‘meaningfulness’ to participants.14 Similarly, Crafter and 
colleagues argue that vignettes do not act as an exact stage for recreating “what 
participants would actually do in a specific situation”15 but instead allowing 
participants a space to reflect on their perceptions, thoughts and feelings. From 
an epistemological standpoint, therefore, the decision to use vignette-type 
questions early on in the project acted as a catalyst for making the project closer 
to a critical constructionist epistemology. This framework enables the project to 
explore and ‘interrogate’ the representations elicited by the stimuli.16 
 
On the basis of this philosophical foundation, the methodological approach of the 
project, outlined in the next section, took inspiration from the setting it investigates 
by being similarly digital and visual. These two methodological themes, along with 
the focus on context dependent knowledge and understanding, led to an online 
survey being used to share the vignettes with participants. As I go on to discuss 
in Section 3.3, there were a number of advantages to this approach including that 
participants’ responses can be presented here verbatim, without the difficulties of 
transcription. In subsequent chapters, I provide quotations in their original form, 
with spelling and grammar uncorrected. Minor changes to formatting (such as 
double spacing) have been made where this was necessary and did not change 
the meaning of the quotation.  The added privacy afforded by online recruitment 
 
14 Wilks (n 13) 83.  
15 Sarah Crafter and others, ‘Using Vignette Methodology as a Tool for Exploring Cultural Identity 
Positions of Language Brokers’ (2015) 28 Journal of Constructivist Psychology 83, 84–85; 
Rhidian Hughes and Meg Huby, ‘The Construction and Interpretation of Vignettes in Social 
Research’ (2004) 11 Social Work & Social Sciences Review 36; Niamh Maguire and others, 
‘Using Vignette Methodology to Research the Process of Breach Comparatively’ (2015) 7 
European Journal of Probation 241. 





and participation, when compared with face-to-face interviews, further facilitated 
the exploration of the HIV disclosure features found on applications, arguably a 
highly sensitive topic, where interviewer effects may be significant. As Holmström 
et al suggest, vignettes are already beneficial in this regard, as ‘[p]articipants who 
do not want to discuss their personal experiences can respond to those of 
“others.”’17 Given the particular sensitivity of HIV and dating application use, the 
additional privacy and ease of participation which online methods provide 
seemed eminently suitable given the online nature of applications themselves 
and the focus on the context within which disclosure and trusting practices arise.   
 
In this introductory section, I have outlined the philosophical foundations of this 
project. At its core, the methodology and methods detailed below aimed to collect 
data on how application users create meaning related to the content of application 
profiles and critically appraise the consequences of this knowledge in the context 
of legal proceedings in England and Wales.18 As I go on to conclude at the end 
of this chapter, I make two primary contributions to socio-legal research methods 
through this work. Firstly, I demonstrate the application of visual vignette 
techniques to explore socio-legal issues, drawing on prior sociological and health 
and social work research. Secondly, I develop the digital visual vignette, which 
might be used to investigate a range of legal issues related to online visual 
phenomena such as social networking, online communication and application 
use beyond the dating applications explored here.  
 
17 Charlotta Holmström, Lars Plantin and Eva Elmerstig, ‘Complexities of Sexual Consent: Young 
People’s Reasoning in a Swedish Context’ [2020] Psychology & Sexuality 5. 
18 In this respect, the project falls within the critical, rather than experiential, camp described in 
Braun and Clarke, Successful Qualitative Research (n 7) 21; Braun and Clarke here build on the 
work of Reicher, see Stephen Reicher, ‘Against Methodolatry: Some Comments on Elliott, 





3.2 Methodological Themes 
As noted above, three methodological themes guided the development of the 
data collection survey used in this project. These were: the internet as a site of 
research; visual research methods in social science; and, the use of stories and 
scenarios to investigate context-related expectations and knowledge. In this 
section, I explore these three themes, explaining their importance to the design 
decisions made during the development of the data collection methods discussed 
in the next section. Prior research into the information included in application 
profiles, which pre-dates the introduction of the disclosure features considered 
here, has approached data collection through interviews,19 observations,20 and 
ethnographies.21 Whilst each of these has their own advantages and 
disadvantages in terms of ease of participation, research ethics, and overall data 
collection, through the discussion in this section I establish the particular 
advantages of the online qualitative survey in achieving the research objectives 
of this project, whilst also highlighting the limitations of this approach.  
 
3.2.1 The Internet as a Site of Research 
Widespread internet access, although far from a universal phenomenon, has had 
a significant influence on the development of social science research, particularly 
over the last two decades.22 The internet can be positioned as both a tool to be 
 
19 Rusi Jaspal, ‘Gay Men’s Construction and Management of Identity on Grindr’ (2017) 21 
Sexuality and Culture 187. 
20 Jody Ahlm, ‘Respectable Promiscuity: Digital Cruising in an Era of Queer Liberalism’ (2017) 20 
Sexualities 364. 
21 Christian Phillips, ‘Self-Pornographic Representations with Grindr’ (2015) 1 Journal of Visual 
and Media Anthropology 65. 
22 See, for instance, Alison Evans, Jonathan Elford and Dick Wiggins, ‘Using the Internet for 
Qualitative Research’ in Carla Willig and Wendy Stainton-Rogers (eds), The SAGE Handbook of 





employed during the investigation of other phenomena, or as the subject of 
academic investigation in its own right.23 Research in both instances may draw 
upon research strategies and methods developed offline, although there is an 
increased recognition that certain digital methodologies do not necessarily 
correlate with traditional analogue, offline approaches.24 An issue of longstanding 
debate in respect of online research is whether participants are more likely to 
provide false or incomplete information to researchers. Evans et al point out that 
‘[o]ne of the major criticisms that is levelled at online research is that we cannot 
rely on participants to present themselves “truthfully”.’25 Similarly, Boellstorff and 
colleagues note that data collected offline can sometimes be presented as more 
“authentic” than that collected online.26 Such concerns highlight how online 
research methods are often pitched against traditional offline methods and 
positioned as inferior to them, arguably overlooking the importance of 
acknowledging the major role that the internet has in modern life. 27  
 
Furthermore, the broad distinctions made between online and offline research 
are often overly simplistic. Ashford notes that there is ‘increasing acceptance that 
the Internet itself can be a source of field sites as well as being a tool to examine 
“virtual” and “real” sites, however false that dichotomy may be.’28 Similarly, the 
 
23 Janet Salmons, Qualitative Online Interviews (Sage 2015). 
24 Laura Robinson and Jeremy Schulz, ‘New Avenues for Sociological Inquiry: Evolving Forms of 
Ethnographic Practice’ (2009) 43 Sociology 685. 
25 Evans, Elford and Wiggins (n 22) 5; see, similarly, Brian S Mustanski, ‘Getting Wired: Exploiting 
the Internet for the Collection of Valid Sexuality Data’ (2001) 38 Journal of Sex Research 292, 
296–297. 
26 Tom Boellstorff and others, Ethnography and Virtual Worlds: A Handbook of Method (Princeton 
University Press 2012) 40–41. 
27 Eve Stirling, ‘“I’m Always on Facebook!” Exploring Facebook as a Mainstream Research Tool 
and Ethnographic Site’ in Helene Snee and others (eds), Digital methods for social science : an 
interdisciplinary guide to research innovation (Palgrave Macmillan 2016). 
28 Chris Ashford, ‘Queer Theory, Cyber-Ethnographies and Researching Online Sex 
Environments’ (2009) 18 Information and Communications Technology Law 297, 229 (citations 





dichotomy of “virtual” and “real-world” research methods arguably fails to 
acknowledge that the digital world is interwoven into the physical world, making 
both “real” to those engaged with them.29 It is from this position that the 
exclusively online techniques used in this project came to be developed. This 
approach is not intended to suggest that online methods are inherently superior 
(or, indeed, inferior) to offline methods, nor to erase the potential for blended 
methods which challenge the online/offline dichotomy.30 Instead, it is intended to 
acknowledge that there is nothing inauthentic or lacking in online research which 
investigates specific online phenomena and field sites through similarly online 
means.  
 
3.2.1.1 The Everyday Internet  
In acknowledging the specificity of the internet as a site of research, three 
features stand out in relation to this project, the first of which – the everyday, or 
mundane, nature of internet use – I address here. The HIV disclosure features 
investigated here, along with application profiles more generally, are typical 
examples of the participatory nature of everyday internet usage in the 21st 
century. In contrast to the early years of the internet, when those accessing the 
internet were predominantly consumers of content, internet usage since the turn 
of the millennium has placed a greater emphasis on user participation in online 
spaces.31 Whether participation in social networking is sufficient to afford the label 
 
29 Tom Boellstorff, ‘For Whom the Ontology Turns: Theorizing the Digital Real’ (2016) 57 Current 
Anthropology 387. 
30  Ronald E Hallett and Kristen Barber, ‘Ethnographic Research in a Cyber Era’ (2014) 43 Journal 
of Contemporary Ethnography 306. 
31 Grant Blank and Bianca C Reisdorf, ‘The Participatory Web: A User Perspective on Web 2.0’ 





“produser” – a portmanteau of producer (of content) and user – is contestable: 
Bird, for instance, argues that there is insufficient creativity involved in Facebook 
posts or tweets.32 Furthermore, online dating applications might be distinguished 
from social networking sites, because the content which a user “produces” is 
typically limited to a profile, with a format controlled by the application’s 
developer.  
 
Cassidy argues that, in the context of Gaydar (an earlier social networking site 
for men who have sex with men), some users demonstrated ‘participatory 
reluctance’, leaving sections of profiles blank or partially completed.33 However, 
even where there is disengagement of this kind, dating applications might still be 
compared to other forms of online identity creation and presentation,34 because 
the nature of these applications emphasises the user’s visibility to others, 
including through the use of photos and other multimedia. This participatory 
element, even where users do not go beyond it by uploading content or 
completing profile information, still serves to undermine the dichotomisation of 
the online and the offline self. Consequently, the participatory web, even where 
users’ participation is reluctant, is less a discrete part of the everyday and instead 
woven into other mundane practices.35  
 
This distinction has several implications for academic research. First, recognition 
that engaging with the internet is a pervasive part of everyday living necessarily 
 
32 See S Elizabeth Bird, ‘Are We All Produsers Now?’ (2011) 25 Cultural Studies 502, 512. 
33 Elija Cassidy, ‘Social Networking Sites and Participatory Reluctance: A Case Study of Gaydar, 
User Resistance and Interface Rejection’ (2016) 18 New Media and Society 2613, 2624. 
34 On which, see Liam Bullingham and Ana C Vasconcelos, ‘“The Presentation of Self in the 
Online World”: Goffman and the Study of Online Identities’ (2013) 39 Journal of Information 
Science 101. 





suggests that the role of the internet should be considered in every research 
project, even where the internet is not the primary focus of the investigation. 
Second, where exclusively online or offline methods are used over a blended 
method, this warrants justification and an acknowledgement of any limitations this 
produces.36 Finally, recognising the mundanity of internet usage for many 
participants should also be considered when developing data collection methods. 
As I will go on to discuss below, this was one rationale behind the visual vignettes 
used here. Given that applications are, perhaps, unexceptional to those using 
them, techniques such as the ‘app walkthrough’37 and ‘media go-along’38 or 
methods such as participant diaries39 have some advantages over interviews, 
where participants may not provide data on unremarkable experiences. However, 
there are potential privacy concerns with such approaches, given that there is a 
risk of identifiable non-participant data being referenced in participants’ diary 
responses and walkthroughs may involve researchers observing non-participants 
as they are taken through the application. Although such concerns can be offset 
through research design, as in the works cited above, similar concerns relating 
to participant inhibitions and the sensitive nature of the research topic may be 
more challenging.  
 
Therefore, in this project, purely online data collection methods were used. These 
enabled the collection of data without raising privacy concerns, whilst also 
capitalising on the benefits of online only research and acknowledging specific 
 
36 On this point, see, in particular, Hallett and Barber (n 30). 
37 Kath Albury and others, ‘Data Cultures of Mobile Dating and Hook-up Apps: Emerging Issues 
for Critical Social Science Research’ (2017) 4 Big Data & Society 1, 9. 
38 Kristian Møller Jørgensen, ‘The media go-along – Researching Mobilities with Media at Hand’ 
(2016) 32 MedieKultur. Journal of media and communication research 32. 
39 Carl Bonner-Thompson, ‘“The Meat Market”: Production and Regulation of Masculinities on the 





limitations which might be addressed by future offline research. Advantages of 
online-only research, where the issue under investigation is similarly digital, 
include an increased familiarity to participants, which may lower inhibitions and 
contribute to more open discussion of complex personal experiences and 
beliefs.40 Online asynchronous research, where researcher and participant do not 
need to be online at the same time, also enables participants to contribute at a 
time convenient to them. In contrast, offline or blended data collection would 
require more personal details to be collected and introduce additional barriers to 
participation. There are downsides to such methods, particularly the challenge of 
establishing rapport and putting participants at ease.41 As detailed below, I 
attempted to offset these limitations in this project through the recruitment 
process. Given there were also advantages to online data collection in terms of 
interviewer and participant mobility,42 relevant to the mobile nature of applications 
which I now turn to, I would argue that any disadvantages to this approach were 
outweighed in this project.  
 
3.2.1.2 The Mobile Internet 
A critical factor in the everyday usage of the internet is the pervasive and mobile 
nature of internet access through technologies such as smartphones, the 
proliferation of public wi-fi and availability of high-speed mobile data. This might 
be considered a further challenge to the online/offline dichotomy, given that users 
no longer need to be tethered to a desktop computer in order to be “active” online. 
Stirling notes that on Facebook, for example, a user’s profile might be viewed and 
 
40 John Suler, ‘The Online Disinhibition Effect’ (2004) 7 CyberPsychology & Behavior 321. 
41 Evans, Elford and Wiggins (n 22) 12–13. 





interacted with whilst the user is “offline”.  Consequently, Stirling argues that 
research into “online” behaviour might therefore need to address periods when 
users might not think of themselves as online.43 With social networking sites with 
their own mobile applications, the distinction between online and offline is most 
acutely blurred because these applications enable notifications and messages 
whilst users are mobile. The design of mobile dating applications further 
complicates this issue, as although these applications prioritise immediate 
communication, users do remain visible and “online” for a short (or in some 
instances a significantly longer) period after they have closed the application.44  
As well as being able to receive messages from previous contacts when offline, 
this means that users might receive messages from new contacts during a time 
when they are nevertheless disconnected from the site. 
 
It is also significant that many mobile dating applications do not have a 
companion website and therefore can only be accessed via a mobile device. At 
the time of data collection in this project, this included Grindr, although 
subsequently this has seen the introduction of Grindr Web.45 At the time of data 
collection, therefore, it could be suggested that the lack of alternate access points 
distinguished dating applications from social networks. In her 2014 research into 
Facebook, Stirling noted that 22% of users’ access was through mobile phones,46 
and whilst a greater proportion of access may now be through mobiles given the 
 
43 Eve Stirling, ‘Using Facebook as a Research Site and Research Tool’ [2014] SAGE Research 
Methods Cases. 
44 The exact length of time a profile will remain visible varies between (and possibly within) 
applications. Hornet, for instance, shows users who were online over a day ago, whereas Grindr 
typically shows users for only a number of hours.  
45 Josh Milton, ‘Grindr Web: Here’s How to Use Grindr on Your Computer Desktop’ (Pink News, 
5 May 2020) <https://www.pinknews.co.uk/2020/05/05/grindr-web-desktop-computer-laptop-app-
what-is-how/> accessed 5 May 2020. 





increased affordability of smartphones and mobile data, these services still 
combine mobile and desktop access. In contrast, where there is a lack of web-
based access, dating applications are intrinsically tied to a physical device. This 
device, in turn, maintains a physical proximity to the user. As such, it might be 
suggested that Facebook and Twitter might be on a user’s mind, but Grindr and 
Hornet are always in their pocket. The developments seen since data was 
collected in this project, including the impact of COVID-19 and the lockdown and 
travel restrictions seen in the UK, mean that future research may wish to consider 
the extent to which these applications continue to be “mobile”.  
 
3.2.1.3 Researching (via) The Internet 
The mobile and everyday nature of the internet mean that researching via the 
internet is now an established technique in both legal and sexualities focused 
research, including research related to HIV.47 The advantages of internet-based 
research can be both general, in terms of time and cost savings,48 or, as is the 
case here, specifically tied to the research topic. As the aim of this project was to 
explore the relevance of HIV disclosure on applications to criminal proceedings 
in England and Wales, this project necessarily had a connection with the internet 
and, as contextual expectations were critical to this aim, there was an inherent 
advantage to maintaining a contextual similarity for participants. Still, there are 
particular challenges to researching via the internet, particularly the lack of an 
existing relationship between the researcher and prospective participants 
 
47 See, for example, Brenda L Curtis, ‘Social Networking and Online Recruiting for HIV Research: 
Ethical Challenges’ (2014) 9 Journal of Empirical Research on Human Research Ethics 58. 
48 Rosie Harding and Elizabeth Peel, ‘Surveying Sexualities: Internet Research with Non-





recruited online, especially where there is not a gatekeeper to the spaces in which 
recruitment takes place.  
 
Online recruitment techniques can take multiple forms, including the use of 
emails,49 social media posts,50 and social networking itself.51 Often, a 
broadcasting approach is used, where messages and posts promoting the project 
are sent out in a fire-and-forget fashion. These attempt to balance the potential 
benefits of online recruitment (speed, reach and access to harder to engage with 
populations) with risks such as consent and privacy issues.52 However, the 
effectiveness of this approach can be limited, particularly where prospective 
participants are likely to be hesitant because of the research topic. It may also 
disrupt ordinary usage of the online space and prove an inconvenience to other 
users, which may make further research activities on these spaces more 
difficult.53 Using networks and other contacts can be an alternative to this 
approach, where snowball sampling can prove effective as a means of 
introduction; although as Dietz notes snowballing blurs the ‘distinction between 
“gatekeepers” and “participants”’.54  
 
 
49 Harding and Peel (n 48). 
50 Curtis (n 47). 
51 Max Morris, ‘“Gay Capital” in Gay Student Friendship Networks: An Intersectional Analysis of 
Class, Masculinity, and Decreased Homophobia’ (2018) 35 Journal of Social and Personal 
Relationships 1183; Brandon Miller, ‘A Picture Is Worth 1000 Messages: Investigating Face and 
Body Photos on Mobile Dating Apps for Men Who Have Sex with Men’ [2019] Journal of 
Homosexuality. 
52 For instance, see Curtis (n 47). 
53 Ellen DB Riggle, Sharon S Rostosky and C Stuart Reedy, ‘Online Surveys for BGLT Research: 
Issues and Techniques.’ (2005) 49 Journal of Homosexuality 1, 8. 
54 Chris Dietz, ‘Governing Legal Embodiment: On the Limits of Self-Declaration’ (2018) 26 





In this project, a combination of application-based and social media recruitment 
was used. Application based recruitment is a common approach in research 
investigating apps,55 although this does require careful planning and 
implementation, which I discuss below. Such techniques acknowledge and 
capitalise on the mobile and everyday nature of the internet by opening up 
research to a broad pool of potential participants. As Chiasson et al state, ‘like all 
recruitment methods, there are many sources of potential bias in online sampling 
in addition to some technological issues specific to the Internet’.56 However, when 
researching issues where internet access is already part of the eligibility criteria 
for the project, the advantages of researching via the internet are significant.  
 
 3.2.2 The Visual Nature of Applications 
Visual methodologies were the second theme arising in the development of this 
project. The appearance of visuals in social research is not a recent development. 
Rose argues, however, that significantly more attention has been given to visual 
research, as part of a larger trend towards ‘visual culture studies’, in the last two 
decades.57 Grady suggests that this trend is not a natural variation in changing 
academic interests but rather a response to the “pull” of mass visualisation in 
modern society.58 Digital imagery and the rise of the graphical user interface on 
computers and mobile devices are clear examples of this mass visualisation. As 
 
55 See, for instance, Carl Anthony Bonner-Thompson, ‘How to Do Grindr: Sensory, Visceral and 
Haptic Geographies of Men Who Use Grindr in Newcastle-upon-Tyne’ (PhD Thesis, Newcastle 
University 2018). 
56 Mary Ann Chiasson and others, ‘HIV Behavioral Research Online’ (2006) 83 Journal of Urban 
Health 73, 77. 
57 Gillian Rose, ‘On the Relation between “visual Research Methods” and Contemporary Visual 
Culture’ (2014) 62 Sociological Review 24. 
58 John Grady, ‘Reframing Visual Social Science: Towards a More Visual Sociology and 





noted in Chapter 1, the visual profile and the location-based capabilities of 
smartphones combine to connect otherwise strangers. In contrast to earlier forms 
of mobile connectivity, imagery and photography is not just media to be shared,59 
it is the medium through which communication takes place.  
 
3.2.2.1 Pictures and Photos, Public and Private 
When users first download an application, sometimes before even being asked 
to create an account, users are presented with what some applications have 
termed a “cascade” – a grid of nearby users’ profiles including a profile image 
where one has been provided.60 The photos in these profiles play a significant 
role in establishing first impressions between users.61 In addition to publicly 
visible profiles, the private sharing of (often, sexually explicit) photos is common 
and can be a reason for application use in itself or a secondary aim where apps 
are being used to pass time,62 facilitate sexual encounters,63 or search for and 
maintain romantic relationships.64  
 
 
59 See, for instance, earlier literature on bluetooth connectivity: Sharif Mowlabocus, Gaydar 
Culture : Gay Men Technology and Embodiment in the Digital Age (Ashgate 2010) Ch 7. 
60 Jed R Brubaker, Mike Ananny and Kate Crawford, ‘Departing Glances: A Sociotechnical 
Account of “Leaving” Grindr’ (2016) 18 New Media & Society 373, 376; Yoel Roth, ‘Zero Feet 
Away: The Digital Geography of Gay Social Media’ (2016) 63 Journal of Homosexuality 437, 438. 
61 Courtney Blackwell, Jeremy Birnholtz and Charles Abbott, ‘Seeing and Being Seen: Co-
Situation and Impression Formation Using Grindr, a Location-Aware Gay Dating App’ (2015) 17 
New Media & Society 1117. 
62 Chad Van De Wiele and Stephanie Tom Tong, ‘Breaking Boundaries : The Uses & 
Gratifications of Grindr’ [2014] 2014 ACM International Joint Conference on Pervasive and 
Ubiquitous Computing 619. 
63 Kirsty Best and Sharon Delmege, ‘The Filtered Encounter: Online Dating and the Problem of 
Filtering through Excessive Information’ (2012) 22 Social Semiotics 237. 
64 Mark McCormack, ‘The Role of Smartphones and Technology in Sexual and Romantic Lives’ 





The sharing of sexually explicit photographs is itself a significant sociological 
issue,65 which has potential socio-legal consequences in the context of 
harassment and so-called “revenge porn’.66 Previous research into the legal 
implications of online imagery has employed online surveys as part of a mixed-
methods approach, using written prompts rather than visuals to elicit participants’ 
responses.67 Such an approach had limitations in this context, including in 
relation to one final visual element that should be highlighted: the emoji.  As well 
as the Unicode standard set of emoji symbols and the variations of these 
developed by mobile phone manufacturers,68 specific emoji symbols have been 
introduced by application developers and emoji use is a common occurrence on 
apps.69 Both varieties of emoji contribute to a potential for ambiguity, in part 
because of the inherent ambiguity of symbolism. 70 But, also, because the specific 
appearance of emoji can differ between platforms, as well as between 




65 Andrea Waling and Tinonee Pym, ‘“C’Mon, No One Wants a Dick Pic”: Exploring the Cultural 
Framings of the “Dick Pic” in Contemporary Online Publics’ Journal of Gender Studies (2017) 1; 
Flora Oswald and others, ‘I’ll Show You Mine so You’ll Show Me Yours: Motivations and 
Personality Variables in Photographic Exhibitionism’ [2019] The Journal of Sex Research. 
66 Nicola Henry and Anastasia Powell, ‘Sexual Violence in the Digital Age: The Scope and Limits 
of Criminal Law’ (2016) 25 Social and Legal Studies 397; Thomas Crofts and Tyrone Kirchengast, 
‘A Ladder Approach to Criminalising Revenge Pornography’ (2019) 83 The Journal of Criminal 
Law 87. 
67 Ari Ezra Waldman, ‘Law, Privacy, and Online Dating: Revenge Porn in Gay Online 
Communities’ (2019) 44 Law and Social Inquiry 987. 
68 See Unicode Inc, ‘Full Emoji List, V11.0’ (2018) <https://unicode.org/emoji/charts/full-emoji-
list.html> accessed 28 September 2018. 
69 The Guardian, ‘Grindr’s Gaymoji: Pierced Aubergines, a Peach on a Plate – and a Banned “T”’ 
(The Guardian, 21 March 2017) <https://www.theguardian.com/technology/shortcuts/2017/mar 
/21/gaymoji-pierced-aubergines-a-peach-on-a-plate-and-a-banned-t> accessed 24 May 2018. 
70 It has been observed that emoji can serve several purposes in online communication. See, 
Lauren Gawne and Gretchen McCulloch, ‘Emoji as Digital Gestures’ (2019) 17 
Language@Internet. 
71 Fred Morstatter and others, ‘Cross-Platform Emoji Interpretation: Analysis, a Solution, and 





3.2.2.2 Visual Methods and Data 
In order to investigate this visual side of application use and explore the relevance 
of the (visual) profile in criminal proceedings, a method that incorporated imagery 
into the data collection process seemed appropriate. Visual methods can 
incorporate a number of different approaches including the analysis of existing 
images by the researcher, getting participants to create new images, or exploring 
how existing images are “seen by particular spectators who look in particular 
ways”.72 Boellstorff et al note that multiple ethnographic researchers investigating 
digital phenomena have recorded and analysed visual data such as screenshots, 
shared images, and video capture, or included imagery in their data collection 
process.73 These different approaches do share a commonality, however; all 
consider the intention behind the production of an image, the audience who view 
it, and the interpretation it is given.74 
 
Some researchers have, in prior studies, taken data directly from applications.75 
In order to avoid ethical concerns, these authors have taken data only from what 
might be categorised as “public” spaces on apps and have redacted images 
where necessary.76 Others investigating the visual nature of application use have 
circumvented such concerns by relying on stock images,77 or have sought to only 
 
72 Gillian Rose, Visual Methodologies : An Introduction to the Interpretation of Visual Materials 
(Sage 2001) 12. 
73 See Boellstorff and others (n 26); see, also, Hallett and Barber (n 30). 
74 Rose (n 72) 23–25. 
75 See, for instance, Elija Cassidy, ‘Gay Men, Social Media and Self Presentation: Managing 
Identities in Gaydar, Facebook and Beyond’ (PhD Thesis, Queensland University of Technology 
2013); Emeka E Moses, ‘Eggplants and Peaches: Understanding Emoji Usage on Grindr’ (MA 
Thesis, East Tennessee State University 2018). 
76 See, in particular, Cassidy (n 75); Guido Noto La Diega, ‘Grinding Privacy in the Internet of 
Bodies’ in Ronald Leenes and others (eds), Data Protection and Privacy (Hart Publishing 2019). 





capture participants’ profiles whilst still anonymising non-relevant information.78 
Whilst there remain few technical limitations to capturing images from dating 
applications, there are arguably ethical concerns with doing so, even where this 
data is lifted from public profiles where there is a limited expectation of privacy. 
There is a risk of exposing private information without consent, even where care 
is taken to anonymise data, or the converse risk that anonymisation distorts the 
meaning of the data collected. Digital walkthrough methods, advocated by Albury 
and colleagues,79 are one method which facilitates this approach – only capturing 
the data of participants or the public profiles they see when using apps. However, 
where the research topic is particularly sensitive, as in the case here with HIV 
disclosure, such approaches arguably do not go far enough.  
 
When developing this project, I considered two potential means of addressing 
this challenge. On the one hand, I could fully redact any images collected during 
the data collection process or allow participants to discuss the images they saw 
but not reproduce these images in this thesis. On the other hand, I could produce 
mock images to elicit participants’ responses which I would then be able to 
reproduce in this text. When evaluating these options, two factors led to the 
choice of the latter approach. Firstly, researcher created images, or “visual 
vignettes” allow the researcher to focus on specific issues which might occur 
infrequently during digital walkthroughs. Secondly, this approach communicated 
a greater respect for the privacy of application spaces to potential participants. 
 
78 Freddy MacKee, ‘Social Media in Gay London: Tinder as an Alternative to Hook-Up Apps’ 
(2016) 2 Social Media and Society. 





Again, given the sensitivity of the topic, reassuring participants in this manner 
seemed desirable.  
 
3.2.2.3 Visual Elicitation  
Visual elicitation, using images to facilitate discussion and stimulate additional 
responses from participants in the manner done here, is a common approach in 
a range of social research projects.80 The visuals used in visual elicitation can be 
photographic or non-photographic; they can be presented to participants, or 
participants can be invited to produce the images themselves before then 
returning to them at a later stage of the research.81 The latter introduces a 
collaborative element into the research, with the researcher providing direction 
but the participant ultimately possessing greater control over the direction of 
discussion.82 However, it also acts as a barrier to participation by requiring 
ongoing or repeated contact between the researcher and participant. The former 
is less collaborative in nature, with the researcher creating images that address 
the specific issues the researcher identifies as important but allows a more 
expedient participation process.  
 
The categorisation of photo elicitation, particularly photo elicitation involving 
researcher created images, as a form of visual methodology has been 
challenged. Using images in interviews – or in this case, surveys – is, according 
 
80 See Emma Hutchinson, ‘Digital Methods and Perpetual Reinvention? Asynchronus Interviewing 
and Photo Elicitation’ in Helene Snee and others (eds), Digital Methods for Social Science 
(Palgrave Macmillan 2016). 
81 See, for instance, Rosaleen Croghan and others, ‘Young People’s Constructions of Self: Notes 
on the Use and Analysis of the Photo-Elicitation Methods’ (2008) 11 International Journal of Social 
Research Methodology 345. 





to Grady, a visual technique but not a form of visual sociology.83 He argues this 
is, in part, because this uses images to investigate another phenomenon, rather 
than the visuality of society itself.84  Whilst such claims may have merit where 
visual elicitation is used purely as a trigger for discussion of another topic, here 
where visual elicitation is used to elicit discussion on how images themselves are 
seen and interpreted, such claims are more doubtful.  
 
3.2.3 Context and the Importance of Scenarios 
As mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, the vignette technique used here 
had several advantages given that the data collection in this project aimed to 
capture participants’ beliefs and attitudes in a predetermined context. Vignettes, 
stories developed with the research question or questions in mind, have been 
used in a variety of research projects, including those related to HIV.85 They have 
been applied in a variety of research areas due to their perceived effectiveness 
at reducing participants’ hesitation at discussing potentially embarrassing or 
controversial opinions.86 They are also an example of a method in keeping with 
the third methodological theme in this project: contextual or scenario-attentive 
research.  
 
Given that I argue that the law can and should be informed by contextual 
knowledge and understanding, but keeping in mind the ethical limitations 
 
83 John Grady, ‘The Scope of Visual Sociology’ (1996) 11 Visual Sociology 10. 
84 Grady (n 83) 12. 
85 See, for example, Rhidian Hughes, ‘Considering the Vignette Technique and Its Application to 
a Study of Drug Injecting and HIV Risk and Safer Behaviour’ (1998) 20 Sociology of Health and 
Illness 381. 





discussed in the previous section, the use of vignettes was an appropriate means 
of capturing rich informative responses from participants in this project. This third 
methodological theme was also closely interrelated with the second, in that the 
vignettes used were predominantly visual. Consequently, as well as drawing on 
methods literature relating to vignettes, generally, I also took inspiration from 
thematic apperception tests, or “TAT(s)”, a projective technique used in 
psychology which uses visuals to elicit responses in the form of stories or 
narratives.87 By incorporating images to elicit responses from participants, I 
attempted to capitalise on the added realism that imagery can provide in the 
context of applications when developing the vignettes. 
 
The stories and images used in TATs are typically free of text and simplistic in 
nature.88 As psychological tools, the analysis of TAT responses may be 
qualitative or mixed methods, but in either event there is a focus on achieving a 
“close examination of qualitative features” of responses. 89  Other methods, such 
as Braun and Clarke’s story completion approach, which use written stems for 
participants to expand upon,90 provide a greater level of detail whilst remaining 
‘ambiguous enough for participants to “fill in”’ the remaining gaps.91 The approach 
taken here might be considered a middle ground between these two approaches, 
in that the stimuli materials are comparatively detailed compared to TATs, but 
provide less narrative direction when compared to story completion tasks.  
 
 
87 Sharon Rae Jenkins, ‘Not Your Same Old Story: New Rules for Thematic Apperceptive 
Techniques (TATs)’ (2017) 99 Journal of Personality Assessment 238. 
88 Phebe Cramer, ‘Using the TAT to Assess the Relation Between Gender Identity and the Use 
of Defense Mechanisms’ (2017) 99 Journal of Personality Assessment 265. 
89 Jenkins (n 87) 248. 
90 Braun and Clarke, Successful Qualitative Research (n 7) 142–145. 





This level of detail was achieved through the creation of five “visual vignettes”, 
with two of these accompanied by a short, written prompt. Visual vignettes are an 
arguably underexplored variation on vignettes and story completion tasks.92 As 
with written vignettes, these prompts allow participants to symbolically distance 
themselves from their responses, giving an additional degree of anonymity by 
limiting the extent to which participants are obliged to disclose their own 
behaviour.93 Whilst remaining focused on the context for participants’ perceptions 
rather than their disclosure and trust practices, in contrast to written vignettes and 
some story completion tasks, these visual vignettes could be approached either 
as 3rd person tasks (i.e. participants projecting onto the characters) or 1st person 
tasks (i.e. participants placing themselves into the story).  
 
This made the creation of the stimuli a particularly important stage of planning 
this project. Where vignettes are used qualitatively, Braun and Clarke state that 
‘[a]uthenticity is important with regard to how much a vignette engages a 
participant in the topic and task, and so produces rich data through which to 
explore these.’94 This is in contrast to quantitative projects, where ‘the gap 
between vignettes and ‘reality’ is of great concern’.95 Discussing story completion 
tasks specifically, Smith suggests that: 
Irrespective of what we call story completion “data,” if people’s repertoire 
of personally and socio-cultural-available narratives do influence how they 
respond to a stem, this brings into focus story completion as a useful 
method for “capturing” socially and culturally prevalent sense-making and 
moral forces.96 
 
92 See Harper (n 11); Groot and others (n 11). 
93 Barter and Renold (n 12). 
94 Virginia Braun and Victoria Clarke, ‘An Introduction to the Vignette Method’ (Successful 
Qualitative Research Companion Website, 2013) <https://studysites.uk.sagepub.com/braunand 
clarke/study/additional.htm> accessed 1 July 2020. 
95 Braun and Clarke (n 94). 
96 Brett Smith, ‘Some Modest Thoughts on Story Completion Methods in Qualitative Research’ 





Again, the authenticity of the stimuli material seemed critical in order to draw on 
these personal and socio-cultural narratives. Therefore, creating the stimuli 
entailed a detailed reflection on existing literature addressing application use and 
app design, as well as on the socio-legal debates surrounding disclosure, non-
disclosure and deception discussed in Chapter 2. One criterion by which 
authenticity in this project came to be evaluated was participants’ engagement 
with the stimuli and lack of negative feedback about their (un)authenticity. Whilst 
one participant noted that a character in a scenario was an ‘imaginary person’,97 
several other participants discussed the mock profiles as if they were taken from 
real applications, with comments such as ‘I don’t use this app’ when discussing 
the specifics of the stimuli profiles.98 Another criterion was the general 
engagement with the survey and other feedback, which was on the whole positive 
as to the aims of the research and the data collection survey. Whilst responses 
were somewhat short, this is not uncommon with qualitative data collection of this 
kind,99 and this approach gave participants the space to expand and elaborate 
where desired.100 
 
3.3 Method and Ethics 
These methodological themes, and the approaches to data collection associated 
with them, influenced the development of the data collection survey in this project, 
which I now consider. Using online recruitment and data collection as I have done 
 
97 Participant 401353-401344-40159893. 
98 Participant 401353-401344-42628221. 
99 Gareth Terry and Virginia Braun, ‘Short but Often Sweet’ in Virginia Braun, Victoria Clarke and 
Debra Grey (eds), Collecting qualitative data : a practical guide to textual, media and virtual 
techniques (Cambridge University Press 2016). 
100 For some discussion of the challenges that accompany collecting data about complex online 
behaviour, see Ragan Fox, Gays in (Cyber- ) Space : Online Performances of Gay Identity (VDM 





here has several advantages, particularly in technology focused research such 
as this, but also presents some limitations which I highlight below. In this section, 
I also address the ethical considerations which went into the design of the study 
and the eligibility criteria and recruitment process used to find participants for the 
project.  
 
3.3.1 Online Surveys  
The number of online survey sites has proliferated in recent years and 
consequently the social science researcher now has a range of suitable options 
when considering which survey platform to employ.101 Developments in 
technology also mean that, in contrast to earlier online survey options,102 
constructing an online survey is no longer difficult and does not require technical 
knowhow. Whilst researchers experienced in online web-development may find 
it easier to construct novel and technically intricate surveys, the design tools 
available on most survey platforms should suffice for most projects, including 
those incorporating visuals, as was the case here.  
 
Nevertheless, the choice of survey platform is also a significant step in the 
development of online projects. There are a number of implications in terms of 
cost, with some platforms locking certain tools behind paywalls or requiring a 
subscription, as well as in terms of appearance, means of distribution and 
eventual options in terms of analysing or exporting data. In this project, 
 
101 The range of available sites is too extensive to list here, but options include SurveyMonkey, 
Qualtrics, and Prolific among many others. 





OnlineSurveys.ac.uk (formerly Bristol Online) was used.103 As Northumbria 
University had a licence for this site, which I was able to make use of, there were 
no costs for developing the survey using OnlineSurveys. The site is also hosted 
on an academic (ac.uk) web address and the URL for a survey begins with the 
name of the licensee university. On multiple occasions throughout the project, the 
Northumbria prefix and ac.uk suffix reassured prospective participants recruited 
through applications that the project was genuinely academic. It is possible that 
this was also the case with social media recruitment, although no direct feedback 
was gathered which supports or disputes this suggestion.  
 
One final consideration which should be made when choosing online survey 
platforms is reliability and data security. Given that one of the advantages of 
asynchronous online data collection is that participants can take part at a time 
suited to them, it is important that survey platforms do not suffer significant 
downtime during the data collection phase. With the exception of a short pre-
planned period of maintenance in mid-November 2018, OnlineSurveys did not 
experience any outages throughout the data collection period.104 OnlineSurveys 
is operated by JISC, a Higher Education non-profit organisation, and has a 
reputation for data security and keeping up to date backups. Surveys using the 
site take place over a secure connection, offering additional reassurance to 
participants that their responses are secure. 
 
 
103 For ease of reference, this is referred to as OnlineSurveys (without a space) below. General 
references to surveys carried out online, irrespective of the site they are carried out on, include a 
space and avoid capitalisation.  
104 During this period, of a few hours, those using the survey URL were invited to come back later. 
No participants or prospective participants recruited through application based recruitment 





3.3.1.1 Designing the Survey 
The design of the data collection survey aimed to use visual elicitation to collect 
data on the contextual knowledge and understanding related to HIV disclosure 
and non-disclosure and the disclosure features now found on many dating 
applications. Online surveys, in contrast to online interviews and other qualitative 
online methods, arguably share some similarities with standardised interviews – 
in that they require researchers to have ‘fairly solid ideas about the things they 
want to uncover’.105 Unlike these other methods, survey participants are each 
presented with the same series of stimuli and questions, meaning that the 
eventual design of the survey establishes some of the limitations of the overall 
project.  
 
In this project, the survey was divided into four stages. First, after providing 
participant information and obtaining consent, a series of eligibility questions 
checked that participants were within the recruitment criteria set out below. 
Following this, participants were then presented with the first three vignettes, 
composed of a mock profile without additional text. Participants were then 
presented with the final two vignettes, which consisted of similar mock profiles 
accompanied by a short, written prompt. I provide a detailed account of each 
stimuli and the questions associated with it, below.106 The final section of the 
survey collected additional background information from participants, in particular 
asking about their prior awareness of treatment as prevention, which had been 
discussed in one of the two later vignettes.   
 
105 Bruce Lawrence Berg and Howard Lune, Qualitative Research Methods for the Social 
Sciences (8th edn, Pearson Education 2014) 109. 





Charoenruk and Sage emphasise the importance of quickly establishing the 
importance of images when they are used in web surveys. Where images are 
seen as less central to the survey as a whole, and to each question individually, 
they suggest participants are less likely to fixate on the images to the extent 
needed for the image to be impactful on responses.107 The decision to place the 
image only vignettes before the vignettes with written text was done with this 
observation in mind. Similarly, the webpages of the survey were formatted in such 
a way that the image was at the top left of the page, or likely to fill the screen with 
questions listed below if viewed on a mobile device. For similar reasons, the 
instructions given to participants at the beginning of the survey drew particular 
attention to the images. This was also done in order to emphasise that the images 
were mocks, not screenshots of actual application users, which was necessary 
both to avoid confusion and to reassure participants that the research was not 
exposing other individuals’ application use.  
 
3.3.1.2 Ensuring Mobile Compatibility 
As the planned recruitment methods involved social media and application-based 
recruitment, it was anticipated that a significant proportion of participants would 
access the survey via a mobile device. Ensuring that the survey was compatible 
with such devices was therefore a critical part of the design process, reflecting a 
broader concern with the accessibility of online participation methods in social 
science research.108 In order to ensure compatibility, some research into 
smartphone use has employed specifically designed applications which 
 
107 Nuttirudee Charoenruk and Mathew Stange, ‘Respondent Processing of Images in Web 
Surveys’ [2018] Sociological Methods & Research. 





participants download,109 however these introduce additional privacy concerns 
and require a greater level of technical skill to develop. Web-based surveys avoid 
these concerns and can be accessed across all smartphone operating systems. 
However, it is also important to consider how the survey will appear across the 
various devices that may access it, including on desktop and laptop computers.  
 
The choice of survey platform has a significant influence on this appearance. 
OnlineSurveys is able to detect whether the device accessing the survey is a 
mobile or desktop and automatically direct users to a mobile optimised version of 
the survey if necessary. When designing the survey, the desktop and mobile 
version of each page was inspected on several devices to ensure that 
participants’ experiences would not be dissimilar based on how they accessed 
the survey. One limitation of OnlineSurveys related to the size of the image used 
in the survey. Image size had to be kept consistent between the mobile and 
desktop versions of the survey, with the result that the largest image needed to 
be viewable on the smallest mobile devices. Some participants, particularly those 
on desktop, found that this made the image harder to view. However, this had to 
be balanced with the risk that making the image any larger would mean it 
surpassed the size of the screen on smaller devices. Based on feedback in early 
responses, an option to open the image in a new window, where it could be 
significantly larger, was added.  
 
More generally, the size of the images was also a concern, in that larger image 
files take longer to download and, if participants are accessing the survey using 
 
109 Borja García, Jo Welford and Brett Smith, ‘Using a Smartphone App in Qualitative Research: 





mobile data, this may use up more of a participant’s data allowance.110 Critiques 
of online recruitment have highlighted that requiring internet access may deter 
participation by those in lower socio-economic groups who have limited internet 
access.111 I would argue that more affordable internet access means that, when 
focusing on an online phenomenon such as mobile dating use, these effects are 
limited. However, the possibility that some prospective participants were deterred 
because the survey would use up limited mobile data allowances is perhaps a 
valid concern, one that I attempted to mitigate by ensuring that the survey did not 
require participants to download large files, and one which the corresponding 
benefits in terms of ease of recruitment and participation was felt to outweigh.  
 
Accessibility for disabled participants is also a specific concern when carrying out 
web surveys and other online research.112 Again, OnlineSurveys offered some 
advantages when compared to other online survey platforms, as it uses relatively 
large buttons for navigation through the survey, which limits the need for precise 
mouse control.  Where possible, steps were taken during the design of this survey 
to minimise potential difficulties caused by the layout of the survey. For instance, 
pages were generally designed to be no greater than twice the length of any of 
the images, meaning that participants on mobile devices were less likely to 
struggle with repetitive scrolling in order to navigate. Unfortunately, despite these 
steps, at least one participant found the survey somewhat difficult to complete 
because of a physical disability and the size of the stimuli image when viewed on 
 
110 In 2005, when internet access, generally, was more expensive, a comparable concern was 
noted in relation to online surveys more broadly. See Riggle, Rostosky and Reedy (n 53) 5. 
111 Roger Sapsford, ‘Research and Infomation on the Net’ in Roger Sapsford and Victor Jupp 
(eds), Data Collection and Analysis (2nd edn, SAGE Publications in association with the Open 
University 2006). 





his mobile device.113 It is possible other participants had similar issues, although 
it is hoped that by enabling the survey to be completed on mobile devices these 
difficulties were overcome in some cases by participants’ devices, which can 
often be augmented to offer additional accessibility functionality.  
 
3.3.2 Eligibility and Recruitment 
3.3.2.1 Eligibility 
As has been noted, application usage is frequently precarious114 and many users 
might be considered hard to reach.115 As well as the motivations for application 
use being varied and multifaceted,116 users may leave and return to applications 
frequently or leave on a permanent or semi-permanent basis as these motivations 
change.117 This can present challenges when establishing eligibility criteria for 
projects, such as this, where the primary eligibility criteria is application use. In 
addressing this challenge, the survey asked participants to confirm that they: 
a) Were aged 18 or over; 
b) Had previously used a dating application targeted at men who have sex 
with men; 
c) Had used an application of this type at least once in the past three years, 
and; 
d) Had used this application in England and Wales. 
 
113 This participant was recruited via Grindr and provided some informal feedback through 
messages on Grindr following completion of the survey.   
114 Brubaker, Ananny and Crawford (n 60). 
115 Danielle Couch and Pranee Liamputtong, ‘Online Dating and Mating: The Use of the Internet 
to Meet Sexual Partners’ (2008) 18 Qualitative Health Research 268. 
116 Kathryn Macapagal and others, ‘Geosocial Networking App Use Among Men Who Have Sex 
With Men in Serious Romantic Relationships’ (2016) 45 Archives of Sexual Behavior 1513. 





Research ethics motivated the introduction of the age limit, which excluded any 
potential participants aged below 18. Applications typically impose the 
requirement that users are over the age of 18, although anecdotally it seems this 
restriction is not always adhered to, and to avoid the need for additional consent 
requirements, a minimum age limit seemed appropriate. There was, however, no 
rationale for imposing an upper age limit on participation.  
 
The limitations on relatively recent application use were included so that 
participants would have a general awareness of the application marketplace over 
the time period when HIV disclosure features were introduced. This does not 
necessarily mean that they will have first-hand experience of these features but 
reduced the need for these features to be explained. Similarly, the geographical 
limitation was included because the project overall looks at application use in the 
context of HIV transmission law as it exists in England and Wales. As the context 
surrounding application use differs in an international context, where additional 
laws may restrict or punish sexual relationships between men, and these issues 
are deserving of particular attention, it seemed appropriate to limit participants to 
those who had used apps within the jurisdiction of England and Wales.  
 
A particular consideration when developing these eligibility criteria was the desire 
not to exclude potential participants who do not identify as LGBT or who are 
reluctant to categorise themselves within certain groups. 118 Consequently, these 
filtering questions did not ask participants to self-identify with a particular 
 
118 This might be compared to authors who use the term ‘nonhetrosexual’ in their work in an 
attempt not to exclude alternate identities. See Stefano Ramello, ‘Behind the Mask: A Typology 





sexuality, only confirm that they had used applications targeted at men who have 
sex with men. Similarly, given that participants’ narrative of their own application 
could be complex and nuanced,119 when participants were asked to describe how 
long they had been using applications for in the final section of the survey, this 
was done with an open text field, rather than through closed questions. 
 
When designing the survey, thought was given to the most effective way to 
distribute it given these eligibility criteria. As Grey notes, when recruiting from 
among hard to reach groups and when investigating sensitive topics, there is 
prudence in advertising the research and inviting those who are interested to 
contact the researcher, rather than individually contacting potential 
participants.120 This limits the ability of the researcher to conduct purposeful 
sampling. It suggests that the researcher can only exclude potential participants 
through filtering, as a form of criterion sampling,121 rather than actively seeking 
out participants who meet previously established categories suitable for study.122 
However, by promoting the research in specific spaces, such as on applications, 
it is possible to target specific populations without directly approaching 
individuals, arguably an indirect method of purposive sampling. To an extent, this 
is also a form of convenience sampling, which has typically been seen in research 
conducted into serostatus issues123 and application use.124 Given that the 
 
119 Take, for example, the participant in Brubaker who equated ‘leaving Grindr’ with ‘not meeting 
people off of Grindr’, Brubaker, Ananny and Crawford (n 60) 381. 
120 David E Gray, Doing Research in the Real World (Sage 2014) 221. 
121 Gray (n 120) 221. 
122 Bryman (n 86) 412–413. 
123 Patrick J Murphy and others, ‘Serostatus Disclosure, Stigma Resistance, and Identity 
Management among HIV-Positive Gay Men in Ireland’ (2016) 26 Qualitative Health Research 
1459. 
124 Karoline Gatter and Kathleen Hodkinson, ‘On the Differences between Tinder versus Online 





eligibility criteria also included recent, but not current, application users; there 
was also a need to advertise the project using other means as well, this was 
achieved through a combination of social media recruitment and possible 
snowball recruitment by some participants.  
 
3.3.2.2 Application Based Recruitment 
Recruitment through mobile applications is a common technique and can be 
achieved through one of two means. On the one hand, recruitment can take place 
using paid-for advertisements on these applications.125 On the other hand, 
recruitment can be undertaken using a user profile on the application itself.126 
Whilst the former has certain time-saving advantages, given that the creation and 
management of a single profile does not carry a significant financial or time-cost, 
the latter option was chosen here. It should also be noted that I had previously 
used several applications myself and although I could be seen as having “left” 
these applications, as I no longer have them downloaded on my personal devices 
and do not regularly make use of them,127 I might also be seen as a partial insider 
given my existing experiences. This enabled me to create a profile on two 
applications – Grindr and Hornet – and to navigate the use of these sites whilst 
recruitment took place. These applications were selected as both had specific 
 
125 William Goedel, Forrest Brooks and Dustin Duncan, ‘Approaches to Sampling Gay, Bisexual, 
and Other Men Who Have Sex with Men from Geosocial-Networking Smartphone Applications: A 
Methodological Note’ (2016) 5 Social Sciences 51. 
126 For examples of this in doctrinal work, see Max Morris, ‘Incidental Sex Work: Casual and 
Commercial Encounters in Queer Digital Spaces’ (PhD Thesis, Durham University 2018); 
Alexander Maine, ‘Same-Sex Marriage and the Sexual Hierarchy: Constructing the 
Homonormative and Homoradical Legal Identities’ (PhD Thesis, Northumbria University 2019). 
127 See Brubaker, Ananny and Crawford (n 60). During the data collection period, I did reinstall 
the two applications used for recruitment onto my personal devices. This enabled me to validate 
how the “researcher” profile was seen by others nearby, so my ‘leaving’ of these apps might itself 





HIV disclosure features and position themselves as “broad churches”, rather than 
targeting a niche market.128 
 
Other researchers making use of these applications for recruitment purposes 
have spoken of the challenges that accompanied being an insider in these 
spaces, particularly regarding boundaries between the research usage of apps 
and the expectation of other users that applications are used for social-sexual 
means.129 As well as this, I was particularly concerned that the profile not be seen 
to waste anyone’s time or spam other users. In earlier online research there was 
concern over “spamming” email distribution lists and the disservice this did to 
future researchers who might be refused access by gatekeepers or be 
disregarded as spam themselves.130 In the present context, this arguably extends 
to not being forthright about the reason why one is on the application in the first 
place. Packer suggests that although establishing rapport can be an important 
step in recruitment for qualitative projects, there is a relationship of power which 
must not be misused which makes wasting participants’ time a legitimate ethical 
concern.131 Consequently, I felt that it was necessary to make it as clear as 
possible, as early as possible, that the account was being used only for research 
purposes. 
  
For these reasons, the research profile used might be considered impersonal but 
practical. The username for the profile was “Researcher” and the bio explained 
 
128 Alexis Mastroiannis, ‘Gay Dating Apps: A Comprehensive Guide to Jack’d, Grindr, Hornet, 
Scruff and the Rest’ (Pink News, 5 March 2018) <www.pinknews.co.uk/2018/03/05/best-gay-
dating-apps-jackd-grindr-hornet-scruff/> accessed 26 August 2019. 
129 Bonner-Thompson (n 39), 5-6; Morris (n 126) 102–105. 
130 Riggle, Rostosky and Reedy (n 53) 8. 





that the profile was being used to recruit participants for a project investigating 
application use. It invited users to send a message if they were interested in 
learning more about the project and at this stage, I answered any questions 
potential participants might have and provided a link to the survey site if there 
was interest in taking part. As age is shown by default on both applications, my 
age was included in the profiles, but no additional personal information was 
provided. A photograph was not included in either profile. However, because 
Hornet requires a picture of some nature in order to be shown to nearby users, a 
blank background was uploaded on that app.  
 
Recruitment on both applications was conducted by keeping the app open for 
extended periods. As both apps are based on seeing the profiles of other users 
who are nearby and online, a general picture can be created of where the 
researcher profiles will have been visible. Given travel patterns over the time 
recruitment took place, the profiles are more likely to have been seen by those in 
Yorkshire and the North East, as well as occasionally in London, Cambridge and 
the Midlands. Participants recruited through apps were more likely to be using 
these applications in urban areas, as well as in areas where the East Coast Main 
Line ran nearby. During these periods, messages were received both from users 
who had clearly read the profile and those who clearly had not, the majority did 
appear to have engaged with the research focus described in the profile’s 
username and bio, expressing curiosity or willingness to participating in the 
project. 
 
Nevertheless, many of these applications maintain a reputation for being 





noted: ‘no one uses Grindr to participate in research’.132  It  is perhaps 
unsurprising, therefore, that a minority of messages were received which were 
sexually explicit. Nevertheless, the number of sexually explicit messages that 
were received was relatively low and reassured me of the benefits of establishing 
a distinct researcher profile. Where these messages were received, I addressed 
each on a case by case basis, responding where I felt it courteous to explain that 
I was not on the application for that purpose. In some instances, where an explicit 
photo was sent without any accompanying message, this was not done, and I 
instead waited until a subsequent message was sent before responding. This 
approach was relatively effective, and most users typically responded stating that 
they had not engaged with the information in the profile before sending the 
message but had now taken note of it. Importantly, few expressed frustration or 
dissatisfaction with my use of the app for research purposes.  
 
However, towards the end of the data collection process, the recruitment profile 
used on Grindr was banned by the platform’s moderators. Through emails with 
Grindr’s support team, I learned that this was due to a report by another user, but 
I was unable to ascertain the specific complaint made and no interaction with 
another user stood out to me as the likely source of this complaint. As with 
analogue research methods, digital research requires careful consideration of the 
level of privacy expected in particular spaces.133 The approach taken here relied 
upon not imposing upon other users and instead responding to interest, so that 
the account was not perceived as an intrusion and did not impede future 
 
132 Morris (n 126) 104. 





researchers.134 Given that only one complaint appears to have been received 
across the seven months when recruitment took place, this approach was 
moderately effective, but further methodological research is necessary to better 
understand how to carry out web-based research in a fully unobtrusive manner, 
if this is possible whilst still maintaining the fully informed consent and respect for 
privacy which was achieved here.  
 
3.3.2.3 Social Media Recruitment 
Recruitment through social media is a commonly used approach, presenting 
some similar ethical challenges to offline (and application-based) recruitment, in 
terms of privacy, transparency, and the need for informed consent.135 Given the 
privacy concerns associated with many social networking sites, Curtis 
emphasises that recruitment through social media should still direct participants 
to secure web addresses for data collection itself.136 In this project, participants 
recruited through social media were directed to the same OnlineSurveys 
webpage as application-recruited participants. The social media sites used were 
Facebook and Twitter, both of which allow posts to be shared by others, also 
facilitating a degree of snowball sampling.137  
 
 
134 Generally, the discussion accompanying Riggle, Rostosky and Reedy (n 53). 
135 Luke Gelinas and others, ‘Using Social Media as a Research Recruitment Tool: Ethical Issues 
and Recommendations’ (2017) 17 American Journal of Bioethics 3. How these concerns were 
addressed in this project is discussed below. 
136 Curtis (n 47). 
137 Word of mouth, as well as retweeting and the sharing of Facebook posts, may also have 
advertised the project to a wider range of potential participants. Of those recruited on social 
media, several participants also stated that they had shared the project with others. On snowball 





The recruitment posts used gave a limited description of the role of the study, 
prioritising the role of dating applications. This was done as social media posts 
are inevitably seen by many who do not use dating applications and whilst these 
individuals would be prevented from participating via the filtering questions, 
avoiding this at an early stage seemed appropriate. Further information on the 
focus of the project, including its interest in HIV and HIV disclosure, were provided 
to participants before the beginning of the survey on the OnlineSurveys site. 
These posts were made on my own Twitter138 and Facebook accounts. On 
Facebook, posts were made both on my homepage and on group pages for LGBT 
networks I was a part of. Most of these posts made use of an image (Image 1.) 
and included an email address so that prospective participants recruited through 
social media were afforded the same ability to ask questions prior to participation 
as application-recruited participants.    
 
 
138 This can be found at twitter.com/giles_cameron. 






3.3.3 Research Ethics 
One significant ethical concern considered during the development of the project 
related to privacy. Earlier in that year there had been privacy concerns related to 
Grindr, particularly relating to the HIV disclosure feature, when it had been 
revealed that the developers had been sharing users’ HIV status with third 
parties.139 Therefore, as well as the general need to maintain participants’ 
privacy, there was an additional need to reassure participants given the nature of 
this project. To achieve this, privacy and data protection information and general 
participant information were listed on two separate webpages at the beginning of 
the survey, both of which asked participants to confirm that they understood the 
information provided. Data protection steps taken included the selection of 
OnlineSurveys, which uses secure servers to store responses, and creating 
regular backups of the data which were password protected and stored securely 
in a locker in the Faculty of Business and Law Postgraduate Research office.  
 
Another ethical concern was ensuring that all participants were over the age of 
18. As noted above, there is typically a minimum age requirement on applications, 
but anecdotal evidence suggests that some users are below these age limits. As 
part of the filtering questions at the beginning of the survey, participants were 
required to provide an age range, which then directed those under 18 to a 
rejection page. However, there remains a possibility that, as with applications, a 
participant might list an age over 18 in order to take part. Any steps to address 
this issue through verification of ID or other means would have undermined the 
 
139 Julia Belluz, ‘Grindr Is Revealing Its Users’ HIV Status to Third-Party Companies’ (Vox, 3 April 
2018) <https://www.vox.com/2018/4/2/17189078/grindr-hiv-status-data-sharing-privacy> 





sense of anonymity afforded to participants, even if details were kept 
anonymously or destroyed once verified. Given that there was no financial 
incentive for participating, I would suggest it is unlikely that any participants did 
falsify this information, given that the rejection page explained that there were 
eligibility criteria in place.  
 
3.3.3.1 Consent and Withdrawal  
In addition to questions verifying age and prior application use in England and 
Wales, consent was recorded through a series of questions at the beginning of 
the survey. These were placed after the online “information sheet” which was 
available to download as a PDF (Appendix 1). Among this information, 
participants were informed that they could withdraw at any point during the survey 
by closing the browser before completion. Where participants did this, none of 
the data provided was retained and the only information recorded was the page 
the participant was on when they closed the browser. OnlineSurveys does have 
a feature which allows participants to close the survey and return to it at a later 
stage. However, this feature was disabled for this survey, as it required additional 
cookies being recorded on a participant’s device. Although this may have resulted 
in some participants dropping out where unable to complete the survey in one 
sitting, this seemed preferable to requiring those participants who wished to 
withdraw to complete an extra step in order to withdraw.   
 
In Chart 1, below, the number of participants who left the survey on each page is 
shown. For example, 575 people used the link provided to the project, but then 





might be explained by participants reading the participant information and then 
returning to the survey at a later time. Other than a rather large dropout on this 
first page, the most significant dropout was on page eight, where the first of the 




It is somewhat disappointing that these prospective participants found the nature 
or format of the questions unappealing and declined to participate once they saw 
the vignettes. However, the absence of a similar steep decline later in the survey 
supports the decision to establish the format of the question as early as possible 
within the survey as, had other questions come before the vignettes, there may 
have been a similar dropout but after participants had expended time and effort 
on completing parts of the survey. Although other approaches may have resulted 
in a different rate of attrition across the survey, it is questionable whether a 
different approach would have produced a different overall dropout rate. Given 
the benefits of the vignette approach in ethical and analytical terms, the approach 







































taken enabled a risk dataset to be collected in a manner which, the data suggests, 
was engaging and stimulating for participants.  
 
Withdrawal after completion of the survey was possible via a randomly generated 
participant ID provided to participants upon completion of the survey. For 
participants’ ease, the ID and debrief information could be downloaded and saved 
as a PDF, along with a copy of the participant’s response. Participants were 
informed that if they withdrew within one month, their responses could be 
removed entirely, and that after this period every effort would be made to limit the 
use of their response, but analysis may have taken place that might prevent full 
redaction. Ultimately, no participants withdrew post-submission. It is hoped this 
is because no participant came to regret taking part in the project. However, it 
should also be acknowledged that withdrawal required participants to note down 
their participant ID, which may have deterred those who had not saved the debrief 
information; although that no participant requested withdrawal without this is, in 
itself, reassuring.  
 
3.4 Stimuli Image Creation 
The purpose of the visual stimuli in this project was to elicit discussion about HIV 
disclosure, non-disclosure and application use, more broadly, in order to evaluate 
the relevance of application evidence in criminal proceedings and as a potential 
influence on the law addressing HIV transmission. As discussed above, the visual 
and narrative vignettes used here were distinct from visual elicitation methods 





uses simple illustrations,140 the images used here were detail rich and 
incorporated several features, including written text. I created each image in 
photoshop, using stock photographs within the vignette where necessary. 
Ultimately, five vignettes were produced. Each vignette was designed to look like 
a generic application and incorporated multiple points of potential ambiguity in an 
attempt to elicit relevant discussion by participants. One of the main focuses of 
each of these profiles became a shorthand term used to refer to the “profile” as a 
whole, these were: “Undetectable”, “Emoji”, “Couple”, “History” and “Disclosure”. 
 
The intention behind creating a generic profile format, rather than echoing the 
design language of a specific application was both to make the profile familiar to 
participants irrespective of which applications they had used, and to emphasise 
to participants that these were mock profiles, rather than ones collected during 
the research. Many applications follow a similar format, where users first see a 
grid composed of the profile photos of nearby users, or a blank photo if a user 
has not uploaded a photograph. By tapping on one of these photos, users are 
then taken to the profile associated with it, which includes additional information 
if this has been provided.141 As well as space for a short free-form biography, the 
additional information that can be included in a profile is divided into categories, 
which include physical descriptors such as body type, height and weight; and 
other categories such as what a user is “looking for”. As Ahlm suggests, this 
information might be described as ‘sparse’: 
 
140 See, for example, Groot and others (n 11). 
141 Compare, for instance, the format of Grindr and another application, Scruff. See Yoel Roth, 
‘Locating the “Scruff Guy”: Theorizing Body and Space in Gay Geosocial Media’ (2014) 8 
International Journal of Communication 2113, 2118; Roth, ‘Zero Feet Away: The Digital 





Age, height, and weight can be entered as any value. Body type, ethnicity 
and relationship status can be chosen from a menu. Finally, users can 
indicate their intentions on the app by choosing any combination of the 
options: Chat, Dates, Friends, Networking, Relationship, Right Now. Users 
can also choose not to provide any of this information, though the majority 
of users choose to include height, weight, ethnicity, and intentions.142 
 
Users are typically able to filter who is visible on their homepage using the 
information in these categories, although not based on HIV disclosure using the 
features discussed here.143 Problems with discriminatory filtering practices, 
particularly in respect of race and ethnicity,144 but also extending to fat-shaming 
and ageism,145 appear to be common. Recently, Grindr announced that it would 
be removing the ability to filter based on ethnicity; however, this has yet to be 
implemented.146 By focusing upon the information within the profile, the vignettes 
here do not address, directly, the impact of these filtering features. However, in 
Chapter 4, I do address the extent to which participants discussed avoiding 
certain kinds of profile, a quasi-personal-filtering practice.  
 
The five vignettes were divided into two sections within the survey. In the first 
section, the participants were presented with the first three visual vignettes in 
turn. The first question for each of these vignettes asked participants to discuss 
their general impressions of the profile and to produce an account of the person 
who “created” it. This first question was intended to be somewhat open to 
interpretation, so that participants felt comfortable with developing their answers 
 
142 Ahlm (n 20) 368. 
143 Although the possibility of such a feature has been discussed. See Bobby Rae, ‘Is Grindr about 
to Introduce a HIV Filter?’ (Pink News, 11 July 2016) <https://www.pinknews.co.uk/2016/07/11/is-
grindr-about-to-introduce-a-hiv-filter/> accessed 5 December 2019. 
144 Ahlm (n 20) 378. 
145 Noto La Diega (n 76) 14–15. 
146 Ben Hunte, ‘Grindr Fails to Remove Ethnicity Filter after Pledge to Do So’ (BBC News, 26 June 





based on whatever stood out to them. Riggle and colleagues suggest that ‘some 
participants may not be able to provide analysis of their own behaviour or 
motives’.147 Similarly, here questions asked participants to provide detail and 
context in their responses but did not require them to explain or justify their 
assumptions and impressions. After this initial question, more specific questions 
for each profile highlighted particular aspects of the profile to elicit discussion on 
narrower points. In the second section of the survey, participants were presented 
with two visual and narrative vignettes. These consisted of written narrative of a 
scenario which involved application usage leading to a sexual encounter, both 
had a completed mock profile to provide additional information but unlike the first 
three questions this was primarily to complement the vignette text.148 
 
3.4.1 Vignette 1: “Undetectable” 
The first vignette was intended to stimulate discussion of undetectable viral load, 
the test history feature, and situations where profiles contain potentially 
conflicting information. This vignette also had the role of introducing the visual 
elicitation style of questions used in the survey. Consequently, this first mock 
profile was arguably less complex than the two used in subsequent questions. 
Despite this, however, participants were not given additional prompts and the first 
question remained consistent between this vignette and the following two.  
 
To create this image, a stock photo of a man was taken from pexels.com, which 
offers licence free images which do not require direct attribution. All of the photos 
 
147 Riggle, Rostosky and Reedy (n 53) 4–5. 





used in subsequent vignettes were also taken from this site. The only limitation 
imposed by pexels.com is that the people appearing within the photos cannot 
appear ‘in a bad light or a way that is offensive’.149 Given that the participant 
information emphasised that the vignettes were mock images, this did not limit 
the use of the photos here, and, in any event, it is questionable whether any of 
the characters in the vignettes are portrayed negatively.  
 
Once the photo was selected, it was imported into Photoshop where it became 
the background layer of the image. Formatting which replicates the general 
appearance of a mobile phone screen, including signal strength and battery 
indicators, was added to enhance the realism of the vignette. Text was then 
overlaid atop the photo, replicating the design of several dating applications. 
Advertisements, which are a common feature on free versions of applications, 
were not included. Some applications include static adverts which take up space 
at the top or bottom of the screen, whilst other applications play short video 
adverts when navigating between different parts of the app. As the vignettes were 
themselves static images, the inclusion of video adverts was not possible. Static 
adverts could have been included but would have taken up space within the 
profile without being the focus of the investigation. It was decided not to include 
static adverts, as the profiles did not appear unrealistic in their absence and this 
provided more space to make the other features of the profile larger and easier 
to read.  
 
149 Pexels, ‘License of Our Free Stock Photos - Pexels’ (2018) <https://www.pexels.com/photo-







One of the primary points of interest within this vignette was participants’ reaction 
to and understanding and interpretation of “undetectable”. The inclusion of this 
identity as ‘its own category’ reflects the disclosure practices of some HIV+ 
men,150 as well as the general prevalence of the term in application disclosure 
 
150 Daniel Grace and others, ‘Becoming “Undetectable”: Longitudinal Narratives of Gay Men’s Sex 
Lives After a Recent HIV Diagnosis’ (2015) 27 AIDS Education and Prevention 333, 341. 







features.151 The profile therefore aimed to elicit discussion which would 
demonstrate whether participants equated undetectable with being HIV+, or 
whether the former was seen as ‘somehow different than being HIV positive’.152 
In addition, what meaning was prescribed to the “test history” category when an 
undetectable viral load is disclosed, particularly whether this was seen to relate 
to viral load testing, other sexual health tests, or a combination of the two was a 
further point of interest.    
 
This vignette also aimed to prompt discussion about the motivations for 
application use, particularly whether disclosure of sexual health information was 
seen as the norm or if it was associated with particular aims, such as seeking 
casual sexual encounters. Even among men who have sex with men, there 
continues to be stigmatisation related to HIV status and a perception that HIV is 
acquired through promiscuous sexual behaviour.153 The profile does not list 
“Right Now” in the “Looking For” section of the profile,154 nor does the profile 
explicitly state that a sexual encounter is sought. Whilst the free-form biography 
does not overly reject the possibility of sexual encounters, it was written 
generically in order to see what expectations participants would read in to the 
profile. This point was part of a broader issue of stigma that the profile aimed to 
address, and a specific follow up question asked participants to discuss whether 
they expected the user was on the application for any particular purpose.  
 
151 See, for instance, ‘Know Your Status: What Do the Different KYS Options Mean?’ (Hornet) 
<https://hornet.com/about/know-your-status/> accessed 15 August 2019. 
152 Mario Brondani, Leeann Donnelly and Jonathan Postnikoff, ‘“I’m Not HIV Positive, I’m 
Undetectable”: Community Forum on Issues of Stigma.’ (2016) 1 Stigma and Health 244, 6 
(emphasis in original). 
153 Murphy and others (n 123) 1464. 
154 For discussion of the immediacy of some encounters facilitated by applications, see Tien Ee 
Dominic Yeo and Tsz Hin Fung, ‘“Mr Right Now”: Temporality of Relationship Formation on Gay 





The final significant element of the profile was the username and age provided in 
the header of the profile. Usernames are a critical component of many online 
spaces. Gatson argues that ‘[b]ecause screen names are chosen, rather than 
given, the online handle can be seen as a reflection, at least partially, of the true 
self.’155 In contrast to other social networking sites, such as Facebook or Twitter, 
usernames on applications might be seen as complementing rather than 
superseding other self-identification taking place in the profile. In further contrast 
to these sites, where users will search for and identify one another via 
usernames, as is the case on twitter for instance, the usernames on dating 
applications are only one form of representation taking place. As a result, the 
interaction between the username and other parts of the profile was a point of 
interest here.  
 
Geographic identifiers are common on dating applications. Birnholtz and 
colleagues note the prevalence of terms which situate the user in a particular 
neighbourhood, city, state or with a particular institution, such as a college or 
university.156 By listing the username of “City Centre” here, the vignette prompts 
participants to discuss the particular meanings associated with users situating 
themselves in particular spaces. Birnholtz and colleagues argue that one 
explanation for this trend is the link between specific locations and particular 
socio-economic status or other identities, such as status as a student.157 
However, location is also of importance if encounters in the physical world are 
 
155 Sarah N Gatson, ‘Self-Naming Practices on the Internet: Identity, Authenticity, and Community’ 
(2011) 11 Cultural Studies - Critical Methodologies 224, 224. 
156 Jeremy Birnholtz and others, ‘Identity, Identification and Identifiability’, Proceedings of the 16th 
international conference on Human-computer interaction with mobile devices & services (2014). 





desired or anticipated. Whether and how participants made any connection 
between the username and other elements of the profile, including the intentions 
of the user and other aspects of their identity, was therefore one focus during 
analysis. Similarly, as this information situates the user in the physical world, 
whether this impacted the apparent trustworthiness of the profile was also of 
interest.  
 
Given that application users report attaching significant weight to the age 
disclosed in application profiles and often filter out users who are either too old 
or too young,158 the importance of the other element of the header should not be 
discounted. Here a point of potential ambiguity and confusion was introduced, in 
order to explore participants’ reaction to minor inconsistencies within application 
profiles. Whereas the age listed in the header was 27, the biography below the 
header gave the number 26. The discrepancy between the two was kept small in 
order to see if participants generally overlooked or justified such a discrepancy, 
or if it was noticed at all.  
 
Finally, an unintended, but consequential, error within the profile must be 
acknowledged. Confusion between imperial and metric measurements meant 
that the weights given in this profile and the third vignette, below, were 
significantly higher than intended. Although this was originally a mistake on my 
part, the extent to which this error went unnoticed or was dismissed by 
participants came to be of interest. When I later noted the error, therefore, I 
retained the mistake within both profiles, which also meant that all participants 
 
158 Brandon Andrew Robinson, ‘“Personal Preference” as the New Racism’ (2015) 1 Sociology of 





were presented with the same stimuli. In Chapter 5, I note how inconsistencies 
within the profile undermined confidence in other information disclosed in the 
profile, such as test history, and in Chapter 6, I demonstrate how errors of this 
kind can lead users to be concerned about fake profiles and what is often termed 
“catfishing”.159  
 
3.4.2 Vignette 2: “Emoji”  
As discussed above, emoji are, along with photographs and written text, a core 
factor in the visuality of application profiles.  The second vignette was therefore 
intended to elicit discussion of these symbols, in addition to prompting discussion 
regarding photo-less profiles, incomplete or missing information and explicit sex-
seeking behaviour. Very little text was used in the profile, beyond the text which 
acts as the formatting for the mock application. Only including emoji in the about 
me section of the profile might be somewhat hyperbolic as emoji are commonly 
utilised as well as, rather than instead of, text.160 However, this exaggeration 
makes the focus of the profile immediately clear to participants and enables the 
issues of emoji ambiguity to be addressed in a single profile. 
 
Selecting which emoji to include in the profile was a particular challenge. Moses 
suggests that whilst emoji are not uncommon in application profiles, the use of 
them is inconsistent and often limited to users in specific sub-communities, such 
as older users.161 Some thought was given to using emoji with specific cultural 
 
159 See Carolyn Lauckner and others, ‘“Catfishing,” Cyberbullying, and Coercion: An Exploration 
of the Risks Associated with Dating App Use among Rural Sexual Minority Males’ (2019) 23 
Journal of Gay and Lesbian Mental Health 289. 
160 Gawne and McCulloch (n 70). 





connotations, such as the emoji representing the biohazard symbol, which has 
historically been associated with serostatus.162 However, this would have made 
the vignette highly specific, rather than prompting participants to reflect more 
generally on application use. On some applications, there are also restrictions on 
the use of this and other emoji with cultural connotations.163 Nevertheless, future 
research may wish to build on the analysis of this vignette, discussed below, and 
explore whether these symbols continue to have their historic connotations.   
 
Emoji are governed through the Unicode consortium. The consortium gives each 
new emoji a unique identifying code and a short descriptive name. For example, 
‘U+1F920’ is named ‘cowboy hat face’.164 These names and codes remain 
consistent across platforms and devices, however each platform retains some 
control over the pictographic image visible to the end user. This means that the 
same Unicode identifying code can produce dissimilar emoji on different 
platforms. This difference can be observed, for instance, when comparing the 
same emoji on an iOS device and an android device.165 The inconsistency this 
creates extends as far as the formatting of this thesis, as Word utilises its own 
emoji character set, although such issues were avoided by formatting the table 
below separately before copying it into this document. The emoji chosen, listed 
in Table 1, were taken from the Apple emoji keyboard, which can be utilised in 
the photoshop software used to create the vignettes.  
 
162 Dan Brouwer, ‘The Precarious Visibility Politics of Self-Stigmatization: The Case of HIV/AIDS 
Tattoos’ (1998) 18 Text and Performance Quarterly 114. 
163 Grindr, in particular, prohibits the use of the Biohazard emoji along with other emoji assoicated 
with drug use. Despite this, an emoji of a B inside a box, associated with ‘bareback’, or 
condomless, sex continues to be prevelant. See ‘Grindr’s Gaymoji: Pierced Aubergines, a Peach 
on a Plate – and a Banned “T”’ (n 69). 
164 Unicode Inc (n 68). 





Table 1: Emoji Definitions 
Unicode ID Unicode CLDR166 Short Name Apple Symbol 




U+2B06 Up Arrow 
 








U+1F6AD No Smoking 
 
U+1F51E No One Under Eighteen 
 
U+1F6AB Prohibited  
 








U+aF37B Clinking Beer Mugs 
 
 
The choice of Apple’s character set was deliberate, as it was expected most 
participants would have at least a passing familiarity with it. Although when used 
across platforms, emoji are typically formatted based on the recipient’s device; 
 
166 CLDR, the Common Local Data Repository, is an online resource designed for reference. It is 





even those who do not use iOS devices are likely to have seen Apple’s set used 
in popular culture. The availability of Apple’s set on photoshop mean that these 
symbols often feature in marketing, appearing, for instance, on the cover of 
Marcel Danesi’s book on the semiotics of Emoji.167 The choice of specific 
characters from within this set was guided by the common use of certain emoji 
on applications. For instance, certain commonly used emoji are understood by 
some to indicate preferred sexual positions,168 and some emoji, such as the 
ubiquitous “eggplant”, are understood to refer to body parts.169  However, in order 
to introduce a degree of ambiguity, emoji of faces were not included. Whilst the 
use of face emoji is common, non-face emoji create more ambiguity, particularly 
in relation to issues such as identity.170  
 
 
167 Marcel Danesi, The Semiotics of Emoji : The Rise of Visual Language in the Age of the Internet 
(Bloomsbury Academic 2017). 
168 Yoel Roth, ‘“No Overly Suggestive Photos of Any Kind”: Content Management and the Policing 
of Self in Gay Digital Communities’ (2015) 8 Communication, Culture and Critique 414. 
169 Moses (n 75). 
170 Monica A Riordan, ‘The Communicative Role of Non-Face Emojis: Affect and Disambiguation’ 







3.4.3 Vignette 3: “Couple” 
The third vignette was designed to elicit discussion regarding shared application 
profiles. Shared profiles are not the norm on dating applications. Macapagal et al 
found that 6% of participants in their research reported making use of a shared 
profile.171 However, despite this being a minority of users, shared profiles are not 
 
171 Macapagal and others (n 116). 







so uncommon as to be unexpected, and they present particular challenges in 
respect of HIV disclosure and the disclosure of other information. Shared profiles 
have received little attention within existing literature. Research into application 
use in the context of (monogamous and non-monogamous) relationships has 
primarily addressed the impact of application use on the relationship itself, as well 
as analysing the influence of applications on homosocial interaction between men 
who have sex with men more broadly.172 In Chapter 4, I build on this literature, 
addressing participants’ perceptions and assumptions surrounding application 
use by couples and, particularly, the influence that relationship status has on 
expectations of risk-taking.  
 
Typically, most applications provide space for relationship status to be disclosed. 
In some instances, users can write a short description themselves, but more 
commonly users have to select from a closed list of predetermined responses. 
Similarly, in other categories, such as “body type”, “age” and, critically, “HIV 
Status” users are similarly limited to selecting one option from these lists, limiting 
the extent to which they are able to present a multifaceted identity.173 One, 
perhaps unintentional, consequence of this restriction is the challenge of creating 
a profile which is able to represent the disparate characteristics of two people. In 
this vignette, this issue was emphasised to participants by the inclusion of two 
numbers at the beginning of the biography, one of which matched the age listed 
in the profile header. After the first, general, question regarding their impressions 
of the profile, one of the follow-up questions for this vignette specifically asked 
 
172 David Gudelunas, ‘There’s an App for That: The Uses and Gratifications of Online Social 
Networks for Gay Men’ (2012) 16 Sexuality and Culture 347. 
173 In some instances, this limitation can be lifted by accessing the paid-for version of the 





participants about the “shared” ownership of the profile and how they interpreted 
the information which might only apply to one character or the other, such as 
body type, weight and HIV status. 
 
The photograph used in this profile was particularly difficult to source. Searching 
the same stock photo site as the other images, and others, there were decidedly 
few results for searches of “gay couples”, “same-sex couples” and “male 
couples”. Most results returned by these searches were clearly taken by 
professional photographers. Although professional photos are seen on 
applications, they are less common. Introducing this uncommon feature to the 
vignette did not seem appropriate, as, in the context of the vignette technique, it 
may emphasise the manufactured status of the mock profiles and disrupt any 
suspension of disbelief on the part of participants when completing the task. 
Instead, a photo of a group was chosen, which was then edited to focus on two 
men within it. This seemed preferable, as once the text of the profile was overlaid 
onto the image, it then appeared reasonably realistic for the purposes of eliciting 








3.4.4 Vignette 4: “History” 
The fourth vignette was the first of the two written and visual vignettes, which 
might be equated more closely with story completion tasks, such as those used 
by Braun and Clarke,174 among others.175 The written narrative 
 
174 Braun and Clarke, Successful Qualitative Research (n 7) 142–145. 
175 See, generally, the special edition introduced in Victoria Clarke and others, ‘Editorial 
Introduction to the Special Issue: Using Story Completion Methods in Qualitative Research’ 
(2019) 16 Qualitative Research in Psychology 1. 







accompanying this image was positioned to the right of the image, or on some 
mobile devices below the image where there was insufficient room at the side. 
This was done in order to encourage participants to look at the image, before 
then considering the text. The primary focus of this vignette was the test history 
feature that accompanies the status disclosure feature on many applications; in 
addition, the vignette also addressed non-HIV sexual health and also considered 
the role of profile pictures, alongside vignette two, above.   
 
 





Ben finds out at his regular 
sexual health screening 
that he has Gonorrhea, the 
doctor gives him 
antibiotics to treat the 
infection. 
 
The doctor tells him that 
Gonorrhea can sometimes 
be resistant to antibiotics, 
these antibiotics take up 
to two weeks to work, and 
they won’t know for 
certain that the treatment 
has worked until his follow 
up appointment a month 
later. 
 
Two weeks later, Ben uses 
the app to look for casual 
sex. He plans to use 
condoms with anyone he 
meets as he has read this 
greatly reduces the chance 






This vignette aimed to elicit discussion of sexual health, more generally, in order 
to place HIV transmission within a broader context. Infections such as 
gonorrhoea,176 which is typically treatable with antibiotics, remain prevalent 
across England and Wales. Concern about this prevalence was noted by the 
Court of Appeal in Dica.177 Subsequently, gonorrhoea has been one of a limited 
range of infections which have been the subject of a successful prosecution in 
England and Wales.178 Although, as I have discussed elsewhere,179 the 
circumstances of the one case where this took place were sufficiently unusual for 
it to be considered an outlier among transmission case law. Nevertheless, 
concern about antibiotic resistant strains of otherwise treatable infections and the 
potential for “super” strains have received significant media attention in recent 
years.180 Furthermore, increased rates of these treatable infections have been 
associated with application use,181 similar to the suggestion that there is an 
association between application use and HIV transmission, which I noted in 
Chapter 1. As such, this vignette aimed to elicit discussion about these other 
sexual health risks, to see if participants saw them as comparable or 
distinguishable from concerns surrounding HIV.182 
 
 
176 The American spelling of Gonorrhea, which is used in some literature, was used in the vignette 
itself and is reproduced above for accuracy. However, the typical English spelling is used 
elsewhere throughout the remainder of this thesis. 
177 R v Dica [2004] EWCA Crim 1103 [2]. 
178 R v Marangwanda (Peace) [2009] EWCA Crim 60. 
179 Cameron Giles, ‘A Sexual Harm?: HIV Transmission, “Biological” GBH, and Ancillary 
Sentencing Provisions in England and Wales’ [2020] Journal of Criminal Law (forthcoming). 
180 James Gallagher, ‘Man Has “world’s Worst” Super-Gonorrhoea’ (BBC News, 28 March 2018) 
<https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/health-43571120>. 
181 Matthew R Beymer and others, ‘Sex on Demand: Geosocial Networking Phone Apps and Risk 
of Sexually Transmitted Infections among a Cross-Sectional Sample of Men Who Have Sex with 
Men in Los Angeles County.’ (2014) 90 Sexually transmitted infections 567. 
182 Given the recency of the gonorrhoea diagnosis, it would be possible that Ben’s test was inside 
the window period where a HIV infection might not be detected by a sexual health screen. 





As part of this vignette, participants were asked to discuss the process of 
updating a profile with new information. Similar to the age discrepancy in Vignette 
1, one of the aims here was to explore whether profiles are understood as static 
artefacts, or as something to be continually modified and updated. Given that 
information such as Test History and HIV status may change and become 
outdated, this is particularly relevant to the honesty or dishonesty of 
representations made through profiles. As I will go on to discuss, below, 
participants’ responses to these issues demonstrated several distinct ways of 
interpreting and understanding time, which became critical to later analysis.  
 
Other issues within this vignette included the lack of a profile picture and the use 
of a given name as the username for the profile. Given the importance of 
usernames, as noted above,183 this vignette aimed to elicit discussion of the 
different degrees to which application users are able to reveal or conceal 
information about themselves. In particular, whether participants interpreted 
concealment or disclosure of some information as normal or unusual was a point 
of particular interest, especially when some information, such as HIV status, race, 
or age, can result in social stigma.184 
 
3.4.5 Vignette 5: “Disclosure” 
The final vignette again combined a mock profile with a short narrative as part of 
a visual and written vignette. The purpose of this set of questions was to elicit 
 
183 Gatson (n 155). 
184 See, for instance, Colin Fitzpatrick, Jeremy Birnholtz and Jed R Brubaker, ‘Social and Personal 
Disclosure in a Location-Based Real Time Dating App’, 48th Hawaii International Conference on 





discussion of disclosure, the adequacy of treatment as prevention as an 
alternative to disclosure, and the distribution of responsibility between sexual 
partners. In the written narrative, participants are told that the character in this 
scenario understands themselves to have an undetectable viral load. However, 
in contrast to Vignette 1, this information is not disclosed in the mock profile. 
Participants are not told the rationale behind the character’s choice not to include 
this information, instead the questions participants were asked aimed to elicit 
discussion of disclosure and any perceived challenges to disclosure participants 
expected or understood. 
 
One of the aims of this vignette was, also, to prompt discussion of the law and to 
explore whether participants were aware of the specific legal obligations placed 
on people living with HIV. How these related to, contrasted with or superseded 
social or moral obligations to disclose was a point of particular interest. Given that 
prior research has demonstrated that awareness of the law can be limited or 
incorrect,185 this question provided an opportunity to explore whether this 
continues to be the case (particularly important given the developments in 
treatment and prevention discussed in Chapter 2) or whether applications have 
an impact on their users’ understanding of disclosure obligations and the law.  
 
 
185 Catherine Dodds, Adam Bourne and Matthew Weait, ‘Responses to Criminal Prosecutions for 
HIV Transmission among Gay Men with HIV in England and Wales’ (2009) 17 Reproductive 
Health Matters 135; Matthew D Phillips and Gabriel Schembri, ‘Narratives of HIV: Measuring 
Understanding of HIV and the Law in HIV-Positive Patients’ (2016) 42 Journal of Family Planning 







One final point addressed by this vignette was the issue of post-intercourse 
disclosure. Participants were asked whether they perceived disclosure 
obligations differently if questions about status were asked after intercourse. This 
provided a further opportunity for participants to reflect on the rationale behind 
non-disclosure and whether non-disclosure might be because of concern about 





Ari is HIV+. He knows 
from his doctor that he 
has an undetectable viral 
load and that this means 
he can’t pass the virus 
on. This is his current 
dating app profile.  
 
Ari arranges a hook up 
with someone called 
Charlie, who agrees to 
come around to Ari’s 
house. Before he 
arrives, Charlie sends a 
message saying “Btw, 





stigma.186 It was also intended to elicit data relevant to the issue of “conditional” 
consent, discussed in Chapter 2, and the assumptions of the HIV-negative 
character in the vignette.   
 
3.5 Data Collection and Response Rate 
Recruitment and data collection in the project were carried out between October 
9th, 2018 and May 27th, 2019, during which time 102 participants completed the 
survey. The length and detail provided in responses did vary and some responses 
were so brief that only one or two codes were applied to them.187 No responses 
were excluded from analysis, as whilst some were less detailed no participant 
responded in a wholly trivial manner. Participants were not asked to report how 
they came to be aware of the survey. However, as I promoted social media 
recruitment and spent time recruiting via applications on different days, it is 
possible to anecdotally suggest that both recruitment methods were reasonably 
effective.  
 
As shown in Chart 2, the overwhelming majority of participants make use of 
Grindr, with only one participant (who exclusively used Hornet) not doing so. 
Participants were able to provide additional answers beyond the options given in 
the survey, with 21 choosing to do so. Among these 21, Tinder (11) was the most 
common additional choice, followed by Recon (6), with several apps reported by 
a single participant (Squirt, BiggerCity, Chasabl, Fabguys, NakedMates, 
 
186 On this point, see, for instance, Andrew Spieldenner, ‘PrEP Whores and HIV Prevention: The 
Queer Communication of HIV Pre-Exposure Prophylaxis (PrEP)’ (2016) 63 Journal of 
Homosexuality 1685; Robinson (n 158). 
187 As noted above, shorter responses are a common feature of story completion tasks, but still 





HotOrNot, Gayromeo, OKCupid, Grommr, Fitlads, Fridae) or only two participants 




Given that application-based recruitment took place on Grindr and Hornet, that 
these are the two most reported apps is unsurprising.  That all but one participant 
reported using Grindr is similarly unsurprising when taking into consideration its 
market dominance. Nevertheless, the lack of participants with experience of only  
applications other than Grindr remains a limitation of this project. Future research 
may wish to consider whether other applications have their own unique forms of 
contextual knowledge, disclosure expectations and ways of being used.  
 
When broken down by age, the majority of participants in this project were 
younger, with the oldest participant being in the 60-64 age bracket. This may 
reflect a demographic trend in the userbase of many applications, however, as 
most major applications do not release information about the demographic 
breakdown of their users, it is not possible to verify this point.  








At the end of the survey, participants were asked whether they had been aware 
that those with an undetectable viral load cannot transmit the virus during 
intercourse, prior to taking part in this research. For those participants who were 
not previously aware of this, a link was given which provided more information on 




As I go on to discuss in Chapter 4, some participants drew on detailed medical 
knowledge of TasP in their responses. However, several participants also 
Chart 3: Participant Reported Age Breakdown 
 






expressed doubts over the efficacy of U=U. Those in the “Other” category, who 
were provided with a short text box in which to explain their response, discussed 
being aware of public health campaigns about TasP or hearing about U=U 
through word-of-mouth but feeling as if they had insufficient information to feel 
confident concerning it. Participants were also provided a final box for any 
comments they wished to make and several participants who were aware of TasP 
echoed these points. One participant, in particular, suggested that there needed 
to be a public health campaign involving TV materials to promote a broader 
awareness of TasP and HIV health.188 
 
3.6 Data Analysis and Analytic Perspectives 
One of the advantages of the digital data collection methods used here is the 
ease with which responses can be downloaded in full, without the need for 
transcription or modification by the researcher. As noted above, this meant that 
quotations taken from participants’ responses could be presented verbatim in this 
and subsequent chapters.189 This also enabled responses to be downloaded and 
imported into the qualitative analysis program NVivo,190 where they could 
undergo thematic analysis.  
 
Braun and Clarke argue that thematic analysis (“TA”) is ‘a poorly demarcated, 
rarely acknowledged, yet widely used qualitative analytic method’ which ‘offers 
an accessible and theoretically flexible approach to analysing qualitative data’.191 
 
188 Participant 401353-401344-41722354 
189 84 of the 102 participants who took part in the project are quoted directly in subsequent 
chapters, as representative of the themes developed from the data. 
190 Specifically, Nvivo Version 12.  
191 Virgina Braun and Victoria Clarke, ‘Using Thematic Analysis in Psychology’ (2006) 3 





At a fundamental level, TA involves coding the data by identifying pertinent points 
within responses, guided by the overall research question, then using these 
codes as the foundation for broader themes. As Braun and Clarke explain:  
Codes are the smallest units of analysis that capture interesting features 
of the data (potentially) relevant to the research question. Codes are the 
building blocks for themes, (larger) patterns of meaning, underpinned by 
a central organizing concept – a shared core idea. Themes provide a 
framework for organizing and reporting the researcher’s analytic 
observations.192 
 
TA, when used within a constructionist project, as is the case here, shares some 
similarities with constructionist grounded theory approaches to data analysis.193 
As with grounded theory, the themes and concepts explored in the following three 
chapters were developed from within the data. However, unlike grounded theory, 
TA does not require the researcher to commit to what might be described as the 
‘prescriptive and purist’ ideals of grounded theory such as line-by-line coding.194 
Braun and Clarke indeed emphasise that many researchers ‘do not appear to 
fully subscribe to the theoretical commitments of a ‘full-fat’ grounded theory’ 
instead carrying out what they term ‘essentially grounded theory “lite”’.195  
 
TA offers a suitable alternative to this GT-lite approach, avoiding concerns such 
as those articulated by Tolhurst that grounded theory is employed ‘more [due] to 
its efficacy as a legitimating tool (in the face of the ascendant biological sciences) 
than its ability to guide research in a clear and helpful fashion’.196 As Grey states, 
 
192 Victoria Clarke and Virginia Braun, ‘Thematic Analysis’ (2017) 12 Journal of Positive 
Psychology 297, 297. 
193 For an overview of constructionist grounded theory, see Jane Mills, Ann Bonner and Karen 
Francis, ‘The Development of Constructivist Grounded Theory’ (2006) 5 International Journal of 
Qualitative Methods 25. 
194 Braun and Clarke, Successful Qualitative Research (n 7) 185–187. 
195 Braun and Clarke, ‘Using Thematic Analysis in Psychology’ (n 191) 81. 
196 Edward Tolhurst, ‘Grounded Theory Method: Sociology’s Quest for Exclusive Items of Inquiry’ 





TA’s ‘flexibility allows the exploration of new ideas, drawing on participants’ 
answers, which will provide an ecologically grounded’ form of analysis.197 
 
TA also enables the researcher to draw upon existing theories and models when 
analysing responses and developing themes from the codes applied to the data. 
In this project, as themes were developed, the literature discussed in Chapter 2 
prompted these themes to be organised into the three subsequent chapters. Each 
of these chapters was then able to draw on particular analytic perspectives, which 
I summarise below, which I explore using the data.198 
 
3.6.1 Time and Space 
In Chapter 4, the themes of “Risk”, “Safety”, “Avoidance”, “Stigma” and “Emotion” 
are discussed with particular reference to the spatial and temporal assumptions 
and frameworks that accompany them. This is done by drawing upon the concept 
of the “chronotope” and “chronotopic” analysis developed in legal literature by 
Valverde.199 As I will discuss in Chapter 4, chronotopes are specific assumptions 
about the operation of space and time, which can vary when looking at particular 
concepts or settings; chronotopic analysis therefore enables the spacio-temporal 
specificities of particular concepts to be explored and discussed.200 Whilst 
Valverde herself focuses upon chronotopes within particular spaces, I focus upon 
chronotopes operating at particular scales, specifically at the level of the 
 
197 Jacqueline M Gray, ‘What Constitutes a “Reasonable Belief” in Consent to Sex? A Thematic 
Analysis’ (2015) 21 Journal of Sexual Aggression 337, 339. 
198 Over the following three chapters, excerpts from participants’ responses are used to illustrate 
the arguments in my analysis. Other than minor formatting adjustments, these are presented as 
written by participants, without corrections to spelling or grammar.  
199 See Mariana Valverde, Chronotopes of Law: Jurisdiction, Scale and Governance (Routledge 
2015) . 





individual and sexual community. I demonstrate how these themes each have 
particular temporal connotations and assumptions which are linked with 
participants’ constructions of obligation and responsibility.  
 
3.6.2 Obligation and Consent 
In Chapter 5, I address the limitations of consent within the current approach to 
HIV transmission offences and introduce the themes of “Trust”, “Privacy”, 
“Knowledge”, “Disclosure” and “Consent”. I illustrate how the assumptions about 
time and space, identified in Chapter 4, relate to the contractual approach to 
consent in transmission case law, as seen in Chapter 2. This chapter, therefore, 
draws upon the concept of “conditional consent” and “materiality” and 
demonstrates how these concepts do not necessarily conform with the context 
specific meanings participants discussed in their responses.  
 
3.6.2 Responsibility and Law 
Responsibilisation, which I introduced in Chapter 2, acts as the analytic lens 
through which I explore participants’ understanding of the law and application of 
legal concepts to the issue of HIV disclosure and non-disclosure in Chapter 6. 
The themes of “Intent”, “Law” and “Responsibility” are explored, and I 
demonstrate how responsibility for HIV prevention is often constructed as limited 
or one-sided. As I will discuss in Chapter 6, responsibilisation in the context of 





concept seen in the literature relating to the “risk society”.201 I explore the 
limitations of the law in addressing these concerns, highlighting how both 
reinforce individualistic narratives relating to HIV prevention which the current law 
on HIV transmission incorporates. 
 
3.7 Concluding Remarks 
In this chapter, I have set out the approach to data collection taken in this project. 
This has involved a novel use of visual elicitation methods adapted for the 
purpose of investigating the context dependent meanings and understandings of 
current and recent application users in relation to sexual health, generally, and 
HIV disclosure via mobile dating applications, specifically. As I have 
demonstrated, the visual vignette technique here enabled detailed and 
informative responses to be collected from participants. I have also illustrated that 
whilst the relative realism of the vignettes is important for the purpose of eliciting 
this data; their fictitious status does not limit the findings of this project, which is 
interested in participants’ knowledge and understanding. Although participants 
were not asked about their own profiles or their trust in the profiles of others they 
encounter online, which would introduce additional ethical challenges 
surrounding the reproduction of data in this work, this methodology enables the 
context in which these practices take place to be examined. Rather than capturing 
how the individual participants who took part in the project would react specifically 
to the scenarios depicted in the vignettes, this instead facilitates a detailed 
examination of the beliefs and attitudes relevant to HIV disclosure on applications 
 
201 See Matthew Weait, Intimacy and Responsibility: The Criminalisation of HIV Transmission 





aimed at men who have sex with men, more broadly, enabling the analysis of 
legally relevant concepts presented over the following three chapters.  
 
One limitation which should be acknowledged at this stage stems from the 
ongoing (re-)development of these applications and online dating/social 
networking more generally. Since the beginning of this project applications have 
not remained static and, as has been the case with earlier work relating to online 
dating websites,202 new features have been introduced and existing features 
altered or removed. Other than longitudinal projects, keeping pace with this 
ongoing change is a challenge for any researcher. However, the HIV disclosure 
features which are at the core of this study continue to be used on several 
applications and this continuation emphasises the significance of this research 
as a whole. What has been, of course, unexpected and likely disruptive on the 
expectations and knowledge discussed in subsequent chapters, is the 
emergence of COVID-19. Attitudes towards testing, treatment and disclosure of 
short and long-term health conditions may have been significantly impacted by 
COVID. Whilst the data here pre-dates the current pandemic, it does offer a 
suitable foundation for future research addressing future developments in the 
digital disclosure of personal health information.203
 
202 Amy Shea, ‘Race, K. The Gay Science: Intimate Experiments with the Problem of HIV’ (2018) 
40 Sociology of Health & Illness 925. 
203 Paul Waugh, ‘NHS Test and Trace Phone App To Be “Rolled Out in Next Few Weeks”’ 
(Huffington Post, 28 July 2020) <https://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/entry/nhs-test-and-trace-
phone-app-riordan-next-few-weeks_uk_5f1ff10fc5b638cfec4996de> accessed 30 July 2020. 
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Chapter 4: Risk, Safety, and Other Core Concepts 
4.1 Introduction 
Chapter 2 noted how the criminalisation of HIV transmission is often justified 
through reference to conceptualisations of risk, responsibility and trust which are 
overly simplistic. I observed the manner in which the perceived culpable 
behaviour of the proposed defendant is closely associated with (in some cases 
actually being) perceived breaches of norms of sexual responsibility and 
citizenship. Building on this discussion, this chapter explores participants’ 
accounts of risk and safety, as well as highlighting how emotion and stigma can 
be seen running throughout elements of these accounts. As discussed in the 
previous chapter, it draws upon the recent analysis of Mariana Valverde and her 
adaptation of Mikhail Bakhtin’s theory of the chronotope,1 demonstrating the role 
of time in these concepts, as well as the relationship between time and the legal 
concepts discussed in Chapters 5 and 6.   
 
The chronotope can be conceptualised as a socially constructed spacio-temporal 
framework of analysis,2 that is to say a means of understanding the particular 
space-time characteristics of a phenomenon.3 Although originally a literary theory 
for understanding the way that ‘space and time vary in qualities, [and] different 
social activities and representations of those activities presume different kinds of 
 
1 Mariana Valverde, Chronotopes of Law: Jurisdiction, Scale and Governance (Routledge 2015). 
2 Kristiina Kumpulainen, Anna Mikkola and Anna Mari Jaatinen, ‘The Chronotopes of Technology-
Mediated Creative Learning Practices in an Elementary School Community’ (2014) 39 Learning, 
Media and Technology 53, 56. 
3 See Dawn Moore and Mariana Valverde, ‘Maidens at Risk: “Date Rape Drugs” and the 
Formation of Hybrid Risk Knowledges’ (2000) 29 Economy and Society 514, 516; also, Garry 
Saul Morson and Caryl Emerson, Mikhail Bakhtin: Creation of a Prosaics (Stanford University 





time and space’,4 chronotopes offer a useful analytic framework for legal 
concepts. Valverde, for instance, highlights how ‘standards of proof and burdens 
of proof that are found in criminal but not civil law set up and presuppose specific 
spaciotemporal dynamics.’5 This is not to suggest that chronotopes actually 
exist,6 instead chronotopes should be seen as a way of interrogating the way that 
concepts produce and are produced by different conceptualisations of space and 
time.7   
 
In his review of Valverde’s book on chronotopes of law, Harrington suggests that 
chronotopes are ‘more or less well established in law to the extent that they are 
persuasive to concrete audiences’.8 Here I mean to suggest that chronotopes can 
be one means of analysing how application users go about using applications 
and co-producing the concepts of risk, safety and responsibility, in ways which 
depends on particular types of space-time and which can come in to conflict. In 
the context of criminal proceedings, I mean to argue that the temptation to see 
the past as a static, chronological narrative ignores the manner in which the 
chronotopes of risk, safety and ultimately consent to risk are carried out in 
practice, and particularly understates the inherent instability and subjectivity of 
these concepts.9  
 
4 Morson and Emerson (n 3) 367 (emphasis in original). 
5 Mariana Valverde, ‘What Counts as Theory, Today? A post-philosophical framework for socio-
legal empirical research’ (2016) 3 Brazilian Journal of Empirical Legal Studies 172, 177 (emphasis 
added). 
6 Valverde (n 1) 23. 
7 Suzanne Fraser, ‘The Chronotope of the Queue: Methadone Maintenance Treatment and the 
Production of Time, Space and Subjects’ (2006) 17 International Journal of Drug Policy 192, 199. 
8 John Harrington, ‘Time and Space in Medical Law: Building on Valverde’s Chronotopes of Law’ 
(2015) 23 Feminist Legal Studies 361, 362. 
9 For additional discussion of the limitations of ‘static’ pasts, see Rachel Loewen Walker, ‘The 
Living Present as a Materialist Feminist Temporality’ (2014) 25 Women 46; see, also, Moore and 






Epidemiological understanding of HIV transmission risk has developed over time, 
particularly in respect of condomless sex,10 and the impact of these 
developments can be seen in the changing conceptualisation of risk among men 
who have sex with men.11 Among those who participated in this project, the risk 
of HIV transmission continued to be a pressing concern. Although risk was 
discussed in several distinct ways by participants, the need to avoid or minimise 
exposure to risk was pervasive across the responses.  
 
Many of these respondents discussed risk in a manner which exemplified the 
scale, tempo, and linearity of risk. The first major theme developed in this section 
highlights how participants’ accounts focused on particular sites of risk, which 
were depicted in concepts such as the “red flag” mentioned by some participants. 
Within these discussions, risk was generally constructed as something external 
to be encountered, rather than as a factor in sexual behaviour. The second 
theme, discussed below, relates to the differing conceptualisations of the 
calculability of risk and the extent to which participants perceived risk in both 
relative and absolutist ways. The third theme highlights the ways in which 
participants discussed responding to risk, including the role of testing in narratives 
surrounding risk. The final part of this section brings together the preceding 
 
10 Brian C Kelly, ‘Reconsidering “Unprotected” and HIV Risk in the Twenty-First Century’ (2016) 
7 Frontiers in Immunology 209. 
11 See, for instance, Troy P Suarez and others, ‘Influence of a Partner’s HIV Serostatus, Use of 
Highly Active Antiretroviral Therapy, and Viral Load on Perceptions of Sexual Risk Behaviour in 
a Community Sample of Men Who Have Sex With Men’ (2001) 28 Journal of Aquired Immune 
Deficiency Syndromes 471; Ingrid Young, Paul Flowers and Lisa Mcdaid, ‘Can a Pill Prevent HIV? 
Negotiating the Biomedicalisation of HIV Prevention’ (2016) 38 Sociology of Health and Illness 
411; Erin M Kahle and others, ‘HIV Prioritization and Risk Perception Among an Online Sample 






discussions to explore the chronology of risk and the extent to which risk, 
conceptually, depends on this chronology.  
 
4.2.1 Encountering Risk 
Several participants constructed risk as something to be encountered whilst 
navigating mobile dating applications. Discussing the visual stimuli, participants 
highlighted how the information given in, or withheld from, profiles could act as 
indicators of risk(iness). Not listing a HIV status within the disclosure feature was 
an example of one such indicator, as discussed by this participant:  
“… [The] use of the emojis always makes me think the person is immature. 
The lack of picture, but describing himself as toned, casts doubt on just 
how toned he'd be in real life. The choice not to enter a weight backs this 
up further for me. His lack of info on HIV status concerns me, feels a red 
flag for his lack of safer sex practices.”12 
 
Similarly, other responses demonstrated the central role that HIV transmission 
risk, as well as risk more generally, continues to play in shaping behaviour whilst 
using apps. Participants highlighted how encountering perceived risks shaped 
their interactions with and expectations towards one another:  
• “It’s a risky game , always be open”13 
 
• “Nobody would be interested in meeting with this person without a credible 
HIV status because you do not know if this person could have unprotected 
sex with anyone he meets up with, which could prove dangerous.”14 
 
• “Risky sexual partner, I like to have a more thorough understanding of a 
persons sexual health”15 
 
12 Participant 401353-401344-42532460 
13 Participant 401353-401344-41901554 
14 Participant 401353-401344-41612375 





Risk externalisation has been a common feature of public health messages on 
HIV/AIDS, which have encouraged individuals to take measures ‘to protect 
themselves from external perils.’16 The data here suggests that such messages 
are incorporated into participants’ perceptions of app profiles. The first excerpt 
highlights what might be called the general spectre of risk hanging over 
application use, exemplifying how understanding of risk can be shaped by the 
sites and scales at which it is identified.17 Each of the excerpts also demonstrates 
the extent to which risk is seen as something to be encountered, either generally 
or, as in the latter two quotes, in the form of an Other to whom the label of “risky” 
is attached.  
 
The externalisation of risk is consequential, both in terms of how risk is 
understood, which I address here, and how individuals respond to it, which I 
address below. Critically, these accounts highlight how risk is understood as 
unevenly distributed and therefore navigable. Even within the first example, 
where risk is broadly applied to the “risky game”, the participant emphasises a 
response (“always be open”) which suggests that communication can aid the 
identification and management of specific risks. The latter two excerpts do not 
diminish the importance of this general spectre of risk but, instead, highlight how 
risks associated with particular contexts still draw upon the idea of other 
individuals being the source of risk.18 The individualistic approach to risk 
 
16 Barry D Adam, ‘Constructing the Neoliberal Sexual Actor: Responsibility and Care of the Self 
in the Discourse of Barebackers’ (2005) 7 Culture, Health and Sexuality 333, 337. 
17 Paul Flowers, Claire Marriott and Graham Hart, ‘’The Bars, the Bogs, and the Bushes’: The 
Impact of Locale on Sexual Cultures’ (2000) 2 Culture, Health and Sexuality 69; Niels van Doorn, 
‘Treatment Is Prevention: HIV, Emergency and the Biopolitics of Viral Containment’ (2013) 27 
Cultural Studies 901. 
18 The ‘Others’ of the risk society. See Matthew Weait, Intimacy and Responsibility: The 





reduction related to these conceptions, discussed in further detail below, echoes 
the narratives of historic government-led public health campaigns, and more 
recent health organisation messaging.19  
 
The quotation at the beginning of this section puts forward the concept of the “red 
flag” of risk, which further demonstrates the individual scale risk operates within 
on mobile dating applications. The participant highlights the importance of 
disclosure as a means of overcoming uncertainty, as well as the way certain 
markers are read as a warning about sexual health risks. Among non-
heterosexual men, avoiding discussion of HIV and sexual health is often seen as 
a signal of HIV-positivity.20 Among heterosexuals, it has been suggested that HIV 
disclosure is further complicated by a lack of ‘shared culture’ relating to HIV, with 
disclosure being more closely associated with specific times and settings.21 
However, as Siegel et al note, the concept of the “red flag” also has a role in 
heterosexual dating where representations of HIV status tend to be believed in 
the absence of “red flags”.22  
 
 
19 Adam Burgess, ‘The Development of Risk Politics in the UK: Thatcher’s “Remarkable” but 
Forgotten “Don’t Die of Ignorance” AIDS Campaign’ (2017) 19 Health, Risk and Society 227; 
Matthew Thomann, ‘“On December 1, 2015, Sex Changes. Forever”: Pre-Exposure Prophylaxis 
and the Pharmaceuticalisation of the Neoliberal Sexual Subject’ (2018) 13 Global Public Health 
997. 
20 Ann O’Leary, ‘Guessing Games: Sex Partner Serostatus Assumptions Among HIV-Positive 
Gay and Bisexual Men.’ in Perry N Halkitis, Cynthia A Gómez and Richard J Wolitski (eds), HIV+ 
sex: The psychological and interpersonal dynamics of HIV-seropositive gay and bisexual men’s 
relationships. (American Psychological Association 2006); and, also, Iryna B Zablotska and 
others, ‘Gay Men’s Current Practice of HIV Seroconcordant Unprotected Anal Intercourse: 
Serosorting or Seroguessing?’ (2009) 21 AIDS Care - Psychological and Socio-Medical Aspects 
of AIDS/HIV 501. 
21 Asha Persson and Wendy Richards, ‘From Closet to Heterotopia: A Conceptual Exploration of 
Disclosure and “passing” among Heterosexuals Living with HIV’ (2008) 10 Culture, Health and 
Sexuality 73, 83. 
22 Karolynn Siegel and others, ‘The Strategies of Heterosexuals from Large Metropolitan Areas 
for Assessing the Risks of Exposure to HIV or Other Sexually Transmitted Infections from 





Grimm and Schwartz, in their investigation in to gay men’s perceptions of PrEP 
usage, noted a similar use of the “red flag” expression by a participant who felt 
that disclosure of PrEP usage was itself a ‘“red flag” for having STDs and being 
more likely to have “risky sex.”’23 Whilst, for the participant above, non-disclosure 
acted as a red flag for other practices which were risky, other instances of similar 
“red flag” type observations included instances where profiles disclosed an 
undetectable viral load: “No strings hook ups, sex only, bareback implied as 
undetectable”.24 Again, this account of perceived risk incorporates assumptions 
about the behavioural practices of people living with HIV. The participant’s 
assertion that disclosure of an undetectable viral load in this context indicates a 
preference for “bareback” sex concords with findings elsewhere that suggest both 
HIV+ and HIV- men understand the disclosure of some information, such as 
sexual preferences, as implicitly disclosing other information, particularly HIV 
status,25 in what Race has described as ‘veiled disclosure’.26 
 
As I have discussed elsewhere,27 the design of mobile dating applications is 
extensively governed by content restrictions. Some of these content restrictions 
limit or prohibit the discussion of sexual practices, such as bareback sex,28 within 
profiles. Both intentional veiled disclosure and (intentional and unintentional) red 
 
23 Joseph Schwartz and Josh Grimm, ‘Stigma Communication Surrounding PrEP: The 
Experiences of A Sample of Men Who Have Sex With Men’ (2019) 34 Health Communication 84, 
87. 
24 Participant 401353-401344-40473816 
25 See, for instance, O’Leary (n 20) 125–126; Barry D Adam and others, ‘Silence, Assent and HIV 
Risk’ (2008) 10 Culture, Health and Sexuality 759, 764–766. 
26 Kane Race, ‘“Party and Play”: Online Hook-up Devices and the Emergence of PNP Practices 
among Gay Men’ (2015) 18 Sexualities 253, 262. 
27 Cameron Giles, ‘Digital Disclosure: HIV Status, Mobile Dating Application Design and Legal 
Responsibility’ [2020] Information and Communications Technology Law. 
28 Chris Ashford, ‘Bareback, Grindr and a New Censorship?’ (Law and Sexuality, 5 June 2016) 
<https://lawandsexuality.wordpress.com/2016/06/05/bareback-grindr-and-a-new-censorship/> 





flags, may be interpreted as a response by application users to these restrictions. 
As bareback sex cannot be openly discussed within profiles, disclosure of an 
undetectable viral load (which is an alternative to condom use as a safer sex 
practice) may be read as synonymous with condom cessation, as it is in the 
following excerpt:  
“The users HIV status tells you it is "undetectable" which may ring alarm 
bells amongst other users on the app because they may not be interested 
in meeting the person until they get checked next time around.”29 
 
4.2.2 Risk as a Label 
The extent to which people living with HIV are, generally, constructed as the site 
of risk within a sexual health context is notable among many of the responses. In 
the accounts above, undetectable acts as a red flag despite the risk reduction 
that an undetectable viral load represents. Similarly, the participant’s focus on 
waiting until the next time viral load is tested places an emphasis on the potential 
that someone with an undetectable viral load might become infectious to others.30 
Both also exemplify how the label “undetectable” might be constructed as a sub-
category of HIV-positive identities, and therefore remain associated with the idea 
of risk, rather than an entirely new category.31  
 
Although many participants’ accounts of risk focused on situations where a 
prospective partner was not aware of their HIV status, some participants did focus 
 
29 Participant 401353-401344-42164265 
30 Asha Persson, ‘Non/Infectious Corporealities: Tensions in the Biomedical Era of “HIV 
Normalisation”’ (2013) 35 Sociology of Health and Illness 1065. 
31 Mark DM Davis and others, ‘“HIV Is HIV to Me”: The Meaning of Treatment, Viral Load and 
Reinfection for Gay Men Living with HIV’ (2002) 4 Health, Risk & Society 31, 35–36; however, cf, 
Kane Race, ‘Speculative Pragmatism and Intimate Arrangements: Online Hook-up Devices in 





on the perceived risks of those who had been diagnosed as HIV+. This is 
unsurprising, considering the ‘notion of “risky people”’ in relation to sexual health, 
and particularly HIV, has long been observed in the gay community.32 As Weait 
has noted,33 and as seen above, it is not necessary for someone to have been 
diagnosed as HIV+ for these narratives to be employed. But where HIV was 
disclosed in the mock profiles, participants often expressed particular concerns 
regarding the perceived riskiness they attached to the character in the scenario:   
“If actually undetectable (i.e. HIV positive, but medicated so as to 
massively reduce transmission of HIV), it does not phase me at all. 
However, if I were to see that test date now (18/12/2018), I would be 
concerned that someone who is diagnosed as HIV positive had not been 
for a more recent check up (it subconsciously implies they may be inept at 
other things like taking their medication). It is also unclear what ‘Test 
History’ actually means, as it is not specifically “date on which you were 
last tested for HIV”.34 
 
In this instance, the participant’s concern that someone diagnosed with HIV might 
not adhere to the medication necessary to maintain an undetectable viral load is 
closely associated with their perceived failure to maintain a closer surveillance 
over their sexual health. This is despite the dates provided in the scenario being 
well within recognised medical guidelines.35  Beliefs such as these carry with 
them the implicit assumption that people living with HIV are irresponsible with 
regards to their health, further othering them from the “responsible” sexual partner 
who scrutinises them.36 Similarly, several participants expressed a concern that 
 
32 Paul Flowers, Barbara Duncan and Jamie Frankis, ‘Community, Responsibility and Culpability: 
HIV Risk-Management amongst Scottish Gay Men’ (2000) 10 Journal of Community and Applied 
Social Psychology 285, 291. 
33 Weait, Intimacy and Responsibility: The Criminalisation of HIV Transmission (n 18) 122–123. 
34 Participant 401353-401344-42164625 
35 UNAIDS, ‘The Need for Routine Viral Load Testing’ (UNAIDS/JC2846, Joint United Nation 
Programme on HIV/AIDS 2016), 5. World Health Organisation guidelines suggest testing can be 
done annually once an undetectable viral load is achieved, the date in the scenario was also 
within the six month time frame adopted by other organisations.  






where HIV was disclosed in the profile this indicated that the user was “[n]ot good 
at prevention”.37  
 
For some participants, these concerns around risk were developed from a 
perception of HIV closely associated with promiscuity and risk taking: 
“He's been going around quite a bit, maybe lieing about his age (26/27) 
and had an awful amount of partners, where he got infected by HIV.”38 
 
In this excerpt, the participant draws a clear link between HIV status and the 
number of sexual partners that they expect the character to have had. Here, 
again, the othering of people living with HIV draws heavily on aspects of the 
homonormative and respectable queer sex.39 Promiscuity has long featured in 
the moral panic surrounding HIV/AIDS, particularly in inducing fear surrounding 
the link between promiscuity and “disease and death.”40 Within this data, these 
associations were played out, alongside related concerns about the disclosure 
and non-disclosure of status:  
 “His HIV status also indicates to me that he tends or has been more 
promiscuous than others on a very regular basis and who doesn't use 
condoms.”41 
 
 “At least he’s honest... maybe he sleeps about unprotected or he got it 
because someone lied about theirs”42 
 
 
37 Participant 401353-401344-41516378 
38 Participant 401353-401344-40187345 
39 See Chris Ashford, ‘Bareback Sex, Queer Legal Theory, and Evolving Socio-Legal Contexts’ 
(2015) 18 Sexualities 195;  and, also, Jody Ahlm, ‘Respectable Promiscuity: Digital Cruising in an 
Era of Queer Liberalism’ (2017) 20 Sexualities 364; Weait, Intimacy and Responsibility: The 
Criminalisation of HIV Transmission (n 18) 143–145; and, for general discussion of the privileging 
of ‘good’ forms of sexuality, Charlotta Carlström, ‘BDSM – the Antithesis of Good Swedish Sex?’ 
(2019) 22 Sexualities 1164. 
40 Gayle S Rubin, ‘Thinking Sex: Notes for a Radical Theory of the Politics of Sexuality’, From 
Gender to Sexuality (1984) 164; and, also, Octavio Gonzalez, ‘Tracking The Bugchaser’ (2010) 
75 Cultural Critique 82, 105. 
41 Participant 401353-401344-40688721 





Other participants suggested that disclosure of a positive status was itself an 
indication that the user was looking for “riskier” forms of sex: 
“I didn't notice this. I would immediately avoid him. It tells you he practices 
unsafe sex with strangers”43 
 
It is notable that within this account, the participant calls on both the overarching 
issue of promiscuity but also the idea of the stranger as the source of the risk in 
the situation. As Sharpe points out, it is our inability to determine whether the 
stranger is friend or foe which causes them to be conceived of as a source of 
risk.44 Here the stranger acts not only as the source of infection for the character 
in the scenario but also the possible risk that the participant feels exposed to 
themselves and allows them to further distance themselves from the 
disrespectable risky Other, discussed in Chapter 2. The stranger, as discussed 
by Bauman, can be understood as one form of the Other, one which is less visible 
or identifiable but still looming and threatening.45 Much like Bauman’s discussion 
of the stranger, the stranger conceived of by the participant here is “socially 
distant and yet physically close”,46 only the physical proximity is achieved through 
indirect contact, through the sexual partner.  
 
However, it is worth highlighting that not all participants constructed people living 
with HIV as inherently risky, nor were all seen as inherently likely to be 
promiscuous. Some participants went so far as to recognise the significant role 
of chance and luck that transmission or non-transmission of HIV involves:  
  
 
43 Participant 401353-401344-41625219 
44 Andrew N Sharpe, Foucault’s Monsters and the Challenge of Law (Routledge 2010) 26–27. 
45 Vince Marotta, ‘Zygmunt Bauman: Order, Strangerhood and Freedom’ (2002) 70 Thesis Eleven 
36. 





“HIV+ so has probably been both unlucky and stupid, but is undetectable 
so has taken steps to reduce the harm to himself and others to effectively 
zero.”47 
 
By emphasising that the character in the scenario was perceived to be both 
“unlucky and stupid” the participant addresses not only the element of chance (or 
what might, if a more neutral definition were adopted, be labelled risk) but also 
the continued role of individual responsibility that is then exemplified by the 
participants’ account of treatment as prevention.  
 
Statements such as these highlight the extent to which HIV status is utilised as a 
marker of risk in the accounts of participants, but a marker which is closely 
associated with the principle of individual responsibility. The participant above 
discusses how the character in the scenario is seen as taking responsibility for 
themselves but also, critically, for their sexual partners, by seeking treatment.  
Guta et al highlight how a HIV diagnosis is the beginning of a process of ongoing 
surveillance and management of viral load, with a particular focus on achieving 
the success marker of an undetectable viral load.48 They also highlight how this 
subjects HIV+ men to increased pressure to maintain this marker of health and 
to increased shame where this is not achieved.49  
 
The data discussed above highlights how risk plays an important role in the 
narratives of participants in justifying the culture of surveillance and scrutiny 
facilitated by mobile dating application profiles. This can lead to HIV+ men being 
constructed as an absolute source of risk, a risk either through their (detectable) 
 
47 Participant 401353-401344-41613134. 
48 Adrian Guta, Stuart J Murray and Marilou Gagnon, ‘HIV, Viral Suppression and New 
Technologies of Surveillance and Control’ (2016) 22 Body & Society 82, 89. 





viral load, through perceived risk of failure to maintain an undetectable viral load, 
or thought of otherwise as being a “risky person” generally: 
“The status to me shows that's he's unsafe and takes risks. It doesn't 
bother me to much that he has it but if he takes risks then that could put 
me off. Putting the date on when he last got tests is a good idea.”50 
 
The unknown also played a significant role as a sub-theme within participants’ 
accounts of risk and sexual health on dating applications. This was closely linked 
with an emphasis on taking responsibility and taking control of one’s own sexual 
health and the perceived inability to do so when not having the adequate 
information to do so. To the extent that participants reflected on the uncertainty 
that the characters in the scenarios might themselves experience, it was often 
suggested that disclosure within profiles was under- or uninformed. Where no 
HIV status was listed, it was often assumed that the profile’s creator “probably 
doesn't know himself”.51 Furthermore, where a profile was perceived as “risky”, 
disclosure of a HIV-negative status was sometimes doubted: “[t]hey’ve just put 
negative but really have no idea probably”.52 Such assumptions were often 
incorporated into broader concerns that such risk was posed by those individuals 
to others: 
• “I would assume that they do not know their status or are assuming 
that it is clear. They would be a high risk sexual partner who is 
potentially unsure of themselves and perhaps liable to risk their 
health or others in their habits.”53 
 
• “I always think blank HIV status generally equates to a person not 
knowing thier status. - I don’t think this means I can tell a person 
has good or bad sexual health but it may suggest they are more 
risky in thier sexual behavoirsb”54 
 
50 Participant 401353-401344-42326141. 
51 Participant 401353-401344-41483556. 
52 Participant 401353-401344-40167755. 
53 Participant 401353-401344-42316129. 





Such observations about who was at risk and who was a source of risk were often 
centred on the inability of those who had little reason to suspect they were 
potentially at risk to take control of the risky situation: 
“I think this is because there is something to hide, or they are not testing 
and do not know their status! This indicates danger to me in terms of their 
risk to passing on sexual infections, if they don’t know, how am I to know? 
I can’t make an informed sexual health decision based on the limitined 
information provided. So I must to assume otherwise or asked hum sexual 
health questions to get the answers, but then they could be lies.... or they 
could just tell me what they want me to hear. It still very much bothers me 
that they choose not to disclose!”55 
 
As Race has highlighted, the legal construction of the HIV-negative sexual 
partner in law often sees them positioned as the unassuming, unsuspecting 
sexual actor, with little reason to question the sexual health of their sexual 
partners and bearing little responsibility for preventing HIV transmission.56 In the 
example above, the risk that a prospective sexual partner is not fully informed 
about their own sexual health is reframed through the impact that it might have 
on the participant who finds themselves unable to make “an informed sexual 
health decision”. As noted in Chapter 2, in Konzani, the defendant’s culpability 
and blameworthiness were closely linked to his knowledge, or expected 
knowledge, of HIV transmission risk when compared to the complainants.57 
Similarly, where non-disclosure is demonstrated in application profiles, this may 
be used to evidence the defendant’s (moral, if not legal) culpability through his 
withholding of this information from “unsuspecting” partners. However, where 
these partners have actively engaged with the sexual health section of application 
 
55 Participant 401353-401344-41722354 
56 Kane Race, ‘Framing Responsibility: HIV, Biomedical Prevention, and the Performativity of the 
Law’ (2012) 9 Journal of Bioethical Inquiry 327, 331. 





profiles this is arguably indicative of a state other than “unassuming” or unaware 
of risk, even if not fully informed.  
 
This discussion highlights the important role that control over sexual health plays 
in the narratives of participants in two respects. Firstly, the participant discusses 
the lack of control they feel over the situation owing to the non-disclosure of any 
sexual health information; this lack of control is exemplified by their perception 
that they are working with limited information – something they cannot directly be 
responsible for. Secondly, in the latter half of the excerpt the participant discusses 
several ways through which they might attempt to take control of the situation, 
either by making further assumptions about the sexual health of the other; by 
asking the other about it and (notably) by further questioning or doubting the 
response to these questions; and finally, by maintaining the awareness of sexual 
health which they perceive the character to be lacking in. One other key method 
which participants discussed in the context of taking control of (perceived) risk, 
which will be returned to below, was avoidance: 
“I wouldn’t want to have sex with them even if they were my type and I was 
theres. They seem to want some risky things and are not too fussed about 
who with, and they are shady about their sexual health. No thanks, they 
probably have something even if they might be ignorant of it.”58 
 
These conceptions of risk, particularly the risk from the unknown and the risk 
specifically from people (knowingly) living with HIV play an important role in 
shaping the perceived distribution of responsibility for ensuring “safer sex” and 
preventing HIV transmission. The imbalance of responsibility to disclose, discuss 
risk taking and ensure sex is “safe” onto the shoulders of people living with HIV 
 





is closely associated with HIV-negative normativity.59 The othering of, particularly, 
people living with HIV, is notable considering the extent to which the current legal 
framework has an effective duty of disclosure,60 as will be discussed in Chapter 
6.  
 
4.2.3 Responding to Risk 
What the excerpts in the previous section also exemplify is the critical role that 
uncertainty and the unknown have in shaping perceptions of risk. For a number 
of participants, silence was not only a red flag because of the extent to which it 
might indicate someone knowing their HIV+ status, in the manner noted by 
O’Leary,61 but because it suggested that the user was unaware of their status 
themselves:  
“They may have left this blank to hide their status, or because they don't 
feel the need to share the date of their last check up or because they have 
limited knowledge of sexual health. They may be the type of person to only 
seek testing if symptoms are apparent, as opposed to regular checkups.”62 
 
Many participants similarly emphasised a concern that prospective sexual 
partners might be less well informed about sexual health issues, resulting in 
greater risks because of reduced rates of testing:  
“As above, would expect that they are either not particularly clued up on 
the issue of HIV, don't know their status, or just don't care to disclose. Even 
straight people these days get tested (mostly a little bit... not enough) so I 
would honestly presume that this person has been tested at some point in 
their life, could be wrong though.”63 
 
 
59 For, now somewhat historic, discussion of this, see Anthony PM Coxon, Between The Sheets 
(Cassell 1996) 166, among others. 
60 Samantha Ryan, ‘“Active Deception” v Non-Disclosure: HIV Transmission, Non-Fatal Offences 
and Criminal Responsibility’ [2019] Criminal Law Review 4. 
61 O’Leary (n 20). 
62 Participant 401353-401344-41613134 





As Lee and Sheon have noted, maintaining a regular routine of HIV testing has 
been relied upon by many who use testing services as an opportunity to reframe 
risk taking behaviour and present ‘themselves as responsible rather than being 
labelled “at risk”.’64 It is also notable that the participant above highlights the 
mundanity surrounding testing and the normalcy of testing itself, even among 
heterosexuals. Arguably this reflects the continuing evolution of HIV risk 
narratives, from the at-risk communities approach seen at the emergence of the 
epidemic to a more individualistic risk-incident based approach.65 Although this 
individualistic focus does appear to be only partially effective at encouraging 
testing, as exemplified by the first participant’s account of some only seeking 
testing “if symptoms are apparent”, and the second participant’s belief that some 
heterosexual testing behaviour is “not enough”. 
 
Many participants considered regular testing an important component of 
maintaining an awareness of one’s own sexual health. Further discussion of 
testing highlighted how the act of testing acted as a broader indicator of, to some 
participants, sexual responsibility: 
 “I suspect this person may not test regularly, is probably unaware of their 
HIV status.”66 
 
 “they may not know, may be concealing something, may not be regularly 
tested”67 
 
 “It does raise concerns that this section is left blank as they are looking for 
hook-ups/NSA meets. It could be possible that this person does not get 
 
64 Seung Hee Lee and Nicolas Sheon, ‘Responsibility and Risk: Accounts of Reasons for Seeking 
an HIV Test’ (2008) 30 Sociology of Health and Illness 167, 178. 
65 Mary S Petty, ‘Social Responses to HIV: Fearing the Outlaw’ (2005) 2 Sexuality Research and 
Social Policy 76; Rayner KJ Tan, ‘Internalized Homophobia, HIV Knowledge, and HIV/AIDS 
Personal Responsibility Beliefs: Correlates of HIV/AIDS Discrimination among MSM in the 
Context of Institutionalized Stigma’ (2018) 66 Journal of Homosexuality 1082. 
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tested often, if at all. Therefore, they are unaware of any STI's they could 
potentially carry.”68 
 
Comments such as these highlight how for some participants, testing was 
conceived of as a way by which a prospective partner could demonstrate that 
they were not an unaware “carrier” of a sexually transmitted infection. The 
construction of sexually active gay men as “carriers” of sexually transmitted 
infections has been noted by many and goes hand in hand with the idea that gay 
men and their bisexual partners act as “vectors” of infection,69 as discussed in 
Chapter 2.   
 
In her study into conceptualisations of risk and responsibility by men who have 
sex with men in the North East of England, Young noted the effects that such 
narratives can have on the distribution of responsibility for preventing HIV 
infection.70 Similarly, where participants in this project discuss the role of 
prospective sexual partners as unwitting carriers of sexually transmitted 
infections, that conceptualisation draws on a dichotomy of 
responsibility/irresponsibility where testing acts as the mechanism by which one 
can take control and take responsibility for one’s sexual health by testing and 
minimising risk as a result. Similarly, where participants discussed believing that 
the character in some of the vignettes “[didn’t] take his sexual health seriously”71 
or was “[l]ooking for fun, careless about infection risks”,72 the irresponsibility and 
 
68 Participant 401353-401344-41483556 
69 See, for instance, Heather Worth, Cindy Patton and Diane Goldstein, ‘Reckless Vectors: The 
Infecting “Other” in HIV/AIDS Law’ (2005) 2 Sexuality Research and Social Policy 3; Kagan (n 
36) 825. 
70 Ingrid Kristine Young, ‘Reimagining Risk: Exploring Understandings of Risk in Sexual Health 
amongst Gay and Bisexual Men in the North East of England’ (PhD Thesis, Newcastle University 
2011), Ch 5, in particular, 162-163. 
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perceived risk that these participants focus on was related not to promiscuity per 
se, but rather from the risk of the unknown not being confronted through testing.  
 
Furthermore, these excerpts again demonstrate that participants’ accounts of risk 
are often driven by specific markers, or lack thereof, within application profiles. 
The anonymity afforded by applications continues to be a source of risk, as was 
the case in earlier accounts of risk associated with the anonymity afforded by 
online dating websites.73 It is important to note that this data does not suggest 
that estimations of risk are presumed to be absolutely accurate, as exemplified 
by the participant above who directly acknowledges the possibility that they “could 
be wrong”. Similar accounts stressed that whilst absolute judgements about risk 
are less common, application users do tend to draw some assumptions where 
profiles: “[seem] to show that [the character who created the profile] may be less 
clued up about sexual health”.74 
 
4.2.4 The Chronology of Risk  
In this section, I have demonstrated the various conceptualisations of risk 
discussed by participants in response to the visual stimuli introduced in Chapter 
2. Although there was significant variation about what constituted a risk and what 
did not – most notably between those participants who positioned people living 
with HIV as inherently risky and those who did not – what these accounts 
consistently demonstrate is the spaciotemporal scale seen in the 
conceptualisation of HIV transmission risk. This sense of scale can be thought of 
 
73 Mark Davis and others, ‘Sex and the Internet: Gay Men, Risk Reduction and Serostatus’ (2006) 
8 Culture, Health & Sexuality 2. 





as a chronology, beginning when a risk (or perceived risk) is encountered and 
progressing through to the risk’s eventual realisation or non-realisation.  
 
 
Figure 6: The Chronology of Risk 
 
The externalising of risk seen in the use of markers such as the “red flag” and 
attempts to navigate around risk by labelling other people as “risky”, as well as 
attempts to resolve risk through the use of HIV testing and negotiations with 
prospective sexual partners, all exemplify how risk plays out, at an individual 
level, with a marked chronology. What stands out in these accounts is how risk 
is always dependent upon some external, embodied,75 source of risk which is 
encountered. In this respect, risk is always part of a chronological narrative of 
cause to effect (or non-effect if the risk does not come to pass) as risks are 
accepted, avoided, or mitigated.  
 
75 As Weait notes, HIV risk is only ever embodied: Weait, Intimacy and Responsibility: The 





As Van Doorn argues, there is a significant range of scales seen in the biopolitics 
of HIV, stretching from population level statistics down to the role of risk at a 
cellular level as seen in the discourses surrounding PrEP and TasP.76 However, 
when operating at an individual level, risks inherently rely on a chronological 
narrative which stands in marked contrast to conceptualisations of safety which, 
as I will discuss in the next section, are quite cyclical in nature.  
 
4.3 Safety 
Closely related to discussion of risk, the second theme developed from the data 
related to conceptualisations of safety and what it means to have “safe sex”. In 
contrast to the marked linearity of risk, these accounts suggest that safety is 
conceptually cyclical.  That is, in order for safety to be enacted, it presupposes a 
repeating routine to which the responsible sexual actor is committed. Despite the 
variation in the meaning ascribed to safety, being safe was often discussed as 
being essential by participants and safety conceived of as desirable when using 
dating applications, leading to the avoidance behaviours discussed later in this 
chapter.  
 
The discussion of safety in absolute terms by some participants reflects perhaps 
the limitations imposed by the design of dating applications and the impact of a 
history of public health safer sex messaging which has been, generally, 
monolithic in nature. Of course, safer sex has never been monolithic in nature in 
practice.77 However, the development of new technologies, most notably in the 
 
76 van Doorn (n 17) 906–917. 
77 Susan Kippax and Kane Race, ‘Sustaining Safe Practice: Twenty Years On’ (2003) 57 Social 





form of PrEP, have further diversified the meaning of safety both in individual 
accounts of gay men and in the wider medicalised understanding of the term.78 
Nevertheless, many participants did discuss their impression of the safety of the 
characters in the profiles in relatively absolute terms:  
 
 “They practice safe sex” 79 
 
 “It tells you that they are a safe couple and regularly get tested. Which is 
comforting.”80 
 
 “That they are both HIV negative, are regularly tested (even though the 
test history may only be with ref to one of them), probably not on PREP 
though and I would expect them to be looking for sex safe only (with 
condoms).”81 
 
It is notable that these accounts all focus on the third stimuli: “Couple”.82 Whilst 
these participants do utilise safety as a singular concept, it is the second 
participant’s emphasis that they are a “safe couple” which suggests a less uniform 
practice of being “safe”. Maintaining safety in sexual contact outside of a 
relationship – negotiated safety – has long been adopted by some gay men as a 
HIV prevention strategy which allows for condom cessation within the confines of 
the “safety” of the relationship.83 Here, the focus on safety as something which is 
 
78 Andrew Spieldenner, ‘PrEP Whores and HIV Prevention: The Queer Communication of HIV 
Pre-Exposure Prophylaxis (PrEP)’ (2016) 63 Journal of Homosexuality 1685, 1693–1694; Iain 
Williamson and others, ‘“There’s This Glorious Pill”: Gay and Bisexual Men in the English 
Midlands Navigate Risk Responsibility and Pre-Exposure Prophylaxis’ (2019) 29 Critical Public 
Health 560, 566–567. 
79 Participant 401353-401344-41625219 
80 Participant 401353-401344-42121132 
81 Participant 401353-401344-42790768  
82 See Section 3.4.3, above. 
83 See, for instance, Kippax and Race (n 77) 3; Timothy Frasca, Gary W Dowsett and Alex 
Carballo-Diéguez, ‘The Ethics of Barebacking: Implications of Gay Men’s Concepts of Right and 
Wrong in the Context of HIV’ (2013) 25 International Journal of Sexual Health 198, 209; Brandon 
Andrew Robinson, ‘Barebacking with Weber: Re-Enchanting the Rational Sexual Order’ (2014) 





achieved by the couple as a unit speaks to the importance of safety in accounts 
of condom cessation and other forms of risk taking.  
 
Eisenberg et al, drawing on empirical data collected from young men who have 
sex with men, highlighted the importance of the concept of safety to instances of 
condom cessation in relationships. Safer sex was conceptualised by participants 
there ‘as a necessary behaviour that [the participants] and other [young men who 
have sex with men] should engage in to protect against HIV and other STIs.’84 
However, despite the (at the time) continued monolithic emphasis of condom use 
within public health safe sex discourses, condom cessation was discussed within 
social contracts which established trust between sexual partners, such as 
relationships.85 Such social contracts might be seen as a demonstration of the 
link between conceptions of safety, such as the ones discussed by the 
participants above, and the related concept of control.  
 
As noted above, testing was employed by some participants as a means of 
navigating risk taking. However, the emphasis on regular testing seen in the 
excerpts above suggests that, additionally, testing exemplifies the routine nature 
of safety. Regular testing, like daily PreP doses,86 and using a condom every 
time,87 employs a cyclical chronotope. This chronotope of safety might best be 
conceptualised as a “living present”, ‘stretching between past and future’.88 
 
84 Anna Eisenberg and others, ‘Achieving Safety: Safer Sex, Communication, and Desire among 
Young Gay Men’ (2011) 26 Journal of Adolescent Research 645, 649. 
85 Eisenberg and others (n 84). 
86 Alexander Maine, ‘Bareback Sex, PrEP, National AIDS Trust v NHS England and the Reality 
of Gay Sex’ [2019] Sexualities. 
87 David L Chambers, ‘Gay Men, AIDS, and the Code of the Condom’ (1994) 29 Harvard Civil 
Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review 353. 





Testing, and other risk reduction behaviours, maintain this living present, 
because they are only ever sufficient to sustain, but never resolve or bring about 
the safety which is desired.89 
 
As highlighted in the excerpts above, condoms were seen as one, key, way 
through which individuals (or in this instance, the unit of the couple) could take 
control of their sexual health. In addition, some participants discussed the role of 
treatment as a means of lowering the viral load in order to reduce the risk posed 
to sexual partners:  
“If he’s undetectable it means he’s managing his condition properly, and 
so long as also using contraception there is low risk to other partner”90 
 
Treatment as prevention challenges the traditional understanding of safe sex 
which emphasises the existence of a physical barrier preventing the transmission 
of bodily fluids between partners.91 Control also plays a different, although not 
non-existent, role in such accounts. Whilst condoms or negotiated safety rely 
upon a perceived social contract between sexual partners, involving the mutual 
participation in safe practices, this is not the case with TasP. With TasP, the 
virologic status of the HIV+ partner determines which acts are understood as 
“safe”, with control of this safety resting with the HIV+ partner.  
 
Related to this was the importance of understanding the means of HIV 
transmission, and means of risk reduction, in the accounts of safety that related 
to TasP. Awareness of TasP as reported through a yes/no/other awareness 
 
89 Moore and Valverde (n 3) 517. 
90 Participant 401353-401344-40196504 
91 Adam H Bourne and Margaret A Robson, ‘Perceiving Risk and (Re)Constructing Safety: The 





question at the end of the survey was high with 76% (n=77) of participants 
reporting previously being aware of TasP.92 Some of these participants drew on 
detailed medical understanding of viral loads when discussing TasP:   
“They have been diagnosed as HIV positive, but are under treatment to 
bring their virus cell count down to below 40 and are now classed as 
undetectable which means they can not transmit the virus to anybody while 
on their medication. The test history tells me that they were last tested in 
September and that they were confirmed as undetectable, hence listing 
that they are undetectable.”93 
 
As this account exemplifies, TasP was seen by many participants as a means of 
someone diagnosed with HIV taking control and managing the condition. This 
particular participant draws on detailed medical knowledge regarding viral loads 
when discussing the perceived safety of TasP; however, this level of detail was 
less common among participants. Whilst many who did not go into this level of 
detail were, nevertheless, reassured by disclosure of a undetectable viral load, 
some participants expressed a degree of uncertainty regarding, in particular, the 
role of the test history section of profiles in such instances:  
 “Undetectable suggests to me they are HIV+ and have an undetectable 
viral load. However, in light of that, I have no idea what the test history 
date might mean. Unless, he has misunderstood the meaning of the 
'undetectable' in this context.”94 
 
 “As I previously mentioned this makes me think the person is HIV+ with an 
undetectable viral load (and thus I’d read this as being Treatment as 
Prevention as part of his safer sexual practices). I think the last test date 
in the instance of a HIV+ individual is harder to parse - is this their last viral 
load test or their last HIV test (date of seroconversion?). Either way - it 
seems to be fairly redundant information”.95 
 
 “I was wondering that on the last page! I think he is HIV+ but undetectable 
and therefore cannot pass the virus on (as far as I understand). But I don't 
quite understand why he needs a test to update. However, it might be that 
 
92 18% (n=18) reported not being aware, 7% (n=7) responded other. See further discussion of 
these responses, particularly the explanation of other responses, below. For all participants, a link 
to additional information about TasP and treatment was provided.  
93 Participant 401353-401344-41722354  
94 Participant 401353-401344-40163650 









Such uncertainty is not only notable in light of the perception of PLWHIV as 
inherently risky, as discussed above, but also speaks to the seronormativity – the 
normative assumption that people are, by default, HIV negative – of dating 
applications.97 There is some variation of the prescribed role of the testing date 
feature across different applications; however, participants often discussed the 
testing feature in one of three ways in this project: as indicative of character, as 
a feature of a given moment/encounter, or as a source of uncertainty.  
 
The smallest of these categories were those participants who were openly 
uncertain regarding the purpose of the feature in their responses: 
“My thoughts are this is someone who is HIV positive and has an 
undetectable viral load. Their test history suggests they keep an eye on 
their sexual health regularly. Though to what extent is anyone’s guess. As 
test can mean anything from a pee sample to full blood works.”98 
 
The uncertainty with which this participant addresses the test history feature is 
indicative of the variation in testing services both across the UK, and at a more 
local level where different providers may offer different packages of testing which 
incorporate a broader or narrower range of individual tests.99 However, 
recognition of this uncertainty was less common across the data, where testing 
was seen predominantly as an indication either of sexual responsibility, leading 
 
96 Participant 401353-401344-41530858 
97 For additional discussion of the seronormative design of dating website, see Kane Race, ‘Click 
Here for HIV Status: Shifting Templates of Sexual Negotiation’ (2010) 3 Emotion, Space and 
Society 7. 
98 Participant 401353-401344-43004560 
99 Health and Social Care Committee, Sexual Health: Fourteenth Report of Session 2017-2019 





to further discussion of safety by participants, or as a necessity which gave 
incidental safety in a particular instance through acting as a symbolic “all clear”.  
 
4.3.1 Safe Identities: Testing as Indicative of Character  
Testing was considered important by nearly all participants in the project. 
Participants generally conceived of testing as a necessity in order for sexually 
active people to accurately know their status:  
 “Tested but not active! And test history is very important”100 
 
 “I think people should know their status”101 
 
 “Good to know when they lastvtested. This shows that they know their 
status.”102 
 
Various aspects of these excerpts are notable, including how testing is seen as 
necessary not only in response to a particular risk incident, but rather on a regular 
and routine basis in order to demonstrate that one is actively aware of their HIV 
status. The emphasis by the third participant quoted also highlights the extent to 
which trust plays an important role in regulating testing; it is insufficient for the 
user of a profile to “know” themselves what their virological status is, testing is 
needed in order for that belief to be established in fact in the participant’s account.  
 
As already discussed, several participants highlighted a belief that the couple in 
the third mock profile were more likely to practice what they considered safe sex. 
Testing played an important role in establishing this confidence: 
 
100 Participant 401353-401344-42091689 
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“[T]hey are negative, regular tested and either play safe or careful due to 
their relationship”.103 
 
Other respondents also highlighted how even where there may have been a risk 
taken in the past, testing was indicative both that transmission had not come to 
pass and that the risk had been relatively modest in any eventuality:  
“That they both get checked up at same time and are clear. That they may 
of taken risks before but are pritty good as are negative”.104 
 
In these instances, and others throughout the data, HIV-negativity was often 
interpreted as an indicator that someone was consciously aware of their sexual 
health and could be considered a “safe” sexual partner. As one participant 
exemplified with the observation that a character was “[e]xtremely safe.”105 
Discussing the first of the two written scenarios (“Gonorrhoea”), another 
participant explained:  
“I think Ben would update [his profile to reflect the recent test at which 
gonorrhoea was detected], and it would appear (to other users of the app) 
that he is negative. I know it only says 'HIV Status: Negative' however 
whenever I see this on an app, I think to myself "This guy must be 
responsible as he gets tested regularly, and of course he wouldn't sleep 
with me knowing he has something without telling me" - at least I hope.”106 
 
This excerpt highlights not only the extent to which HIV status is extrapolated 
upon to produce a broader impression of the sexual health of a prospective 
sexual partner, but also exemplifies a common trend across the data of 
interpreting a recent HIV test to be an indicator that testing is done on a regular 
basis and where necessary to ensure that testing is accurate.  
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It is notable that across many of these accounts, participants rarely discuss safety 
in absolute terms – even the participant above suggests that their impression is 
one of extreme, not absolute, safety. Safety, as such, cannot be reduced down 
to a range of behaviours which can be carried out in order to achieve the goal of 
safety, it is rather a means of navigating a realm of perceived risks.107 Here, 
where participants’ accounts use the perception of safety as a characteristic of a 
prospective sexual partner, there is a clear link to trust as well, something which 
is perhaps less present in the final conceptualisation of testing history: the “all 
clear”.  
 
4.3.2 Safety in the Moment: The “All Clear” 
The “all clear” conceptualisation of testing differs from where testing is read as 
an indicator of sexual responsibility in that it is less concerned with overall sexual 
behaviours and is instead only concerned with sexual health in the moment.  The 
“all clear” was predominantly mentioned in the gonorrhoea scenario as a rationale 
for the character not to update their profile to reflect a more recent test because 
that more recent test had returned something other than an “all clear” result: 
“He has not had all clear”108 
And, similarly: 
“Changing the date would imply his most recent ‘clean’ result was more 
recent that it is.”109 
 
 
107 See Matthew Weait, ‘Unsafe Law: Health, Rights and the Legal Response to HIV’ (2013) 9 
International Journal of Law in Context 535, 536; also, more generally, Kimberly Koester and 
others, ‘Risk, Safety and Sex among Male PrEP Users: Time for a New Understanding’ (2017) 
19 Culture, Health and Sexuality 1301. 
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The “all clear” invokes a sense of safety and security which is clearly lacking in 
the estimation of these participants. Young discusses how, for her participants, 
the all clear acted as a means by which condoms could be dispensed with, as 
the possible risk of a hitherto unknown infection had been overcome.110 The use 
of the all clear by the second participant above also draws on elements of the 
“clean/dirty” binary which marks HIV- people as desirable and HIV+ people as 
undesirable and unattractive and has been observed widely among men who 
have sex with men.111 As discussed below, safety was often constructed as an 
element of desirability, the “all clear” played a significant role in several accounts 
of desirability, most notably with the participant quoted below, for whom the “gold 
star” of an “all clear” from a medical professional served as a marker of 
desirability: 
“Absolutely and I would respect some one discussing and would make me 
more inclined to trust them and potentially meeting up with them, 
preferably a date at the clap clinic with a pack lunch after once I had seen 
bens gold Star from the good doctor!”112 
 
Given the variation in different testing packages across the NHS and other 
providers, the all clear conception of sexual health is perhaps the most 
problematic. It carries with it significant scope for miscommunication and 
misunderstanding and may very well lead to allegations of active deception or 
non-disclosure.113 Whilst some may understand the “all clear” as an indication 
that there is no risk and that a partner is clear of all infections, others using this 
term may recognise that the “all clear” is limited to a range of more common, and 
 
110 Young (n 70) 124. 
111 Spieldenner (n 78) 1691–1692. 
112 Participant 401353-401344-42526627 
113 For discussion of similar observations relating to disclosure of a ‘clean’ status, see Barry D 






perhaps more serious, infections typically tested for in the absence of symptoms. 
Furthermore, given the extent to which the “all clear” is dependent on no further 
exposure to risks in the time since the test (and before it taking into consideration 
the window period of different HIV tests), there is additional risk of 
miscommunication inherent in the absolutist nature of the all clear. 
 
4.3.3 Safety Dissipating Over Time 
In many of the responses discussed so far, there is a general emphasis that 
regular testing is important and necessary. For those participants who discussed 
testing as a general indicator in relation to sexual health,114 regular testing was 
seen to be indicative of the (sexual) responsibility of the tester and for those 
emphasising the importance of the “all clear” testing was key to obtaining the 
safety and security that the all clear facilitates. In both of these accounts the 
regularity of testing is central and, consequentially, as testing becomes less 
recent, the safety that it provides dissipates. This was noted by several 
participants and, whilst the exact length of time that a test carried weight for varied 
across the data, most participants discussed testing which was perceived to be 
older or dated carrying little weight at all:  
“The fact that the last tested section is within 4 months of the current date 
I would not be overly allarmed, this could be due to a host of reasons, 
chielf that he has not had sexual intercourse during that time and has not 
had cause to be retested. I would become concerned if the date were to 
be over 6 months and very weary if it were over 12”115 
 
This particular participant stood out, owing to the specificity with which they 
address the time periods within which a test would be reassuring, not overly 
 
114 See, for example, responses at footnotes 80-81 and 100-104. 





alarming and then concerning. They were also one of the few participants who 
reflected on the reason for non-testing in a given time frame. All of the profiles 
which disclosed a test date included a test date which was (at the end of the data 
collection period) less than 12 months prior, often the recommended timeframe 
for repeat testing.116 Whilst most participants did not discuss specific time frames, 
some, nevertheless, highlighted that a newer test was more appealing than a 
more dated one: 
“The users HIV status tells you it is "undetectable" which may ring alarm 
bells amongst other users on the app because they may not be interested 
in meeting the person until they get checked next time around.”117 
 
Other participants’ concerns regarding test history appeared to vary, to a greater 
or lesser degree, dependent upon HIV status. One participant, quoted above as 
saying that he “would be concerned that someone who is diagnosed as HIV 
positive had not been for a more recent check up (it subconsciously implies they 
may be inept at other things like taking their medication)”118 when discussing the 
first stimuli (Undetectable), went on to say, on the third question (The Couple):  
“I don’t think it really tells me anything other than that they did not have 
HIV on 30/9/2018. It does imply they get checked regularly as a couple, 
which is positive, but if I were to read this now (18/12/2018), i would hope 
to see a new check date fairly soon. Broadly speaking, I think these two 
men are sensible”119 
 
 
The difference between the test history dates on these two images, 29 days, may 
go some way to explain the different levels of concern that the participant has for 
 
116 Annual testing is generally recomended for those not considered to be ‘at risk’ of infection. 
However, there is no general consensus on what ‘at risk’ means in this context. See LM McDaid 
and others, ‘Frequency of HIV Testing among Gay and Bisexual Men in the UK: Implications for 
HIV Prevention’ (2016) 17 HIV Medicine 683, 684;  see, also, P Flowers and others, ‘Has Testing 
Been Normalized? An Analysis of Changes in Barriers to HIV Testing among Men Who Have Sex 
with Men between 2000 and 2010 in Scotland, UK’ (2013) 14 HIV Medicine 92. 
117 Participant 401353-401344-42164265  
118 Participant 401353-401344-42164265  





each situation. However, it should also be considered whether perhaps people 
living with HIV are being held to a higher standard of safety, with safety 
dissipating more over time, than the HIV- application user.  
 
4.3.4 Safety as Desirable  
The final sub-theme relating to safety was the extent to which safety was 
constructed as desirable by participants, both as a state (being safe) and as a 
behaviour (practicing “safe” sex). Many participants discussed how giving the 
impression of safety, through behaviours such as displaying a recent HIV test, 
might be seen as desirable by application users:  
 “A more recent test date looks better to would be sexual partners. It implies 
the individual behind the profile cares about his sexual health.”120 
 
 “Letting people know that you get tested and only recently can be 
appealing to people. If he does meet up with people for sex, until he knows 
he's clear he should tell people about it even though it would put people 
off”121 
 
These examples not only demonstrate two of the different conceptions of safety 
discussed above, the latter also demonstrates the converse, the undesirableness 
of perceived risk.122 This response also highlights the role of disclosure in 
navigating risk and achieving safety, the participant arguing that despite the 
impact that it would have on desirability, disclosure should take place.  
 
120 Participant 401353-401344-43686850 
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122 It should be noted within the context of the scenario that the character being discussed has 
already received treatment for gonorrhoea and is intending to have sex with a condom before the 





Other participants discussed the impact that the desire for safety had on their 
own sexual practices; here, safe sex returned to a monolithic state, being 
something that was (for these participants) essential:  
 “I don’t really give it a second thought with how many people don’t fill [the 
HIV section of application profiles] in, safe sex is a must but even so, it 
doesn’t irk me too much.”123 
 
 “I think people use undetectable to indicate there is no risk. But I think this 
is untrue. I understand there are different strains etc. I never trust the 
tested date to be honest. I am always safe.”124 
 
Other participants were less absolute in their attitudes and practices, instead 
highlighting how perceived risk would lead them to adopt safer practices: “If I met 
with them it would be safe fun only”.125 This conception of safety often related to 
condom use, but also reflected other means of HIV prevention, such as selective 
sexual practices:  
“Wouldn't draw any conclusions, but a reasonable possibility that he's 
never been tested exists. If we were to have sex it would probably be 
handjobs and oral only, if we ended up fucking I'd wear a condom. Also, I 
would ask him about it beforehand.”126 
 
Robinson highlights that where gay men shift away from “always safe” strategies 
of sexual behaviour, safety can be seen to be giving way to trust and intimacy.127 
In keeping with such an analysis, safety here can be seen as one means of 
achieving control. Condoms and other methods of preventing the transmission of 
fluids, such as avoiding penetrative sex, as seen with the excerpt above, give 
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men a sense of control by reducing the exposure of vulnerable sites within the 
body.128 Relying on TasP provides less of this control, and relies more heavily on 
trust and belief in the act of disclosure:  
 “I imagine Charlie would want to reassure himself what undetectable 
means. But that he would still want to get tested - Ari said nothing and so 
nothing he says or does can be relied upon, including any explanation that 
he is undetectable.”129 
 
 “If I used a condom I wouldnt be worried but still get my regular check ups. 
If not used a condom and he explained he's undetectable and explain s 
what that means that would ease my mind but will still get a check up as 
soon as I can.”130 
 
Drawing on the work of Rubin and Race, Kagan suggests that risk and safety can 
mirror elements of Rubin’s charmed circle with the terminology of the two 
enabling the distinction between different sexual actors on a similar hierarchy of 
risky to safe.131 Another way of framing this conception would be to consider a 
hierarchy between control and its absence. This is not to advocate that this 
approach is justifiable, nor that it signifies the fair distribution of responsibility for 
preventing infection. What the data here does demonstrate, is the desirability of 
control/safety/security in the accounts of application users. It is notable how, 
through their exclusive focus on HIV, there are significant limitations on the extent 
to which the actual risks that may exist in a sexual encounter can be 
communicated.132 The lack of space to highlight other sexual health concerns 
means that, despite the risks that may be posed to people living with HIV by other 
 
128 Weait, ‘Unsafe Law: Health, Rights and the Legal Response to HIV’ (n 107). 
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STIs, PLWHIV are, through the design of these feature, always conceived of as 
the source of risks, never the “at risk” population.133  
 
4.3.5 The Cycle of Safety 
In this section, I have discussed participants’ accounts of safety and the meaning 
of safe(r) sex. I have suggested that safety, unlike risk, is understood as a cycle 
through which sexual actors maintain control over their sexual health through 
employing “safe sex” strategies each time they have sex, get tested routinely and 





Figure 7: A Cycle of Safety 
 
 
133 See Ragan Fox, Gays in (Cyber- ) Space : Online Performances of Gay Identity (VDM Verlag 
Dr Müller 2007) 164–165. 














The cyclical nature of safety is best exemplified by the degradation of safety over 
time, as seen in the accounts above. This highlights how safety is, in these 
accounts, as much about participants ‘feeling safe’ as it is about reducing actual 
transmission risks.135 Consequently, safety plays a significant role in the 
avoidance behaviours exemplified in several of the excerpts above, which I now 
turn to.  
 
4.4 Avoidance and Stigma 
Building on these conceptions of safety and risk, the next major theme in the data 
was the interrelationship between behaviours employed by participants in 
response to risk and associated attitudes expressed towards people living with 
HIV. Race136 and Robinson137 have both highlighted how online technology can 
be used by HIV+ and HIV- to avoid one another and establish boundaries on the 
basis of the binary status of being HIV positive or negative.138 This is not a wholly, 
or even predominantly, online phenomenon; serosorting has long been employed 
as a personal strategy of HIV-negative people.139 However, I would agree with 
Race and Robinson that online technologies offer a particularly exclusionary and 
stigmatising method of this kind of behaviour.140  
 
 
135 Bourne and Robson (n 91). 
136 Race, ‘Click Here for HIV Status: Shifting Templates of Sexual Negotiation’ (n 97); Race, 
‘Speculative Pragmatism and Intimate Arrangements: Online Hook-up Devices in Gay Life’ (n 31). 
137 Robinson (n 127). 
138 Of course, there are siginificant limitations on the effectiveness of this as a means of HIV 
prevention. See, in particular, Zablotska and others (n 20); and, Robinson (n 127) 395ff. 
139 Murphy et al discuss the sexual and social exclusion of PLWHIV on the basis of their HIV 
status in detail. See Patrick J Murphy et al, ‘Serostatus Disclosure, Stigma Resistance, and 
Identity Management among HIV-Positive Gay Men in Ireland’ (2016) 26 Qualitative Health 
Research 1459. 





In this section, I discuss first the behaviours discussed by participants, including 
the extent to which this serosorting or sero-avoidance draws on perceptions of 
desirability and the implicit belief within some of these behaviours that people 
living with HIV must be aware that they are conceived of as less desirable by 
others. I then highlight how some participants drew on concepts of risk and safety 
to explain why these behaviours were adopted. Race suggests that such avoidant 
behaviours might be seen not primarily as prejudicial in nature; but as the product 
of ever-present concerns around safety, security and self-protection as enacted 
through digital innovations and an increasing degree of “seronormativity” within 
gay culture.141 Whilst not disagreeing with Race’s analysis, I would emphasise 
the role that stigma and prejudice do have in these behaviours, in particular, the 
extent to which some participants draw on discourses of infectibility and 
(ir)responsibility and employ “cautionary stigma” when interacting with PLWHIV.  
 
4.4.1 Avoidance Behaviours 
The responses by several participants drew on hierarchies of desirability which 
positioned people living with HIV as undesirable or unattractive on the basis of 
their HIV status: 
 “To prevent people from being prejudice in thier choices, associated with 
guilt maybe or embarrassment. But it would have a clear impact on 
‘attractiveness’”142 
 
 “Guys would probably not respond to him if they know he has HIV.”143 
 
 “It will put people off”144 
 
141 Race, ‘Click Here for HIV Status: Shifting Templates of Sexual Negotiation’ (n 97) 12–13. 
142 Participant 401353-401344-42316129  
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Not only do all of these accounts suggest that HIV-positivity is perceived by many 
application users as an undesirable characteristic, it is also telling how people 
living with HIV are presumed to know and act on the basis that this is the case. 
Another participant similarly highlighted:  
“He knows people do not want to go with guys who has hiv regardless of 
being undetectable so he would hide it to have sex , I find it wrong him not 
being honest people should know if they are meeting him for sex”145 
 
Although for some participants, it was infectivity and the avoidance of risk which 
drove avoidance behaviours, this excerpt highlights how, for others, status alone 
was the driving force behind avoidance. Again, the suggestion that PLWHIV are 
acutely aware of this state of play is present in the participant’s account.  
 
As Race has highlighted, these practices are built on a principle of 
seronormativity.146 Other participants’ responses highlighted the impact of this 
seronormativity, notably within the context of a HIV+ character who did not 
disclose their status in the application profile:  
“He is concerned guys he likes won't meet him if they know his actual 
status”147 
 
The emphasis on the character’s actual status is notable, because the profile did 
not list a status. Other responses were, similarly, based on the position that HIV-
negativity was the default position. Adam et al note the important role that silence 
has in establishing normative values, including the extent to which “quick-sex 
environments” are further driven by a silence which may result in 
misunderstanding and miscommunication, particularly with regards to HIV 
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status.148 In online “quick sex” sites such as Adam4Adam, as Robinson 
highlights,149 HIV disclosure features initially did not incorporate the capacity for 
silence and instead required the disclosure of some information in order for the 
profile to be created. In such circumstances, there might be additional capacity 
for silence to espouse a seronormative position where PLWHIV must actively 
disclose in order not to be (actively or passively) deceptive. However, where 
these features have always been optional, as is the case on mobile dating 
applications, the extent to which the attitudes of users can be explained through 
the development process is less clear. The role of participants’ own experiences 
and their knowledge of HIV statuses and transmission risks may also have a 
significant impact on these assumptions.  
 
Discussing the first vignette (“Undetectable”), one participant suggested that a 
HIV+ status can be undesirable to some application users. However, they also 
suggested that an undetectable viral load was in some ways distinct to being 
HIV+, comparing it to having a less apparent or visible form of HIV:  
“They may still have HIV but it is very hard to notice. They don't want to 
put others off”150 
 
Assumptions and knowledge such as this, which draw less on medicalised 
knowledge and more on expectations and observations, further underscore the 
extent to which the person living with HIV is understood as a stranger, hard to 
identify but a potential threat.151 This threat is compounded, rather than 
 
148 Adam and others (n 25) 769–770. 
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undermined, by seronormative expectations, which make the HIV+ Other an 
uncommon but dangerous threat to be avoided.  
 
4.4.1.1. Other Behavioural Expectations Relating to HIV Status 
Although many participants throughout the project considered HIV to be an 
undesirable characteristic in a prospective sexual partner and discussed general 
seroavoidance behaviours, often in absolute terms, others expressed a less 
specific and more dynamic set of behaviours when interacting with people living 
with HIV. For several, whilst HIV status might be off-putting upon initially meeting 
another on an application, they did not express the absolute exclusionary 
attitudes exemplified by others:   
“Knowing their hiv status can put me off if I know right from the beginning 
but if I got to know them first before finding out it wonted bother me.”152 
 
Some participants felt that this set of beliefs was one explanation for why people 
living with HIV did not initially disclose their status within application profiles: 
“The stigma prevents people from even talking to him, and so excluding it 
and   mentioning it at a later date gives him more of a chance”153 
 
The stigma that the participant above alludes to was noted by the majority of 
participants and encompassed both application-centric behaviour and other 
offline behaviours. Below, I go into additional detail in respect of both of these 
points; however, for current purposes it is notable how behaviour which enacted 
this stigma continued to be justified, in particular the different avoidance attitudes 
expressed by some participants regarding relationships: 
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“Sadly many would not respond or initiate conversation if status on profile. 
Understandable if seeking more than hook up”154 
 
This response highlights how HIV disclosure is understood differently dependent 
upon the context of the relationship between the discloser and the party to which 
they disclose. Whilst, in existing literature,155 it has been observed that disclosure 
is less likely to take place within a casual sexual encounter, here the participant 
highlights how disclosure has additional consequences in the context of long-
term relationship seeking. The implication, that HIV status acts as a barrier to 
long-term relationships, demonstrates how avoidance behaviour may differ 
dependent upon whether the perceived “risk” is seen as a one-off instance of a 
source of ongoing risk. This data is also significant as it suggests that whilst non-
disclosure is anticipated by HIV-negative application users, many avoidance 
strategies assume that disclosure is taking place. This dissonance, between 
anticipated disclosure and acceptance that non-disclosure is understandable, 
may go some way to explaining perceived “dishonesty” in instances of non-
disclosure.  
 
As Race suggests, this kind of avoidance behaviour is most often interrelated 
with the desire of application users to feel safe and secure when using 
applications to facilitate sexual encounters. This was also notable where 
responses addressed the Gonorrhoea scenario; as noted above participants 
suggested a desire to see an “all clear” before they would feel comfortable coming 
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into sexual contact with the character. One participant, contemplating these 
avoidance behaviours, suggested that:  
“people are not going to be inclined to sleep with someone who tells them 
they have a possibly antibiotic-resistant disease that could be spread 
(albeit greatly reduced chance with a condom, still why take a chance 
when the app is full of other available people too).”156 
 
The marketplace of sexual encounters that this participant alludes to plays an 
important role in facilitating the avoidance behaviours discussed here. Through 
the emphasis that these applications place on connecting to other nearby and 
online users, applications provide a regularly changing array of potential 
connections to their users.157 The participant’s emphasis on the availability of 
others speaks to the extent to which users are able to adjust their own personal 
filters – including the technological filters on applications which users can easily 
broaden or narrow.158 
 
4.4.1.2 “Cautionary Stigma” 
One final element of the avoidance behaviours discussed by participants that is 
particularly notable is the extent to which these behaviours are not affected by 
awareness of TasP or U=U. Certainly, many participants who were less informed 
about TasP explicitly discuss avoidance behaviours, one participant explained:  
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“I lack knowledge on an 'undetectable' status, however it should always be 
communicated to potential sexual partners. I think he has not completed 
this as it would put most men off wanting to meet him.”159 
 
Again, in this account is the assumption not only that HIV acts as a discrediting 
characteristic but also that people living with HIV are acutely aware of this “fact” 
when choosing to disclose or not disclose in an application profile. However, what 
is notable is that when compared to participants who not only reported being 
aware of TasP, but who also discussed this in their responses, there were similar 
avoidance and personal-safety discourses, discussed in terms of “cautionary 
stigma”:  
“The test history lets me know how recently they’ve been tested. I’d be 
questionable to those who haven’t had a test in about 4/5+ months. I’m 
happy and proud that he put his HIV status on there. Admittedly I still have 
a little bit of that cautionary stigma with it all so would take me a bit more 
of a conversation first about it all with the person. There are those who say 
they’re on ‘PReP’ therefore don’t need a condom. This really is infuriating 
as you can still catch other STIs and STDs.”160 
 
The “cautionary stigma” that this participant discusses was seen in several other 
responses, typically when discussing characters with undetectable viral loads. It 
was most often used to distinguish between people with undetectable viral loads 
and HIV negative people on the basis that there was a perceived risk with the 
former which warranted additional caution:  
 “Useful to have but I would be cautious here as undetectable does not 
mean negative”161 
 
 “He's open about it but I'm not sure whether he's actually undetectable. 
Might be a way of still getting laid.”162 
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What is notable about this cautionary stigma is the extent to which the status of 
undetectable people as undetectable is specifically interrogated in a manner 
which the negative status of negative people is not. Whereas caution was noted 
in both instances, it is the role of this caution which might be used to distinguish 
between caution and cautionary stigma. Whilst many participants discussed not 
relying on disclosure and instead employing their own safety strategies (most 
prominently in the form of insisting upon condom use), cautionary stigma was 
specifically employed in order to question the truthfulness of PLWHIV and their 
disclosure. To this extent, the emphasis of cautionary stigma should not be upon 




“Stigma on HIV and AIDS is a killer for users of apps”.163 
 
Discussion of stigma permeated the responses. Whereas avoidance behaviours 
were a potentially stigmatising practice picked up on throughout many of the 
responses, the broader negative attitudes towards people living with HIV that 
stigma encapsulates were less specific to the digital world of websites and 
applications. Facing stigma is certainly not an experience specific to people living 
with HIV; that being said, the nature and extent and intensity of HIV stigma may 
be unparalleled.164 The stigma associated with HIV was, for some participants, 
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closely associated with the continued lack of understanding of HIV by many 
application users:  
“Guys with HIV face stigma from other users, it is not widely accepted or 
understood by the app using community. Knowing Undetectable guys 
myself, they complain of finding their choices limited and having to rebuff 
bullying or victimisation in apps.”165 
 
Similarly, one participant, who disclosed being HIV positive in their response, 
highlighted the impact that stigma had on his own disclosure practices:  
“As with me I believe it's a personal thing and even now there is to much 
bad feelings about guys with hiv So.i agree with him withholding that I 
Do.on a public page”166  
 
Given that HIV status is not a visible physical characteristic in the same way as 
certain disabilities, ethnicities and genders, (non-)disclosure plays a critical role 
in regulating the stigma that these participants discuss. In the second excerpt it 
is the concern that the participant has around being visible to a wider audience, 
potentially attracting the stigmatising behaviours discussed above, that at first 
highlights how HIV disclosure can be experienced as a discrediting moment.167 
The participant then goes on to explain the extent to which there is a general 
negative attitude directed towards people living with HIV on applications, 
revealing how this shapes his own disclosure practices leading him not to 
disclose on a pubic page. Miller notes how there is a distinction in how information 
which is freely given and information which ‘leaks out’ produce stigma.168 Another 
participant went on to explain how they could understand non-disclosure in a 
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publicly visible profile, owing to the impact that this might have on the character’s 
offline life:  
“I think he doesn't include his status as there is still so much stigma still 
attached to HIV & it would greatly reduce his chances of arranging casual 
sex and also meeting someone who he could form a long term relationship 
with. He also may not include it in case someone he knows/works with etc. 
sees & spreads it to people in his social/educational/employment circles - 
again due to the stigma this would be difficult for him.”169 
 
As Ahlm has noted, the use of dating applications and the information on them 
can leak out into the offline lives of users.170 The visibility which mobile dating 
applications utilise for networking, instant visibility to nearby users, gives users 
little control over who they can be seen by – the audience can only ever be 
imagined.171 Concerns such as those expressed above highlight how this 
imagined audience regulates what application users include in their profiles, 
including in the sexual health categories.  
 
Several participants commented upon the stigmatising effect that the newer 
features designed to promote HIV disclosure might have. Most notably, several 
were critical of the test history section of profiles: 
“Test history adds stigma to HIV sufferers by distinguishing those that have 
HIV and those that haven’t. A culture is created whereby people that are 
HIV+ are seen as disgusting and wrong and a negative diagnoses is worn 
as a badge of honour”172 
 
and, similarly;  
“Test history again just strikes me as weird and somewhat stigmatising”.173 
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Although the design of most applications means that, at present, users cannot 
filter out profiles that disclose HIV or on the basis of the test history date,174 both 
of these features can be seen contributing to the hierarchies of desire associated 
with “safety”, as it is discussed above.175 The “badge of honour” discussed by the 
participant above highlights the continued normative status of HIV-negativity and 
the extent to which HIV is singled out as the threat to health, safety, and 
desirability by mobile application design.176 
 
To conclude, the avoidance behaviours discussed by participants were strongly 
associated with the underlying stigma directed towards people living with HIV on 
mobile dating applications, as well as offline. The exclusive focus on HIV status 
taken by many dating applications positions it as the standout sexual health 
concern and targets responsibility for sexual health primarily onto the shoulders 
of PLWHIV or otherwise encourages segregation as a risk management 
approach. The next section discusses the role that emotion plays within this 
process; therefore, to end this section, I present an excerpt from a participant 
discussing their perception of the stigma that PLWHIV face:  
“Disclosure of ones HIV Staus is still very taboo. I think people in general 
do not know what HIV Positive undetectable means. People hear/see a 
HIV Positive status and immediately panic and discriminate. Potential 
partners generally don’t want to take that risk by having sex with somebody 
who has the virus. It’s just too much for them take in. They are not 
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equipment with the information to make a rationale decision about the risk. 
They assume they are at risk!”177 
 
4.5 Emotion 
In the final section of this chapter, I intend to address a theme which appeared to 
underpin all of the themes discussed in this chapter: emotion. Emotion featured 
throughout the responses of many of the participants. However, one area where 
emotion featured heavily, and where this section focuses, was the final scenario 
and the non-disclosure featured in it. By exploring the two emotions which arose 
most prominently – fear and anger – and how these were employed by 
participants in their expectations towards HIV disclosure, I hope to demonstrate 
how the anxieties surrounding HIV are not resolved through disclosure, but 
instead frame the scrutiny of PLWHIV’s (non-)disclosure.  
 
4.5.1 Fear 
“But fear was what the plague produced copiously, till it now constitutes 
the substance of homosexual life.”178 
 
 
Fear was discussed both directly and indirectly by participants in response to a 
question concerning their expected reaction of a character who had not been 
informed of a partner’s undetectable viral load prior to sexual contact: 
 “Prob not happy may panic.but then seek reassurance”179 
 
 “Scared as fuckk”180 
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 “Charlie may feel deceived and worry about his own health even if he 
knows what undetectable means”181 
 
As these three quotations highlight, fear is closely related to the theme of risk 
discussed earlier in the chapter, along with a desire for safety which is 
demonstrated by the ways participants describe the actions they suspect the 
character may take. Fear highlights the extent to which risk and safety are part of 
a broader conceptualisation of individual control and individual self-determination 
which underpins participants’ accounts of disclosure and sexual responsibility, as 
will be addressed in the next two chapters.  
 
Many participants discussed the character seeking out additional information, 
including medical advice, to partially allay the fear they described the character 
as having:  
“I think Charlie would be shocked, scared and angry and would hopefully 
seek medical advice”182 
 
The “shock” that this excerpt highlights again demonstrates the seronormativity 
that can arise on dating applications. The surprise that the participant prescribes 
onto the character signals the extent to which silence is read as HIV-negativity.183 
It is also notable that the participant suggests the character would seek out 
medical advice. Not only does this suggest the expectation that application users 
are underinformed about sexual health issues, particularly those relating to HIV, 
it also speaks to the search for safety and security that application users appear 
to engage in. As exemplified by the third excerpt above, however, additional 
information about transmission risk in undetectable cases was often insufficiently 
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reassuring and many participants discussed characters seeking out testing to 
provide additional reassurance: 
 “fear and worry as this has happened to me. so booked in for immediate 
test”184 
 
 “Upset, worry, check”185 
 
 “Annoyed angry upset, would think he needs to get tested ASAP”186 
 
Furedi suggests that the preoccupation with risk seen in modern society has 
resulted in a ‘culture of fear’ where the theoretical possibility of risk can give rise 
to fear even where the probability is negligibly low.187 Even among those 
participants who understood the (non-)risks involved in sexual contact with 
somebody with an undetectable viral load; perceived risks and the fear of this risk 
continued to be present. What is important to note about fear is the extent to 
which negligible risk situations can still give rise to the stigmatising avoidance 
behaviours discussed above:  
“I think he would most likely block him and not meet. There is a huge 
stigma related to hiv and people aren’t educated well enough about 
undetectability. There’s a major element about fear”.188 
 
Fear, particularly the fear of HIV/AIDS, can be seen shaping discourses around 
risk management, safety and, as will be discussed below, responsibility. Rubin 
highlights the impact that HIV has had on sexual ideology, in particular how it 
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frames the scrutiny of sexual actors.189 In discussion of the number of recent 
“gender deception” cases, Alex Sharpe similarly highlights how the emotional 
responses of complainants in those cases framed discussion of sexual 
responsibility and consent, seen both in the popular press and within legal 
proceedings.190 Similarly to those cases, it is important to discuss what the 
limitations of the impact of ‘complainant distress, disgust and revulsion’ should 
be.191  
 
These excerpts highlight the important role that fear plays in framing the risk and 
safety themes discussed earlier. Fear of HIV is significant among men who have 
sex with men; as the quote from Holleran at the beginning of this section 
highlights, fear framed sexuality for this group long before the AIDS epidemic but 
was brought sharply into focus by it. Research into the impact of PrEP has 
highlighted its role in overcoming the undercurrent of fear associated with 
sexuality for some gay men.192 Fear can be seen shaping accounts of safety and, 
consequently, the attribution of responsibility for perceived breaches of that 
safety. Within many responses, the fear participants discussed was used to 
scrutinise the actions of the non-disclosing HIV character; however, some 
participants did reflect on the role of the other character in the scenario: 
“[If the character would] be fine with Ari saying "oh I haven't tested for a 
year but I assume I'm negative", it's hypocritical to cause a fuss with 
someone telling you they're undetectable and by definition without risk. of 
course, in the former case the chances are they aren't positive whereas in 
the latter case everything hinges on whether they're undetectable, so it 
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heightens your anxiety. but [the character] should be just as if not more 
anxious in the former case too if he hadn't used condoms. basically: you 
never know who's lying to you, so take precautions, and don't project your 
understandable anxiety over STDs onto someone else.”193 
 
In contrast to other participants, who focused on the non-disclosure of Ari – the 
character with an undetectable viral load – this participant puts an emphasis on 
individual responsibility and risk reduction by Charlie – the other character in the 
scenario. Although they highlight the role that fear and anxiety plays in navigating 
sexual health issues, they position this more as a call to action on the part of HIV- 
individuals to ensure that they do not place themselves at risk. This response 
stood out among the data because it did not place responsibility for preventing 
transmission squarely on the shoulders of PLWHIV. It also reemphasises the role 
of control in accounts of risk and safety, in particular the self-control taken by the 
character by not relying on TasP (whether knowingly or unknowingly) or trust in 
others and instead taking control by holding oneself accountable.  
 
Other participants similarly highlighted how fear could be avoided through 
individually taking steps to reduce or eliminate risk so that they could have 
confidence that HIV transmission would not take place:  
“If it was me, I would not have a problem as I use prep but who knows how 
a person would react. There are lots of people who overreact”194 
 
Discussion of PrEP usage was generally limited, which is unsurprising as none 
of the stimuli images sought to elicit discussion of it specifically. However, given 
the extent to which PrEP has been discussed as reframing “safe(r) sex” and 
sexual responsibility, it is important to consider how PrEP alters the culture of risk 
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and safety seen with application users here.195 PrEP can be seen as a tool for 
sexually active individuals to take individual control over risk and safety, without 
necessitating the disclosure by their sexual partners. However, in much of the 
media discussion of it, PrEP has been positioned as something used 
predominantly by gay men who are outside the bounds of ‘“safe” homonormative 
models of gay life’, who are inherently risky and irresponsible in matters relating 
to that risk.196  
 
Such narratives of course ignore the role that PrEP plays in allaying the fear of 
risk and the desire for safety, seen in the accounts of participants here and 
elsewhere.197 Drawing on Joshi198 and Ashford,199 Lovelock argues that 
conceptualisation of non-homonormative homosexuality ‘remain charged with 
associations of danger, threat, irresponsibility, excess, waste, destruction, and 
death.’200 It is similar accounts of the fear of danger, the irresponsible and risky 
PLWHIV here, that draw attention to the role of control and lack of control in the 
fear that participants here discuss.201 
 
It is notable how the design of mobile dating applications does little to reduce the 
fears that participants have surrounding HIV and sexual health more broadly:  
“I agree there is no reason why a blank status is less worrysome than an 
undetectable one. But it is. It’s on account of ignorance i know”202  
 
195 On the role of PrEP in discourse on safer sex, see generally, Spieldenner (n 78); Sharif 
Mowlabocus, ‘“What a Skewed Sense of Values”: Discussing PreP in the British Press’ [2019] 
Sexualities. 
196 Michael Lovelock, ‘Sex, Death and Austerity: Resurgent Homophobia in the British Tabloid 
Press’ (2018) 35 Critical Studies in Media Communication 225, 226. 
197 Koester and others (n 107). 
198 Yuvraj Joshi, ‘Respectable Queerness’ (2012) 43 Columbia Human Rights Law Review 415. 
199 Ashford (n 39). 
200 Lovelock (n 196) 236. 
201 Furedi (n 187) 68. 





Although the decision by application developers to incorporate sexual health 
information into the profiles of applications should be seen as a positive step, 
there are limitations and potentially negative consequences which should also be 
highlighted. Applications might be seen to be contributing to the culture of fear 
surrounding HIV and sexual health by reducing sexual responsibility to the act of 
disclosure. Not only does this reduce the extent to which application users might 
feel in control of issues of sexual health, it also undermines the impact of TasP 
and U=U by continuing to construct PLWHIV with undetectable viral loads as 
objects of fear.  
 
Given the extent to which risk is closely associated with the unknown in the 
accounts of participants here, it is also notable how little can be said on the 
profiles of applications, something that was noted by several participants:  
“I would be worried by this. I do not really understand the various HIV 
diagnoses and it is certainly an issue for me. It's hard to clarify these things 
on an app like this”203 
 
Fear was certainly not the only emotion discussed by participants, participants 
also highlighted the significant mental health impact that application use as well 
as the continuing sense of judgement and rejection can have as well as some 
discussion of positive emotions such as enjoyment and pleasure. However, in 
discussion of HIV, fear was a unifying theme and closely related to the other 










Participants spoke of their expected reaction to instances of non-disclosure 
primarily, as seen above, in terms of fear. This fear can also be seen to be giving 
rise, however, to anger directed towards non-disclosing PLWHIV. One participant 
explained that the character would likely be angry specifically because “he wasn’t 
told before” the sexual encounter had taken place.204 Another participant 
emphasised how much they would similarly be angry towards a partner who had 
not disclosed their status: “He, as I would, would be angry and upset”.205 
 
Accounts of anger within the data highlight the interrelationship between risk, 
safety and fear. In particular, several responses demonstrate how the fear of risk 
need not have a basis in the objective risk present in the scenario which is being 
discussed in order to give rise to anger:  
“I think Charlie would be upset/feel betrayed/be angry at Ari. I think Charlie 
would be more likely to get a full STI screening as a result of the 
information, even though the chances of passing on HIV are slim to none 
he will still feel at risk & may think Ari it at risk of having other STIs which 
he could pass on.”206 
 
In terms of the impact of non-disclosure, these excerpts highlight how instances 
of non-disclosure evoke an emotive reaction, which includes the anger and sense 
of “betrayal” that the participant here emphasises.  The emotive response to non-
disclosure should be noted, not only because of the role that anger and blame 
have in legitimising the present use of the criminal law as a response to HIV 
transmission,207 but also because of the additional weight that they may bring to 
 
204 Participant 401353-401344-43612383 (emphasis added) 
205 Participant 401353-401344-41625219  
206 Participant 401353-401344-43683239  
207 Matthew Weait, ‘Taking the Blame: Criminal Law, Social Responsibility and the Sexual 





the expansion of the criminal law in this area. For instance, Yusef Azad of the 
National Aids Trust, among others, has highlighted how significant the impact of 
the emotions present in non-disclosure instances can be, potentially resulting in 
overzealous police involvement and investigations into non-disclosure.208  
 
Of course, the distress of potential complainants should be taken seriously in 
such instances and support should be offered to them. But this need not involve 
legitimising the range of emotional responses to non-disclosure that might arise. 
The distinction between these two positions goes to the heart of the emotional 
responses seen here and the extent to which they are driven by the prioritisation 
of the perceived right to know over the right of PLWHIV to privacy:  
“Charlie would be angry and upset that Ari had not disclosed and given 
him a choice before the meet. No doubt he would immediately test himself 
and fear the worst. Ari would delete/block the profile no doubt.”209 
 
This account highlights how the anger that many participants directed towards a 
non-disclosing character was driven by the perceived breach of personal 
autonomy. Personal autonomy, as it is discussed here, links the perceived right 
to know with the consent-driven right to choose, legitimising the former with the 
legal weight of the latter. Similar to debate surrounding gender identity cases, 
discussed in Chapter 2, this sees the right to personal autonomy as absolute. 
Instead, it might be necessary to acknowledge, as Brooks and Thompson argue 
in respect of “sexual fraud” cases, ‘that in certain situations autonomy can be 
 
others, ‘Motivations for Punishing Someone Who Violates HIV Nondisclosure Laws: Basic 
Research and Policy Implications’ (2015) 15 Analyses of Social Issues and Public Policy 127. 
208 Emily Jay Nicholls and Marsha Rosengarten (eds), ‘Witness Seminar: The Criminalisation of 
HIV Transmission in the UK’, Disentangling European HIV/AIDS Policies: Activism, Citizenship 
and Health (EUROPACH) (2019), in particular, Azad at p.31, who highlights a case involving a 
highly distressed complainant, where a police investigation continued long after it was apparent 
there was no case to answer as one of the investigating officers felt that something needed to be 
done. 





impacted, or not fully realised, without legal intervention, and indeed this may be 
useful to the lifelong development of autonomy competencies.’210  
 
It is noteworthy that the participant quoted above also reported being aware of 
TasP and yet attributes fear to the character in the scenario. Again, this highlights 
how fears felt in the context of HIV disclosure can arise out of improbable or 
impossible eventualities and still be perceived to impact individual autonomy and 
agency. The emphasis that the participant places upon the HIV- character’s 
choice was mirrored in other responses which prioritised the autonomy of HIV- 
characters over the privacy of HIV+ ones:  
“I would expect Charlie to feel angry that he was not informed prior to the 
hookup so he could make an informed decision.”211 
 
The claim, that the HIV- character has the right to the virological status of his 
partner in order to facilitate making an informed decision, positions HIV status 
disclosure as both relevant and necessary to the consent to sexual activity. This 
necessity seems to override any claim of the right to privacy that the character 
living with HIV might make. Similar responses show some of the ways that this 
dynamic is justified by participants as necessary in order to enable HIV-negative 
individuals to take additional steps to provide a sense of safety, such as using 
condoms.  
 
Brooks and Thompson suggest that, generally, the courts’ assessment of consent 
is obfuscated and privileges ‘cisgendered masculine desire’ in being accepting of 
 
210 Victoria Brooks and Jack Clayton Thompson, ‘Dude Looks Like a Lady: Gender Deception, 
Consent and Ethics’ (2019) 83 The Journal of Criminal Law 258, 271 (emphasis in original). 





rape as communication failure myths. In gender deception cases, they suggest 
that this dynamic is reformulated by ‘the privileging of the ability to make a 
“straight” choice’ being blocked by the “deception” of the defendant.212 Similarly, 
here the ability of the complainant to make a “risk free” choice can be seen 
outranking the right to privacy, in participants’ estimations.  
 
Jonathan Herring similarly observes the potential conflict between competing 
rights conceptualisation in sexual consent cases.213 Although Herring is critical of 
non-disclosure, the emphasis that he places upon non-disclosure and 
transmission is perhaps indicative of the pre-TasP context in which his argument 
was developed.214 Given that reckless transmission is unable to take place where 
the prospective defendant has an undetectable viral load, the argument that the 
autonomy of the prospective complainant should outweigh the privacy of the 
prospective defendant arguably carries much less weight. As Brooks and 
Thompson discuss,215 Herring is also sympathetic to the argument that a 
transgender individual can be said to have a right to privacy, a right which is 
circumvented if the right to sexual autonomy of their partner is held as absolute.216  
To date, case law on HIV transmission has avoided these issues by considering 
disclosure and consent in relation to HIV transmission only as a non-fatal offence, 
not as a sexual offence. Unlike the extremely broad boundaries of a complainants 
right to know in gender identity cases, the criminal law in England and Wales has 
never prescribed the right to know a partner’s HIV status as absolute, making this 
 
212 Brooks and Thompson (n 210) 265-266. 
213 Jonathan Herring, ‘Mistaken Sex’ [2005] Criminal Law Review 511. 
214 ‘[T]he principle of her personal autonomy is not enhanced if he is exculpated when he 
recklessly transmits the HIV virus to her’. See Herring (n 213) 518. 
215 Brooks and Thompson (n 210) 268–270. 





right dependent upon transmission risk. This distinction might be viewed through 
a temporal lens, in that whilst the focus of legal analysis might be said to rest 
upon the defendant’s HIV status/gender identity at the time of consent,217 risk can 
be evaluated without reference to the past. In contrast, (trans)gender identity 
cases focus on non-disclosure of identities which do not concord with prior 
presentations of gender, necessitating a broader temporal analysis of the case.218 
 
I would emphasise that the right of complainants to make genuinely informed 
consent decisions regarding instances of actual transmission risk is not disputed 
here. However, disclosure in order to take risk-reducing steps should be 
distinguished from disclosure which only serves to reassure and provide a sense 
of “safety”. The former may be all but essential where a PLWHIV has a detectable 
viral load, so that condoms, PrEP, or another preventative technique can be 
employed. The latter, where viral load is undetectable, constitutes the 
prioritisation of “concern” and worry, over the privacy of those living with HIV. This 
can be seen most evidently when looking at another respondent, who highlights 
how the emotional reaction of the HIV-negative character might be dependent on 
whether “precautions” had been taken:  
“If he had not taken precautions, he might be angry or upset or both. 




217 Matthew Gibson, ‘Deceptive Sexual Relations: A Theory of Criminal Liability’ (2020) 40 Oxford 
Journal of Legal Studies 82, 90. 
218 For a critical analysis of gender identity cases and time, see Gibson (n 217). Gibson discusses 
how gender may ‘fluctuate’ and argues that legal analysis should focus on authentic gender 
presentation at the time of consent. 





Leaving aside the issue of why the TasP of the HIV+ character is not perceived 
as an effective precaution, despite the participant’s awareness of U=U,220 
disclosure is clearly positioned here as the catalyst for taking precautions and is 
therefore necessary in order to allow the HIV-negative character to feel more 
secure. Therefore, much like gender identity cases, concern seems to rest with 
the distress felt by HIV-negative people rather than the privacy of PLWHIV.221 
Given the prioritisation of the “right to know” over the right to privacy, it is notable, 
also, that several participants did continue the narrative of the vignette to address 
how they thought the HIV-negative character might behave upon discovering the 
status of the HIV+ character:   
 “He might be angry/scared about having had sex with a positive person, 
and could 'warn' other people away from Ari”222 
 
 “He would be furious and shocked scared and feel cheated he would block 
him or in anger write on his profile to defame Ari”223   
 
Given the stigma directed towards people living with HIV, as discussed above, 
and the avoidance behaviours highlighted by several participants, that several 
participants suggested that an outing of the HIV+ character might take place is 
perhaps not surprising. Nevertheless, it emphasises the extent to which HIV-
negativity is considered a normative position and how the emotional reactions to 
instances of non-disclosure reinforce the Othering of people living with HIV.  
 
220 Additional discussion of what this suggests about the role of trust will feature in the next 
chapter.  
221 A similar point is made in relation to gender identity cases by Sharpe, who highlights the regular 
and repeated challenges facing people who are Transgender, which is often overlooked in 
constrast to the ‘distress’ felt by cisgender sexual partners upon ‘discovering’ their partner’s 
gender identity history. See Alex Sharpe, ‘The Ethicality of the Demand for (Trans)Parency in 
Sexual Relations’ (2017) 43 Australian Feminist Law Journal 161, 169. 
222 Participant 401353-401344-40545646  






In this chapter, I have focused on four themes developed from the data collected 
which underpin the analysis of later chapters: risk, safety, stigma and avoidance 
and the emotions of fear and anger. Drawing on Valverde’s chronotopic form of 
analysis, I have suggested that there are spacio-temporal specificities produced 
by and producing several of the key concepts discussed above. The chronotopes 
of “risk” and “safety” highlight the contrast between the chronology of risk and the 
cyclical construction of safety.  This contrast can be seen, in part, in the risk 
avoidance behaviours discussed by participants and the effect of emotions, such 
as fear, which constantly reinforce the desirability of safety to some participants. 
Such a contrast is, perhaps, unsurprising. Previous analysis of risk and safety 
discourses relating to HIV have highlighted temporal differences,224 whilst issues 
of scale can be observed in public health and criminalisation literature 
repeatedly.225 Nevertheless, in this chapter I have demonstrated that these 
spacio-temporal dynamics are co-produced by the concepts they are found 
within, rather than reflecting external models of time or space.  
 
In the first section, I demonstrated how participants spoke of risk as something to 
be calculated or otherwise estimated, and as something to be managed or 
avoided through concepts such as the “red flag”. These accounts also 
emphasised how people living with HIV continue to be conceptualised as the risk-
embodying Other. That this continues to be the case speaks to the challenges of 
overcoming the historic association between people living with HIV and risk in 
 
224 Dwayne C Turner, Risky Sex (Columbia University Press 1997) xiii. 





spite of the development of treatment as a form of prevention.226 Morson and 
Emerson, in their work on Bakhtin’s development of the chronotope, suggest that 
‘a particular sort of event, or a particular place that usually serves as the locale 
for such an event, acquires a certain chronotopic aura, which is in fact the “echo 
of the generic whole” in which the event typically appears’,227 and what I suggest 
here is that through the continued normative status of HIV-negativity and the 
continued framing of PLWHIV as the source of risk in sexual encounters, the 
‘chronotopic aura’, to borrow Morson and Emerson’s terminology, is one of 
individualisation and linearity, where there is a chronological progression from 
risk (or perceived risk) to resolution (through the avoidance, acceptance, 
management or realisation of that risk).  
 
By way of contrast, the conceptualisation of safety by many participants 
demonstrated a much less static and more ongoing or cyclical dynamic. In the 
following two chapters, I will go on to argue that this is co-produced by the related 
concept of individual responsibility. As highlighted, participants spoke of safety 
as an ongoing commitment and something closely associated with individual 
control and choice. I went on to emphasise that the cyclical nature of safety is not 
intended to suggest that safety is not an active process, in fact the opposite. 
Whilst the chronotope of risk might be marked by an increased “tempo” where a 
risk must be navigated in some way,228 safety is perhaps to be understood as an 
ongoing and repeating call to maintain said “safety” by “being safe”. In this way, 
 
226 Asha Persson, ‘“I Don’t Blame That Guy That Gave It to Me”: Contested Discourses of 
Victimisation and Culpability in the Narratives of Heterosexual Women Infected with HIV’ (2014) 
26 AIDS Care - Psychological and Socio-Medical Aspects of AIDS/HIV 233. 
227 Morson and Emerson (n 3) 374 (my emphasis). 
228 Kumpulainen et al speak of chronotopes being marked by changes in the ‘tempo of an ongoing 





the dissipation of safety over time I discuss highlights how the chronotope of 
safety, unlike risk, is less focused on the present in isolation and is instead 
‘always stretching between past and future’.229 
 
In the latter half of the chapter, I discussed the ways in which risk and safety 
influenced the behaviours and attitudes of participants in relation to sexual health 
and HIV. Building on the work of Race and Robinson, I highlighted how some 
participants discuss using the disclosure feature of the dating applications I focus 
on to avoid contact with people perceived as risky in an effort to maintain 
perceived safety. I also suggested that stigma towards PLWHIV continues to be 
rife on these applications, potentially as a result of the way in which these 
disclosure features have been implemented,230 in a way which may maintain the 
relationship between hierarchies of perceived risk and desire suggested by 
others, notably Kagan.231  
 
Discussing the strong emotions felt by participants in relation to the scenarios 
used in the data collection survey, I argued that the fear and anger mentioned by 
participants was closely influencing and influenced by the competing chronotopes 
of risk and safety I have set out. As I will go on to highlight in the next chapter, 
the shifts in the understanding given to time are consequential, not only in how 
they impact the emotions and behaviours of those involved, but also in how the 
past is approached, either as a static, established event or as part of an ongoing 
and dynamic process, subject to change and reformulation.232 In Chapter 5, I will 
 
229 A phrase borrowed from Walker’s discussion of ‘operational time’, in Walker (n 9) 54. 
230 Giles (n 27). 
231 Kagan (n 36) 820. 





go on to argue that this change and reformulation is key to understanding how 
the chronotopes of risk and safety shape and are shaped by the legal 





Chapter 5: Consent, Disclosure and Trust  
5.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter, I illustrated how several of the concepts found in 
participants’ accounts of dating application use, HIV disclosure, and sexual health 
more generally, had spacio-temporal specificities. I argued that these had an 
effect on individual strategies of safety and risk reductions, as well as on the 
stigma that continues to be directed towards and experienced by those living with 
HIV. I then went on to suggest that the differing constructions of time within these 
concepts had a relevancy to legal discourse, particularly to legal concepts such 
as consent, responsibility and personal autonomy. Building on that discussion, 
this chapter addresses participants’ accounts of the influence of those concepts 
on themes related to disclosure, including trust, mistrust and the “right to know”.  
The chapter then goes on to explore how HIV-related knowledge and status 
disclosure were understood and framed within the data. I explain how these 
understandings highlight the limitations of the contractual, conditional approach 
to consent as it has been discussed by Clough and others.1 
 
Recent developments relating to the concept of sexual fraud, such as the gender 
“deception” cases of McNally and Newland discussed in Chapter 2,2 have 
established the importance of consent and trust narratives in criminal 
proceedings relating to deception and sexual activity. In those cases, the sexual 
autonomy of cisgender complainants has been prioritised over the right to privacy 
 
1 See Section 2.6 and Amanda Clough, ‘Conditional Consent and Purposeful Deception’ (2018) 
82 The Journal of Criminal Law 178; see also Joseph J Fischel, Screw Consent: A Better Politics 
of Sexual Justice (University of California Press 2019). 





of transgender defendants, with the principle of informed consent being critical to 
arguments in favour of a “right to know” otherwise private information.3 In this 
chapter, I draw on participants’ accounts of a similar “right to know” – in this 
instance to know a prospective partner’s HIV status – and discuss how principles 
of choice, trust and control are employed in the context of dating application use 
in order to emphasise the perceived importance of disclosure. I demonstrate that 
there are limitations to evaluating HIV transmission cases solely through the lens 
of consent, particularly due to the inability to address the particular cultural 
narratives surrounding HIV, sexual health, and sex, generally, including those 
narratives associated with mobile dating application use. This reasoning draws 
upon recent criminal law literature, particularly the claims made by Fischel that:  
[C]onsent restrictively narrows the spatial and temporal parameters of 
discussion. If we are talking about the presence or absence of consent, 
we are by definition talking only about a sexual encounter between two or 
more persons in the immediate present, right there and then. Consent talk 
fundamentally cannot address drinking and hookup culture on campus; 
fraternity and sorority culture and their comitant cultures of sexual 
pressure; impoverished sexual education; people’s sexual skill set or lack 
thereof; the routinized violence of homosociality; (consented to but 
sexually abusive) hazing; or better ways to communicate in the sexual 
encounter itself in order to enhance possibilities for pleasure and decrease 
possibilities for discomfort or regret.4  
 
As well as the factors Fischel identifies, I mean to suggest that “consent talk” 
cannot adequately address the multitude of social and cultural factors 
surrounding HIV transmission.5 Nor can it accommodate the differing spatial and 
temporal dynamics of safety and risk outlined in Chapter 4. Although mobile 
 
3 Alex Sharpe, ‘Sexual Intimacy, Gender Variance, and Criminal Law’ (2015) 33 Nordic Journal 
of Human Rights 380, 382; Tom O’Malley and Elisa Hoven, ‘Consent in the Law Relating to 
Sexual Offences’ in Kai Ambos and others (eds), Core Concepts in Criminal Law and Criminal 
Justice (Cambridge University Press 2019) 155. 
4 Fischel (n 1) 18. 
5 See Matthew Weait, Intimacy and Responsibility: The Criminalisation of HIV Transmission 





dating applications offer a means of evidencing (non-)disclosure and therefore 
have some evidential value to “consent talk” issues at trial, the analysis here 
demonstrates that there are significant limitations as to what dating application 
profiles do and do not evidence.  
 
Each of the three sections below discusses consent and other themes developed 
from the data. In the first section, I explore the relationship between trust and 
consent. Drawing on the work of Palmer,6 Adam,7 and others, I demonstrate how 
participants’ conceptualisations of trust highlight the liberal, quasi-contractual 
nature of consent talk. In shaping and being shaped by this construction of trust, 
I argue that the disclosure features on applications have the potential to both 
inhibit and enhance trust relationships between users. This consequently makes 
application-derived evidence significant in the context of HIV transmission cases, 
where trust has been a central theme of pro-criminalisation arguments.  
 
Discussing consent and the law, I return to the transmission case law introduced 
in Chapter 2 and examine the concepts of “conditional consent” and “material 
facts”. I illustrate how many participants understand consent within a framework 
of choice and control, as discussed in Chapter 4, which in turn underpins the 
perceived “right to know” as it was discussed by some participants. I critique this 
“right” and highlight its relevance to debates on consent and disclosure within the 
law. This discussion precedes discussion in Chapter 6 where I explore how the 
 
6 Tanya Palmer, ‘Distinguishing Sex from Sexual Violation’ in Alan Reed and others (eds), 
Consent: Domestic and Comparative Perspectives (Routledge 2017). 
7 Barry D Adam, ‘Constructing the Neoliberal Sexual Actor: Responsibility and Care of the Self in 
the Discourse of Barebackers’ (2005) 7 Culture, Health and Sexuality 333; Barry D Adam and 





law, particularly the approach to consent applied in Dica and Konzani, employs a 
particular conceptualisation of sexual responsibility which is dispassionate and 
detached from the practical context and conditions facing those who are sexually 
active.8 In addition to acknowledging the emotional context of HIV disclosure, and 
sexual activity more broadly,9 I underscore the need to acknowledge that the 
concept of “materiality” is socially constructed, contextually contingent, and an 
unsound basis from which to determine criminal culpability.  
 
Then, in the final substantive section, I address the themes of knowledge and 
disclosure. Participants’ accounts demonstrate that disclosure using the features 
seen on applications is often considered inadequate by those using apps and that 
disclosure of an undetectable viral load is open to misinterpretation, particularly 
where knowledge of treatment as prevention is absent, limited, or misunderstood. 
I consider the nature of online disclosure, the manner in which it can be both an 
active and a passive occurrence, and the additional weight that might be given to 
digital disclosure by jurors. The chapter concludes by questioning the role of 
application evidence in criminal proceedings, arguing that the ‘ambiguous’ nature 
of consent is liable to be compounded by the narrow construction of disclosure 




8 See Samantha Ryan, ‘Risk-Taking, Recklessness and HIV Transmission: Accommodating the 
Reality of Sexual Transmission of HIV within a Justifiable Approach to Criminal Liability’ (2007) 
28 Liverpool Law Review 215, 247. 
9 See, generally, John E Stannard, ‘The Emotional Dynamics of Consent’ (2015) 79 The Journal 
of Criminal Law 422. 






5.2 Trust and Consent 
Although a breach of trust is not an essential component of either HIV 
transmission offences themselves, or other possible sexual assault charges, it 
does play a significant role in the legal analysis of these potential offences.11 
Slater, in particular, has argued for an expanded use of the criminal law where 
non-disclosure occurs within a relationship of trust,12 as I noted in Chapter 2.13 In 
addition, recent literature on “gender deception” and cases such as McNally and 
Newland have re-emphasised the role of trust, particularly in relation to 
determinations of consent, autonomy, deception and disclosure.14  In her analysis 
of these cases, Clough has suggested that trust is central to judicial 
interpretations of disclosure and non-disclosure, highlighting how actions which 
are seen to undermine trust and autonomy are drawn upon in establishing 
criminal culpability in both gender identity and disease transmission cases.15 
Similarly, disclosure, trust, and their relationships with each other and consent 
was a central theme within participants’ responses.  
 
In this section, I address the relationship between application use, trust and 
consent seen in this data. Focusing on the context specific norms and 
understandings discussed by participants, I highlight how apps are understood 
as both enhancing and inhibiting trust between users. I build on the arguments 
set out in Chapter 4 by suggesting that application profiles, particularly the HIV 
 
11 See James Slater, ‘HIV, Trust and the Criminal Law.’ (2011) 75 Journal of Criminal Law 309, 
318; Sharon Cowan, ‘Offenses of Sex or Violence? Consent, Fraud, and HIV Transmission’ 
(2014) 17 New Criminal Law Review 135. 
12 Slater (n 11), in particular, 334-335. 
13 See Section 2.4, above. 
14 See, for example, Alex Sharpe, ‘Criminalising Sexual Intimacy: Transgender Defendants and 
the Legal Construction of Non-Consent’ [2014] Criminal Law Review 207, 215. 





status and test history features, are used as a means of navigating perceived 
risks through disclosure and trust. In the third subsection, I discuss how some 
participants turn to other sources of information, screenshots of test results or 
awareness of TasP, as a means of verifying disclosed information. The final 
section addresses the importance of understanding trust and related rhetoric if 
the law is to acknowledge the practical realities of HIV disclosure within the social 
context of application use.  
 
5.2.1 Trust, Casual Sexual Encounters and Mobile Applications 
In Dica, Judge LJ distinguishes ‘loving, and trusting relationship[s]’ from ‘casual 
sex between complete strangers’.16 This judicial distinction has carried over into 
academic analysis, where it has been suggested that those engaging in casual 
sexual encounters take on individual responsibility for risk reduction whilst those 
in committed relationships do not.17 However, I would propose that this 
dichotomisation is overly simplistic and does not acknowledge how trust does or 
does not develop in different socio-sexual contexts. A common theme within 
responses here highlighted how applications can complement or enhance trust 
relationships between users, suggesting that even within “casual sex” there is the 
prospect of trust between partners.  
 
As discussed in Chapter 4, disclosure of an HIV+ status was closely associated 
with many participants’ understanding and conceptualisation of risk, even where 
this disclosure emphasised an undetectable viral load. I return to this discussion, 
 
16 R v Dica [2004] EWCA Crim 1103 [42] (Judge LJ). 






below, to highlight how the concepts of risk and safety frame participants’ 
accounts of trust. Although many participants were unwilling to rely upon 
treatment as prevention as a safe sex strategy, many responses also suggest 
that users are inclined to believe the accuracy of disclosed undetectable statuses 
where these are listed:  
“The picture is “wholesome” and I get the impression that the person’s 
claim to be looking for “chats, friends, dating and relationships” is genuine. 
The honest HIV status notification makes them seem trustworthy. 
However some inconsistencies - the age being different in the bio and the 
tag line and, more prominently, the dissonance between the 
aforementioned “wholesome” picture and the impersonal nature of “city 
centre” (which reads as an implied location of sex) - create slight 
apprehension.”18 
 
Although the belief that disclosure is likely to be honest and accurate was not 
shared by all participants, a point returned to below, responses such as these 
tacitly acknowledge both the difficulties of disclosure and the stigma directed 
towards PLWHIV. These both have an influence on the importance and 
complexity of trust in the context of “casual” sexual encounters. Although not 
universally held, such beliefs demonstrate that some application users expect 
and value “trust” with those they meet online.  This challenges the claim that 
“casual” sexual encounters take place in a trustless context and indicates that the 
picture is somewhat more complex in participants’ experience. Similarly, several 
participants discussed the perception that some application users take sexual 
health “seriously” whilst others do not. Perceptions such as this can be interpreted 
as a context specific form of trust which arises in the context of online sexual 
encounters, resulting from the formalistic way applications incorporate sexual 
health information into user profiles. For example, one participant discussing the 
 





“Couple” stimuli explained that disclosing sexual health information within the 
profile ‘[s]hows that the person it refers to takes sexual health seriously and 
although they are [in an] open [relationship] they are responsible’.19 This 
response is notable, not only because of the manner in which it frames disclosure 
and taking sexual health “seriously” as important, but also because of the 
approach it takes to “sexual responsibility”. 
 
Race has pointed out that, historically, same-sex sexual encounters often 
occurred between strangers, particularly when these encounters took place in 
urban areas.20 Application profiles and the HIV status information within them can 
be seen as one means of reducing concerns about risk,21 in part through 
establishing a foundation for trust between casual sexual partners, reducing 
concerns about unknown strangers.22 Participants’ construction of trust can be 
distinguished from practices of safety – such as monogamy, consistent condom 
use, and regular testing – which can, but do not necessarily, involve partners 
placing trust in one another.  
 
Beyond disclosure of HIV status, there were two main ways in which participants 
perceived trust as being enhanced by this information. First, participants 
emphasised the importance of internal consistency within a profile if the user of 
that profile was to be trusted. Internal consistency was understood by 
participants, in part, through a contrast with the “dissonance” highlighted by the 
 
19 Participant 401353-401344-42174917 
20 Kane Race, The Gay Science: Intimate Experiments with the Problem of HIV (Routledge 2017) 
174. 
21 Cameron Giles, ‘Digital Disclosure: HIV Status, Mobile Dating Application Design and Legal 
Responsibility’ [2020] Information and Communications Technology Law, 18. 
22 See Section 4.2.2, above, and Andrew N Sharpe, Foucault’s Monsters and the Challenge of 





participant quoted above.23 Internal consistency was often judged by comparing 
different sections of the overall profile, for instance, the free-form section and 
“Looking For” section, and looking for inconsistencies, such as the different ages 
listed in the “Undetectable” stimuli. Participants acknowledged that minor 
inconsistencies such as the age difference could arise through genuine mistake 
or through information becoming outdated. However, greater weight was often 
attached to the consistency between the information in the profile and the 
impression given by the photo in a profile. One participant explained that where 
a user lists ‘information which matches their photo’ this ‘indicates a more reliable 
user’.24 
 
Second, participants discussed the importance of transparency and openness to 
establishing trust between application users. As with internal consistency, photos 
played a critical role in participants’ conceptualisation of transparency. Several 
responses highlighted how complete profiles and profiles which included a profile 
picture provided reassurance that interactions were genuine. Conversely, where 
profiles do not include a picture, this can be taken to indicate a reservedness 
about being visible: 
“They are looking for one thing - sex. Some men are not interested in the 
additional details. They would happily see a picture (sometimes not) and 
meet the guy. He also does not appear to have a picture, which suggests 
to me he is discreet about his sexuality”.25 
 
Miller points out that photographs are included in application profiles for a number 
of different reasons and the inclusion or non-inclusion of photos can often be 
 
23 Participant 401353-401344-42164365 
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associated with different patterns of app usage or degrees of “outness”.26 The 
data here supports this claim and suggests that application users draw upon 
cultural expectations towards visibility and “discretion” when making judgments 
about application profiles. As I pointed out in Chapter 2, the inclusion of more 
than one photograph in a user’s profile has become a more common application 
feature in the time since data collection in this project took place. The static nature 
of the vignette stimuli limits the extent to which this data can address these 
features, which may produce different beliefs concerning consistency and 
transparency. Nevertheless, given that the responses here indicate that 
photographs continue to be central to app users’ construction of trust these 
findings may provide a foundation for future research on this point. Given that 
internal consistency is a central sub-theme within these responses, any future 
research may wish to address if and how internal consistency is constructed 
when comparing photographs and if this is similar to or distinct from the internal 
consistency discussed above.  
 
Finally, the desirability of trust and responsibility, as well as the broader role of 
desire within the social context of applications should also be noted. Several 
responses demonstrated the importance of disclosed sexual health information, 
not only as a means of enabling “safer” practices but also because a “responsible” 
persona was understood as desirable within the sexual communities that 
applications create. One participant explained:  
 
26 Brandon Miller, ‘A Picture Is Worth 1000 Messages: Investigating Face and Body Photos on 
Mobile Dating Apps for Men Who Have Sex with Men’ [2019] Journal of Homosexuality, 15. See 
also Brandon Miller, ‘“Dude, Where’s Your Face?” Self-Presentation, Self-Description, and 
Partner Preferences on a Social Networking Application for Men Who Have Sex with Men: A 






“They have had a fairly recent test - which means they care about their & 
their partner's sexual health to a degree - although the test refers only to 
HIV and not other STIs. They are also responsible enough to broadcast 
their status (if accurate) which may act as incentive for people to sleep 
with them but also may act as incentive for "clean" people to sleep with 
them.”27 
 
This participant, by emphasising the “incentive” provided by recent test 
information, highlights the importance of desire. In the previous chapter, I 
highlighted the desirability of safety as it was discussed by several participants. 
Responses such as this further demonstrate the importance of safety to many 
application users, whilst also showing how the principle of trust between sexual 
partners, seen in the participant’s reference to ‘care’, is similarly understood as 
desirable, at least to some users. Given that testing and “responsible” practices 
have long been understood as carrying sexual capital,28 it is perhaps unsurprising 
that some men who have sex with men employ testing and status disclosure in 
this way.29 In the context of mobile dating applications, this disclosure may 
represent a form of ‘respectable promiscuity’, as discussed by Ahlm,30  where a 
shared understanding of discrete meanings and insider knowledge are employed 
by application users to facilitate sexual interaction without those interactions 
being fully understood by those outside of the app user community.  
 
These varying accounts of trust and responsibility, as well as the discussion of 
trust more broadly seen within the data, indicate that rather than being an absent 
 
27 Participant 401353-401344-43683239 
28 See Adam and others (n 7) 769; and, more generally, Adam Isaiah Green, ‘Playing the (Sexual) 
Field: The Interactional Basis of Systems of Sexual Stratification’ (2011) 74 Social Psychology 
Quarterly 244, 247. 
29 See Seung Hee Lee and Nicolas Sheon, ‘Responsibility and Risk: Accounts of Reasons for 
Seeking an HIV Test’ (2008) 30 Sociology of Health and Illness 167 and Section 4.2.3, above. 






factor in application-facilitated sexual encounters, trust does influence many 
application users’ perceptions as well as their belief in the information they 
encounter online. The design of applications and the “HIV Status” and “Test 
History”, particularly, rely on or engage with users’ trust and expectations towards 
transparency and consistency. However, trust was far from a universal premise 
within the data and mistrust, which I now turn to, was also discussed prominently.  
 
5.2.2 Mistrust and Disbelief 
Like many of the participants who discussed trust, where participants expressed 
reservations about believing the information they encountered whilst browsing 
applications, the importance of safety and risk reduction were also frequently 
emphasised. Several participants discussed consistently doubting or questioning 
the accuracy of information found in profiles, including information relating to 
sexual health. Photographs were, again, one of the components of a profile which 
were regularly scrutinised in this way: 
“They leave very little information about themselves, particularly the HIV 
status section. I personally wouldn't chat with this person as they have no 
photo and no indication of who they are.”31 
 
The mistrust of those without profile pictures is a commonly reported attitude of 
those using online dating services, as Mowlabocus highlights in his research into 
Gaydar, a site targeting gay men which preceded the emergence of mobile 
applications.32 The expression ‘“No Pic? No Dick!”’ noted by Mowlabocus,33 
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32 Sharif Mowlabocus, ‘Look at Me! Images, Validation, and Cultural Currency on Gaydar’ in 
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2010). 





which reflects a common suspicion of photoless profiles on dating websites, is 
echoed in the response here. Whilst, previously, high-quality digital photographs 
might have been considered relatively uncommon on dating websites because of 
limitations in internet speeds and the cost of high-quality digital cameras, the ease 
with which users can now take pictures, including on modern smartphones, may 
reinforce concerns such as those discussed by the participant about profiles 
without a profile picture. The strategy of avoiding interaction with such profiles 
discussed by the participant can, therefore, be understood as an indication of the 
social capital photos have in online networking spaces as well as an 
acknowledgement that this capital is easy to obtain,34 as well as being another 
strategy of safety which participants discussed “always” adhering to.35 
 
The absence of photographs can be understood as a particular concern for some 
users stemming from the design of dating applications. The format of 
applications, designed to be viewed on a handheld device, restricts the quantity 
and quality of information which can be included in profiles, including and beyond 
photographs.36 Participants also expressed concerns, however, about the 
accuracy of photos which were included. Markowitz and Hancock point out that 
the deceptive use of photographs is relatively common on mobile dating 
applications.37 Yet, this commonality may also result in a general ambivalence 
towards low-level deception, where users are comfortable with minor 
 
34 For further discussion of the ‘sexual economy’, see Kane Race, ‘Click Here for HIV Status: 
Shifting Templates of Sexual Negotiation’ (2010) 3 Emotion, Space and Society 7, 10. 
35 Although the extent to which these rules are sustainable in practice may be limited. See 
Brandon Andrew Robinson, ‘Doing Sexual Responsibility: HIV, Risk Discourses, Trust, and Gay 
Men Interacting Online’ (2018) 61 Sociological Perspectives 383. 
36 Miller, ‘A Picture Is Worth 1000 Messages: Investigating Face and Body Photos on Mobile 
Dating Apps for Men Who Have Sex with Men’ (n 26). 
37 David M Markowitz and Jeffrey T Hancock, ‘Deception in Mobile Dating Conversations’ (2018) 





misrepresentations which might be related to impression management.38 Several 
participants suggested that minor deceptions of this kind were expected: 
“People constant change their ages to look more pleasing, some guys 
want daddies so they change their age to fit the son profile[.]”39 
 
Markowitz and Hancock note that deception can benefit application users in 
respect of certain short-term goals; which include ‘casual sex, and entertainment 
browsing’.40 In practice, given the multifaceted aims behind mobile application 
use,41 the interpretations given to particular deceptions may be similarly 
multifaceted and the apathy towards low level deception cannot be considered 
universal. Indeed, several participants expressed extreme reservations about any 
information found in profiles, including, notably, reservations about the HIV 
disclosure and test history features: 
“The HIV status row tells us nothing more than that the person has ticked 
the undetectable box. It tells us nothing about whether the person has HIV, 
or their status. The test history row tells us nothing more than that the 
person has entered 01-09-2018 into the row to suggest that they were last 
tested on that date. It tells us nothing about whether the person has HIV, 
their status, or whether they have been tested.”42 
 
Although this level of mistrust was relatively uncommon, many participants did 
highlight how errors, such as the age inconsistency in one of the vignettes, 
resulted in a more general concern about details such as sexual health 
information:  
“Not sure that the test history on its own says much - but given the errors 
or lies in the rest of the profile I don’t believe it. For the same reason I don’t 
believe his status either[.]”43  
 
 
38 Markowitz and Hancock (n 37). 
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These responses underscore the mistrust which also arises in the context of 
mobile application use. The complex juxtaposition of trust and mistrust within 
participants’ accounts, including the expectations of truth and dishonesty 
surrounding HIV status, are further complicated by the strategies used to 
overcome mistrust. Although the information provided in application profiles, 
where completed, was often referred to in responses, a small but notable number 
of participants discussed trust based on other sources of information and 
evidence.  
 
5.2.3 Mobile Applications, Trust and Verification 
Many mobile dating application developers do signpost to other sources of 
information on sexual health matters. Often, this is achieved through links on their 
own websites and through their broader social media presence online.44 Whilst 
some developers offer definitions of different HIV statuses in materials which 
discuss the disclosure features they have introduced,45 conformity with either 
their own or third party definitions is not enforced by application moderators. The 
concerns noted in the previous section may be one consequence of the 
uncertainty this creates, and several participants reflected on the need for 
additional evidence to verify the sexual health information found in app profiles. 
This was particularly notable in the vignettes which explored undetectable viral 
loads. In response to those stimuli, several participants suggested that evidence 
 
44 See, for example, Hornet, ‘My Boyfriend Is #HIV+ but Undetectable, Can I Still Get It If We 
Don’t Use Condoms? #AskAPro @AlexGarnerLA’ (Twitter, 9 November 2017); Grindr LLC, ‘How 
Often Should I Get an HIV/STD Test?’ (Help.Grindr.com) <https://help.grindr.com/hc/en-
us/articles/230933567-How-often-should-I-get-an-HIV-STD-test-> accessed 8 August 2020. 
45 See Hornet, ‘Know Your Status: What Do the Different KYS Options Mean?’ 





such as viral load test results would overcome anxieties whilst mere disclosure 
would not:  
“[F]rom [the] point of view [of the character who disclosed an undetectable 
viral load], he knows that there's less risk for [the HIV-negative character] 
hooking up with him than hooking up with someone who hadn't even tested 
for ages. but there's no reason for [the HIV-negative character] to trust a 
stranger saying they're undetectable. if [the HIV-negative character] could 
trust that [the prospective sexual partner] is undetectable, then that would 
be far less anxiety-inducing than hooking up with someone who didn't 
know their status in the first place, as I'd assume any stranger who says 
they're negative could either be lying or unaware and may well be positive. 
but if you already know for sure that someone's positive, then of course 
you need to know if they're undetectable. and either way, use condoms. 
so I don't think [the character with an undetectable viral load] can lie to a 
direct question, the best he can do is make it clear he's undetectable, 
provide a screenshot of some official confirmation so it's clear, and hope 
[the HIV-negative character] is knowledgeable enough to get that 
undetectable means no risk.”46 
 
Robinson observes that although a HIV status can be listed on the dating 
websites he investigates, ‘some men still take other measures to try to determine 
the HIV status of their sexual partner’.47 In particular, he notes that some men 
employ tactics such as the ‘bathroom snoop’, searching through bathroom 
cabinets for HIV medication.48 Similarly, O’Leary notes how some men use their 
own knowledge of HIV treatment regimens as a means of investigating their 
partner’s HIV status.49 Similarly, some participants also spoke of inquiring about 
medication and treatment regimes in order to verify that an undetectable viral load 
was genuine and asking HIV+ characters in the vignettes for ‘more information 
about [their] test history and what medication [they use]’.50 Several participants 
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47 Robinson (n 35) 391. 
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49 Ann O’Leary, ‘Guessing Games: Sex Partner Serostatus Assumptions Among HIV-Positive 
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spoke of disclosure and supporting evidence facilitating HIV-negative characters 
taking greater control over their sexual health.51 Discussing a scenario where 
disclosure had not taken place prior to sexual activity, one participant spoke of 
disclosure facilitating the decision to ‘[take] PEP until [the HIV+ character’s] viral 
load status [could] be independently verified’. 52 
 
As I discuss in Section 5.4, below, these practices contrast with the prototypical 
complainant in transmission case law. In Chapter 2, I highlighted existing case 
law that has determined that, in general, a complainant’s pre-existing knowledge 
of HIV transmission and prevention is insufficient for informed consent.53 
However, the data here indicates that some men using dating applications are 
informed about HIV transmission, to the extent that they employ this knowledge 
to scrutinise the disclosure of others. Similarly, other participants discussed 
seeking external evidence to verify disclosure taking place on applications in a 
way which drew on their existing knowledge:  
“The men on dating apps seem to like playing games or lie a lot. So even 
if they said they’re all clear and tested I’d like to see a screenshot from 
their sexual health clinic test. Additionally they lie about their pictures so 
I’d like to see them on sc where it’s a live picture.”54 
 
Responses such as this are in keeping with the approach to safety discussed in 
Chapter 4 and reflect the value given to recent test results. The participant also 
discusses using ‘sc’, an abbreviation of snapchat, to verify the identity of those 
they speak to through video messaging. The use of other mobile applications 
 
51 On the general mistrust of PLWHIV in relation to sexual health, see Iain Williamson and others, 
‘“There’s This Glorious Pill”: Gay and Bisexual Men in the English Midlands Navigate Risk 
Responsibility and Pre-Exposure Prophylaxis’ (2019) 29 Critical Public Health 560. 
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53 See Section 2.2.2 and Matthew Weait, ‘Knowledge, Autonomy and Consent: R v Konzani’ 
[2005] Criminal Law Review 763, 765–766. 





such as snapchat, as part of ‘a staged series of online and offline interactions, 
across a range of networked platforms and spaces’ through which application 
users can build up trust with other application users, has been noted elsewhere.55 
As well as overt use of these tools to verify information, through live interaction 
with the encountered other, the covert use of social networking sites and other 
sources of information has been extensively observed in empirical analysis.56 
However, in relation to issues of sexual health, as seen in the account above, 
participants also report relying on more direct measures.  
 
5.2.4 The Role of Trust 
So far in this section, I have demonstrated that both trust and mistrust feature 
significantly in participants’ responses. I have also observed that the design of 
mobile dating applications and participants’ broader knowledge of sexual health 
can influence and prompt these attitudes. On first inspection, this analysis might 
suggest that the categorisation of casual sexual relationships as untrusting, in 
contrast to committed relationships of trust, is overly simplistic. For instance, 
Spencer suggests that the risk of disease transmission ‘comes with the territory’ 
of casual or commercial sexual relationships,57 and Slater proposes reforms 
which criminalise ‘non-disclosure when it constitutes a breach of trust’.58 Slater’s 
arguments are based on the claim that there is an inherent value in sexual 
partners being able to trust one another and therefore dispense with ‘due-
 
55 Kath Albury and Paul Byron, ‘Safe on My Phone? Same-Sex Attracted Young People’s 
Negotiations of Intimacy, Visibility, and Risk on Digital Hook-Up Apps’ (2016) 2 Social Media and 
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56 See, for example, Joni Meenagh, ‘Flirting, Dating, and Breaking up within New Media 
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diligence’ at the time of each sexual encounter.59 Like Spencer’s claims, this 
argument draws distinctions between certain types of relationship. Slater claims 
that the ‘social capital’ of trust is contextual and that ‘betrayal’ of that trust only 
constitutes wrongdoing where it is the ‘exploitation of vulnerability within the 
context of a certain kind of relationship’.60 Casual sexual relationships are 
explicitly excluded from this context of trust:  
“In a casual sexual relationship where the parties concerned are more or 
less strangers, the ignorant party has no justified reason to trust the other 
party; as a result, her trusting, or more accurately her reliance on the other 
party, is entirely voluntary.”61 
 
The data here might, therefore, be used to challenge this conceptualisation and 
to argue that trust can factor into casual sexual relationships. There are, however, 
two key reasons for not doing so: firstly, because this fails to acknowledge the 
complex interrelationship between trust and mistrust, and second, because it 
constructs trust as somewhat unidirectional and privileges HIV-negativity.  
 
Emphasising the context of mobile application use, several participants 
discussed deception being rife in the context of application use:  
“Ultimatly there is a very ferocious battle to meet with some ‘hot’ and get 
your load out. This battle sees people use false imagry, lies, deception and 
omissions. I have been tricked into meeting people who are clearly not the 
people in the images they have sent me, and been stood up by more guys 
who have simply blocked me when I have been within the immidiate 
vicinity. Slowly though I have gathered a small close group of gay friends 
that I trust. We have all had bad experiences, but we all seemed captivated 
by the oppertunity of meeting mr perfect.”62 
 
This example highlights that application use is associated, by some, with a highly 
sexualised lifestyle which results in concerns regarding deception and trust. 
 
59 Slater (n 11) at 309 and 319. 
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However, it also demonstrates that mistrust, even significant mistrust, is not static 
but instead changes and develops over time. As I discussed above, applications 
offer several methods for establishing trust, including through photographs and 
internal consistency. Several applications have also enabled users to link social 
media profiles to their application profile which, along with the ad hoc use of social 
media services such as snapchat, provides a further means of trust 
enhancement.  
 
On the one hand, it is possible to use this analysis to argue for a detailed 
examination of trust in each individual case. Rather than excluding casual 
relationships out of hand, this would entail exploring whether there was a breach 
of trust in each case, irrespective of the categorisation of the relationship. On the 
other hand, this analysis might also suggest that the dichotomy of trust/mistrust 
in sexual relationships is an inappropriate foundation for criminal culpability. 
Given the multifaceted discussion of trust seen in the data, I am inclined to 
support this second approach. Gore notes that several ‘legal dichotomies’ fail to 
acknowledge the complexity of lived experiences and employ an ‘all or nothing’ 
approach, particularly in the area of sexual offences.63 Whilst Gore focuses on 
the legal construction of ‘reasonable belief’, arguing that the dichotomy presented 
to juries is detached from the lived context of female complainants,64 this is 
equally applicable to trust. Any legal dichotomy of trust is inherently unable to 
reflect the practical experiences of men who have sex with men navigating 
 
63 Ashlee Gore, ‘It’s All or Nothing: Consent , Reasonable Belief, and the Continuum of Sexual 
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applications, including experiences of risk, safety and other themes seen in this 
data.  
 
On the relationship between trust and law, Sharpe argues that:  
[A] focus on trust in the criminal law context may be less appropriate 
because of the different and non-professional nature of the relationship 
[between complainant and defendant, when compared to doctor-patient 
relationships,] and because of the implications for liberty that necessarily 
attend the criminal law. 65 
 
Nevertheless, Sharpe notes that trust continues to underpin the developments 
seen in the law relating to “sexual fraud”.66 Similarly, drawing on trust and mistrust 
in HIV transmission cases arguably misrepresents the nature of HIV risk and risk 
reduction. Trust instead privileges HIV-negative individuals, facilitating avoidance 
strategies such as those discussed in the previous chapter and overlooking the 
privacy claims of people living with HIV. Whilst the privacy rights of those living 
with HIV are not undermined to the extent seen in gender “fraud” cases, where 
the privacy rights of transgender defendants are further undervalued through the 
construction of passive non-disclosure as “active deception”,67 insufficient 
consideration is still given to the balance of rights and responsibilities between 
sexual partners.68 Although EB retained the possibility that active deception 
regarding HIV status might do so, as I highlighted in Chapter 2 this was not the 
approach taken in Rowe, where intentional transmission was dealt with via s.18 
OAPA 1861.69 
 
65 Alex Sharpe, ‘Expanding Liability for Sexual Fraud Through the Concept of ’Active Deception: 
A Flawed Approach’ (2016) 80 The Journal of Criminal Law 28. 
66 Sharpe, ‘Expanding Liability for Sexual Fraud Through the Concept of ’Active Deception: A 
Flawed Approach’ (n 65). 
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Flawed Approach’ (n 65). 
68 Samantha Ryan, ‘“Active Deception” v Non-Disclosure: HIV Transmission, Non-Fatal Offences 
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Trust, when employed in a criminal law context, is effectively a legal fiction. As 
with all legal fictions it is underlined by normative thinking and context specific 
norms and rationales, which can be scrutinised in order to evaluate the fiction as 
a whole.70 Not only do trust narratives continue to position HIV-negative men as 
inherently vulnerable to the deceptions of those living with HIV,71 reinforcing the 
externalisation of HIV risk seen in the chronotope of risk outlined in the previous 
chapter, they also fail to acknowledge trust by those living with HIV. Frances and 
Frances argue that trust goes both ways and that the concept of trust should not 
be employed punitively to criminalise those already subject to stigma and 
marginalisation,72 which might be considered breaches of a broader trust in 
sexual solidarity. To this extent, the role of trust in legal discourse on “sexual 
fraud” underpins the detached ‘rhetoric of liberalism’ and individualism that many 
have sought to criticise in literature on sexual consent.73 On this basis, the role of 
trust as a standalone concept supporting further criminalisation of those living 
with HIV should be rejected and its more general role in discussion of consent, to 
which I now turn, challenged.  
 
5.3 Consent and HIV Transmission Criminalisation 
Many participants discussed the concept of consent, but relatively few responses 
made direct reference to the criminal law.74 Although the particular legal 
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formulations of consent seen in Dica, Konzani, and other case law, did not appear 
to be a significant influence upon the majority of participants’ understanding of 
consent, their responses nevertheless address two core concepts associated 
with those cases: the concept of autonomy or choice, and the concept of a “right 
to know” (a prospective partner’s HIV status). In this section, building on the 
discussion of safety, avoidance and risk in Chapter 4, I challenge the “right to 
know” and highlight the limitations of consent as the determining factor in HIV 
transmission cases. Examining the concept of “materiality” and HIV disclosure, I 
argue that the consent-centric approach to HIV transmission in criminal law 
employs a quasi-contractual construction of consent. I demonstrate how this 
approach draws upon cultural narratives surrounding sex and sexuality, 
exemplified in participants’ accounts, but argue that these narratives are a poor 
basis for determining criminal culpability.  
 
As highlighted in Chapter 4, many participants spoke about the importance of 
HIV-negative individuals having the choice of whether to have sex with a partner 
living with HIV. One of the main ways in which participants addressed consent 
was through discussion of informed consent, which focused on HIV-negative 
characters having sufficient knowledge of the viral status of their partners so that 
they could choose whether or not to have sex:  
“[The HIV-negative character] might be scared and worried about what if 
he gets HIV. Some hate and disgust at the fact [the HIV+ character] didn’t 
tell him before hand either so [the HIV-negative character] could’ve made 
a fully informed choice of sex.”75 
 
 





Several participants were similarly critical of non-disclosure because it impeded 
the ability of HIV-negative individuals to control who they had sex with, 
underscoring the prevalence of the avoidance behaviours highlighted in the 
previous chapter. This construction of consent as control/choice reflects the 
normative position of HIV-negativity in multiple ways. Firstly, it emphasises how 
being HIV-negative is assumed by many to be the default position, as exemplified 
by a participant who distinguished between his own non-disclosure and that of a 
HIV-positive person: “I don’t personally alt give mine but I’m negative”.76 The 
privilege of those with ‘a “normal” body’, according to Lacey, involves those with 
“abnormal” bodies being relegated from the ‘privileged model of the rational 
choosing individual’.77 Although Lacey focuses on bodies considered abnormal 
because of gender and sexuality, responses such as the one above demonstrate 
how people living with HIV are marked out as exceptional.  
 
Secondly, consent as choice draws on this distinction between “normal” and 
“abnormal” and frames silence as a passive omission only to those considered to 
have “normal” bodies. In addition to the participant above, several responses 
reflected silence as the default position for those who are HIV-negative who were 
only expected to disclose when asked or when they considered it relevant. For 
instance, one participant explained:  
“I didn't fill mine out on my profile until I was asked specifically about it. For 
people who want chats or dates it's not too important[.]”78 
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Returning to the law, Konzani constructs silence as inherently deceptive, subject 
to the potential exception relating to indirect disclosure, and blurs the 
act/omission distinction by suggesting that defendants may give ‘implicit 
guarantees’ concerning their serostatus.79 In this response, silence is seen as 
unremarkable, particularly when applications are used for social and romantic 
endeavours. However, this was not the case in many responses discussing the 
silence of those living with HIV:  
“If [the HIV-negative character] found out [the undetectable character] was 
HIV positive but hadn't revealed it in his profile, he'd probably feel deceived 
by him, and would seek to get tested himself.”80 
 
This example highlights how silence is not seen as unremarkable when it is the 
silence of the HIV+, even in situations where transmission risk is absent. This 
further emphasises how many participants saw disclosure as necessary in order 
to avoid those living with HIV, rather than as a means of facilitating consensual 
risk reduction. As I stressed in the previous chapter, statements of this kind also 
serve to externalise risk, situating transmission risk with HIV+ bodies rather as a 
feature of unprotected sexual intercourse participated in by serodisconcordant 
partners. As a consequence, several participants spoke of PLWHIV placing the 
HIV-negative “at risk”: 
I think [the HIV-negative character] would be annoyed that he was not told 
beforehand as it could put him at risk. I would expect him to go and get 
tested as soon as possible to confirm that he is negative.81 
 
As this response exemplifies, the externalisation of risk and the construction of 
safety has an effect, not only on behaviours such as avoidance, but also on 
participants’ understanding of consent. The manner in which participants 
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discussed consent stresses the importance of choice, or control, over their sexual 
partners and the “riskiness” of those partners.  The narrative of risk creation and 
imposition set out by the participant is particularly significant in the context of the 
active/passive dichotomy, discussed in literature on sexual consent. As Palmer 
notes, within a consent driven legal framework, sexual encounters are 
constructed as ‘inherently asymmetrical and unequal’ rather than positioning 
partners as ‘collaborators in the creation of a mutually satisfying experience’, and  
that such an approach frames potential sexual partners as threats or barriers to 
overcome.82 By attributing PLWHIV as active (placing others “at risk”) and the 
HIV- as passive (being placed “at risk”), responses such as this reflect a broader 
cultural determination of the two concepts.83 A similar cultural influence has been 
observed by Malloch,84 in relation to gender, and Lacey, in relation to sexuality.85 
Arguably, the cultural framing of HIV-positivity as other than the norm informs this 
distinction and constructs silence as both an active and morally (and potentially 
legally) condemnable act.86 
 
It should be acknowledged that the situating of risk and risk creation with those 
living with HIV was not universal within the data. A minority of participants did 
reflect on the “riskiness” of their own behaviour, although typically this was to 
highlight that their own behaviour minimised their exposure to external risks:  
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“I suppose just that as a fairly strict side HIV status is pretty irrelevant to 
me as my preferred sexual practices aren't 'risky' in that regard. So it's 
something I don't pay much attention to in profiles[.]”87 
 
Responses such as this recognise that HIV-negative individuals participate in 
practices which carry risks of varying degrees and do so without situating risk 
with an identified Other. Returning to the construction of consent as choice or 
control over risk taking, the acknowledgement of risk taking by those HIV-
negative was discussed by some participants who highlighted how risk reduction 
strategies might reduce or eliminate the need for status disclosure. One 
participant, discussing a vignette character who disclosed an undetectable viral 
load explained: 
“That would mean they are HIV positive but are on medication that means 
their viral load is undectable. That would mean they would be able to 
engage in sexual intercourse without risk of passing on the virus.  I would 
not have bareback sex with anyone I wasn't in a relationship with; I know 
that someone undetectable cannot pass on the virus, but I don't know 
whether a stranger is truly undectable. That is the same logic as my not 
having unprotected sex with someone who says they are HIV negative.” 
 
The same participant went on to discuss a scenario involving non-disclosure of 
an undetectable viral load, and stated:  
“[The character] may not want the stigma.   If [he] is 100% certain that he 
is still undetectable - that he has not missed any of his pills etc - then it is 
fine for him not to disclose.   The onus is on the individual to practice safe 
sex - so [the HIV-negative character] should not have unprotected sex - 
he should use a condom or be on PREP.  Likewise, [the HIV+ character] 
should ensure that he is undetectable (which in this situation he has); given 
this, he doesn't need to disclose.   However, he should also refrain from 
unprotected sex because he should avoid passing on (and contracting) 
other STIs.”88 
 
The emphasis this participant places on the actions and responsibilities of 
individuals reflects the fundamental individualism of consent. For Palmer, 
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‘consent is enmeshed with a particularly individualistic notion of the Kantian 
liberal subject’.89 Although individual autonomy is a feature of this liberalism,90 it 
is not without limitations. Chapter 2 highlighted how security and (self-) 
surveillance practices are connected with the idea of the universal rational subject 
and that this delegitimises “risky” choices.91 The ambiguity of this delegitimisation 
can be seen in the distinction between HIV transmission cases, where a consent 
defence (however limited) is available, and sadomasochism cases, where it is 
not.92 Weait observes how this is reflective of the ‘tension in the law in which the 
right of legal subjects to choose how they wish to interact is subject to wider, 
policy-based and morally informed notions of what the public interest demands.’93  
 
This tension has resulted in claims such as those by Baker, who argues that 
‘surely those who engage in unprotected casual sex are also risking their human 
dignity’, undermining the availability of even an informed consent defence.94 As 
well as being a minority view in legal analysis, this perspective on casual sexual 
encounters is transparently one-sided and simplistic. It fails to reflect upon the 
dynamics of trust, set out above, or risk and safety, set out in Chapter 4. Instead 
of engaging with the practices of those who have casual sex, including the 
practices of condom cessation and disclosure linked with online dating,95 this 
approach focuses upon the act of disclosure or non-disclosure and associated 
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claims related to sexual morality.96 In contrast to the participant above, and the 
minority of similar responses who acknowledged the responsibility of those 
maintaining an undetectable viral load, the emphasis on sexual morality and 
responsibility can be seen in the right to know certain material facts.  
 
5.3.1 The “Right to Know” 
For many participants, status disclosure, irrespective of the actual transmission 
risks present in a particular situation, was necessary because, in their accounts, 
HIV-negative sexual actors have a “right to know” the HIV status of their partners. 
As Gostin and Hodge note, the right to know sexual health information relating to 
one’s partner has a longstanding foundation in public health messaging, 
especially in partner notification programs, where disclosure is seen to empower 
individuals to make informed decisions and take responsibility for their own 
health.97 However, as I will discuss below, participants’ conceptualisation of the 
“right to know” extended beyond information necessary to prevent HIV 
transmission. It was also used by some participants to explain the angry and 
emotive reactions to non-disclosure discussed in Chapter 4:  
 “I’d understand anger as a sexual partner has a right to know[.]”98 
 
 
Several participants similarly explained that, irrespective of the risks in a given 
situation, they felt that disclosure should take place prior to a sexual encounter 
because of a similar right to know. Notably, for some participants, this 
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necessitated (or, at least, strongly encouraged) disclosure within application 
profiles, whereas, for others, it was sufficient that disclosure take place at any 
stage prior to sex. Compare, for example:   
“I think it is probably because of a worry of misunderstanding and 
Stereotypes around the issue. It’s difficult as it would likely require him to 
explain it but I would prefer that he disclosed this on his profile.”99 
and,  
“Because he is young and possibly ashamed to reveal his status. My view 
on his decision not to do so is two fold:    1) [The HIV+ character] has every 
right to privacy. There is no need for him to put it on his status.    2) If [he] 
intends to sleep with [the other character], [the other character] should 
have been told prior to the get together being finalised.”100 
 
It is significant that in the second excerpt the participant discusses the conflict 
that may arise between the justifiable right to privacy that PLWHIV have regarding 
their status and the right to know of a sexual partner. In this response, although 
privacy justifies not including the information in a public profile, it is not sufficient 
to prevent a duty to disclose based on the right to know.  
 
Privacy was a factor several participants considered sufficient to explain non-
disclosure occurring in the vignette scenarios used in the survey, although many 
participants remained critical of non-disclosure on the whole. For example, one 
participant explained: “I support his decision not to make a status known on a 
dating app like this. I would however expect him to disclose before sex 
happened.”101 Similarly, another participant emphasised the stigma directed 
towards people living with HIV on mobile dating applications, as noted in Chapter 
4, and suggested that this produced privacy concerns resulting in non-disclosure:  
“I'd imagine that his decision to do so is based on fear of the stigma 
attached to a HIV diagnoses. I'd say that his decision not to include it is 
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his business, but if he was meeting someone, I'd feel he has a 
responsivility to tell them especially if asked directly about it. It could be 
seen as deceptive that he didn't tell them about it.”102 
 
In accounts such as this, participants ultimately prioritise the sexual autonomy of 
the HIV-negative sexual actor over the right to privacy of the HIV-positive one. 
Similarly, privacy concerns were echoed by many participants who remained 
critical of non-disclosure but who understood the rationale behind the decision 
not to disclose:  
• “He thinks it's irrelevant to mention since he can't pass it on.  It's dishonest, 
but understandably a difficult thing for some people to share so openly.”103 
 
• “Having a positive status online (whether undetectable or not) can invite 
stigma. It's his right to do so, especially when he is aware of his status, 
however he should probably tell his hookup, even to inform the hookup of 
undetectable status if he isn't aware”.104 
 
However, the “right to know” continued to supersede the right to privacy, even 
where participants acknowledged the role of privacy and were conscious of the 
stigma directed towards PLWHIV:  
The stigma still around it. Some people would get scared about the 
possibility of getting it even if [the HIV+ character] still explained about the 
undetectable viral load. If he wasn’t planning on having sex with someone 
then that’s fine. It is a very personal matter but the other person should 
know as well before hand if you do plan to have sex105 
 
The prioritisation of the right to know over the right to privacy is further evidence 
that the social construction of sexual autonomy and consent can result in sexual 
partners being positioned against one another,106 and that people living with HIV 
more often than not are the disadvantaged party in this situation. Although the 
current legal framework on HIV transmission does not give full effect to this 
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perceived “right”, unlike in gender identity cases,107 it nevertheless frames the 
claim that there is a category of “material” facts about which sexual partners are 
entitled to know and inquire about.108 
 
5.3.2 The Fiction of “Materiality” 
Historically, consent was not the driving force behind the criminalisation of sex, 
with offences such as adultery and sodomy existing where consent was a 
secondary factor. 109 The marital rape exception in England persisted until the 
mid-1990s, with earlier reforms addressing impersonation cases, it has been 
suggested,110 implicitly reinforcing the existence of the legal fiction that a man 
could not rape his wife. Furthermore, Herring suggests that the wrong in certain 
sexual consent cases is not inherently a lack of legal consent,111 something which 
is certainly supported by the approach of the court in Brown and other cases.112 
The limits placed on consent appear rooted both in questions of policy, 
concerning what might be framed as the ‘public interest’,113 and morality and civic 
obligation,114 which I return to in the following chapter.   
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As Cowan points out, the distinction in the approaches to consent taken in Dica 
and Brown, where in the former it was possible to consent to the risk of harm and 
in the latter it was not, are further complicated by the open communication 
between partners in Brown when contrasted with Dica.115 In Dica, Judge LJ 
distinguishes the case from Brown by limiting the issue of consent to the risk of 
infection.116 This not only produces contradictions between Dica and other case 
law, but is also problematic when looking at the internal logic of Dica as a whole. 
In order for the recklessness offence to transpire, transmission must have taken 
place; nevertheless, the courts artificially narrow the focus of consent to the issue 
of risk. Consent would not provide a defence were transmission to be 
intentional,117 even though the nature of the risks taken and awareness of these 
may remain the same. Cowan argues that this emphasises a legal fiction based 
on the normative position of some sexual activities, which distinguishes between 
non-normative sexual activities and those risks that “normal” sexual intercourse 
incurs, which may go some way to explaining the divergence between Dica and 
Brown.118  
 
The continued prevalence of principles of disclosure linked to choice, self-
autonomous personal control and the “right to know” in the context of legal 
discourse on consent highlights how consent, far from being a neutral concept, 
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inherently privileges particular models of risk taking and personal autonomy.119 
Bergelson highlights that individual autonomy may well be diminished by 
deception (and arguably non-disclosure) between sexual partners, as this does 
in some way limit the control one has over one’s own life, but argues that there 
are compelling arguments against accepting that some facts are inherently 
“material” whilst others are not.120 As I have noted above, the data here suggests 
that many application users see HIV status as material to consent decision 
making, giving rise to the perceived “right to know”. 
 
Archard, on material facts, suggests that in order for consent to be valid consent:  
[T]he person consenting must be possessed of all the relevant material 
facts bearing significantly on the decision to consent. The person does not 
need to know everything, only everything that would make a real difference 
to whether or not she consented.121  
 
However, how ‘everything that would make a real difference’ can be distinguished 
from “anything the person wishes to know” remains unclear. Rubenfield, and 
Fischel, point out that if materiality, underscored by autonomy, is privileged in this 
manner then there is very little, if anything, that could be legitimately excluded 
from the scope of inquiry.122 
 
If materiality is taken to mean facts that would determine whether sex would take 
place or not,123 then the fiction of materiality is highlighted by spacio-temporal 
limitations that the “right to know” and narrative of choice and control employ. As 
Palmer notes, these models of sexual consent are based on the premise that sex 
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can be separated into distinct acts which are easily distinguished and separated 
from one another, which ignores how sexual activity is co-produced.124 This would 
arguably equate sexual activity to performance of a contract, with parties 
engaging in detailed negotiations on the requirements and limits of their consent, 
setting out specific conditions for their consent,125 which arguably overlooks the 
role of emotion, passion and desire.126 As Elliott and de Than note,127 the Home 
Office explicitly rejected incorporating language perceived to be quasi-contractual 
in the Setting the Boundaries Report which preceded the 2003 Act.128 If it is 
possible for consent to be conditional then it entails either resorting to this quasi-
contractual model, where partners can raise any condition prior to sex which their 
partner is under an obligation to respond truthfully to, or otherwise it must resort 
to some standard of “reasonable” requests, which would entail normative 
judgments about the role and purpose of sex.   
 
Archard suggests that mistaken consent cases can generally be categorised as 
unreasonable owing to the modest or minimal impact that clarification of the 
consent of the other might have on the party seeking clarification.129 This would, 
in effect, enable consent to be made conditional upon any facts which the 
consenting party either specified, or which are to be considered expected in 
specified circumstances.130 In the context of many forms of alleged “sexual fraud”, 
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including the criminalisation of HIV transmission, however, this argument carries 
with it significant limitations. It is not the case that, in Archard’s words, there is 
‘no significant cost’ to seeking clarification. Indeed, there may be significant costs 
in the form of immediate bodily harm.  
 
In gender identity cases, fear of violence has been advanced as a potential 
explanation for non-disclosure, an explanation which the law fails to 
acknowledge.131 The same may be the case in instance of HIV non-disclosure,132 
where people living with HIV may fear violent responses to disclosure, driven by 
the angry and emotive reactions to non-disclosure I have discussed. 
Furthermore, the reverse maxim may be true in HIV cases, in that it could be 
suggested that there are few gains from the act of inquiry other than the sating of 
curiosity or the absolute avoidance of contact with a person living with HIV. 
Arguably, neither of these benefit the HIV-negative in ways that justify the force 
of law. To prioritise curiosity over the right to privacy of those living with HIV would 
be manifestly unjust, undermining their personal autonomy and representing 
what Weait terms ‘unwarranted interference and condemnation by the state’.133 
Although inquiry may facilitate safer sexual practices, it is disclosure of 
transmission risk (which the law does enforce) rather than HIV status alone which 
is critical to risk reduction. This argument might also have more merit if it were 
not open to individuals to insist upon preventative measures such as condoms in 
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any event, if they are significantly averse to risk taking, or to discuss methods of 
prevention (rather than status disclosure alone) with their prospective partners.  
 
5.4 Knowledge, Disclosure and Consent 
In the early stages of the HIV/AIDS epidemic, then Secretary of State for Health 
and Social Services Norman Fowler agreed with the statement, made by the US 
Surgeon General, that: ‘“Information [concerning HIV/AIDS] is the only vaccine 
we have”’.134 In the previous section, I highlighted how many, although not all, 
participants in this project spoke of a “right to know” a prospective partner’s HIV 
status. I challenged this “right to know” as unnecessary as a precondition for safer 
sex, in part, because it is open for those who are sexually active and HIV- to 
engage in safer sex (either through condoms or PrEP) without needing to know 
their partner’s serostatus. One potential limitation of this argument is that it 
assumes that the HIV- are informed about sexual health and HIV prevention. In 
this section, I examine how knowledge of HIV and HIV prevention were discussed 
in the responses. As noted in Chapter 2, the difference between the defendant’s 
knowledge of his HIV status and the complainants’ limited knowledge of HIV 
framed the defendant’s culpability in Konzani.135 However, although many 
participants did construct the HIV- as unknowing and dependent upon the 
disclosure of the HIV+ as a source of information, I argue that this is a result of 
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Acquiring, maintaining and acting upon sexual health education information has 
been seen as critical since the emergence of HIV/AIDS in the 1980s. Avila 
suggests that modern sex education programmes, including those beyond the 
Spanish context of his research, continue to target men who have sex with men 
as particularly in need of HIV prevention education and intervention.136 As the 
Hansard quotation above highlights, the role of sexual health education and 
knowledge has been at the centre of the cultural response to HIV/AIDS in the UK 
since the emergence of the epidemic. The notorious “Don’t Die of Ignorance” 
campaign placed an emphasis on knowledge and education in the 1980s, in a 
manner, it might be argued, now echoed by the disclosure and testing emphasis 
found on applications.  
 
Burgess suggests that the ‘direct impact, significance and legacy of the 
“remarkable” “Don’t Die of Ignorance” campaign have been limited’ but that the 
shift towards the individualisation of risk and the moralistic imposition of 
responsibility that it encapsulated persists more broadly, particularly in public 
health policies.137 Some research, particularly that by Young,138 however, 
suggests that there is also a persistent cultural awareness of these campaigns, 
particularly upon the generations of gay men who saw them at the time. Those 
campaigns were not referenced by participants here, even by those who were 
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among age groups likely to have been exposed to those messages in the 1980s. 
However, the individualistic ethos of those messages can be seen more generally 
within the data, particularly where participants discuss disclosure obligations. 
 
It is significant that although a majority of participants indicated a prior awareness 
of treatment as prevention, concerns about their own lack of understanding and 
a broader concern that men who have sex with men are underinformed about 
HIV transmission risk and sexual health more generally was seen across the 
data. For instance, one participant openly discussed being uninformed about HIV 
until learning about it through the diagnosis of a friend:  
“The only reason I am aware that having an undetectable status means 
you can not pass on the HIV virus during sex is because my best friend 
was diagnosed as HIV Positive this summer. This wasa total shock for him.     
I have been to every sexual health appointment with him and have 
supported him through this over the last 6 months. He is now undetectable, 
we have had protected sex in the past when he thought he was negative, 
and we have had sex since his undetectable status.     Before I’d been 
through this experience, I would never ever ever of knowingly had sex with 
some with a HIV Positive diagnosis or who have an undetectable status. I 
did not know enough about it, so just avioded it completely, I didn’t want 
to take any unnecessary risk.  I certainly was not clear what undetectable 
meant, and I didn’t realise there was no risk of passing it to a sexual 
partner.”139  
 
Other responses were not explicit, but included comments which signalled 
varying degrees of awareness, for instance: ‘[t]hey do not have HIV even if they 
may have in the past’140. It was not uncommon for these responses to also 
suggest an expectation that prospective partners who were HIV positive were 
obliged not only to disclose their HIV status but also explain their status, HIV 
prevention and concepts such as U=U: 
 
139 Participant 401353-401344-41722354 





“To be honest I don't know much about HIV. I would ask them about it or 
Google it. It tells me that they are open about what they have.”141 
 
Whilst, on the one hand, for the participant above, disclosure within the app profile 
reassured them that they could ask questions in this way, on the other hand, 
silence on the issue of HIV status concerned some participants, who felt that 
silence reflected a lack of awareness which might make discussion of sexual 
health challenging:  
“[I]f [a partner doesn’t] know, how am I to know? I can’t make an informed 
sexual health decision based on the limitined information provided. So I 
must to assume otherwise or asked hum sexual health questions to get 
the answers, but then they could be lies.... or they could just tell me what 
they want me to hear…”142 
 
The emphasis this response places on the prospective partner as the source of 
sexual health knowledge reflects the individualist approach to sexual health seen 
across much of the data. Although there are arguable justifications for all 
prospective sexual partners engaging in constructive discussion surrounding how 
to have sex safely, the extent to which this is often used to justify extensive 
obligations imposed on PLWHIV and the stigmatising behaviour of some HIV-
negative individuals undermines these justifications.143 Within this data, the 
extent to which lack of awareness and poor sex education might lead to stigma 
was often highlighted: 
“Immoral of him go not mention it on profile but there is a negative stigma 
on HIV status and not a lot of people understand the terms[.]”144 
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It is perhaps significant that the participant here suggests that the obligation on 
the character is an ethical or “moral” obligation, rather than a legal one.145 The 
participant appears to be sympathetic to the prevailing stigma present on these 
applications, something that was echoed in several responses. One participant 
suggested that non-disclosure in order to avoid stigma might be morally 
justifiable, but only if disclosure took place prior to a sexual encounter: 
“If [the character has not disclosed due to] stigma, and to give him a 
chance to explain during chat - fair enough.  - If [it is] so that he can satisfy 
a fetish of having unprotected sex with men whilst he has HIV - bad.  - If 
privacy - fine.    Basically, it all depends on whether he would volunteer 
that he is HIV positive before having sex, or would answer truthfully if 
asked.”146 
 
Given that the vignette this participant is discussing involved a character with an 
undetectable viral load,147 statements such as this also indicate that some 
application users do not consider TasP an alternative to disclosure. The manner 
in which the participant frames condomless sex as unprotected stands in contrast 
to current public health messages,148 but may reflect the attitudes towards safety 
discussed in Chapter 4. Similar responses spoke of non-reliance on disclosure, 
irrespective of status, with participants instead discussing strategies of safety 
they retained control over. Discussing the same vignette, another participant 
explained:  
“I think [the character] is HIV positive, and his viral load was undetectable 
as to September 2018, the date of their last test. This would mean that, 
were we to have sex, he couldn't transmit the HIV virus. I don't have any 
reason to think he is lying, but if I had sex with him, I would rely on my 
strategies for self-protection, rather than on his disclosure about his HIV 
status.”149 
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Whilst some statements such as this emphasise how participants drew upon their 
own ‘strategies for self-protection’, which included beliefs that ‘safe sex is a must’ 
irrespective of a partner’s HIV status,150 these strategies often involved 
compelling disclosure from HIV+ partners or expecting them to ‘volunteer’ this 
information, as the participant above suggests. The view that, despite the 
prevalent stigma seen on applications, those living with HIV had a responsibility 
to do this was often justified by the assumption that PLWHIV were more informed 
than the HIV-negative. Offering an explanation for non-disclosure, one participant 
stated:  
“[The Character may be e]mbarrassed or afraid that people don't have 
enough information to make informed decisions about having sex with 
someone with HIV. I understand his reasoning as long as be discloses in 
advance of sexual interaction.”151 
 
As this participant exemplifies, PLWHIV were often expected to be acutely and 
accurately aware of their own transmission risk (or non-risk) as compared to HIV-
negative characters where knowledge was unexpected. One participant, 
continuing the narrative of a scenario involving non-disclosure of an undetectable 
viral load explained:  
“I think [the HIV- character] might be angry or Worried initially.     He may 
feel he had been deliberately mislead. He may not have decided to have 
sex with [the undetectable character] or meet him if he had know his status 
beforehand. But once Ari has explained what undetectable means he 
might be okay with it and his mind mind be put to rest[.]”152 
 
The emphasis this statement places on differing levels of knowledge and 
disclosure being necessary in order to allay the fears of HIV-negative people was 
a feature which stood out in several responses. Several participants distinguished 
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between the HIV-negative character’s awareness, stemming from general sex 
education, and the knowledge expected of the character with HIV:  
“I would hope he would be honest, since he has had a medical professional 
give him the diagnosis of ‘undetectable’. But I suspect that he would say 
negative as he is unable to pass the virus on and this would not have a 
derogitory impact on Charlie’s choice whether or not to meet him.”153 
 
The distinction drawn here between general knowledge and the knowledge 
provided by medical professionals may underpin, to some extent, the approach 
to knowledge and responsibility taken by the CoA in Dica and Konzani. As Weait 
sets out, there is a reasonable argument that those who engage in unprotected 
sex with a partner of unknown status are, by agreeing to have sex, consenting to 
the risk in that situation.154 This approach was rejected by the Court of Appeal, 
who emphasised that ‘to the extent that Clarence suggested that consensual 
sexual intercourse of itself was to be regarded as consent to the risk of 
consequent disease, again, it is no longer authoritative.’155 The accounts of 
participants here suggest that many of the men who use dating applications 
similarly feel that HIV-negative men who have sex with men are insufficiently 
aware of transmission risks to properly consent to these risks, therefore justifying 
disclosure obligations.  
 
However, whilst it might be suggested that this general awareness is insufficient 
to base duties to disclose or the right not to disclose upon, the more specific 
knowledge that comes along with application use and the presence of these 
features and associated testing reminders may yet undermine the CoA’s 
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approach in cases involving application use. Several participants did emphasise 
that these features may reinforce obligations to disclose, but also serve as a 
reminder to HIV-negative application users that they should be mindful of their 
sexual health irrespective of the declared status of their partners. Not only is this 
increasingly relevant as TasP results in the sites of the greatest risk shifting to 
those who are unaware of their status, rather than those who have been 
diagnosed,156 it also serves to reinforce the arguments above that HIV-negative 
individuals can be made sufficiently aware of risks without disclosure taking 
place:  
“I think that the test history section is useful to have shown as HIV is a big 
topic of discussion in the current climate. It makes people aware that they 
are responsible for themselves and make sure they are repeatedly getting 
tested and looking after themselves. However, it is also very easy to lie 
about these tests and dates and so should be taken with a pinch of salt.”157 
 
5.4.2 Disclosure 
As Chapter 4 highlighted, participants’ accounts of disclosure were complex, 
often contradictory, and frequently emotionally charged. The stigma directed 
towards those who did disclose, and the anger directed towards those who did 
not, were interlinked with claims about the necessity of disclosure, towards which 
the perceived imbalance of knowledge, discussed above, further contributes. 
Because of this stigma, many participants expressed surprise that the HIV 
disclosure features were used to disclose statuses other than negative, but this 
public disclosure was often distinguished from disclosure in private: 
“Disclosing your HIV status on an app where hundreds of other men can 
see you is scary. I personally would not disclose this information on a 
profile. I would tell the person privately, but not public-ally display it on an 
app. I think the reason Ari has not disclosed his status is fear of being 
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judged and that he would not get attention from other men because most 
men (unfortunately) would turn their heads as soon as they saw a profile 
where it stated they were positive.  I believe a lot of men are uneducated 
on the subject and as soon as they see 'positive' they turn the other 
way.”158 
 
As Roth describes, the cartography of dating apps is ‘constantly in flux [with] a 
community whose participants enter, interact, and exit at will.’159 Statements such 
as the one above highlight how this visibility reinforces the distinctions between 
public and private disclosure, something which other participants discussed when 
addressing disclosure obligations:  
“I'd imagine that his decision to do so is based on fear of the stigma 
attached to a HIV diagnoses. I'd say that his decision not to include it is 
his business, but if he was meeting someone, I'd feel he has a 
responsivility to tell them especially if asked directly about it. It could be 
seen as deceptive that he didn't tell them about it.”160 
 
As well as focusing on responsibility, this participant also explores what it means 
to be deceptive in this context. The participant’s distinction between (passive) 
non-disclosure and (active) deception demonstrates how participants’ 
perspectives on consent, noted above, shape the meaning given to deception. 
The foundation of the distinction the participant makes is the active role taken by 
the HIV-negative individual who inquiries about a prospective partner’s HIV 
status. As Weait points out, the law’s response to HIV is marked by a ‘linear and 
unidirectional approach to causation’.161 The non-disclosure of someone living 
with HIV is constructed as central to the inability of the HIV-negative to remain 
HIV-negative, and as a result infection is positioned as something that would not 
 
158 Participant 401353-401344-40168692 
159 Yoel Roth, ‘Zero Feet Away: The Digital Geography of Gay Social Media’ (2016) 63 Journal of 
Homosexuality 437, 442. 
160 Participant 401353-401344-42164399 





have happened but for the non-disclosure.162 There is a clear contrast between 
this position and the expectations discussed by participants such as the one 
above. Whilst, in law, both deception and non-disclosure are central to HIV 
transmission, in these accounts, only deception impedes the ability of the HIV-
negative to remain so.  
 
Other participants emphasised that disclosing information within the profile was 
not the default position and was, in essence, an active process and that non-
disclosure is, in practice and in the design of these applications, the default: 
• “He doesn't have to. If there is no risk to other people he does not have to 
actively offer this information. There is still a stigma attached to being HIV+ 
so I can understand his reasons for not telling displaying this information 
publically.”163 
 
• “No thoughts from that / a lot of people can’t be bothered completing 
that”164 
 
• “Honest about the HIV status. I don’t think a lot of people add that 
information.”165 
 
These responses demonstrate that although many participants considered HIV 
status important to their decisions around consent, HIV status disclosure is not 
expected or anticipated by all. It is also notable that none of these responses 
frame a positive HIV status as exceptional in the context of application use. It has 
been suggested that the exceptional nature of HIV infection justifies disclosure 
obligations and undermines claims that the HIV-negative hold some responsibility 
relating to disclosure. Mawhinney argues, for instance, that because those living 
with HIV ‘differ from the norm’, responsibility for disclosing their status rests with 
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them alone.166 Indeed the perceived exceptionalism of HIV-positive bodies may 
contribute to the lack of clarity between active/passive deception distinction, 167 
by suggesting that ‘presenting oneself for sexual union carries with it an implied 
representation that one is free from sexually transmitted disease or that one is 
unaware that one has such a disease’.168 This data would appear to challenge 
that claim, highlighting that serodiversity is an accepted reality for many 
application users and HIV-negativity is not understood as the norm by all users, 
or even by all HIV-negative users.  
 
Several other participants emphasised that not only was HIV-positivity 
unexceptional, it was also considered unimportant. In part, this lack of importance 
was often because participants’ understanding of “safe” sex extended beyond the 
risks of HIV:  
“If it was me, it wouldn't change my reaction because I know U=U. 
However, I would not have unprotected sex because of other STIs.”169 
 
And, similarly: 
“Pleased they have felt able to disclose their status, but still aware of the 
risks of other STI transmission.”170 
 
Many concerns regarding other STIs were unconnected with participants’ 
discussion of HIV status and disclosure. However, concerns such as those 
discussed in the previous chapter, including statements suggesting that PLWHIV 
were promiscuous and “bad at prevention”, are counter to this view. These beliefs 
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position HIV-positive statuses as a ‘spoiled identity’ persisting even when 
transmission risk is eliminated.171 Several participants suggested that disclosure 
of a positive status was an implicit signal that someone on an application was 
seeking a sexual encounter or was generally sexually promiscuous: 
“The fact that he is single, HIV positive points towards sexual meetings 
(definitely this is not sure but thats what pops to my mind).”172   
 
Another participant similarly commented:  
“The specification that he travels about a lot & wants to meet new people 
suggests to me he was random no strings attached fun whilst he is away. 
But he is also after chat, friends, dating & a relationship when he's at home 
however doesn't want to come across overtly as a "slag" to potential 
partners. He also wants people who he can have a sexual relationship with 
- otherwise probably wouldn't mention his HIV status.”173 
 
Race suggests that the law contributes to ‘an “affective climate”: a shared context 
of fear, shame, secrecy, suspicion, rejection and avoidance’ within which 
responsibility for preventing HIV transmission rests only or primarily with 
PLWHIV.174  Responses such as these demonstrate that disclosure can take on 
a particularly sexualised meaning when it takes place within application profiles, 
offering additional rationales for non-disclosure. This arguably contributes to the 
affective climate and is overlooked by a legal framework which focused on the 




171 See Asha Persson, ‘Non/Infectious Corporealities: Tensions in the Biomedical Era of “HIV 
Normalisation”’ (2013) 35 Sociology of Health and Illness 1065, 1068; and, also, Erving Goffman, 
Stigma: Notes on the Management of Spoiled Identity (Penguin 1963). 
172 Participant 401353-401344-42768685. 
173 Participant 401353-401344-43683239. 
174 Kane Race, ‘Framing Responsibility: HIV, Biomedical Prevention, and the Performativity of the 
Law’ (2012) 9 Journal of Bioethical Inquiry 327, 331ff. 





5.4.2.2 A Question of Attribution 
The normative position of HIV-negativity was also arguably demonstrated in 
several accounts that addressed the third mock profile, which intended to 
highlight the complexity of a profile purporting to represent more than one person. 
Although several participants expressed uncertainty surrounding this profile, as I 
will outline below, there was very little by way of surprise over the content of the 
profile. Although firmly a minority practice, a, nevertheless significant minority of 
application users report using a shared profile in certain instances,176 and the lack 
of surprise here may further support claims that shared profiles are not rare or 
abnormal.  
 
When discussing the profile, several participants expressed general uncertainty 
regarding information in “shared” profiles purporting to represent more than one 
person. Participants often commented that if they interacted with the users of 
such profiles, they would aim to clarify the situation when communicating directly 
with them. Despite this, there were also some general expectations through 
several responses which are worth highlighting, particularly where relating to the 
inclusion of HIV status in these profiles.  
 
Firstly, responses often expressed an expectation that shared profiles were, 
nevertheless, controlled by only one user:  
• “To me the shorter person in the photo due to it matching his height. I find 
it’s usually the older man running the account.”177 
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• “I don’t think it’s as complex as you imply. Whoever is the more active user 
of the profile in the pair (and thus probably made it) would have their details 
included.”178 
 
• “They're probably both somewhere around those figures - probably these 
are the stats of the person who wrote the profile, but the other guy is near 
enough.”179 
 
As a form of location-aware software, dating applications are designed to be 
accessed from a single device, in a single location, at any given moment. 
Consequently, many applications log a user out on one device if they log in on 
another. It is, therefore, unsurprising that many participants expected there to be 
an ‘active user’ in primary control of each profile. As demonstrated in the excerpts 
above, there were various intuitions regarding which of the two people in the 
profiles picture was the one actively managing the account, with some 
participants seeing the situation as reasonably unambiguous. However, this 
expectation was far from universal:  
“I assume this information has been from the user setting up the profile, 
they have either put the information in which matches their description or 
they may have put average information on which relates to both of the 
users. [T]here is also question as to whether the other user is in agreement 
for their photo/details to be disclosed.”180 
 
In this account, the participant speaks of the information in the profile reflecting 
the details of the person who created the profile, but also suggests that some 
information might reflect an average or middle ground between the two. They 
also point out that there are also potential privacy concerns surrounding the use 
of shared profiles, including the extent to which the “secondary” user is aware 
and consenting to their inclusion in the profile. The suggestion that an average of 
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some sort might be achieved echoes the accounts above, which indicated that a 
compromise might be achieved, and several other responses: ‘I would imagine 
they take a sort of average between the two of them.’181  
 
However, other participants discussed the difficulty of compromise or averaging 
in relation to HIV status, leading to several participants suggesting that whilst 
other information could be presented in this way, HIV status could not: 
“I would assume that both partners are negative. But I would check this 
out. My assumption is based upon the fact that they would disclose a 
positive status if either person was[.]”182 
 
Accounts such as these highlight the extent to which HIV-negativity is assumed 
as the default position by many who use dating applications. It also reflects the 
difficulties inherent in representing something as potentially complex as HIV 
status within the limited confines of an application profile. Whilst this stands out 
in instances of shared profiles, as the data here would appear to suggest, this is 
only one example of the limits of applications as a disclosure tool. It also suggests 
that distinct standards of attribution, cohesiveness and consistency apply to HIV 
status on apps. Whilst compromise and averaging may appear acceptable in 
relation to other information, these accounts suggest that application users 
expect HIV status disclosure to take place clearly, unambiguously and overtly 
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5.4.2.3 The Adequacy of Disclosure 
Given the extent to which indirect and non-verbal forms of disclosure of HIV are 
a contentious issue within contemporary legal debate,183 whether disclosure 
within a profile is adequate to discharge the duty of disclosure is a complex 
question. In Chapter 4, I discussed how participants often framed HIV disclosure 
as essential in order to overcome the uncertainty surrounding risks relating to HIV 
and to enable them to feel in control of their own safety. I also pointed out that, 
for many participants, disclosure was perceived to be a red flag for risky sexual 
practices. Building on this analysis, in this section I discuss how disclosure was 
framed as adequate or inadequate, in part as a result of these approaches to risk 
and safety. I demonstrate how the necessity of disclosure in order to achieve 
“safety” often stems from a lack of knowledge regarding TasP or anxieties about 
the efficacy of TasP on the part of the HIV-negative. Consequently, I argue that 
the (in)adequacy of disclosure taking place via mobile applications is driven by 
the perceived exceptionalism of the HIV-positive, the “safety” behaviours of the 
HIV-negative, and the sexualised context of mobile dating application use, rather 
than by what is necessary in order to enable safer sex.  
 
The significant importance attached to disclosure by participants and the 
anxieties surrounding sexual health, discussed above, make it somewhat 
unsurprising that the standards of disclosure mentioned by participants were 
relatively high. Beyond the expectation that disclosure was essential, some 
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participants explicitly rejected alternatives to disclosure such as TasP. In some 
instances, such as this example, this rejection was linked to the participant’s lack 
of knowledge regarding TasP:   
“I lack knowledge on an 'undetectable' status, however it should always be 
communicated to potential sexual partners. I think he has not completed 
this as it would put most men off wanting to meet him.”184 
 
This participant’s lack of knowledge contrasts with the relatively high levels of 
awareness among participants. Three quarters of participants reported prior 
awareness, with several more explaining that they had some knowledge but 
remained uncertain. However, even among this majority, there was concern that 
different meanings could be applied to “undetectable” and cast doubt over the 
efficacy of TasP as a whole:  
• “People view undetectable in many different ways, too hard to say”185 
 
• “I would be worried by this. I do not really understand the various HIV 
diagnoses and it is certainly an issue for me. It's hard to clarify these things 
on an app like this”186 
 
• “Not sure what undetectable hiv means, maybe he’s not choosing to 
disclose?”187 
 
There is a clear sense of uncertainty within these responses which highlights how 
disclosure may be misinterpreted or misunderstood. This does not necessarily 
mean that disclosure of an undetectable viral load alone is to be framed as 
inadequate: indeed, even when misunderstood some may understand it to 
communicate an absence of risk. However, the worry expressed by the second 
participant and the general concern seen in these responses do suggest that 
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disclosing an undetectable viral load may be framed as inadequate in certain 
contexts. Given, as I highlighted above, that the HIV-negative continue to be 
constructed as unknowing and the HIV-positive as a source of information 
regarding transmission risk, the very uncertainty which results in disclosure being 
ineffective may be leveraged to sustain more stringent disclosure obligations. 
 
Similarly, participants’ understanding of the purpose and meaning given to the 
“Test History” feature where individuals disclosed an undetectable viral load was 
often uncertain:  
• “I don't know if there's some kind of separate test after testing as positive 
to check that the meds are working and that you're undetectable. so maybe 
he only got a positive test result as recently as September.”188 
 
• “Undetectable suggests to me they are HIV+ and have an undetectable 
viral load. However, in light of that, I have no idea what the test history 
date might mean. Unless, he has misunderstood the meaning of the 
'undetectable' in this context.”189 
 
Although HIV arguably continues to be framed as an exceptional health concern, 
HIV prevention through testing and treatment sits alongside broader public health 
campaigns and those relating to other specific sexually transmitted infections.190 
HIV testing often takes place alongside tests for other STIs; however, it has been 
suggested that there is a ‘variability’ over which tests are offered across 
England.191 The doubt that the two responses above demonstrate may be 
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indicative of this variability in testing provisions, a point made explicitly by another 
participant:  
“My thoughts are this is someone who is HIV positive and has an 
undetectable viral load. Their test history suggests they keep an eye on 
their sexual health regularly. Though to what extent is anyone’s guess. As 
test can mean anything from a pee sample to full blood works”.192 
 
One of the aims of the fourth vignette was to elicit discussion of the relationship 
between the test history feature and the HIV disclosure feature. As these features 
were introduced at the same time on many applications, it is perhaps unsurprising 
then that many participants considered the meaning ascribed to each of them to 
be interrelated:  
• “The assumption is always that test refers to HIV”193 
 
• “The assumption is that test refers to HIV status, not STI status”194 
 
• “Because that's an HIV status box, not a ‘generic STI’ box.”195 
 
As these responses demonstrate, although participants were often aware of the 
range of sexual health screening services that “testing” might include, a more 
specific meaning was often given to the “test history” feature, in part because it 
was seen as part of the “HIV status box”. 
 
Whilst this perception limits what test history is taken to represent, it can also 
have an influence on perceptions relating to the HIV disclosure feature, as one 
participant explained:   
“I believe the test history section tells you when the individual was last 
tested as being positive and undetectable. In otherworlds, this individual 
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monitors and keeps up to date their status in regards to detectability. I 
have dated someone who was undetectable previously, I definetely had 
some concerns and needed some education and reassurance in regards 
to this”.196 
 
In this response, the participant discusses the importance of disclosing testing 
history when also disclosing an undetectable viral load. This appears critical to 
establishing that viral load can be trusted and conforms with the cyclicality of 
safety discussed in Chapter 4, highlighting the decreasing value of an 
undetectable viral load test over time. This suggests that disclosure is only 
understood as effective and adequate when it is indicative of a broader effort on 
the part of the HIV+ to reduce or eliminate transmission risk. The response also 
highlights how disclosure is seen to contribute to the incremental development of 
HIV-related knowledge through lived experience over time. In light of the 
perception that the HIV-negative are underinformed about HIV (and sexual health 
more broadly), this further demonstrates why disclosure is seen as important by 
many participants, even where it does not directly contribute towards risk 
reduction. Indeed, it could be suggested that this construction of disclosure as 
education contributes towards a broader risk reduction over time, as the HIV-
negative become more aware of transmission risk. But I would challenge any 
claim that this places any disclosure obligations on the HIV-positive, who should 
not shoulder the burden of public health education purely in consequence of their 
HIV status.  
 
Although many participants gave weight to disclosed test history as an indicator 
of safety and transmission risk, trust in this disclosure does not appear to be 
 





consistent.  Indeed, several participants suggested that this component of profiles 
was particularly prone to falsification or general unreliability: 
“The test history is not reliable at all, this user may or may not have been 
tested and may have just put in a random date to fill the section[.]”197 
 
More broadly, whilst many participants were inclined to believe disclosure taking 
place via applications, many participants also stated that this disclosure did not 
influence their general attitudes towards sexual health or was not to be relied 
upon. Compare, for example, the attitude of a participant who stated:  
“I notice [the character] has disclosed an undetectable status, which I 
believe to be true. This makes me more likely to trust his profile info. […] I 
would tend to believe his status as it's a big decision to disclose such info. 
I don't put much trust in test history, I know people who just change that 
date every couple of months to appear healthy.”198 
 
with responses where participants stated that ‘I never trust what they write about 
HIV or Test History’199 and ‘[w]ell people can lie on this things, if i am going to 
meet him, i’ll be careful and use protection.’200 
 
Each of these responses expresses doubt over “Test History” dates, in particular, 
but there is a contrast between them in relation to HIV status disclosure. The 
former highlights how the perpetual cycle of safety can influence disclosure and 
deception practices by creating a pressure to ‘appear healthy’. The latter 
highlights a distinction between believing and relying upon disclosure. The final 
response, above, highlights how disclosure can have little impact on their own 
safety strategies, because those strategies involve practicing safer sex 
irrespective of the HIV status of their partners. Some have pointed out that these 
 
197 Participant 401353-401344-42413617 
198 Participant 401353-401344-42532460 
199 Participant 401353-401344-42505942 





strategies are often only employed with casual sexual partners and then 
disapplied with partners that men trust.201 Within the scope of this project, which 
looked at disclosure practices as they took place via mobile dating applications’ 
dedicated sexual health sections, it was not possible to capture all behaviour of 
this kind. However, several participants did reflect on the specificity of disclosing 
via an application profile. In keeping with the belief in disclosure noted above, 
others emphasised that disclosure was unusual and often unexpected:  
“Status is irrelevant, I would only bother looking at it if it was a profile I was 
really interested in in other respects. I've never seen someone list their test 
dates, that seems bizarre and somewhat obsessive. If I saw this on a 
profile it would make me think the person had negative thoughts about HIV 
and was desperate to show they don't have it. Somewhat stigmatising.”202 
 
Whilst this participant constructs HIV disclosure itself as unusual and 
unexpected, this was a minority view within the data. Most responses indicated 
that HIV disclosure was normal within the context of application use, although not 
always expected because of stigma and other attitudes seen here in the data. 
The HIV specificity of the sexual health features seen on the dating applications 
investigated here was noted in several responses discussing the fourth vignette 
(“History”) which presented participants with a narrative involving gonorrhoea.  
Several participants expressed doubt that a gonorrhoea diagnosis would be 
discussed within an application profile, with one participant explaining:  
“Never in several several years of using the app have I seen someone 
declare anything other than HIV in their profile.”203 
 
 
It is notable that the specificity of these disclosure expectations contrasts with the 
broader interpretation of the “all clear” discussed in the previous chapter. 
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Although the importance and desirability of disclosure was pervasive across the 
responses, any trends relating to expected behaviour were less clear and often 
more context-dependent.  For instance, the perceived peculiarity of gonorrhoea 
disclosure within an application profile may contribute towards the belief that 
disclosure within an app profile would be adequate in those instances, which 
contrasts with the doubts raised about disclosing an undetectable status noted 
above:  
“No. If he mentions [the gonorrhoea diagnosis] on his profile, I do not think 
he would mention it again. The assumption would be the potential partner 
would have read the profile prior to messaging.”204 
 
5.4.2.3 To Disclose, or Not To Disclose, that is the Question 
In this section, I have observed that the meaning, scope and adequacy of 
disclosure on mobile dating applications varies significantly among application 
users, whilst also being driven by the HIV-centric nature of disclosure features. 
The responses discussed above indicate that the perceived imbalance of HIV-
related knowledge and the mixed meanings given to disclosure both contribute 
to an ‘affective climate’, 205 where disclosure is often understood as necessary 
and yet insufficient to address the concerns of some who are HIV-negative. 
Arguably, the design of applications fails to address this climate and reduces 
disclosure down to a dichotomous state, failing to reflect the nuanced and 
complex experiences of HIV-positive and HIV-negative application users. As 
discussed in Chapter 4, there is a tendency among some HIV-negative men to 
construct risk as an externality associated with non-disclosure and limited 
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discussion of sexual health issues. However, as seen throughout this section, the 
disclosure of HIV and other sexual health information are often not relied upon 
when men practice their own “safety” driven behaviours. Instead, the uneven 
distribution of knowledge and the necessity of disclosure is employed as part of 
a discourse of consent which positions HIV-negative individuals as implicitly 
unaware and places ethical obligations upon PLWHIV to disclose their status, 
even where this disclosure is secondary to safety practices. The consequences 
of this may be significant, particularly in the context of criminal proceedings where 
disclosure and non-disclosure on applications may be evaluated outside of the 
specific context in which it occurs.206 
 
5.5 Concluding Comments 
Fischel claims that many of the values underpinning consent – such as sexual 
fulfilment, respect and enthusiasm for sexual encounters – are valid and 
compelling, but should be advocated for beyond the ‘small, legalistic box of 
consent.’207 Similarly, Brooks argues that the separation of the legal construction 
of consent from the context in which consent takes place means that the law is 
unable to fully respond to social conditions that shape sexual violence.208 In this 
chapter, I have demonstrated how concepts such as trust, knowledge and “the 
right to know” are critical to the social context of mobile application use. 
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I have sought to explicitly challenge the categorisation of certain facts as 
“material” to consent decisions, particularly the materiality of HIV status, both 
from a legal and an ethical perspective. Disclosure and consent, as with sexual 
responsibility – the focus of the next chapter – are employed as a particular kind 
of legal fiction in HIV criminalisation cases, ones which sustain the uneven 
distribution of duties and disclosure obligations, as well as responsibility for 
preventing further HIV transmission. This positions sexual actors as inherently 
individualistic and ignores how sexual fulfilment is a cooperative endeavour. 
 
This contractual, conditional approach to consent, which “materiality” is based 
upon, is likely to have an appeal owing to the manner in which it employs a 
particular framework of responsibility, one which is likely co-produced 
by/producing cultural narratives relating to sex, sexuality and sexual health.209 
Included in this are narratives which construct the HIV-negative as uninformed 
and disclosure as a moment of education. The dichotomies of material and 
immaterial, informed and uninformed, trusting relationships and those with an 
absence of trust, are all potent narratives which “legalistic box[es]” may be prone 
to further oversimplify. As with other mobile applications designed to capture 
distinct declarations of consent, the disclosure features seen on applications may 
reinforce these dichotomies in the course of criminal proceedings. As Danaher 
argues in relation to these other “consent” apps, the additional weight that juries 
might give to permanent digital information over, for instance, first-hand 
testimonial accounts remains a compelling argument in favour of limiting the use 
of application evidence at trial.210 The influence of these applications is unlikely 
 
209 Palmer (n 6). 





to be mitigated through judicial directions alone because the appeal of evidence 
of this kind is that it aids in resolving what is otherwise one of the most contentious 
issues a jury can deliberate.211
 
211 See, for instance, Emily Finch and Vanessa E Munro, ‘Breaking Boundaries? Sexual Consent 
in the Jury Room’ (2006) 26 Legal Studies 303. 
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Chapter 6: Legal, Social, and Moral Responsibilities 
6.1 Introduction 
In Chapter 1, I pointed out that the social functions of the criminal law necessarily 
link it to normative social and contextual practices associated with the behaviours 
it is called upon to address and adjudicate.1 One consequence of this is that 
‘moral ideas about responsibility are absorbed into the law, and the law influences 
the way people think about responsibility in the moral domain.’2 Discussing the 
relationship between moral and legal responsibility, Farmer argues that as well 
as importing basic moral concepts into the law:  
[R]esponsibility in the narrower sense of liability is also fundamentally 
linked to the establishment of wider responsibilities (or obligations) in the 
criminal law. These impose obligations or duties on individuals (as legal 
persons) in general, or in relation to particular roles, such that the function 
of the criminal law is not simply that of prohibition.3 
 
Farmer goes on to claim, with HIV criminalisation as a paradigmatic example, 
that these deployments of responsibility establish and reinforce links between 
social obligations of civility and criminal responsibility to the extent that, although 
the law may not criminalise all uncivil conduct, it does reinforce the legitimacy of 
these obligations.4 To this extent, it might be suggested that the law establishes 
expectations surrounding disclosure of HIV which position the knowledge of HIV 
among PLWHIV as a burden. Knowledge as a burden; in contrast to knowledge 
as capital or resource, is discussed by Valverde – who highlights how a “duty to 
 
1 Victoria Brooks, ‘Greer’s “Bad Sex” and the Future of Consent’ [2019] Sexuality & Culture. 
2 See Peter Cane, Responsibility in Law and Morality (Hart 2002) 15–16. 
3 Lindsay Farmer, ‘Civility, Obligation and Criminal Law’ in Daniel Matthews and Scott Veitch 
(eds), Law, Obligation, Community (Routledge 2018) 226. 





know” can arise in relation to certain pieces of knowledge which the law presumes 
are, in a manner, “common sense”.5  
 
Similarly, in the previous chapter, I demonstrated that the perceived imbalance 
of knowledge between the HIV+ and HIV- was deployed by some participants to 
justify and reinforce disclosure obligations. These responses reflected the belief 
that those living with HIV were more informed and, consequently, more 
responsible for raising and carrying out HIV prevention.6 Whereas in the previous 
chapter this analysis was framed around disclosure obligations and consent, in 
this chapter I focus on how these concepts relate to discussions of responsibility. 
I explore participants’ accounts of social and sexual responsibility within the data 
and the limited discussion of the law relating to HIV transmission, as well as legal 
concepts such as intent, passivity and obligations, drawing upon literature 
addressing the philosophy of criminal law and literature on responsibilisation.7 
 
Chan and Reidpath argue that responsibilisation discourses draw direct 
association between individual agents and safety and health at a population level, 
based on assumptions about risk taking and decision making that do not account 
for individual circumstances.8 In Chapter 2, I highlighted how this influences 
 
5 Mariana Valverde, Law’s Dream of a Common Knowledge (Princeton University Press 2003) 
169–172, 190–192; and, also, Joachim J Savelsberg, ‘Law’s Dream of a Common Knowledge 
(Review)’ (2006) 31 The Canadian Journal of Sociology 270. 
6 For discussion of this claim in legal literature, see Lisa Cherkassky, ‘Being Informed: The 
Complexities of Knowledge, Deception and Consent When Transmitting HIV’ (2010) 74 The 
Journal of Criminal Law 242, 245; George R Mawhinney, ‘To Be Ill or to Kill: The Criminality of 
Contagion’ (2013) 77 The Journal of Criminal Law 202, 203. 
7 Susanna Trnka and Catherine Trundle, ‘Competing Responsibilities: Moving Beyond Neoliberal 
Responsibilisation’ (2014) 24 Anthropological Forum 136. 
8 Kit Yee Chan and Daniel D Reidpath, ‘“Typhoid Mary” and “HIV Jane”: Responsibility, Agency 





discourse on HIV prevention and “vectors” of disease transmission.9 In criminal 
law, this is also reflected in the ‘moral-philosophical framework which takes the 
responsible agent as the foundational unit of analysis’.10 Responsibilisation’s 
restricted understanding of our social interdependency, and the prioritisation and 
protection of ‘equal autonomous rights-bearing selves from harm by each other 
and the state’,11 results in the suggestion that ‘[t]hose who “knowingly” place 
others at risk are to be blamed for their irresponsibility or judged irrational in their 
decision making’.12 Responsibilisation consequently underpins the legal process, 
by providing a foundation upon which individuals are held accountable.13  
 
In the context of HIV transmission, intertwined with discourses on responsibility 
is the pervasive figure of the Other of HIV/AIDS, which is itself dependent upon 
the externalisation of risk, as discussed in Chapter 4.14 Although the prominence 
of the cultural association between the Othering of PLWHIV and sexual 
transmission of the HIV virus is significant, the extent to which the Other and 
Stranger of HIV can also be viewed in relation to intravenous drug use, seen, for 
example, by Zigon in some international literature, is also noteworthy.15 
Responsibilisation in HIV prevention terms can be seen in the attempts to 
manage those failing to abide by the ‘good citizenship-tamed, “responsible”… 
 
9 See Section 2.5, above, and Heather Worth, Cindy Patton and Diane Goldstein, ‘Reckless 
Vectors: The Infecting “Other” in HIV/AIDS Law’ (2005) 2 Sexuality Research and Social Policy 
3. 
10 Matthew Weait, Intimacy and Responsibility: The Criminalisation of HIV Transmission 
(Routledge-Cavendish 2007) 199. 
11 Jennifer Nedelsky, Law’s Relations: A Relational Theory of Self, Autonomy, and Law (Oxford 
University Press 2012) 5. 
12 Chan and Reidpath (n 8) 43 (citations omitted). 
13 Trnka and Trundle (n 7). 
14 Weait, Intimacy and Responsibility: The Criminalisation of HIV Transmission (n 10) 129–130. 





safe sex ethic’ driven self-responsible model of sexual responsibility.16 In light of 
this, the construction of HIV risk as external – as highlighted in the chronotope of 
risk discussed in Chapter 4 – and of HIV-negative men as vulnerable to deception 
on the part of PLWHIV has, it is argued, resulted in the deployment of cultures of 
surveillance and suspicion, seen, for instance, in several high profile sexual 
health campaigns.17 
 
Building on this literature, this chapter argues that the inconsistent and 
sometimes contradictory ways in which participants discussed responsibility for 
preventing HIV transmission can be analysed through the lens of 
responsibilisation and that this reveals significant challenges for the use of mobile 
dating application evidence in criminal proceedings. It, furthermore, argues that 
the mixed legal and non-legal understandings relating to HIV transmission 
prevention and status disclosure result in the criminal law reinforcing and, in some 
instances, contributing to the production of, what are perceived to be, moral and 
ethical obligations to disclose HIV status. These perceived obligations, 
subsequently, shape how disclosure and non-disclosure are both constructed as 
active, rather than passive, processes. It concludes that this formation of sexual 
responsibility is neither objective nor necessarily helpful in efforts to reduce HIV 
transmission or achieve sexual justice.  
 
 
16 Barry D Adam, ‘Infectious Behaviour: Imputing Subjectivity to HIV Transmission’, Reframing 
Infectious Diseases Conference (2006) 6–9; see also Niels van Doorn, ‘Treatment Is Prevention: 
HIV, Emergency and the Biopolitics of Viral Containment’ (2013) 27 Cultural Studies 901, 916–
917; and, Vanessa E Munro, ‘Shifting Sands? Consent, Context and Vulnerability in 
Contemporary Sexual Offences Policy in England and Wales’ (2017) 26 Social & Legal Studies 
417, 431–432. 
17 See discussion of the ‘Trust Him?’ campaign in Octavio R González, ‘HIV Pre-Exposure 
Prophylaxis (PrEP), “The Truvada Whore”, and The New Gay Sexual Revolution’ in Ricky 





In the next section, I discuss how the construction of responsibility in participants’ 
accounts is centred around disclosure and the “right to know” discussed in 
Chapter 5. Expanding on the arguments made in that chapter, here and in the 
third section, I explore how disclosure obligations are framed as rational and 
responsible due to how they enable independent and autonomous individuals to 
make “reasonable” sexual safety decisions. Following this discussion, I address 
participants’ accounts of the moral and legal responsibility to disclose HIV status, 
engage in safe sex, and prevent HIV transmission. I demonstrate that although 
legal knowledge was limited, where participants did draw on legal concepts these 
had a significant influence on concepts such as sexual responsibility and 
disclosure. In the final substantive section, I return to the legal distinctions 
between active deception and passive non-disclosure, highlighting how the de 
facto duty to disclose may be perpetuated by dating application evidence.18   
 
6.2 Rationality, Autonomy, and Responsibility 
In this section, I aim to illustrate how the accounts of participants are often driven 
by an abstract notion of responsibility which relies upon assumptions concerning 
the nature of individual experiences and rational and irrational decision making in 
the context of sexual responsibilisation. Several of those writing about criminal 
law theory have noted how concepts such as autonomy, rationality and – as seen 
in the previous chapter – consent, are conceptually abstract, removed from the 
 
18 See Matthew Weait, ‘Knowledge, Autonomy and Consent: R v Konzani’ [2005] Criminal Law 





contextual settings in which they arise and driven by liberalistic claims of 
objectivity and universality.19  
 
As might be expected when discussing issues relating to sexual ethics and the 
law, responses from participants in this project were not uniform and, in some 
respects, differed significantly in the distribution of responsibility and culpability. 
However, a recurring theme across responses was the association between ways 
of being responsible and a rational and universal mentality. When discussing 
scenarios involving the disclosure and non-disclosure of HIV status, many 
participants made reference to expectations of disclosure which were detached 
from practical concerns about how disclosure would take place:  
• “He should tell anyone he meets with”20 
 
• “He should disclose this before having sexual relations with an individual 
thoigh”21  
 
• “Either they haven’t got it checked recently or at all. Maybe positive and 
don’t want to disclose that. […] we all should have [testing] done if we have 
sex regardless and stops spreading STIs and STDs”22 
 
Statements such as these are emblematic of a (non-legal) conceptualisation of 
responsibility in which the role of disclosure is central. As seen in the final quote 
above, the continued importance of testing stands out in many of these responses 
and is sometimes justified through reference to broader obligations to community 
 
19 Vanessa Munro, ‘Constructing Consent: Legislating Freedom and Legitimating Constraint in 
the Expression of Sexual Autonomy’ (2008) 41 Akron Law Review 923, 929; Tanya Palmer, 
‘Distinguishing Sex from Sexual Violation’ in Alan Reed and others (eds), Consent: Domestic and 
Comparative Perspectives (Routledge 2017) 24; and, also, Victoria Brooks, Fucking Law: The 
Search for Her Sexual Ethics (Zero Books 2019) 82–87; Manvir Grewal, ‘Victoria Brooks, Fucking 
Law: The Search for Her Sexual Ethics, Zero Books: London, 2019 [Book Review]’ [2020] 
Sexualities, 2. 
20 Participant 401353-401344-41625219 
21 Participant 401353-401344-43061371 





health; in addition to the emphasis on individual choice and decision making, 
which I have noted in previous chapters. As Young has noted, discourses of risk 
management and safer sex – discourses of responsibilisation – have an 
individualistic, and moralistic, tendency which places much of the ‘burden of 
containing infection’ onto PLWHIV.23 Disclosure has, of course, played a 
significant role in sexual safety and security historically and was central to 
responses to HIV/AIDS within the gay community, as a relationship of care (in 
contrast to one of responsibility), once effective testing techniques were 
developed.24 Nevertheless, what is distinct about responsibilisation when 
contrasted to this earlier duty of care is the extent to which fault and blame are 
prescribed primarily or predominantly to people living with HIV,25 and that 
responsibility is taken to involve their disclosure above all else.26  
 
Weait has suggested that the criminal law is influenced by ‘moral, philosophical 
and political principles’ - such as rationality, objectivity and universality – which 
shape the legal construction of responsibility and which  ‘deny – or at the very 
least marginalise – the relevance of’ individual characteristics, experiences, and 
the context in which issues of responsibility arise.27 In practice, this, it can be 
suggested, results in an ‘“effective” duty to disclose’ which is closely associated 
 
23 Diana Young, ‘Individual Rights and the Negotiation of Governmental Power’ (2015) 24 Social 
& Legal Studies 113, 116; see also Nicola Lacey, ‘Space, Time and Function: Intersecting 
Principles of Responsibility across the Terrain of Criminal Justice’ (2007) 1 Criminal Law and 
Philosophy 233. 
24 David M Halperin, ‘The Biopolitics of HIV Prevention Discourse’ in Vernon W Cisney and 
Nicolae Morar (eds), Biopower (Digital Ed, University of Chicago Press 2015) 219. 
25 Barry D Adam, ‘Constructing the Neoliberal Sexual Actor: Responsibility and Care of the Self 
in the Discourse of Barebackers’ (2005) 7 Culture, Health and Sexuality 333, 334; Kane Race, 
‘Framing Responsibility: HIV, Biomedical Prevention, and the Performativity of the Law’ (2012) 9 
Journal of Bioethical Inquiry 327, 332; Munro (n 16) 432. 
26 Weait, Intimacy and Responsibility: The Criminalisation of HIV Transmission (n 10) 184. 





with the construction of safety and overcoming the uncertainty of risk, as 
discussed in Chapter 4.28 As seen in Chapters 4 and 5, disclosure was central to 
many participants’ accounts of safety and, actual or perceived, risks – although 
the stage at which disclosure was necessary varied between responses. Whilst 
some participants discussed the necessity of disclosure early on in interactions, 
other participants, even those who felt that disclosure should take place 
irrespective of risk, suggested that disclosure was only necessary where sexual 
intercourse was intended:  
“The stigma still around it. Some people would get scared about the 
possibility of getting it even if [the character] still explained about the 
undetectable viral load. If he wasn’t planning on having sex with someone 
then that’s fine. It is a very personal matter but the other person should 
know as well before hand if you do plan to have sex”.29 
 
Whilst, in Chapter 5, I discussed the perceived necessity of disclosure 
overcoming both the general claim to privacy that someone living with HIV might 
have and the more specific challenges resulting from the stigma surrounding HIV, 
in this chapter, I intend to address how these competing rights narratives arise in 
relation to HIV criminalisation itself. Statements such as the one above highlight 
the role of responsibility and the extent to which it is driven by individualistic liberal 
values of independence and autonomy.30 Arguably, the criminal law is centred on 
the agency, intention and causality caused by individual agents, with 
responsibility acting as an organising framework for these concepts.31 Responses 
such as the one above draw on narratives of HIV transmission risk and safety, 
 
28 Samantha Ryan, ‘Disclosure and HIV Transmission’ (2015) 79 The Journal of Criminal Law 
395, 399; and, also, Weait, Intimacy and Responsibility: The Criminalisation of HIV Transmission 
(n 10) 191. 
29 Participant 401353-401344-41514592 
30 Nedelsky (n 11) 5–6. 
31 Anthony Giddens, ‘Risk and Responsibility’ (1999) 62 Modern Law Review 1, 8–9; Weait, 





consent and control, which I have explored in the previous chapters. The specific 
models of responsible individualism, such as that seen here, demonstrate how 
responsibility is deployed as a rationale for rights, duties and obligations 
stemming from these concepts.  
 
Not all accounts of individualistic responsibility placed this responsibility with 
people living with HIV, however. Throughout the previous chapters I have 
highlighted the diversity in attitudes towards disclosure and non-disclosure found 
in the responses including instances where participants felt that disclosure, 
particularly unprompted disclosure, should not be expected. Several participants, 
drawing on differing accounts of responsibility to that discussed above, 
highlighted how those who were HIV-negative had a responsibility to maintain 
their virological status and manage their sexual health:  
“Angry although it would be [the character’s] own fault for not asking and 
choosing to have unprotected sex without knowing the other party's 
status”32 
 
Discussing the possibility of disclosure and non-disclosure after a sexual 
encounter,33 another participant responded that the responsibility would rest with 
the HIV-negative individual in the scenario: 
“[The character living with HIV] might [disclose]. He might not respond at 
all. After all, at that point, it’s [the HIV-negative character’s] responsibility 
to manage his own sexual health.”34 
 
In this instance, the extent to which the participant emphasises that it is the 
responsibility of the HIV-negative character at this point is perhaps a further 
 
32 Participant 401353-401344-42414609 
33 Although, this should perhaps be distinguished from other obligations of partner notification, as 
the vignette used here related to (non-)disclosure immediately after sex had taken place.  





indication of the importance of time and temporality in discussion of risk, safety 
and sexual decision making. The suggestion that there is a responsibility on HIV-
negative individuals to manage their own sexual health after an encounter 
perhaps reflects the extent to which the ongoing obligations relating to safety 
interact with the more specific and linear effects of encountered risks.  
 
Although individualistic, the way in which this participant deploys responsibility to 
highlight the need for individual sexual actors to manage their own sexual health 
stands in contrast to the other accounts of responsibility seen above. Chalmers, 
writing following the Kelly case in Scotland in 2001,35 points out that discussion 
over the distribution of responsibility for preventing transmission often presumes 
an ‘either/or’ zero sum model whereby responsibility rests either with sexual 
partners who are HIV-positive or those who are HIV-negative.36 The suggestion 
that there are, instead, multiple co-existing responsibilities for HIV prevention was 
echoed by the same participant, who stated:  
“I think [the decision to disclose is] completely up to [the character living 
with HIV], especially given widespread HIV stigma, not to disclose (or be 
expected to publicly disclose) his HIV status on an app profile. He has 
taken responsibility for his own health and those of his partners by being 
on treatment. It’s not anyone’s business (and his sexual partners have 
equal responsibility to take care of their own health).”37 
 
Although these accounts stand out for placing a slightly greater emphasis on the 
situational decision making of the characters in the vignettes, they continue to 
 
35 HMA v Kelly [2001] Unreported; see, among others, Victor Tadros, ‘Recklessness, Consent 
and the Transmission of HIV’ (2001) 5 Edinburgh Law Review 371; Gillian Harris, ‘Lover with HIV 
Guilty of Risking Woman’s Life’ The Times (London, 24 February 2001) 9; Damian Warburton, ‘A 
Critical Review of English Law in Respect of Criminalising Blameworthy Behaviour by HIV+ 
Individuals’ (2004) 68 The Journal of Criminal Law 55. 
36 James Chalmers, ‘The Criminalisation of HIV Transmission’ (2002) 28 Journal of Medical Ethics 
160, 163. 





highlight the deployment of a rational model of responsibility in which individuals 
maintain a stable standard and expectation of disclosure. It is also notable how 
sexual responsibility is often, in both popular and legal discourse, deployed to 
undermine claims that societal structures contribute, in whole or in part, to the 
issues that legal and moral judgement is attached to. Mowlabocus discusses 
homonormativity in terms of privatisation and individualism where matters such 
as ‘HIV, mental health or substance misuse are … a matter of personal 
responsibility, having little to do with the structural inequalities and pervasive 
forms of discrimination that queer folk continue to experience’.38 Within the 
context of PrEP provision within England, and the associated legal cases 
addressing funding provision for this by the NHS, Mowlabocus finds that HIV 
prevention, and the sexual health of men who have sex with men more generally, 
is presented as an issue of individual sexual responsibility ‘which invariably made 
it vulnerable to the market rhetoric of neoliberalism’ within which gay men can be 
constructed as consumers making market driven decisions.39 In contrast to the 
sexual health concerns of heterosexuals, which are commonly presented as 
matters of public health and broader sexual citizenship, Mowlabocus suggests 
that homonormativity prevents the sexual health concerns of gay men from being 
presented as public concerns, instead casting them as private matters if 
homosexuality is to be tolerated within modern society.  
 
Lovelock similarly considers the extent to which media representations of gay 
men, particularly within the context of PrEP provision and, also, the emerging 
 
38 Sharif Mowlabocus, ‘“What a Skewed Sense of Values”: Discussing PreP in the British Press’ 
[2019] Sexualities, 3. 





media attention addressing chemsex, position gay men who are outside of the 
bounds of ‘”safe” homonormative models of gay life’ as inherently risky and 
irresponsible in matters relating to that risk.40 Similar to Mowlabocus, Lovelock 
argues that the presentations of PrEP and chemsex produce narratives of 
acceptable and unacceptable sexual expression. Drawing on Joshi41 and 
Ashford,42 Lovelock suggests that some conceptualisations of non-
homonormative sexuality ‘remain charged with associations of danger, threat, 
irresponsibility, excess, waste, destruction, and death.’43 This includes, as 
Lovelock points out,44 technological innovations such as Grindr and other dating 
applications, which have the potential to facilitate some homonormative 
conceptualisations of sexuality but which also carry with them the potential to 
undermine respectable forms of queerness,45 something which was echoed by 
some participants: 
“Sexual health is important but a scary thing for people to discuss most 
guys on grinder or other hook up apps are straight bi guys who have wife’s 
and gf they need apps like this to hook up with guys , normally sexual 
health is never discussed , which should be as these guys could be 
passing STI to their partners”.46 
 
As Ashford has noted, the law has generally been disinterested in enforcing this 
respectable/unrespectable distinction in relation to bareback sexual identities but 
has intervened where the transmission of HIV has arisen.47 Nevertheless, it plays 
 
40 Michael Lovelock, ‘Sex, Death and Austerity: Resurgent Homophobia in the British Tabloid 
Press’ (2018) 35 Critical Studies in Media Communication 225, 226. 
41 Yuvraj Joshi, ‘Respectable Queerness’ (2012) 43 Columbia Human Rights Law Review 415. 
42 Chris Ashford, ‘Bareback Sex, Queer Legal Theory, and Evolving Socio-Legal Contexts’ (2015) 
18 Sexualities 195. 
43 Lovelock (n 40) 236. 
44 Lovelock (n 40) 235. 
45 Jody Ahlm, ‘Respectable Promiscuity: Digital Cruising in an Era of Queer Liberalism’ (2017) 20 
Sexualities 364. 
46 Participant 401353-401344-41903701 





an important role in underscoring how legal and non-legal accounts of 
responsibility often represent disclosure as a necessity because of the 
“reasonableness”, rationality and respectableness of the disclosure standard. 
This, furthermore, may impact upon the availability of the consent defence, 
generally, in light of the restrictions on consent defences encapsulated in 
Brown.48 As noted in the previous two chapters, the suggestion that HIV-negative 
individuals have a “right to know” the HIV status of their HIV-Positive sexual 
partners arose throughout many of the responses. Whilst, as seen in previous 
excerpts, this responsibility was often taken to involve disclosure within the 
profile, there was a small proportion of participants who discussed this, on its 
own, being insufficient. This can be seen in one excerpt, discussing a scenario 
where HIV status was disclosed within an app profile, where the participant still 
stated that the character was “not being forthcoming about it”.49 
 
Although participants’ accounts of responsibility vary in that the exact nature and 
extent of obligations stemming from that responsibility differ across the 
responses, the overall construction of responsibility is based on a number of 
presumptions which stand out in these accounts. Responsibility, even where it is 
not directed solely towards people living with HIV, is presented as, primarily, an 
individual imperative and, furthermore, as necessary for maintaining communal 
health standards. Elsewhere, I have suggested that this produces “cultures of 
surveillance” where sexual health information in application profiles is subject to 
the scrutiny of other users,50 something discussed further below. Although not 
 
48 Cherkassky (n 6) 257–258. 
49 Participant 401353-401344-43612383 
50 Cameron Giles, ‘Digital Disclosure: HIV Status, Mobile Dating Application Design and Legal 





universal, there was a recurring theme whereby the burdens of responsibility 
were directed toward, primarily, people living with HIV – often on the basis that 
their knowledge of their status, HIV, and sexual health generally, facilitated this 
uneven distribution of responsibility. Consequently, to be responsible was often 
equated in these responses to disclosure, something which I focus upon in the 
following section.  
 
6.3 Disclosure Obligations and Responsibility 
Obligations of disclosure were pervasive throughout many of the responses, 
building upon the themes of individualism and responsibilisation noted above. In 
this section I address how these disclosure obligations supplement and augment 
the criminal law to produce positive obligations rather than mere prohibitions. 
Essential to this argument is the extent to which HIV-negativity is taken to be the 
default position by many who use these applications. Statements such as these 
emphasise the additional obligations that HIV-positive people are expected to 
undertake by many application users, take as example: 
“A lot of people don’t feel the need to disclose that they are negative 
because those who are positive are normally expected to do so- so either 
they didn't feel the need or are trying to hide the fact they are 
positive/undetectable”51 
 
Again, the extent to which non-disclosure is presumed to be an active process of 
“hiding” one’s status is emphasised in this response. As Ryan points out, the 
Court of Appeal determined, in EB,52 it has been suggested, that ‘non-disclosure 
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of HIV+ status is not analogous to active deception’.53 Although, whether non-
disclosure might be considered an “active” behaviour when someone is asked 
directly remains a debated legal issue.54 As outlined in Chapter 2, the extent to 
which the distinction between active deception and non-disclosure can be made 
sufficiently clear is questionable and often draws upon scenarios, hypothetical 
questions and presumed intentions which may, intentionally or unintentionally, 
reinforce and privilege particular assumptions, as Sharpe has discussed in the 
context of gender identity and deception case law.55 Similarly, several 
respondents highlighted that whilst there may not be a general duty of disclosure, 
responses to direct questions were sufficiently distinct from this to the extent that 
disclosure should take place: 
“I get it. but, obviously, he shouldn't lie if someone directly asks him, and 
people may assume he's hiding something if it comes out like that in 
response to a question. the fact that something's been hidden so far would 
lead someone to wonder "OK so what if he's not really undetectable? I've 
never met this person, how do I know if I can trust them?" so although he 
may know full well he's undetectable, it might create less anxiety for him 
to be totally upfront about everything immediately, if not in the box, then 
through a conversation. but it's not a situation I've dealt with personally 
and I don't know what I'd do, so I don't feel right judging [the character’s] 
choices in this regard without knowing them.”56 
 
In this excerpt, the participant makes a distinction between a response given to 
a direct question from a prospective sexual partner and more general disclosure 
which is unprompted, although they also highlight the additional challenges that 
disclosure only taking place at this later stage might cause. Clough questions 
 
53 Samantha Ryan, ‘“Active Deception” v Non-Disclosure: HIV Transmission, Non-Fatal Offences 
and Criminal Responsibility’ [2019] Criminal Law Review 4, 4. 
54 Karl Laird, ‘Criminal Law Review Rapist or Rogue? Deception, Consent and the Sexual 
Offences Act 2003’ [2014] Criminal Law Review 492; Alex Sharpe, ‘Expanding Liability for Sexual 
Fraud Through the Concept of ’Active Deception: A Flawed Approach’ (2016) 80 The Journal of 
Criminal Law 28; Ryan, ‘“Active Deception” v Non-Disclosure: HIV Transmission, Non-Fatal 
Offences and Criminal Responsibility’ (n 53). 
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whether the distinction between active deception and non-disclosure is really 
relevant since, in her analysis, the non-disclosing/deceptive party is acting with 
the purpose of ‘gain[ing] the consent of their sexual partner without knowledge 
that might affect that decision.’57  Her argument is that: ‘[a] person need not know 
every detail about a person, or an encounter, but they do need to know that which 
is important to them in making their decision.’58  As with the general debate over 
materiality discussed in Chapter 5, however, it is unclear how it can be legally 
and objectively determined what information can be considered “sufficiently 
important” to a partner’s decision making to warrant unprompted disclosure. As 
what is material to sexual decision making is likely to vary from person to 
person,59 at most the claim might be made that parties need to disclose 
information which a reasonable person might suspect is material to their partner’s 
decision making.  
 
But, whether an objective standard such as that suggested by Clough can be 
comprehensively and unambiguously defined is highly questionable and 
subjective standards of “reasonable” disclosure, which often arise in legal, as well 
as related non-legal, debates, are contentious.60 Clough, acknowledging that the 
range of potentially “material” facts is unquantifiable, suggests that gender 
identity is, nevertheless, a key factor in sexual decision making, considering how 
gender interacts with sexual orientation.61 Similarly, others have suggested that 
HIV status is among those facts which are material, given the extent to which it 
 
57 Amanda Clough, ‘Conditional Consent and Purposeful Deception’ (2018) 82 The Journal of 
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impacts decisions surrounding sexual health.62 However, within this debate there 
is often little consideration of low or no-risk situations, such as those involving an 
undetectable viral load, and whilst the criminal law in this area would appear not 
to criminalise non-disclosure in these instances, the ongoing debate around 
“conditional” consent leaves open the possibility that the criminal law in this area 
will be expanded upon.  
 
Given the extent to which many men who have sex with men, including some of 
those who participated in this project, report considering HIV status important to 
their sexual decision making – irrespective of, or only mildly influenced by, 
transmission risk – there nevertheless remains a possibility that matters of 
conditional consent may arise. Fishcel suggests that only explicitly conditional 
consent instigates a moral duty of disclosure, although he also claims that certain 
questions are sufficiently “unanswerable” to the extent that a duty to disclose 
does not arise in relation to those issues.63 Whether or not this would be the case 
in instances of HIV disclosure and non-disclosure again raises issues of legal, as 
well as moral and ethical, responsibilities. 
 
When discussing the relevancy of disclosure in undetectable cases, responses 
often emphasise the continued moral obligations to disclose in these instances, 
even though there was recognition that disclosure was both difficult and less 
relevant in these instances:  
 
62 See, for instance, the commentary of Natalie Reed: Natalie Reed, ‘The “Ethical Imperative” Of 
Disclosure, or: How To Believe Your Victim Owes You An Opportunity For Abuse’ (Sincerely, 
Natalie, 20 March 2012) <https://freethoughtblogs.com/nataliereed/2012/03/20/the-ethical-
imperative-of-disclosure-or-how-to-believe-your-victim-owes-you-an-opportunity-for-abuse/> 
accessed 9 April 2019. 
63 Joseph J Fischel, Screw Consent: A Better Politics of Sexual Justice (University of California 





“He [(a non-disclosing character)] thinks it's irrelevant to mention since he 
can't pass it on. It's dishonest, but understandably a difficult thing for some 
people to share so openly.”64 
 
Again, the distinction between actively offering status disclosure and non-
disclosure and deception as a response arose in some participants’ accounts:  
“He doesn't have to. If there is no risk to other people he does not have to 
actively offer this information. There is still a stigma attached to being HIV+ 
so I can understand his reasons for not telling displaying this information 
publically.”65 
 
Several participants did stress, however, that where there was no transmission 
risk that disclosure was not necessitated and, in fact, non-disclosure and even 
potentially deception regarding HIV status might be justifiable: 
• “He may not want trouble and to panic [his sexual partner], when he knows 
he cannot pass the virus on”66 
 
• “He might potentially pretend he is negative to stop [his sexual partner] 
worrying since he cannot contract it”67 
 
• “I think he would say negative. Maybe people don’t understand what 
undectabel means? Or maybe because Ari knows he can’t contract HIV 
so it’s the same as having a negetive status”.68 
 
Observations such as these which suggested that a somewhat less culpable, and 
potentially even commendable, motivation might lie behind instances of non-
disclosure and deception often focused on the distress and fear that disclosure 
might produce, taking into consideration the limited knowledge and doubt over 
transmission risks that some are expected to have.69 Equally, however, these 
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69 Scott Burris and Matthew Weait, ‘Criminalisation and the Moral Responsibility for Sexual 
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variations in awareness were often employed to place greater obligations upon 
those living with HIV to educate, inform or otherwise allay the fears of partners 
who are HIV-negative:  
• “[The HIV-negative character in the scenario would p]robably panic and 
worry until he researched undetectable load and has a test himself. I’d 
understand anger as a sexual partner has a right to know”70 
 
• “I think [the HIV+ character] may say and emphasise that he cannot pass 
it on. Potentially reassuring through evidence/articles online.”71 
 
As these accounts exemplify, the additional knowledge and experience that 
people living with HIV are presumed to have factor into the additional forms of 
responsibility which some participants felt they had. This is in addition to the 
responsibilities specifically relating to treatment, and in particular adherence, 
which were often flagged by participants. As noted in Chapter 4, the recognition 
of the effectiveness of TasP has had a notable impact on the construction of 
responsibility. Guta et al have suggested that the “success” or “failure” of people 
living with HIV in becoming, or not becoming, virally suppressed is, in part, 
paradoxical considering the extent to which an undetectable viral load might be 
both liberating and restrictive to those employing the identifier of “undetectable” 
in everyday life.72 
 
Various aspects of participants’ responses in this area are notable, including the 
extent to which disclosure of an undetectable status is subject to additional 
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scrutiny, surveillance and doubt in some instances beyond that directed toward 
HIV-negative or unknown statuses:  
“Undetectable HIV is when an individual has undergone treatment for HIV 
and the levels in their body are far reduced, making the virus much harder 
to pass on. Depending on when it was set, the test history would suggest 
that this person is not undetectable as it takes 3-6 months for treatment to 
reduce the HIV level.”73 
 
Although many participants expressed a sense of reassurance when seeing an 
undetectable viral load, questions of adherence to treatment regimens, regularity 
of testing and overall “responsible” management of health often persisted:  
“This person has contracted HIV but I assume is on anti-retrovirals which 
have reduced his viral load to an undetectable level - meaning his chances 
of passing on HIV to his partners are slim to none. In order to have 
achieved this I would imagine his compliance with the medication is high - 
so I think he takes both his, and his potential sexual partners' health 
seriously. The last test was on 1st September 2018 - this means that at 
that time his viral load was undetectable, however there is the potential for 
this to have changed so without an up to date test it's unclear what his 
risks of passing HIV on are.”74 
 
Such concerns were often focused upon the apparent impermanency of an 
undetectable status when contrasted with the permanency of HIV:  
“[I’m a]ware [of TasP,] yes but undetectable is not a permanent status 
unlike hiv+ since unless they keep up the meds they can become 
detectable in between screenings”.75 
 
What is often not considered in this context, however, is the impermanency of 
HIV-negative statuses and the precarious nature of HIV-negative test results.76 
Although participants often conceived of undetectable as an impermanent status, 
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with a degree of uncertainty about it, observations such as the ones below were 
rarely mirrored by similar observations about the state of HIV-negativity:  
• “If actually undetectable (i.e. HIV positive, but medicated so as to 
massively reduce transmission of HIV), it does not phase me at all. 
However, if I were to see that test date now [3 ½ months after the date 
listed], I would be concerned that someone who is diagnosed as HIV 
positive had not been for a more recent check up (it subconsciously implies 
they may be inept at other things like taking their medication). It is also 
unclear what ‘Test History’ actually means, as it is not specifically “date on 
which you were last tested for HIV”77 
 
• “As far as my understanding goes this is rigorously controlled by strict 
medication and although undectable the person is still posative and 
precations should still be advised. The fact that the last tested section is 
within 4 months of the current date I would not be overly allarmed, this 
could be due to a host of reasons, chielf that he has not had sexual 
intercourse during that time and has not had cause to be retested. I would 
become concerned if the date were to be over 6 months and very weary if 
it were over 12”.78 
 
Indeed, as noted previously, HIV-negative statuses were often seen to capture a 
broader sexual responsibility which participants perceived, and often led to 
particular expectations surrounding disclosure:  
“I know it only says 'HIV Status: Negative' however whenever I see this on 
an app, I think to myself "This guy must be responsible as he gets tested 
regularly, and of course he wouldn't sleep with me knowing he has 
something without telling me" - at least I hope.”79 
 
This particular participant’s account of disclosure and what disclosure and non-
disclosure indicate vis-a-vis sexual responsibility highlights how the multiple, 
sometimes inconsistent, aspects of sexual responsibility are often reduced down 
to singular indicators. As Mazanderani has suggested, the ethics of HIV 
disclosure and non-disclosure are fraught with complexities of this kind, which 
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are perhaps compounded by the additional challenges of online interaction.80 The 
Court of Appeal, in EB, highlighted the extent to which these issues remained a 
matter of ongoing public debate above and beyond the specific legal debates that 
existed then and remain ongoing since that case was heard.81 Nevertheless, the 
extent to which responsibility is equated, in the eyes of many, to disclosure, is 
consequential, particularly as the socio-medical discourse on sexual health 
continues to evolve.  
 
Several of those writing on the issue of HIV criminalisation have suggested that 
there is, in effect, a duty of disclosure notwithstanding the apparent alternatives 
to disclosure which have been noted in Konzani. Weait and Ryan have both 
pointed out that the approach taken by the courts to date has been disinterested 
in voluntary nature of risk taking by a sexual partner who is aware of the risks that 
could potentially accompany condomless sex, instead focusing on the perceived 
culpability of the non-disclosing party.82 Worth, Patton and Goldstein have 
advocated for reformulation of sexual responsibility for preventing HIV infections, 
based on the premise that ‘responsibility for preventing HIV infection does not lie 
with the individual, or even in the interaction between two individuals, but rather 
should be a collective response on the part of whole communities and 
populations.’83 However, to date these arguments have not been reflected in the 
criminal law in England and Wales, arguably because the case-by-case nature of 
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the criminal law is ineffective at responding to the broader public health demands 
of HIV prevention.  
 
Instead, as highlighted in Chapter 2 and above, the courts have developed what 
is in effect an obligation to disclose HIV-positive status to be assured of the 
avoidance of criminal sanctions.84 Although this duty can be mitigated by condom 
use, viral suppression, and PrEP based risk reduction,85 disclosure remains the 
only certain way for people living with HIV to avoid criminal sanctions. This is not 
as extensive as the approach taken in other jurisdictions, where disclosure is 
necessary in both legal framing of the issue and these practical terms.86 But, 
nevertheless, this effectively imposes a particular construction of what it means 
to be responsible onto those engaging with issues of sexual health, HIV 
prevention and communication in a sexualised setting.87 
 
Following Konzani, the limited range of circumstances in which someone living 
with HIV may claim an honest and reasonable belief in the informed consent of 
their partner have arguably been misinterpreted as facilitating a much broader 
right to non-disclosure.88 Cherkassky, for instance, has suggested that it is 
“currently the victim’s responsibility and can come in many guises, and the 
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defendant must simply believe that the victim has done her research, leaving him 
to bear no responsibility as an ‘informant’ to divulge his status.”89 This claim 
seems based on Cherkassky’s assumption that ‘in all instances where a 
defendant hides his HIV status, he is being deceptive’ and that it is not, in any 
event, possible to hold a reasonable belief in consent if disclosure has not taken 
place.90 If this assumption is accepted, then it may possibly be argued that the 
law consequently enables defendants to avoid responsibility through the honest 
belief in consent defence found in Konzani.91 
 
However, given the extent to which reasonable beliefs are the indirect product of 
conceptualisation of sexual responsibility, it is argued that this does not reflect 
the reality of HIV criminalisation prosecution. Given the extent to which, as has 
been demonstrated here, (sexual) responsibility in these instances is conceived 
of as interconnected with disclosure, the disclosure standard is liable to extend 
into the application of the criminal law through the reduction or elimination of 
situations where there is held to be a reasonable belief in the informed consent 
of the HIV-negative partner. Writing in an Australian context, Houlihan points out 
that: 
Prosecutorial success seems dependant on the socio-sexual pathology of 
the offender and the socio-sexual normalcy and vulnerability of the 
‘victim?’. Punishment is calculated on the Otherness of the offender to their 
victim, but also on stereotypes of HIV vectors. The level of harm appears 
to be dependant on the (moral) innocence of the victim, rather than on 
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So too, in the English context, does the criminal law employ particular 
constructions of social and sexual responsibility which, in effect, create a 
disclosure standard which applies to, if not in whole, then at least the 
overwhelming majority of cases of sexual activity, if the HIV+ partner is to be 
certain of avoiding the imposition of criminal sanctions or, more worryingly, 
intense investigation and scrutiny by police.93 Mykhalovskiy has pointed out that 
false allegations of non-disclosure can effectively be used by the partners of 
people living with HIV as a form of coercive control where transmission is not 
required for an offence to be committed.94 Given the additional concerns that 
might be raised about instances of intentional transmission, following Rowe,95 
such issues deserve further consideration from a socio-legal perspective, in order 
to better understand the impact that the law has on the lived experiences of 
people living with HIV. This piece does not make any direct claims concerning 
the diverse range of experiences of the law felt by PLWHIV specifically, although 
these issues have been explored by others.96 However, the influence of 
responsibility on these issues stands out in the accounts of participants here, both 
those of who did not discuss the law directly and those, who I now turn to, who 
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6.4 Legal Responsibility and Understanding of the Law 
As noted above, the criminal law relating to HIV transmission is linked with moral 
and/or social responsibilities of the kind discussed in the previous section.97 
Consequently, obligations surrounding the disclosure of HIV status, where it is 
known, are often legitimised by reference to the law, something which can be 
seen in the minority of responses which made direct reference to the law 
governing HIV transmission in England and Wales in this project. Furthermore, 
more general discussion of responsibility and risk reduction often drew upon 
similar concepts whilst not making direct reference to criminal law itself, serving 
to underscore the extent to which these obligations are, at least partially, 
internalised by some who use mobile dating applications.  
 
In this section, I discuss participants’ accounts of the law and seek to highlight 
the extent to which specifically legal knowledge is limited, sometimes 
contradictory and a source of uncertainty to some, points which were all 
recognised by participants to some extent. Despite this uncertainty, participants’ 
recourse to the law often focuses on the perceived illegality of non-disclosure and 
utilised moral judgments on non-disclosure and as justification for the law’s 
approach. One participant responding to a vignette involving non-disclosure 
explained that: 
“[The Character] has a legal obligation to disclose his status if he knows 
what it is I understand his reasons not wanting to publish it due to the 
stigma surrounding HIV but not disclosing it would be worse for the stigma 
I know undetectable means it cannot be spread however he still has the 
legal obligation to disclose it.”98 
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The participant’s emphasis on the legal obligation stemming from the knowledge 
that the HIV+ character has regarding his status highlights the extent to which 
legal responsibilities and perceived (but potentially false) legal responsibilities are 
closely associated with other forms of responsibility, including testing, treatment 
and maintaining an awareness of health. One often debated concern, particularly 
in the period of time around Dica, was the possibility that criminalisation would 
deter testing on the basis that knowing one’s HIV status would open up the 
possibility of prosecution for non-disclosure.99 However, the link between 
criminalisation and decreases in testing is, itself, questionable.100 Furthermore, 
whether prosecution could take place in instances where, notwithstanding a lack 
of a medical diagnosis, a defendant had (potentially strong) reasons to suspect 
that they were HIV+ remains underexplored in the English context.101 
 
Whilst stigma was identified by many participants as a reason for non-disclosure, 
this was primarily discussed in the context of social stigma from other application 
users directed towards people living with HIV. The possibility that the law’s 
response to HIV transmission was itself a source of stigma was never suggested 
by participants, although this participant provides some evidence that this might 
be the case. In contrast to the many participants who conceived of non-disclosure 
as a result of stigma, this participant sees it explicitly as producing the stigma 
surrounding HIV. The suggestion by the participant that the visibility associated 
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with disclosing HIV within a profile makes disclosure more difficult reflects the 
broader privacy concerns highlighted by other participants. The participants’ 
focus on the causation between stigma and non-disclosure (or, in this instance, 
between non-disclosure and stigma) further highlights the extent to which HIV 
related anxieties are associated with HIV being a concealable characteristic. 
  
Fewer than 1 in 10 participants made direct reference to the legal framework of 
HIV criminalisation; however, notably all but one of these participants outlined a 
belief that non-disclosure was itself criminalised, rather than impacting culpability 
where transmission occurs, or otherwise reported an uncertainty regarding the 
exact nature of the obligations under the law. Similarly, these responses often 
incorporated an association between criminalisation and the moral or ethical 
responsibility perceived to be on people living with HIV to disclose. One 
participant emphasised that ‘[the decision not to disclose] is unlawful and very 
bad as you can be criminalised for it’.102  
 
As with the participant initially quoted above, uncertainty surrounding the law was 
often further complicated by the impact of treatment as prevention, with one 
participant reporting an uncertainty surrounding the legal obligation to disclose 
whilst also being aware that having an undetectable viral load meant that the 
character in a scenario “posed the same level of threat (zero)” as someone who 
was HIV negative.103 Notably, the decision not to disclose HIV status when viral 
load was undetectable was seen by this participant as an ethical course of action, 
as the participant felt that ‘morally’ there could not be a distinction between being 
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HIV- and having an UVL. In contrast to the association between morality and the 
law suggested by other participants, where the two both support the imposition 
of an obligation to disclose, this participant’s response makes it clear that the law 
itself can create a belief that disclosure will take place.  
 
Whilst the majority of participants who discussed the legal framework covering 
HIV criminalisation had a general understanding of the existence of a legal 
obligation to disclose, only one participant identified that this obligation arises 
specifically where transmission takes place as a result of unprotected sex. This 
participant also identified that the particular offence a defendant would be 
charged with would be GBH, although there is no particular reference to the 
distinctions between s. 18 and s. 20 variants of the offence. Discussing the same 
scenario involving a profile which did not use the HIV disclosure feature within 
the profile: 
“[The character would] disclose his status. It’s GBH if the other person 
contracts [HIV] from unprotected sex and they haven’t been informed.”104 
 
Whilst identifying that disclosure or non-disclosure is only relevant in instances 
where transmission occurs, it is notable that this participant, who reported an 
awareness that an undetectable viral load prevents transmission of HIV, held a 
belief that disclosure would take place in a scenario where the character in 
question was aware that they had an undetectable viral load. Taking into 
consideration the doubt expressed by other participants about the absolute 
efficacy of TasP as a prevention technique, this is perhaps less surprising. 
Nevertheless, there is a seeming contradiction between the belief that disclosure 
 





is warranted because of the criminalisation of transmission stemming from 
unprotected sex and the belief that disclosure is warranted in this case where 
treatment means that any sex is unprotected.  
 
Misconceptions about the law and the implications that this might have on 
disclosure expectations were discussed by Dodds, Bourne and Weait, who found 
that a majority of their participants held some misconceptions about the 
distribution of legal responsibility in transmission cases.105 Dodds et al also noted 
the possibility that these misconceptions, alongside inaccurate assessment of the 
risk of transmission, might impede public health measures designed to prevent 
transmission.106 Similarly, the attitudes expressed by participants here suggest 
that, for many not living with HIV, the assumption that those living with HIV are 
under an obligation to disclose guides their sexual health practices. Discussing a 
profile which left the HIV status field blank, one participant explicitly explained 
that:  
“I'd assume [the character in the profile] is free from disease. I leave mine 
blank too. There is s legal obligation to say if you are infected.”107 
 
This response highlights how, for some, the disclosure focus within the legal 
framework is positioning being HIV- as the norm, a norm which can then be 
assumed where disclosure does not take place. Although other participants 
reflected on the need for inquiry where no disclosure took place, a point returned 
to below, misconceptions about where disclosure is necessary and where 
preventative measures are sufficient are likely to compound the stigma 
 
105 Dodds, Bourne and Weait (n 96); see also Phillips and Schembri (n 96). 
106 Dodds, Bourne and Weait (n 96) 142–143. 





surrounding HIV, further complicating the disclosure practices of people living 
with HIV.108  
 
The misconception that there it is always a legal necessity to disclose to a sexual 
partner, irrespective of the transmission risk present in the situation, might lead 
to some, such as the participant above, believing that they are avoiding risk when, 
in fact, they are not. As seen above, the moral arguments employed in relation to 
HIV are curtailed by a general recognition that disclosure is fraught with the risk 
of harassment and ostracisation caused by the stigma still surrounding HIV 
status. Yet, as with the example of the participant here, the law appears less 
susceptible to the critical examination which leads other participants to recognise 
that their own personal attitudes surrounding the morality of non-disclosure may 
be flawed in practice. Whilst some making reference to the legal obligation to 
disclose noted the difficulties that PLWHIV face when they disclose, participants 
were generally unpersuaded and felt that the law created an appropriate 
expectation of disclosure between sexual partners in all circumstances.  
 
Whereas in earlier work the risk of criminalisation led, in some instances, to HIV+ 
men being increasingly aware that online profiles might be used in legal 
proceedings, leading to additional care taken to explicitly discuss HIV status 
within them,109 here the attitudes of HIV- men have suggested that the law is 
shaping their expectations surrounding the distribution of responsibility. That 
several participants considered the risk in a given situation to be irrelevant to the 
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legal obligation to disclose, it might be suggested, is driven not only by the desire 
for serosorting to be an effective sexual health strategy but also by application 
design within which silence does not stand out as a neutral statement. As Kane 
Race argues in relation to HIV disclosure within online websites, the serosorting 
strategies of HIV- men might be seen not only as a product of ‘attitudinal prejudice 
on the part of HIV- men’ but also as a result of the design of HIV disclosure 
features ‘formatting sexual negotiation’ in a potentially stigmatising manner.110  
 
Reference to the law governing HIV transmission is sparse on dating applications 
themselves, although there is some reference to it on the sites of application 
developers alongside links to additional sources of information. The limited 
reference to the law in the responses of participants, and the confusion over the 
exact nature of culpability by those who did reference it, suggests that the law 
continues to play a limited role in governing the personal sexual health strategies 
of the participants in this project. What the analysis here does suggest, however, 
is that where the law is referred to, it impacts perceived responsibility by 
reinforcing the moral belief in the obligation to disclose. That this belief is still 
prevalent despite the general awareness among participants about the efficacy 
of treatment as prevention, notwithstanding the minority of participants who were 
unaware of, or doubted, TasP’s preventative potential, may demonstrate 
changing appetites towards risk. However, it may also reflect a renewed desire 
by HIV- men for individual responsibility towards HIV prevention, which 
 





challenges the reliance and trust that medicalised prevention strategies,111 
generally, are based upon.112  
 
Furthermore, given the relatively high-profile nature of recent case law 
addressing other instances of criminalisation incorporating perceived deception 
or non-disclosure of information,113 the possibility of continued confusion over the 
nature of the obligation to disclose remains non-remote. Whilst TasP would mean 
that there would be no case to answer should an instance of non-disclosure be 
discovered and reported, the possibility that the police might still pursue such a 
complaint is not itself an impossibility.114 Although these cases should not result 
in wrongful convictions, subject to the approach in Dica and Konzani being 
upheld, the possibility that these cases may still be brought is concerning given 
the already fraught relationship between the law and efforts in HIV prevention.115 
 
The limited awareness of the criminal law exemplified by participants in this 
project demonstrates some of the limitations that arise when the criminal law 
intervenes in a setting with complex social, interpersonal and personal forms of 
responsibility and morality. The responses here suggest that even where men 
who have sex with men have an awareness that the criminal law in this area 
exists, their understanding is likely to be incomplete and potentially contradictory. 
As others have suggested, misinterpretation of the criminal law may have an 
impact on the personal safety, disclosure and non-disclosure strategies of men 
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who have sex with men, with the potential divergence of expectations possibly 
contributing to unaware risk taking by some.116 
 
These challenges are also reflected in the different attitudes towards non-
disclosure and deception which participants discussed, most notably in how 
participants discussed interpreting the actions of those who did and did not 
disclose as either intentionally deceptive, reckless, as an omission or elsewise. 
This is consequential, not only as to how the law is framed but also in how the 
duty to know the law and the duty to disclose known HIV status bring legitimacy 
to the claims that non-disclosure is an active process, which the final section 
below discusses.  
 
6.5 Deception, Responsibility and Passivity 
This chapter so far has aimed to highlight the conceptual complexity of 
responsibility in the context of HIV transmission, as well as the extent to which 
the criminal law draws upon particular models of responsibility in responding to 
HIV transmission and how this is often a source of misunderstanding or confusion 
for those engaging with these issues on a practical basis. In this section, I explore 
how responsibility can contribute to perceived obligations of disclosure which 
shape and distinguish non-disclosure of HIV status and supposedly “active” 
deception.  
 
As outlined in Chapter 2, the consent defence open to defendants in the absence 
of direct disclosure is based on the premise that there may still be a reasonable 
 





belief that the complainant was consenting, although this is prevented where 
there is held to be concealment of HIV status.117 However, the limitations and 
challenges of introducing a reasonableness standard in this context have been 
well noted, including by some who suggest that this allows culpable defendants 
to avoid liability.118 Arguably, this relies upon a construction of non-disclosure as 
synonymous with, or alternatively sufficiently similar to, overt deception on the 
part of the defendant,119 as well as on a desire not to obligate a potential 
complainant to proactively inquire in order for the law to come into effect.120  
 
As well as offering a general critique of these claims, this section aims to explore 
the attitudes towards online deception expressed by participants. It begins by 
providing an outline of the various ways in which participants discussed 
deception, before then considering how legal distinctions between active 
deception and passive non-disclosure might be obfuscated by the disclosure 
obligations discussed above. It consequently argues that non-disclosure is 
vulnerable to evidence taken from mobile dating applications which might result 
in defendants being found liable for non-culpable behaviour because of a “duty 
to know” the apparent importance of HIV disclosure to others.121  
 
Expectations, experiences and attitudes towards supposedly deceptive practices 
were common throughout the responses, with many responses highlighting how 
 
117 R. v Konzani (Feston) (n 88) [42], [44]-[45]. See also, Section 2.2.2, above. 
118 See, for instance, David Hughes, ‘Did the Individual Consent to the Risk of Harm? A 
Comparative Jurisdictional Analysis of Consent in Cases of Sexual Transmission/Exposure to 
HIV’ (2018) 82 The Journal of Criminal Law 76, 84, among others. 
119 Alan Reed and Emma Smith, ‘Caveat Amator: Transmission of HIV and the Parameters of 
Consent and Bad Character Evidence’ in Alan Reed and others (eds), Consent: Domestic and 
Comparative Perspectives (Routledge 2017) 217. 
120 JR Spencer, ‘Liability for Reckless Infection Pt 1’ (2004) 154 New Law J 384. 





deception is conceptually complex and multifaceted in the context of mobile 
dating application use. This section focuses upon three sub-themes which stood 
out among the data. Firstly, how deception was discussed as something to be 
expected, and almost mundane, when using mobile dating applications. 
Secondly, the manner in which deception was discussed as something which, 
whilst not condoned, was understandable given some of the attitudes and 
prejudices seen on applications of this kind. Third, and interrelated with the 
previous two points, is the suggestion within the data that many participants see 
deception measured in degrees, rather than as a binary of deceptive and non-
deceptive practices. 
 
The first of these, the commonality of deceptive practices of various kinds, was 
noted by several participants, including one who stated:   
“On gay apps there are many fake accounts, you can't trust anyone really, 
as soon as I can I make people prove who they are and often they are not 
willing to do that.”122 
 
The importance given to the concept of trust, which I identified in Chapter 5, is 
demonstrated here as the participant highlights a general attitude of mistrust on 
these applications which produce personal safety strategies such as the one the 
participant discusses using. At first, this may appear to be a relatively limited 
phenomenon, however other accounts highlighting similar concerns, particularly 
surrounding “catfishing” – the act of pretending to be someone else123 – 
demonstrate that such concerns are, at least somewhat, widespread:  
“[The lack of a picture in the profile may be b]ecause he could be a catfish 
or do not want to give many information as what he is looking for is not 
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well seen in nowadays life, and people around could be very traditional. 
He does not want to be recognised.”124 
 
and, similarly;  
“This profile is likely to be fake due to their weight being significantly 
greater than the image suggests and their body type suggests. Also the 
date discrepancies in age make it seem less realistic- it might be spam, or 
a catfish. … This person is likely using the app to collect information on 
people that are likely to believe it is real, and to collect personal images.”125 
 
As noted in Chapter 3, the weight discrepancy the participant alludes to was an 
unintentional error within one of the stimuli images which meant that the weight 
listed was significantly higher than might be expected. However, commentary on 
the error proved insightful, particularly in relation to the anxieties that participants 
had about “fake” profiles on dating applications. As this participant highlights, 
concerns around catfishing often highlight how the collection of personal data, 
particular sexually explicit images, is a pressing concern for many app users. 
Others have noted similar anxieties and the impact that this can have on the 
mental health of application users,126 as well as highlighting how collected images 
might be used for coercive means, potentially as a form of revenge 
pornography.127   
 
As Noto La Diega has observed,128 although those who use dating applications 
often express concerns surrounding privacy, the sharing of personal information 
both generally, and in specific conversation with other users, is common. Others 
 
124 Participant 401353-401344-42505942 
125 Participant 401353-401344-42030243 
126 Carolyn Lauckner and others, ‘“Catfishing,” Cyberbullying, and Coercion: An Exploration of the 
Risks Associated with Dating App Use among Rural Sexual Minority Males’ (2019) 23 Journal of 
Gay and Lesbian Mental Health 289. 
127 Ari Ezra Waldman, ‘Law, Privacy, and Online Dating: Revenge Porn in Gay Online 
Communities’ (2019) 44 Law and Social Inquiry 987. 
128 Guido Noto La Diega, ‘Grinding Privacy in the Internet of Bodies’ in Ronald Leenes and others 





have pointed out that photo and information sharing is often a prerequisite to 
active engagement with others on these applications,129 despite many also 
highlighting the low success rate that many application users report in achieving 
the aims motivating their use.130 Many participants reported that some deceptive 
actions were common, particularly in relation to certain characteristics such as 
age, which could be amended to appeal to different groups of users:  
• “Whilst apps update age annually, this doesn't impact the body text. Most 
guys lie about their age, adding years on when younger or taking a lot off 
when older”131 
 
• “It is possible that they have set their age incorrectly by accident, but this 
is unlikely and it may be possible that they have lied about their age to fall 
into other people's preferences (as you can search people by age), but 
then puts their real age in the bio so as to appear honest.”132 
 
Whilst the ethicality of both of these individual examples may be questioned, the 
recognition by many participants that deceptions exist raises the argument that 
certain deceptions on these apps are expected, to the extent that from a 
consequentialist perspective it might be suggested that low level deceptions are 
already factored into applications users’ evaluation of truth, trust and 
responsibility. Several other participants emphasised that what might be 
considered deceptive acts might be ethically acceptable in light of the prevalence 
of issues of racism, ageism and other discriminatory behaviours.133 For example, 
one participant stated:  
“Opting out of providing ethnicity information may be a sad indictment of 
the racism faced by many people of colour on gay dating apps - I.e. the 
profile creator is a person of colour and thinks that admitting it may harm 
their chances. Whilst omitting HIV related information could be a 
 
129 Waldman (n 127) 996. 
130 Sam Miles, ‘Sex in the Digital City: Location-Based Dating Apps and Queer Urban Life’ [2017] 
Gender, Place & Culture 1605. 
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suggestion of lack of desire to public admit HIV positivity, it seems more 
likely that this was negligence, either in creating the profile, or in knowing 
his status.”134 
 
As this participant explains, HIV status can also be present in this 
conceptualisation of deception and non-disclosure, although other issues relating 
to omitting status information generally remain. Other participants, however, also 
suggested that prevailing attitudes toward people living with HIV did, in part, 
explain tendencies of non-disclosure:  
“It's absolutely fine, he's not lying and there's a lot of stigma about HIV+ 
guys so he might have better luck hooking up if guys connect with him first 
and the discussion about status comes up later.”135 
 
This indicates, and the accounts below emphasise, that non-disclosure of HIV is 
often understood to be innocently motivated, unless and until a later opportunity 
to explain in a more supportive setting arose, or until disclosure was perceived to 
be necessary:  
• “If [non-disclosure was a result of] stigma, and to give [the character in the 
scenario] a chance to explain during chat - fair enough.  - If so that he can 
satisfy a fetish of having unprotected sex with men whilst he has HIV - bad.  
- If privacy - fine.    Basically, it all depends on whether he would volunteer 
that he is HIV positive before having sex, or would answer truthfully if 
asked.”136 
 
• “I'd imagine that [the character’s] decision [not to disclose] to do so is 
based on fear of the stigma attached to a HIV diagnoses. I'd say that his 
decision not to include it is his business, but if he was meeting someone, 
I'd feel he has a responsivility to tell them especially if asked directly about 
it. It could be seen as deceptive that he didn't tell them about it.”137 
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In these accounts, the extent to which participants appear to suggest that there 
are degrees of deception and (dis)honesty is notable, particularly given the extent 
to which there is not a recognition of this reality in the current legal framework. In 
line with the CoA’s judgement in Konzani, non-disclosure of a positive HIV-status 
is “incongruous with honesty”, arguably irrespective of the motivations behind 
non-disclosure.139 Others have recognised that this effectively neuters any 
suggestion that non-disclosure may be warranted because, to take one example, 
disclosure would place the defendant at immediate and significant risk of physical 
harm themselves.140 Critically, these concerns may change over time, being a 
significant concern in specific contexts, locations, or when talking or interacting 
with specific users, factors which the law may fail to address when evaluating 
“straightforward” deceptions.  
 
Further discussion of potential degrees of deception and dishonesty reflected on 
the nature of omissions and partial truths. In several examples, participants 
framed discussion of the absence of risk as less that wholly honest where 
scenarios involved undetectable viral loads:  
“I would expect [the character] to provide an intermediate response (i.e. 
not a clear negative or positive), possibly something along the lines of ‘I 
don't have any STIs you can catch from me’”.141 
 
The extent to which responses such as these, including, for example stating that 
status was unknown, were considered “a lesser lie”142 by many participants 
suggests that HIV is among those issues where there is a degree of difference in 
the meaning of “responsibility”, particularly as it relates to contested truths, 
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varying degrees of knowledge, and personal experience. Relatively few 
participants discussed instances of deception where there was a divergence 
between the risk of transmission and the risk communicated, although reference 
to this by a small number of participants suggests that this practice does occur: 
“I know guys who have put undetectable when they have been detectable 
(probably to avoid stigma and to make it easier to meet guys as they are 
more likely to meet someone who his undetectable and therefore at a very 
low risk of getting HIV).   Some guys don't have their HIV status on their 
profile which makes me think why?”143  
 
In addition to these concerns, also notable across the responses was the extent 
to which deception and disclosure of HIV status were perceived to be distinct 
from other issues relating to the disclosure of sexual health information. The 
fourth scenario, in particular, addressed whether there were differing attitudes 
towards the disclosure other sexually communicable infections144 compared to 
HIV. As noted in Chapter 5, responses here suggest that disclosure of non-HIV 
STIs is highly unusual:  
• “I can’t imagine any man disclosing on his profile that he had tested 
positive for an STI other than HIV status.  Ever.”145 
 
• “Never in several several years of using the app have I seen someone 
declare anything other than HIV in their profile.”146 
 
Despite this being the case, a small number of participants discussed potential 
legal duties relating to the disclosure of non-HIV STIs, including between 
application users. One participant, for instance, stated that disclosing a 
gonorrhoea infection would be the ‘right thing to do and [it would be] illegal if not 
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mentioned’.147 This is notable for two reasons; firstly, as many applications 
continue the HIV specificity I discussed previously; and, secondly, because case 
law on non-HIV STI transmission is limited.  
 
As noted in Chapter 2, although the decisions in Dica and Konzani opened the 
way for prosecutions relating to other STIs there has, to date, been little 
expansion of the use of the criminal law in this respect. A small number of cases, 
predominantly relating to herpes transmission, as well as the notable case of 
Marangwanda involving the (supposedly non-sexual)148 transmission of 
gonorrhoea, have seen the application of HIV transmission case law in this 
way.149 However, this application has been limited and it can be suggested that 
there is a degree of HIV exceptionalism in the current approach of the criminal 
law. Francis and Francis have suggested that: 
HIV is thus a problematic model from which to generalize about 
criminalization of behavior that risks disease transmission. Indeed, HIV 
exceptionalism is even a problematic model for HIV. Not surprisingly, 
patterns of criminalization are quite different for many other diseases, as 
well as for refusals of vaccination or other preventive measures.150 
 
Although this piece has focused on the ongoing role of criminalisation of HIV 
transmission and how this might influence and be influenced by the design and 
use of mobile dating applications and the disclosure features introduced on them, 
 
147 Participant 401353-401344-42179581 
148 Although the facts of the case and commentary from prosecuting counsel, which is recorded 
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See R v Marangwanda (Peace) [2009] EWCA Crim 60. 
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this is done with the broader awareness that the development of the criminal law 
in this area is likely to shape and be shaped by future developments in both 
sexually and non-sexually communicable infections.151 However, it is suggested 
that the HIV exceptionalism seen in the responses here highlights how, in the 
context of HIV transmission, people living with HIV continue to be presented as 
the “agents of infection” transmitting the virus to their “passive victims”,152 to a 
degree not seen with all other communicable infections. 
 
This distribution of agency, which is decidedly one-sided, understates the agency 
of those who are HIV-negative and is liable, as evidence is presented to juries at 
trial, to result in significant injustices as prosecutors aim to place responsibility for 
preventing HIV transmission solely with those who are HIV+.153 Representation 
of those who are HIV-negative as passive and uncritical of the representations of 
HIV status made on mobile dating applications does not take into account the 
extent to which those who engage with the HIV disclosure features discussed 
here do appear not to be gullible in light of expected deception on these 
applications, along with awareness of window periods and the fallibility of even 
“known” HIV statuses.  
 
Given the extent to which responsibilisation of HIV prevention appears to place a 
burden upon PLWHIV to know the importance of their HIV status to others, often 
in spite of the effectiveness of treatment as prevention, evidence taken from 
mobile dating applications might, it is suggested, represent an oversimplification 
 
151 See discussion in Nicholls and Rosengarten (n 93) 41–42. 
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of the complex ways in which dating application users navigate experiences of 
risk taking, safety and sexual agency which some of the data presented here 
appears to capture. It is argued that the particular cultural and social status of 
HIV means that a degree of HIV exceptionalism is placed onto the disclosure and 
non-disclosure expectations, both of mobile dating application users in this 
context and more broadly in the societal attitudes towards responsibility for 
disease transmission, where it exists.  
 
As a result, active deception and passive non-disclosure may, in part as a result 
of the disclosure obligations discussed above, be too closely interrelated for 
evidence taken from mobile dating applications to coherently distinguish between 
culpable and non-culpable behaviour. In the context of a jury trial, the analysis 
presented here suggests that if the (criminal) law relating to the transmission of 
sexually communicable infections continues to be punitive and constructed, 
predominantly, around HIV transmission risk, these cultural expectations are 
likely to produce significant social and sexual injustices if dating application 
evidence is presented uncritically. The responsibility that these cultural 
expectations encapsulate is unlikely to assist in developing health equality and is 
flawed as a general basis for the development of just criminal law. 
 
6.6 Concluding Remarks 
In this chapter, I have explored the manner in which participants drew on 
conceptions of responsibility in their accounts of dating application use, HIV 
status disclosure and their understanding of the criminal law in this area. I have 
suggested that “responsibility” in this context does not represent a neutral, 





significant sexual inequality and may hamper efforts to reduce HIV transmission, 
encourage communication between prospective sexual partners, and achieve 
sexual justice.  
 
In the first section, I outlined how participants spoke of responsibility 
predominantly as an ethical prerogative which encouraged, if not obligated, HIV 
disclosure with only minor distinctions made between scenarios involving 
different levels of risk. Whilst this was by no means a universal experience of the 
participants who responded to the data collection survey, it was nevertheless a 
predominant view across much of the data collected. Building on the accounts of 
safety and risk, discussed in Chapter 4, I suggested that responsibility was 
disclosure-centric owing to the ways in which it drew on accounts of safety as an 
ongoing and continuing imperative in participants’ accounts of sexual life. I also 
highlighted the ways in which this responsibility was individualistic, reflecting 
discourse on sexual life as a private – rather than public – concern. Those writing 
on the legal theory surrounding HIV transmission, same-sex sexual activity and 
queer life more generally have also noted the role of individualisation narratives, 
similar to those identified here.154 This has a relevancy both in socio-political 
terms, as debates on the availability of HIV treatment and prevention drugs 
continue to make distinctions between these medical needs and others which are 
framed as “public” goods rather than the necessities of individual sexual 
 





agents,155 but also in criminal law where issues relating to the distribution of 
responsibility for HIV prevention remains a debated legal issue.156 
 
Focusing on the debate surrounding the existence of a de facto need for 
disclosure,157 I then argued that the impact of responsibilisation’s individualism 
could be seen in the uneven distribution of responsibility for preventing HIV 
transmission between sexual partners. I went on to argue against an “effective 
duty of disclosure” and against the presumption that non-disclosure is 
“incongruous” with honesty. Instead, I suggested that modern sexual ethics 
needed to acknowledge the developments in cultural awareness surrounding 
HIV, developments in testing, treatment and prevention, and the immateriality of 
disclosure to many modern modes of reducing transmission. Instead, at present, 
it might be suggested that cultures of surveillance exist, which incorporate 
societal wide monitoring,158 as well as forms of self-surveillance,159 and the forms 
of community level surveillance seen across the dating applications investigated 
here.160  
 
Developing on the discussions of culpability and wrongdoing which arose in the 
data collected here, the chapter then highlighted the uneven and inconsistent 
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awareness of the criminal law discussed by participants. In line with previous 
findings which suggest that awareness of the criminal law governing HIV 
transmission is low among men who have sex with men,161 I found here that few 
participants had a comprehensive understanding of the law governing HIV 
transmission. It was notable that the majority of those who drew on aspects of 
the criminal law did so to reinforce expectations of disclosure and models of 
sexual responsibility dependent on it. Few participants identified alternatives to 
disclosure as a way of avoiding criminal liability, however, these alternatives were 
addressed in some responses which highlighted the complex interrelationship 
between the criminal law and ethical and moral obligations surrounding HIV 
transmission and prevention.  
 
In the final section of the chapter, I discussed the different ways participants 
positioned disclosure, non-disclosure and deception as active and passive 
actions on the part of dating application users. This highlights the various ways 
that information in profiles might be misinterpreted at trial and the extent to which 
some participants acknowledge degrees of deception and dishonesty, which 
emphasises the role of dating application users as an active and critical audience 
of disclosed HIV-statuses, rather than as “passive” recipients of information. I 
suggested that the design of mobile dating applications presents the socially and 
morally complex issue of HIV disclosure as a relatively simple endeavour, which 









Chapter 7: Conclusion 
7.1 Introduction 
The criminalisation of disease transmission in England and Wales is not limited 
to the transmission of HIV. Yet, the limited number of prosecutions relating to 
other communicable diseases, all of which have been sexually transmittable, 
results in a socio-legal context which has unique social and legal challenges 
linked to HIV and AIDS. Through the analysis of the data collected in this project, 
I have demonstrated that the specific experiences of mobile dating application 
users and the context specific knowledge and beliefs that these experiences 
produce can inform legal analysis and offer new ways to interpret (legal) concepts 
such as risk, disclosure and responsibility. In this final chapter, I provide an 
overview of the project as a whole, summarise each of the preceding chapters, 
and comment on the contribution to knowledge made by this thesis, as well as on 
issues which future research projects may wish to address.  
 
The background to this project was introduced in Chapter 1. Here, I highlighted 
the contentious nature of HIV transmission criminalisation and discussed the 
social functions of the criminal law as they relate to HIV transmission offences. I 
noted that allegations of deception and (non-)disclosure may be particularly 
challenging to establish in the course of criminal proceedings and emphasised 
the potential that online mobile dating applications have in this regard. HIV 
disclosure features found on mobile dating applications, which mirror and build 
upon HIV disclosure features found on dating websites, have proliferated in 
recent years during the period when dating “apps” can be said to have reached 





Race and Robinson have both discussed the use of the disclosure features found 
on websites and have argued that these features contribute to specific disclosure 
expectations and practices which differ between different sites.1 My findings, 
which I summarise below, demonstrate that disclosure features of the kind found 
on several popular mobile dating applications – including Grindr and Hornet – 
also produce norms, beliefs and attitudes which might be described as 
contextually contingent. In contrast to other dating applications and websites, the 
approach taken to sexual health by the applications investigated in this project is 
one which is exclusively focused on disclosure of status and test history as the 
means of HIV prevention, without addressing condom use or alternative risk 
reduction techniques.2 The focus of this thesis was, therefore, to investigate the 
impact of these HIV and test history disclosure features on legal concepts 
including disclosure, non-disclosure and deception. This aim was captured in the 
overall research question of the project, which was:  
How are HIV disclosure features on dating apps understood, and how 
might these context dependent understandings shape the criminalisation 
of HIV transmission in England and Wales? 
 
Given the relatively recent introduction of the HIV disclosure features I 
investigate, it is perhaps unsurprising that there is only limited literature 
addressing their use, particularly from a legal perspective. However, given the 
critical impact that evidence of deception or non-disclosure of HIV status might 
have on a defendant’s culpability, understanding how these specific features are 
 
1 Kane Race, ‘Click Here for HIV Status: Shifting Templates of Sexual Negotiation’ (2010) 3 
Emotion, Space and Society 7; Brandon Andrew Robinson, ‘Doing Sexual Responsibility: HIV, 
Risk Discourses, Trust, and Gay Men Interacting Online’ (2018) 61 Sociological Perspectives 383. 
2 Chris Ashford, ‘Bareback Sex, Queer Legal Theory, and Evolving Socio-Legal Contexts’ (2015) 
18 Sexualities 195, 196; Chase Ledin and Kristian Møller Jørgensen, ‘Viral Hauntology’, Viral 





understood and what expectations exist in respect of them is a significant and 
pressing legal issue which this thesis has addressed through its analysis of data 
collected from over 100 application users.  
 
In the remainder of this concluding chapter, I reflect on the original contribution 
made by this thesis and identify the emerging issues which future work may wish 
to address. Online applications continue to be a major component in the social, 
romantic and sexual lives of many men who have sex with men, and the 
disclosure features they now incorporate play a critical role in shaping what it 
means to have sex safely (or not), to disclose HIV (or not), and be sexually 
responsible (or not). This provides new ways of engaging with legal concepts 
such as deception and disclosure, culpability and duty, which future HIV 
transmission cases will inevitably need to engage with if transmission continues 
to be criminalised.  
 
Of course, there have been recent developments which can be described as 
world-changing, without hyperbole, in respect of social and legal responsibility for 
disease transmission. The COVID-19 epidemic occurred after the data in this 
project was collected and first analysed, but the outbreak and social and 
governmental responses to it have been a major point of reflection during the 
writing up stage. Given the potential legal and socio-legal issues arising out of 
the COVID epidemic, it is hoped that work such as this, which explores the legal 
responses to disease transmission, to date, in England and Wales and the 
increasing role of technology in this process, is of inspiration to others 






7.2 Existing Literature 
Chapter 2 provided a review of the existing literature on the criminalisation of HIV 
transmission and the broader criminalisation of disease transmission in England 
and Wales. Although the criminalisation of HIV transmission continues to be an 
issue of contention, the existing debate is well established.3 Proponents of 
criminalisation draw on concepts such as social and sexual responsibility and 
highlight the perceived necessity of disclosure so that HIV-negative individuals 
are informed and educated about transmission risks. These arguments have 
been subject to significant critiques within existing literature and I have added to 
arguments against criminalisation by highlighting their individualistic and 
simplistic nature. In England and Wales, the development of the current legal 
framework addressing HIV transmission has followed an uneven and unsteady 
path of development through case law, proposed legislative action and social and 
political debate.4 Almost contemporaneously with the beginning of my doctoral 
studies, Daryll Rowe was convicted of intentionally transmitting HIV to sexual 
partners met on mobile dating applications.5 Rowe’s appeal and the public,6 as 
well as academic,7 attention it has received were not the initial inspiration behind 
this research and the issues it addresses. These developments have, 
 
3 See, for general analysis, Jonathan Herring, Great Debates in Criminal Law (4th Edn, Red Globe 
Press 2020) 72–86. 
4 See, in general, The Law Commission, Reform of Offences Against The Person (Law Com No 
361 2015) ch 6. 
5 R v Rowe [2018] EWCA Crim 2688. 
6 See, for instance, Charlotte Charlton, ‘The Man Who Used HIV as a Weapon’ (BBC Three, 15 
March 2019). 
7 Matthew Weait, ‘Daryll Rowe Guilty – but Is Criminal Law the Right Way to Stop the Spread of 
HIV?’ (The Conversation, 16 November 2017) <https://theconversation.com/daryll-rowe-guilty-
but-is-criminal-law-the-right-way-to-stop-the-spread-of-hiv-85488> accessed 6 April 2020; in 
addition to my own commentary, Cameron Giles, ‘Daryll Rowe’s Sentence Could Change the 
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nevertheless, reframed and highlighted many of the issues which stood out when 
developing my initial proposal. 
 
Although it might be suggested that the primary ratio of Rowe was that the earlier 
cases of Dica and Konzani continue to apply and that s.18 OAPA charges are 
indeed appropriate where transmission was intentional,8 arguably one of the 
significant implications of the case as a whole was the link between messages 
sent by the defendant – via text and application – stating that he was “clean” and 
the successful allegations of intent by the prosecution.9 In this respect, Rowe fits 
into a growing corpus of case law which explores the relationship between non-
disclosure of information and the “active” deception of others through both direct 
communication and indirect omission, most notably seen in the gender identity 
cases which have shaped the literature addressing “sexual fraud” over recent 
years.10 Although I have suggested that sexual fraud literature is relevant to the 
evolution of HIV criminalisation, I also argued that HIV criminalisation presents 
particular challenges. What is particular about HIV transmission in the context of 
sexual fraud is that, unlike the offences seen in McNally, Newland, and other 
cases, failure to disclose known HIV status does not vitiate consent to sexual 
activity.11 The focus on harm, in the form of GBH, instead of sexual consent and 
the application of ss 74-76 SOA 2003, introduces unique standards placed upon 
 
8 R v Dica [2004] EWCA Crim 1103 [58]; R v Konzani (Feston) [2005] EWCA Crim 706 [41]. 
9 See R v Rowe (n 5) [15]-[19], [68]. 
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Approach’ (2016) 80 The Journal of Criminal Law 28; Alex Sharpe, ‘Queering Judgment’ (2017) 
81 The Journal of Criminal Law 417; Samantha Ryan, ‘“Active Deception” v Non-Disclosure: HIV 
Transmission, Non-Fatal Offences and Criminal Responsibility’ [2019] Criminal Law Review 4. 
11 R v EB [2006] EWCA Crim 2945 [40]; Karl Laird, ‘Criminal Law Review Rapist or Rogue? 






PLWHIV, as well as conceptual challenges surrounding principles of risk and 
responsibility. Consequently, what this thesis has sought to establish is the 
relationship between these concepts and the disclosure features seen on 
applications.  
 
7.3 Employing an Online Methodology  
This thesis has explored these issues by employing a qualitative methodology 
which develops on earlier literature addressing online, visual and narrative driven 
research. As discussed in Chapter 3, the visual vignette technique used shares 
some similarities with other projective approaches, such as story completion 
tasks,12 but the visual elicitation component is distinctive – reflecting the visual 
nature of the issues under investigation. Combining this approach with an online 
survey method, which presents fewer barriers in projects where participants need 
to have internet access to be eligible, facilitated the collection of a rich set of data. 
In contrast to other legal research which has explored HIV disclosure and non-
disclosure, including from a social-legal perspective, this empirical component 
sought to identify and analyse the conceptual complexity of disclosure, non-
disclosure and deception, rather than focus on past experiences of participants 
or patterns of behaviour exclusively. 
 
There are specific limitations to this project stemming from the methods and 
methodology used, including the focus on concepts and participants’ 
understanding rather than their past behaviour and experiences. Although it 
 
12 See, among others, Victoria Clarke and others, ‘Editorial Introduction to the Special Issue: 






should be acknowledged that the way we conceive and understand specific 
issues inevitably has an influence on our behaviour, and past experience 
subsequently shapes our understanding,13 the approach taken here focuses on 
the former. Whilst I have discussed certain practices, such as avoidance, which 
emerged from the data, I have not argued that these practices are commonly 
enacted, but rather demonstrated how participants’ discussion of them is 
indicative of the construction of concepts such as safety. Although this limitation 
should be acknowledged, I would argue that the value of the data collected is 
reflected in the analysis I have set out and provides a foundation for future 
research which may wish to investigate how these concepts are reflected in 
specific enacted practices.  
 
As a contribution to scholarship on online methodologies, this project presents a 
timely example of how investigation of online phenomena can incorporate online 
recruitment and data collection whilst avoiding ethical concerns surrounding non-
participant data, expectations of privacy and lack of informed consent which have 
been noted in broader social media research.14 The visual vignette, as a tool for 
the investigation of social media sites with an emphasis on visual components, 
avoids several of these concerns. Whilst it may require greater familiarity with the 
site under investigation when compared with other approaches, such as the 
“digital walkthrough”,15 it also allows for a focus on specific issues of interest to 
 
13 Victoria Clarke, Virginia Braun and Kate Wooles, ‘Thou Shalt Not Covet Another Man? 
Exploring Constructions of Same-Sex and Different-Sex Infidelity Using Story Completion’ (2015) 
25 Journal of Community and Applied Social Psychology 153, 156. 
14 See, for example, Wasim Ahmed, Peter A Bath and Gianluca Demartini, ‘Using Twitter as a 
Data Source: An Overview of Ethical, Legal, and Methodological Challenges’ in K Woodfield (ed), 
Advances in Research Ethics and Integrity (Emerald 2017). 
15 Kath Albury and others, ‘Data Cultures of Mobile Dating and Hook-up Apps: Emerging Issues 





the researcher, rather than a reliance on those issues naturally emerging during 
the time when a participant is recording their application use, for instance in a 
diary based study, or during interviews, in a walkthrough based study. Although 
it is more narrowly focused than an open-ended interview question, it is distinct 
from closed-ended vignettes,16 giving participants some control over the focus of 
their responses.  
 
7.4 Chronotopes of Risk and Safety 
After setting out, in Chapters 2 and 3, the existing literature addressing HIV 
transmission criminalisation and the methodology used in this project, Chapters 
4 to 6 presented an analysis of the data. HIV transmission is often understood in 
terms of risk-taking and risk-avoidance behaviours carried out by individuals, with 
less emphasis on the social factors that influence transmission, testing and 
treatment.17 In a legal context, the perceived risk associated with people living 
with HIV is used to justify the imposition of the criminal law, intending to reduce 
the harms caused by this group to those who are HIV-negative.18 Chapter 4 
examined risk and its potential antonym, safety, and explored how these were 
understood by participants in their responses to the visual stimuli. The analysis 
of these concepts highlighted how each was dependent upon its own distinct way 
of conceptualising space and time and that this contributed to different duties, 
responsibility and assumptions associated with risk, safety and other concepts 
such as stigma and avoidance.    
 
16 See Alan Bryman, Social Research Methods (5th edn, Oxford University Press 2016) 259–260. 
17 Tyler M Argüello, ‘Fetishizing the Health Sciences: Queer Theory as an Intervention’ (2016) 28 
Journal of Gay and Lesbian Social Services 231. 
18 Matthew Weait, Intimacy and Responsibility: The Criminalisation of HIV Transmission 





In making this argument, Chapter 4 drew upon Valverde’s analysis of the 
chronotope, a literary technique most closely associated with Mikhail Bakhtin, as 
a form of socio-legal analysis.19 This chapter demonstrated how the chronotope 
and similar forms of spacio-temporal analysis could be used to examine the 
ongoing and cyclical nature of safety, as well as the duties and obligations that 
calls for safe behaviour give rise to, and the linear and chronological nature of 
risk, with its emphasis on cause and event. Furthermore, whilst the spatial 
element of chronotopes have traditionally focused on particular geographies, 
such as public entertainment venues,20 the queues of drug rehabilitation 
centres,21 and, in other fields, school learning environments,22 this piece 
contributed to the emerging body of literature addressing chronotopes within legal 
and law-related concepts, as seen in Harrington’s work on chronotopes in 
medical law and Kotiswaran’s analysis of post-colonial legal theory.23 Looking at 
chronotopes operating at the level of individuals, as well as within concepts, this 
chapter argued that the temporalities of risk and safety seen in the data has a 
particular relevancy to socio-legal debates on HIV prevention, responsibility and 
public health. 
 
Another key argument of this chapter was that the disclosure features seen on 
applications rely on particular emotional attitudes towards risk, safety and sexual 
 
19 Mariana Valverde, Chronotopes of Law: Jurisdiction, Scale and Governance (Routledge 2015). 
20 Dawn Moore and Mariana Valverde, ‘Maidens at Risk: “Date Rape Drugs” and the Formation 
of Hybrid Risk Knowledges’ (2000) 29 Economy and Society 514. 
21 Suzanne Fraser, ‘The Chronotope of the Queue: Methadone Maintenance Treatment and the 
Production of Time, Space and Subjects’ (2006) 17 International Journal of Drug Policy 192. 
22 Kristiina Kumpulainen, Anna Mikkola and Anna Mari Jaatinen, ‘The Chronotopes of 
Technology-Mediated Creative Learning Practices in an Elementary School Community’ (2014) 
39 Learning, Media and Technology 53. 
23 See Prabha Kotiswaran, ‘Valverde’s Chronotopes of Law: Reflections on An Agenda for Socio-
Legal Studies’ (2015) 23 Feminist Legal Studies 353; John Harrington, ‘Time and Space in 





responsibility. This chapter highlighted the importance of emotion, often linked 
with a desire for safety and to avoid risk, suggesting that emotion was critical to 
understanding how evidence taken from applications might have an appeal to 
juries. The analysis of the emotion in participants’ accounts reveals how the 
genuine concerns that application users have around feeling as well as being 
safe, can support claims of conditional consent.  Taking into consideration the 
evolution of sexual fraud case law, this might well have a significant impact on 
how application derived evidence is presented to juries in criminal proceedings 
including in relation to juries’ assessments of witness credibility.24 
 
7.5 Consent, Material Facts and Disclosure 
Many of these issues continued to be explored in Chapter 5, which offered a 
critique of the ways in which conditional consent and materiality is deployed in 
relation to sexual health, and more broadly in relation to sexual activity in criminal 
law literature. Drawing on the work of Fischel and others, it was argued that there 
are significant limitations inherent in addressing the complex reality of HIV 
transmission through the narrow legalistic framework of consent. Through an 
analysis of participants’ responses and literature on gender identity case law, 
Chapter 5 suggested that the highly contractual manner in which consent is 
deployed by those who advocate a “conditional consent” model has flaws, 
particularly when certain intricate and nuanced factors, such as gender identity 
or HIV status, are prioritised as “material”, or otherwise important, facts over 
 
24 See Hlavka and Mulla’s work on the presentation of text messages in sexual offence cases in 
the US: Heather R Hlavka and Sameena Mulla, ‘“That’s How She Talks”: Animating Text Message 





others which may be of equal, or greater, importance to those engaging in sexual 
activity. 
 
For instance, it was suggested that few would argue that “misrepresentation” of 
sexual orientation, itself a highly complicated and often contested social 
construct,25 could be held to the same standards of “materiality” as gender identity 
or HIV status, despite the reality that these factors may be equally relevant to 
sexual decision making. Building on this point and the analysis of emotion in 
Chapter 4, a further focus of Chapter 5 was the manner in which trust is deployed 
in legal analysis of sexual consent, particularly consent to risk. It was argued that 
trust is used as a framing device, positioning those who are HIV-negative as 
vulnerable, underinformed and susceptible to deception and people living with 
HIV as knowledgeable and aware of the importance of their HIV status to their 
partners – often irrespective of transmission risk. 
 
Suggesting that legal analysis of consent to HIV transmission risk is often 
detached from the practical realities of sexual activity, communication and 
decision making, Chapter 5 also considered the argument put forward by some 
participants that those who are HIV-negative have an (often unconditional) “right 
to know” and “right to ask” about their partner’s HIV status in order to protect their 
own sexual health. This discussion served to highlight the manner in which the 
conflation of active deception and non-disclosure is justified by the 
exceptionalism of HIV-positivity and the normative status of HIV-negativity.26 This 
 
25 Mariana Valverde, Law’s Dream of a Common Knowledge (Princeton University Press 2003) 
223. 





point was reinforced by the analysis of participants’ accounts which highlighted 
that the disclosure of sexually communicable infections other than HIV was rarely 
expected by those who participated in the project.  
 
7.6 Responsibilisation, HIV Transmission and Sexual Ethics 
This analysis of the exceptionalism of HIV infection and assumed knowledge of 
people living with HIV also preceded the argument, presented in Chapter 6, that 
knowledge operates as a burden to those diagnosed with a sexually transmitted 
infection. I demonstrated how positive disclosure obligations, beyond what is 
necessary to reduce transmission risk, reflects beliefs relating to sexual 
citizenship, social duty and ethical responsibility.27 Participants’ discussion of 
ethical obligations highlighted how the criminal law may continue to evolve in this 
area. It remains possible that the concept of sexual fraud, developed in gender 
“deception” cases, may be applied in the context of HIV transmission. “Common 
sense” thinking,28 the concept of “conditional consent” based on the assumptions 
of the HIV-negative, and arguments about trust and deception open up the 
possibility for unwarranted use of the criminal law in situations where 
transmission risk is extremely low or absent/hypothetical.  
 
Chapter 6 also considered participants’ awareness of the current legal framework 
on HIV criminalisation, demonstrating that there continued to be a degree of 
confusion and misunderstanding over when disclosure is and is not required,29 
 
27 See Valverde (n 25) 169–172; as well as, Joachim J Savelsberg, ‘Law’s Dream of a Common 
Knowledge (Review)’ (2006) 31 The Canadian Journal of Sociology 270. 
28 Valverde (n 25) 169–172. 
29 Catherine Dodds, Adam Bourne and Matthew Weait, ‘Responses to Criminal Prosecutions for 
HIV Transmission among Gay Men with HIV in England and Wales’ (2009) 17 Reproductive 





and suggesting that this may also contribute to the expectation of disclosure 
reported by participants, as well as to the framing of non-disclosure as deceptive, 
dishonest and irresponsible. Building on earlier chapters, it was argued that 
responsibility was utilised by participants, in both legal and also non-legal ways, 
to frame sexual ethics around a particular expectation of “good, responsible” 
sexuality which was individualistic and unevenly distributed between those living 
with HIV and those not. The extent to which this good, responsible sexuality, 
conducted in private between autonomous, rational agents, produces – in 
practical terms – an ongoing obligation of disclosure, I argued, left open the 
possibility that where application evidence is drawn upon in criminal proceedings, 
and the failure to meet and maintain “responsible” standards of behaviour – by 
not proactively disclosing known HIV status, irrespective of transmission risk, in 
a profile – may have an impact on jurors’ assessment of defendants. 
 
Reflecting on the development of HIV transmission criminalisation in England and 
Wales, the focus on the harm seen in transmission and the extent to which this 
harm is interpreted as a public wrongdoing, rather than a matter of private dispute 
between sexual partners, Chapter 6 concluded by returning to the distinctions 
between HIV transmission offences and gender identity deception cases 
discussed in Chapter 2. I argued that literature on sexual fraud demonstrated 
some arguments which may also be applied in HIV transmission cases, pointing 
out that application use could influence the criminalisation of HIV transmission 
and extend it beyond the approach to culpability seen to date. However, as I 
indicated in the introductory section, although evidencing sexual fraud through 
 
Understanding of HIV and the Law in HIV-Positive Patients’ (2016) 42 Journal of Family Planning 





reference to dating application profiles may be an appealing prospect on first 
inspection, the complex interrelationship between the themes demonstrated in 
this project presents challenges to the crown and not simply the defendant.  
 
7.7 Limitations 
This project has identified and scrutinised a number of core concepts relating to 
the disclosure and non-disclosure of HIV and the prosecution of those who 
intentionally or recklessly transmit HIV to their sexual partners. But, several 
limitations to the findings summated in this section must be acknowledged. The 
most significant limitation of this project is perhaps the result of the recruitment 
strategy adopted and the subsequent makeup of the 102 participants who took 
part in the research. Whilst there was diversity among the group in respect of age 
and duration of application usage, diversity which might be all the more significant 
considering the extent to which the population of application users is itself limited, 
the characteristics of these participants produce a number of limitations and 
highlight where future research may building upon and develop the arguments 
that have been presented here. 
 
Firstly, a very small proportion of participants disclosed living with HIV in the 
survey and, whilst it remains possible that other participants may have been living 
with HIV and opted not to disclose this, the limited extent to which these findings 
address the expectation, assumptions and conceptualisations of PLWHIV 
presents an opportunity for future research to address both how profiles are 
interpreted, and indeed constructed, by PLWHIV specifically. Instead the analysis 
here identifies the key concepts which are drawn upon by those who are HIV- 





attitudes which are likely specific to those who are HIV- interact with disclosure 
and safety expectations.  
 
Secondly, it must be noted that due to the recruitment approach taken, 
particularly the use of application-based recruitment, the group of men who 
participated in the project are likely to reside in England, outside of London – 
where a period of attempted recruitment was generally unproductive. In addition 
to the filtering question during the initial stages of the survey which excluded 
those who had not used dating apps in England and Wales, these conditions 
mean that the findings may not reflect the experiences of application users in 
other locations, particularly those internationally. As the project investigated HIV 
criminalisation in the context of England and Wales the lack of an international 
perspective may be less significant than the limited recruitment from London and 
Manchester, although in the latter case there was some success in recruitment 
via social media. The particularities of these two locations and the high proportion 
of application users in these cities with some of the largest gay scenes in the UK, 
something which may have itself impacted application recruitment efforts, itself 
warrants further research which, as I will discuss below, may also want to 
consider the use of applications specifically in the context of gay nightlife venues.  
 
In addition to these limitations brought about by the recruitment process, it should 
be noted that the design of the visual vignettes and the exploration of the 
disclosure features on applications, generally, is limited owing to the ongoing 





collection was designed and carried out.30 Although the visual vignette method 
develops on the story completion and vignette methods outlined in Chapter 2 and 
online research methods generally, the static nature of the mock profiles may be 
less suited to future research on mobile dating applications particularly when 
many apps continue to introduce new features such as multiple profile images, 
links to social media accounts, and greater integration with other applications and 
messaging services, which will warrant development of the visual vignette 
method if it is used in future. As I discuss below, future research and applications 
themselves will also need to address the changing nature of HIV both in general, 
and in the UK context where reduced infection rates and public provision of PrEP 
have both made a significant impact during the latter stages of this project.  
 
7.8 Remaining and Emerging Issues 
This thesis has sought to pre-empt, rather than simply analyse, the influence of 
mobile dating applications on HIV criminalisation and their potential use in 
criminal proceedings. I have addressed how these features are understood by 
those who use them and how this influences legally pertinent concepts such as 
risk, disclosure and responsibility. I have also reflected upon the evolution of the 
criminal law in this area and identified new areas of potential socio-legal debate, 
particularly relating to the concepts of “conditional consent” and “material” facts.  
Future work may wish to consider how these issues unfold in the course of 
specific criminal proceedings. Although the circumstances of Rowe offer an initial 
 
30 See, for instance, recent developments where dating applications have moved into the online 
spaces which they were previously distinct from: Josh Milton, ‘Grindr Web: Here’s How to Use 
Grindr on Your Computer Desktop’ (Pink News, 5 May 2020) 
<https://www.pinknews.co.uk/2020/05/05/grindr-web-desktop-computer-laptop-app-what-is-





insight into how application evidence may be used, the particular facts of that 
case, and in particular the intent which Rowe demonstrated, do not reflect the 
particular complexities of disclosure and non-disclosure which have been the 
focus of this thesis. Future research exploring the evolution of these issues at first 
instance and appeal levels may wish to consider how evidence is used or not 
used to forward arguments around sexual responsibility and disclosure and 
consent, such as those discussed in the literature and here.  
 
Future research should explore in detail the particular experiences of PLWHIV 
and their perspectives on creating and using profiles on applications. Additional 
literature on projective techniques, similar to the visual vignette technique 
outlined in Chapter 3, has suggested that larger scale projects seeking to 
compare different groups of participants can adopt a quasi-experimental design, 
comparing responses between two groups quantitatively as well as 
qualitatively.31  Future research may wish, therefore, to utilise the visual vignette 
technique set out here as part of a larger scale comparative method, this would 
allow for comparisons between the two groups whilst also increasing the 
generalisability of the findings set out here. 
 
In addition, whilst this thesis has explored the disclosure and non-disclosure of 
HIV, some of the concepts discussed here have a broader applicability to other 
sexual health issues. As noted in the introduction and literature review, the 
criminal law on disease transmission has focused almost exclusively on HIV 
transmission, although the emerging issues resultant from the ongoing COVID-
 





19 epidemic may result in an evolution of the criminal law in this area over the 
coming months and years. Other sexually communicable diseases, including 
herpes,32 gonorrhoea,33 as well as hepatitis and syphilis34 are likely to become 
more pressing legal issues as challenges posed by antibiotic resistance, reduced 
sexual health funding in some settings, and PrEP provision change the socio-
medical landscape. 
 
As noted in the later chapters, participants reported a range of beliefs about how 
the test history feature of application profiles and profiles more generally were, or 
were not, used to communicate information about sexual health beyond and 
distinct from HIV status. Future research may wish to consider further the 
influence of mobile dating application design upon this wider sexual health 
context with a particular focus on potential criminalisation of other STI 
transmission. As applications continue to develop, and there has been some 
suggestion that applications incorporate more sexual health information into 
profiles,35 the potential legal implications of mobile dating application use may 
extend beyond what I have set out here. Other potential updates to applications 
explored by app developers have included the possible introduction of partner 
notification features which could be used to inform previous partners of a 
 
32 The subject of limited case law. See James Roebuck, ‘Criminal Liability for Transmission of 
Herpes Simplex Virus.’ (2014) 78 Journal of Criminal Law 294; R v Golding (David) [2014] EWCA 
Crim 889. 
33 R v Marangwanda (Peace) [2009] EWCA Crim 60. 
34 Rarely considered in existing case law, but arguably as serious as well as potentially life-
threatening 
35 Grindr, ‘How Can We Improve Your Grindr Experience?: Anonymous STD Alerts’ (Grindr 
UserVoice, 2018) <https://grindr.uservoice.com/forums/912631-grindr-feature-





subsequent diagnosis.36 As well as exploring the social, legal and ethical 
obligations that may potentially arise from the introduction of such features, future 
research could address the ways in which such features continue to expand the 
role of surveillance and responsibilisation in online sites.37 
 
7.9 Concluding Remarks 
In this thesis, I have focused on a conceptual analysis of risk, disclosure and 
responsibility as seen in the data collected. I have claimed that this conceptual 
analysis reveals the temporal limitation of the concepts of consent and risk-taking, 
highlighting the ways in which the criminal law imposes a framework of 
responsibility and obligation onto sexual decision making. I have argued that this 
has significant implications for the law and that there are limitations as to what 
applications can demonstrate. Highlighting how future research can develop on 
the original contribution made here, I have shown how online mobile dating 
applications offer new ways to conceptualise responsibility and culpability, but 
that care must be taken not to overextend their usefulness.  
 
Care must be taken to ensure that applications and evidence taken from them 
are not simply used to perpetuate assumptions about who places whom at risk, 
or that people place others at risk at all. Care must be taken to ensure that 
disclosure obligations are not used to perpetuate sigma directed toward those 
 
36 For further discussion of partner notification in the context of HIV testing, see J Blake Scott, 
Risky Rhetoric: AIDS and the Cultural Practices of HIV Testing (Southern Illinois University Press 
2003). 
37 On surveillence, see, for instance, Anders Albrechtslund, ‘Online Social Networking as 
Participatory Surveillance’ (2008) 13 First Monday; Alice E Marwick, ‘The Public Domain: Social 
Surveillance in Everyday Life’ (2012) 9 Surveillance and Society 378; Kane Race, ‘Framing 
Responsibility: HIV, Biomedical Prevention, and the Performativity of the Law’ (2012) 9 Journal 





living with HIV under the guise of sexual responsibility. Furthermore, the law 
should act cautiously when using evidence taken from specific contexts to 
demonstrate “deception” and “disclosure” in HIV transmission proceedings. 
Rather than being effective tools for demonstrating these concepts, applications 
come with their own norms, meanings and consequences for those using them, 
which the law may be ill equipped to address. Although digital technology has 
significant potential as a resource for lawyers, there is a need for theorists and 
practitioners to pay close attention to the ways in which technologies shape and 
are shaped by the understandings, expectations and assumptions of those who 
are using them. As such it is necessary that socio-legal analysis of these issues 
continues to investigate these issues from an empirical, as well as theoretical, 
position, and it is hoped that this project may offer a foundation for this work.
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Appendix 1: Participant Information Sheet Download 
1 
 
Recruitment Information: Dating Application Research Project 
You have been invited to take part in a project investigating dating application usage. Please take the 
time to read through the information below before deciding whether or not to take part. It is 
important that you understand what the research involves and why it is being conducted.  
You do not have to decide immediately and may return to participate at any time until the study closes. 
If you have any further questions, contact details for the researcher can be found at the bottom of the 
page.   
What is the aim of the study? 
This project aims to examine how people who use dating applications construct their profiles and 
perceive the profiles of others. In particular, we are interested in expectations toward HIV disclosure 
and how accurate profiles are expected to be.  
Why have I been invited to take part? 
This project aims to gather responses from people who have used dating application targeted at men 
who have sex with men, you’ve been invited to take part because you fall into this group and have 
expressed an interest in participating.  
What will happen if I take part? 
If you agree to take part, by clicking the agreement at the bottom of this section, you will be forwarded 
to a survey. This will consist of a number of fictitious scenarios involving dating application usage. In 
each scenario you will be asked a number of questions about your perception of the scenario and the 
people in it. There will also be a few demographic questions to help understand the range of people 
who have participated in the research. 
Do I have to take part? 
No. Participation in the research is entirely voluntary. If you do not wish to take part, you can simply 
close this webpage and disregard the invitation.  
You can also withdraw at any point during survey. If you wish to do so, please close the survey without 
clicking the submit option, this will stop your response from being recorded and analysed. 
Are there any disadvantages of taking part in this study? 
Your participation in this research will not cause you any particular disadvantage. 
How is this research funded? 
This research is funded entirely by Northumbria University. 
Will my involvement be confidential? 
Yes. Any information you provide is considered confidential and will be stored securely. The only 
exception to this confidentiality is if the researcher feels that you or others may be harmed if the 
information is not shared. You are not required to give any information which would personally 
identify you as participating in the study. If you volunteer any personally identifying information, it 
will be pseudonymised as soon as is possible.  
Your completed survey will be assigned a generated ID number that you can find on the last webpage 









“Participant 2” and so on, will be used to identify individual responses if they are referenced in 
published works. 
What will happen to the data collected in this study? 
The data collected in this survey will be analysed as part of an ongoing PhD project. As well as this, the 
findings might be reported in an academic journal or at a research conference and may be used in 
subsequent research projects. However, any data presented in this way will be anonymised and you 
will not be identifiable. If you would like a summary of the findings, you can email the researcher at 
the address below.  
What do I need to know about my data rights? 
Under the EU’s new General Data Protection Regulation, University researchers need to highlight 
where personal data might be collected from participants and provide information about the legal 
basis for doing so. All of data collected in this study, including any demographic data, is collected and 
processed because it is necessary to do so for the research purposes outlined above, which are in the 
public interest.  
Under the GDPR individuals have certain rights relating to their personal data, this includes; a right to 
a copy of information comprised in their personal data, a right in certain circumstances to have 
inaccurate personal data rectified, and a right to object to decision being taken by automated means.  
If you have additional questions regarding your data rights, you can contact the researcher using the 
contact details below. Alternatively, you can contact Northumbria University’s Data Protection Officer 
at dp.officer@northumbria.ac.uk. If at that stage you are not satisfied with the data protection 
procedures in place, you have the right to complain to the Information Commissioner’s Office. For 
more information see their website: https://ico.org.uk.  
How will data relating to this study be stored and processed? 
All responses to this survey will initially be stored on the Survey website. When it comes to be 
analysed, it will be downloaded to the University’s servers, which are password protected.  
All data is stored in accordance with University guidelines and the General Data Protection Regulation 
(GDPR) and Data Protection Act 2018. Data will be stored for a period of up to three years following 
the completion of the project.  
Who can I contact for further information?  
If you have any further questions, please contact the researcher using the following contact 
information: Cameron Giles, Faculty of Business and Law, Northumbria University, Newcastle, NE1 
8ST; Or email: c.a.r.giles@northumbria.ac.uk 
 
What if I want to raise a concern or complaint? 
The Faculty of Business and Law Research Ethics Committee, at Northumbria University, have 
reviewed the study in order to safeguard your interests, and have granted approval to conduct the 
study.  
If you have any concerns, you can contact Professor Chris Ashford, who is supervising this research 
project (chris.ashford@northumbria.ac.uk). Or alternatively, Business and Law Ethics Director 















Question 1: Based on your initial impressions, and your experience of dating 
apps, write a brief description of the person (or people) who made this profile. 
Question 2: You may have noticed that in the top right of this profile, the age 
given is 27, but in the about me section the number 26 is given, why do you think 
this is? 
Question 3: Following on from the description you have given, can you say some 
more about the reasons you think this person is using the app, and what suggests 
this to you? 
Question 4: You may have noticed that this user lists their HIV status as 
"Undetectable" and has put the first of September in the Test History section. 
What are your thoughts on this person's HIV status, and what do you think the 
Test History section tells you (if anything)? 
 
Profile 2 
Question 1: Based on your initial impressions, and your experience of dating 
apps, write a brief description of the person (or people) who made this profile. 
Question 2: The person(s) who created this profile has opted to complete fewer 
of the categories than the person(s) in the first profile you saw. Why do you think 
this is, and why do you think they have chosen the particular categories that are 
completed? 
Question 3: As you can see, the about me section of this profile contains quite a 
few emoji symbols. What meanings do you think these symbols carry, if any? 
Question 4: The HIV Status and Test History sections of this profile have been 
left blank. Why do you think this is? Do you have any thoughts on this person's 






Question 1: Based on your initial impressions, and your experience of dating 
apps, write a brief description of the person (or people) who made this profile. 
Question 2: Following on from the description you have given, who do you think 
the information given in the lower portion of the profile (such as height or body 
type) refers to? [Choice “One Person”, “Two People” or “Other”].  
 Question 2(a) [If “Other” selected]: If you selected Other, please specify. 
Question 2(a) [If “One Person” selected]: Which person do you think this 
information refers to? What suggests this to you? 
Question 2(a) [If “Two People” selected]: What suggests this to you? How 
do you think the person/people making the profile chose what to select in 
each category? 
Question 2(b) [If “Other” selected]: What suggests this to you? How do 
you think the person/people making the profile chose what to select in 
each category? 
Question 3: Looking specifically at the HIV Status and Test History categories, 
what do you think the information given in this profile tells you about the sexual 
health of the person/people behind the profile? 
 
Profile 4 
Question 1: Do you think Ben would update the Test History section of his profile 
to include his most recent test (i.e. the test where the Gonorrhea was detected)? 
[Choice: “Yes”, “No” or “Other”]. 
 Question 1(a) [If “Other” selected]: If you selected Other, please specify. 
Question 1(a) [If “Yes” selected]: What do you think would lead Ben to 





Question 1(a) [If “No” selected]: What do you think would lead Ben to the 
decision not to change the date? 
Question 1(b) [For all choices]: Would your response differ if Ben also 
planned to change other parts of his profile (for example, if he planned to 
change his Body Type to "Average")? 
Question 2: Do you think Ben would mention his Gonorrhea infection elsewhere 
in his profile? [Choice: “Yes”, “No” or “Other”]. 
 Question 1(a) [If “Other” selected]: If you selected Other, please specify. 
Question 1(a) [If “Yes” selected]: Where do you think Ben will mention this 
and what do you think he will say? 
Question 1(b) [If “Yes” selected]: If Ben does mention this in his profile, 
do you think he would also mention it in person when meeting someone 
for sex? 
Question 1(c) [If “Yes” selected]: Would your answer to the previous 
question be different if Ben hadn't mentioned the Gonorrhea in his profile? 
Question 1(a) [If “No” selected]: If Ben didn't mention this in his profile, do 
you think he would then go on to mention it if he was arranging to meet up 
with someone for sex? 
Question 1(b) [If “No” Selected]: Would your answer to the previous 
question be different if Ben had mentioned the Gonorrhea in his profile? 
 
Profile 5 
Question 1: Why do you think Ari has decided not to complete the HIV status 
section in his profile? What are your views on his decision not to do so? 





Question 3: Imagine that, instead, Charlie sent the same message after he and 
Ari had hooked-up. Do you think Ari would respond differently in any way? 
Question 4: If Ari chose to disclose his HIV status when Charlie messaged him 
after the hook-up, what do you expect Charlie's reaction would be? Describe any 
thoughts you think he would have and anything you think he would do. 
 
Additional Information  
Question 1: Before this survey were you aware that having an undetectable viral 
load prevents people from passing the HIV virus on during sex? [Choice: “Yes”, 
“No” or “Other”]. 
 Question 1(a) [If “Other” selected]: If you selected Other, please specify. 
Question 2: Which dating apps have you ever had an account with? [Multi-
Choice: “Grindr”, “Hornet”, “Jack’d”, “Scruff”, “Chappy” and “Other”]. 
 Question 2(a) [If “Other” selected]: If you selected Other, please specify. 
Question 3: How long have you been using dating applications? 
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